***Critique of Pure Reason***

**by**

**Immanuel Kant**

**Professor in Königsberg.**

**1781.**

**(Translated by Howard D. Kelly)**

**To his Excellency**

**the**

**Royal Minister of State**

**Baron von Zedlitz**

My Lord:

To further the growth of the sciences for one’s own part means to labour for your *Excellency*’s own interest; for the latter is most intimately conjoined with the former not merely through the exalted post of a guardian but rather through the much more intimate post of a devotee and enlightened connoisseur. For that reason, I also avail myself of the sole means that is, in a certain measure, within my capacity to display my gratitude for the gracious confidence with which your *Excellency* honours me as though I could contribute something to this end. To whomever the speculative life contents, the approval of an enlightened and legitimate judge is, given moderate wishes, a powerful encouragement for endeavours whose utility is great though admittedly distant and will hence be entirely misapprehended by common eyes.

To such a judge and for his gracious attention, I now dedicate this writing; and I dedicate every other concern of my literary vocation to his protection and am with the deepest reverence

your Excellency’s

humble and most obedient servant

**Immanuel Kant**

Königsberg, 29th March, 1781.

Preface

In one genus of its cognitions, human reason has the singular fate that it becomes burdened with questions that it cannot dismiss because they are imposed upon it through the nature of reason itself but which it also cannot answer because they surpass all capacity of human reason.

Human reason drifts into that perplexity without blame. It begins from principles whose use in the course of experience is unavoidable and, at the same time, sufficiently proven through experience. With them, it climbs (as its nature also brings with it) ever higher to remoter conditions. But since it becomes aware that in that way, its task would always have to remain uncompleted because the questions never cease, it sees itself compelled to seek refuge in principles that exceed all possible experiential-use and yet seem so unsuspicious that even common human-reason stands in agreement therewith. Yet it thereby plunges into obscurity and contradictions, from which it can admittedly take that somewhere concealed errors must lie at the basis; but it cannot discover those errors because the fundamental propositions whereof it avails itself recognise no further touchstone of experience since they go beyond the limit of all experience. The battleground of those endless disputations is called *metaphysics*.

There was a time in which metaphysics was called the *queen* of all sciences; and if one takes the will for the deed, then it admittedly deserved that honorific due to the preeminent importance of its object. Now, the fashion of the age brings with it that all contempt is to be shown to metaphysics; and the matron complains – outcast and abandoned – like *Hecuba*: ‘only yesterday, I stood secure as on a mountain higher than the world: my husband, sons, and daughters there to guard me; now homeless, broken’ (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*).

Initially, metaphysics’s governance – under the administration of the *dogmatists* – was *despotic*. Only because the legislation still had in it the trace of the old barbarism, it degenerated little by little through internal wars into full *anarchy*; and the *sceptics* – a kind of nomad who abhor all constant cultivation of the ground – severed the civil union from time to time. But since there were fortunately only few of them, they could not prevent the dogmatists from attempting to cultivate metaphysics again, always anew: though not according to a plan that was unanimous amongst them. In more recent times, it even admittedly seemed as though all of those disputes would be brought to an end and the legitimacy of their claims fully decided through a certain *physiology* of the human understanding (from the famous **Locke**). It was found, however, that even though the birth of that purported queen was derived from the rabble of common experience and her pretension would thereby rightly have to become suspicious, she still nevertheless asserted her claims because that *genealogy* was in fact falsely imputed to her: whereby everything in turn decayed into the antiquated, wormridden *dogmatism* and thence into the disdain from which one had wanted to pull the science. Now – after all paths have (one persuades oneself) been vainly tried – jadedness and total *indifference* govern: the latter of which is the mother of chaos and night in sciences but yet simultaneously the origin or at least the prelude of an imminent reshaping and enlightenment of them when they have become obscure, confused, and unusable through badly-deployed diligence.

For it is fruitless to wish to create *indifference* in regard to such investigations to whose object human nature *cannot be indifferent*. Moreover, even as much as those purported *indifferentists* think to render themselves unrecognisable through altering scholastic language into a popular tone (to the extent that they think something at all), they inevitably fall back into metaphysical assertions: for which they nonetheless professed so much contempt. Yet that indifference, which manifests itself amidst the flower of all sciences and impinges upon precisely those sciences whose knowledge one would least wish to relinquish amongst all if such were to be had, is nevertheless a phenomenon that deserves attention and reflection. It is manifestly the effect not of the light-mindedness of the age but rather of its mature *judging-power*,[[1]](#footnote-1) which no longer allows itself to be tantalised through semblant knowledge, and an invitation to reason to assume anew the most onerous of all its tasks – namely, that of self-cognition – and to institute a tribunal that secures reason in its just claims but which can, by contrast, dispatch all groundless pretensions not through decrees but rather according to reason’s eternal and immutable laws; and that tribunal is none other than the *critique of pure reason* itself.

I understand by that term not a critique of books and systems, however, but rather a critique of the rational-capacity *simpliciter* in regard to all cognitions towards which it may endeavour *independently of all experience* and therefore a decision in respect to the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics *simpliciter* and a determination of its sources as well as of its extent and limits: but everything from principles.

I have now pursued that path – the only one that was left over – and flatter myself to have encountered on it the removal of all errors that had hitherto disunited reason from itself in its experience-free use. I have not, say, avoided its questions through excusing myself with the incapacity of human reason, but rather I have completely specified human reason according to principles; and, after having discovered the point of its misunderstanding with itself, I have resolved those questions to its full satisfaction. Admittedly, the answers to those questions have not at all turned out as dogmatically-effusive curiosity might have expected; for such a curiosity could not be satisfied otherwise than through magical arts, whereof I do not have a good understanding. But nor was that indeed the aim of our reason’s natural determination; and philosophy’s duty was to eliminate the illusion that arose from misinterpretation, even if a great deal of lauded and popular delusion should therein be annihilated. In this occupation, I have let thoroughness be my great aim; and I venture to say that there must be not a single metaphysical problem that is not resolved here or for whose resolution the key has not at least been proffered. In fact, pure reason is also such a perfect unity that if its principle were insufficient for even only one of all the questions that are imposed upon it through its own nature, then one could only discard that principle forever because nor would it then be adequate for any of the others with full reliability.

In saying that, I believe myself to perceive in the face of the reader an indignation mixed with contempt over such ostensibly vainglorious and immodest claims; and yet they are, without comparison, more moderate than those of every author of the commonest programme that therein purports to, say, prove the simple nature of the *soul* or the necessity of a first *beginning of the world*. For he commits himself to expanding human cognition beyond all limits of possible experience, whereof I humbly admit that it totally surpasses my capacity: in whose stead, I deal merely with reason itself and its pure thought, thorough knowledge of which I need not seek far around myself because I encounter it within myself: and even common logic already gives me an example of the fact that all of reason’s simple actions can be enumerated fully and systematically; only here, the question is raised of how much I may perhaps hope to accomplish with reason when all material and support from experience are taken from me.

So much for *completeness* in achieving *every* purpose and *thoroughness* in achieving *all* purposes together: which is not an arbitrary intention but is rather imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself, which is the matter of our critical investigation.

*Certainty* and *perspicuity* – two components pertaining to the *form* of our critical investigation – are nevertheless to be regarded as essential demands that one can rightly make upon an author who ventures upon such a slippery investigation.

In respect to *certainty*, I have expressed to myself the judgement that *opining* is in no way permissible in this kind of contemplation and that everything therein that even merely looks similar to a hypothesis is contraband that is not for sale even at the lowest price but must rather be suppressed as soon as it is discovered. For every cognition that shall stand fast *apriori* itself announces that it is to be regarded as absolutely necessary, and a determination of all pure *apriori* cognitions that shall be the standard and therefore even the exemplar of all apodictic (philosophical) certainty does so far more. Whether I have accomplished that to which I committed myself in respect of this component remains entirely subject to the judgement of the reader because it befits the author only to propound grounds but not to judge concerning their effect upon his judges. But in order that something should not innocently be a cause of a weakening of those grounds, the author may be permitted to himself remark those places that could give occasion for some mistrust even if they concern only the secondary purpose in order to opportunely ward-off the influence that even merely the slightest doubt of the reader about those points might have upon his judgement in regard to the main purpose.

I know of no investigations that would be more important for exploring the capacity that we call ‘understanding’ and simultaneously for determining the rules and limits of its use than those that I have conducted in the second main-component of the Transcendental Analytic under the title of the ‘Deduction of the Pure Intellectual-Concepts’; and they have also cost me the most effort, though I hope that it will not go unrewarded. That contemplation (which is somewhat deeply structured) has two sides, however. One side relates to the objects of the pure understanding and shall demonstrate the objective validity of its *apriori* concepts and render them comprehensible, and it also pertains essentially to my purposes precisely for that reason. The other side aims to contemplate the pure understanding itself in respect of its possibility and the cognitive powers upon which the understanding itself rests and therefore contemplate the understanding in a subjective respect; and even though that discussion is of great importance in respect to my main purpose, it still does not pertain to it essentially because the main question always remains ‘what and how much can understanding and reason cognise freely of all experience?’ and not ‘how is the *capacity to think* itself possible?’. Since the latter is, as it were, a search for the cause of a given effect and to that extent has in it something similar to a hypothesis (even if that is not in fact the case, as I will show at another opportunity), it seems as if it were the case here that I take for myself the permission to *opine* and that it must therefore also be open to the reader to *opine* otherwise. In consideration of that, I must anticipate the reader with the reminder that in the event that my subjective deduction has not effected the whole conviction in him that I expect, the objective deduction (which is primarily at issue here) nevertheless receives its whole strength: for which, in any event, what is said on pages 92-93 can alone be sufficient.

Finally, in respect to *perspicuity*: the reader has the right to demand firstly *discursive* (i.e. logical) *perspicuity* **through concepts** but also an *intuitive* (i.e. aesthetic) *perspicuity* **through intuitions** (i.e. examples or other elucidations *in concreto*). I have sufficiently provided for the first. That pertained to the essence of my project but was also the contingent cause of the fact that I have been unable to satisfy the second demand, which is admittedly not so strict but is nevertheless fair. In the progress of my work, I was almost continuously undecided about how I should deal with it. Examples and elucidations seem to me to be always needed, and hence they also actually assumed their places appropriately in the first draft. I very soon saw the size of my task, however, and the multitude of objects with which I would have to deal; and since I became aware that those entirely on their own would already extend the work enough in a merely *scholastic* presentation, I found it inadvisable to swell it still more: especially because this work could in no way be suitable for popular use and the true connoisseurs of the science are not in such need of that facilitation, though it is admittedly always pleasant but here could even bring with it something contrary to purpose. *Abt Terrasson* admittedly says that if one measures a book’s size not according to the number of its pages but rather according to the time that one needs to understand it, then one could say of some books that *they would be much shorter if they were not so short*. On the other hand, however, if one directs one’s intention to the comprehensibility of a whole of speculative cognition that is extensive yet nevertheless coherent in a principle, then one could say with equally good right that *some books would have been much more perspicuous if they were not intended to be so perspicuous*. For aids to perspicuity admittedly help *in parts* but often distract *in the whole* because they do not allow the reader to arrive at an overview of the whole quickly enough and, through all their bright colours, nevertheless clog the system’s articulation or structure and render it unknowable: even though it is of the utmost concern in order for one to be able to judge about the system’s unity and fitness.

It seems to me that it can serve to attract the reader to no small degree to unite his endeavour with that of the author if he has the prospect of consummating a great and important work entirely and yet enduringly in accordance with the propounded delineation. Now according to the concepts that we will here give thereof, metaphysics is the only science amongst all sciences that may promise such a completion and indeed in a short time and with only little (albeit united) endeavour: in such a way that nothing remains left over for posterity except to arrange everything in the *didactic* manner according to its intentions without consequently being able to augment the content in the slightest. For it is nothing but the *inventory* of all our possessions through *pure reason*, ordered systematically. Nothing can escape us there because what reason brings forth entirely from itself cannot hide but rather must itself be brought to light through reason as soon as one has merely discovered its common principle. The perfect unity of this kind of cognition – and indeed from mere pure concepts without anything from experience or even merely *particular* intuition, which should lead to determinate experience, being capable of having any influence upon it – render that unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary. ‘Learn to live with yourself, and you will discover how poorly you are furnished’ (Perseus).

I hope to deliver such a system of pure (speculative) reason myself under the title ‘metaphysics of nature’: which, at not even half the length, shall nevertheless contain incomparably-richer content than the critique here, which first had to expound the sources and conditions of its possibility and needed to clean and level ground that was entirely overgrown. Whereas here I expect from my reader the patience and impartiality of a *judge*, there I expect from him the compliance and support of an *assistant*; for even as completely as all *principles* for the system are presented within the critique, it nevertheless appertains to the thoroughness of the system itself that it also lack no *derived* concepts, which one cannot take into estimation *apriori* but which must rather be sought out little-by-little. Moreover, since the entire *synthesis* of the concepts was exhausted in the former case, it is additionally demanded in the latter case that exactly the same also occur in respect of their *analysis*: all of which is easy and more entertainment than work.

I merely have something still to remark in regard to the printing. Since its beginning was somewhat delayed, I could see only half of the advanced sheets: on which I admittedly encounter some printing-errors, although they do not confuse the sense – except that which occurs on the fourth line from the bottom of p. 379, where ‘specifically’ must be read instead of ‘sceptically’. The antinomy of pure reason from pp. 425-461 is arranged in the manner of a table in such a way that everything pertaining to the *thesis* always proceeds on the left side whereas everything pertaining to the *antithesis* always proceeds on the right side, which I have ordered thus in order that the propositions and counterpropositions could be compared with one another that much more easily.

0. Introduction

0.1. Idea of Transcendental Philosophy

Experience is, without doubt, the first product that our understanding brings forth, by processing the raw material of sensory sensations. It is precisely thereby the first instruction and, in its progress, so inexhaustible in new instruction that the concatenated life of all future generations of new knowledge that can be collected on that basis will never lack. Nevertheless, it is far from being the only field wherein our understanding can be confined. It admittedly tells us what exists, but not that it must be thus and not otherwise. Precisely because of that, it also gives us no true universality; and reason, which is so desirous of that kind of cognition, is more stimulated by it than satisfied. Such universal cognitions that simultaneously have the character of internal necessity must be independent of experience, clear by themselves, and certain. Hence, one calls them ‘*apriori* cognitions’: whereas, by contrast, that which is borrowed merely from experience is (as one expresses oneself) cognised only *aposteriori* or empirically.

It is manifest (which is exceedingly remarkable) that even amongst our experiences, cognitions mingle that must have their origin *apriori* and which perhaps serve only to provide coherence to our sensory representations. For even if one removes everything that pertains to the senses from the former, certain original concepts and judgements generated from them nevertheless remain that must have arisen totally *apriori* (i.e. independently of experience) because they effect that one can say more about the objects that appear to the senses – or at least believe oneself to be able to say more – than mere experience would teach and that assertions contain true universality and strict necessity, which merely empirical cognition cannot deliver.

What shall say far more, however, is that certain cognitions even leave the field of all possible experiences and have the appearance of expanding the extent of our judgements beyond all limits of experience through concepts for which no corresponding object can be given within experience at all.

And precisely within those latter cognitions that go beyond the sensible world, where experience can give no guiding-thread nor correction whatsoever, lie the investigations of our reason that we hold to be far more preeminent in respect of their importance and whose final intention we hold to be much sublimer than everything that the understanding can learn within the field of appearances: wherein we prefer to venture everything at the risk of erring rather than abandon such important investigations from some ground of doubt or out of disdain and indifference.

Now it admittedly seems natural that as soon as one has left the ground of experience, one will still not immediately erect an edifice with cognitions that one possesses without knowing whence and on the credit of principles whose origin one does not know without previously having secured the edifice’s groundwork through careful investigations and that one will therefore long beforehand have raised the question of how then the understanding can arrive at all those cognitions and what extent, validity, and value they may have. In fact, also nothing is more natural if by that word one understands what should occur equitably and rationally; but if by that word one understands what usually occurs, then, on the contrary, there is nothing more natural and more comprehensible than that that investigation had to remain neglected for a long time. For one part of those cognitions, viz. the mathematical cognitions, is in ancient possession of reliability and also thereby gives a favourable expectation for others: even if they may be of an entirely different nature. Moreover, when one is beyond the circle of experience, one is sure of not being contradicted through experience. The stimulus to expand one’s cognitions is so great that one can be held up in one’s progress only through a clear contradiction that one encounters. That can be avoided, however, if one renders one’s inventions cautious: without their consequently being any the less inventions. Mathematics gives us a shining example of how far we can advance independently of experience in *apriori* cognition. Now, mathematics admittedly occupies itself with objects and cognitions merely so far as they can be presented within intuition. But one would easily overlook that circumstance because the aforesaid intuition can itself be given *apriori* and therefore can hardly be differentiated from a mere pure concept. Emboldened through such a demonstration of reason’s power, the drive towards expansion sees no limits. The simple dove, because it divides the air in free flight, could formulate the conception that it would fare still much better in airless space. In exactly the same way, *Plato* leaves the sensible world because it lays such manifold hindrances upon the understanding and ventures beyond it, on the wings of ideas, into the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not remark that he made no headway through his endeavours because he had no resistance, as it were, as a base upon which he might stiffen himself and to which he might apply his powers in order to bring his understanding from its position. It is a customary fate of human reason in speculation, however, to complete its edifice as early as possible and only thereafter investigate whether the ground for it is also well-laid. But then, all manner of embellishments are sought in order to reassure us in respect of its fitness or to dismiss such a late and dangerous examination. But what frees us from worry and suspicion and flatters us with spurious profundity is the following. A great part and perhaps the greatest part of our reason’s tasks consists in dissections of the concepts that we already have of objects. That delivers a multitude of cognitions to us that, even though they are nothing more than clarifications or elucidations of what has already been thought of within our concepts (albeit still in a confused manner), are nevertheless estimated as equal to new insights (at least in respect of their form) even though, in respect of matter and content, they do not expand the concepts we have but rather merely expound them. Since that procedure yields an actual *apriori* cognition that has a sure and useful progress, reason (without noticing it) inveigles assertions of an entirely different kind under that pretence: where reason adds entirely-foreign *apriori* concepts to given *apriori* concepts without one knowing how it arrived at them and without one even merely allowing that question to enter one’s thoughts. Hence, I shall treat of the difference between those two kinds of cognition at the outset.

0.2. On the Difference between Analytic and Synthetic Judgements

In all judgements wherein a subject’s relationship to a predicate is thought of (if I consider only affirmative judgements: for applying this to negative judgements is easy), that relationship is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B pertains to the subject A as something that is contained (hiddenly) within that concept A, or B lies entirely outside the concept A although it admittedly stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call the judgement ‘analytic’. In the other case, I call it ‘synthetic’. So whereas analytic (affirmative) judgements are those in which the predicate’s connection to the subject is thought of through identity, those in which that connection is thought of without identity shall be called ‘synthetic’ judgements. One could also call the former ‘elucidatory’ judgements and the others ‘expansive’ judgements because whereas the former add nothing to the concept of the subject through the predicate but rather merely divide it through dissection into its partial concepts, which were already thought of within it (albeit confusedly), the latter add a predicate to the concept of the subject that was not thought of within it at all and which could not have been extracted from it through any dissection. E.g. if I say ‘all bodies are extended’, then that is an analytic judgement. For I need not go beyond the concept that I conjoin with the word ‘body’ in order to find extension as connected to it but need rather merely dissect that concept (i.e. merely become conscious of the manifold that I always think of within it) in order to encounter that predicate therein; it is therefore an analytic judgement. In contrast: if I say ‘all bodies are heavy’, then the predicate is something entirely different from what I think of within the mere concept of a body *simpliciter*. The addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgement.

It is clear therefrom (1) that our cognition is not expanded at all through analytic judgements but rather the concept I already have is expounded and rendered intelligible to me myself and (2) that with synthetic judgements, I must have something else (X) outside the concept of the subject upon which the understanding supports itself in order to cognise a predicate that does not lie within that concept nevertheless as pertaining to it.

With empirical or experiential judgements, there is no difficulty whatsoever therewith. For that X is the complete experience of the object whereof I think via a concept A, which constitutes only a part of that experience. For although I do not already include the predicate of heaviness in the concept of a body *simpliciter*, that concept nevertheless designates the complete experience through a part of it: to which I can therefore add still other parts of exactly the same experience as pertaining to the first. I can cognise the concept of a body analytically beforehand through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc.: which are all thought of in that concept. But now I expand my cognition and, through looking back to the experience from which I had abstracted that concept of a body, I also find heaviness as always connected to the above characteristics. It is therefore the experience of that X that lies outside the concept A and upon which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of heaviness B with the concept A is grounded.

With synthetic judgements *apriori*, however, that aid is completely absent. If I am to go outside the concept A in order to cognise another concept B as conjoined therewith, what is that upon which I support myself and whereby the synthesis becomes possible: since there I do not have the advantage of looking for it within the field of experience? One may take the proposition ‘everything that occurs has its cause’. In the concept of something that occurs, I admittedly think of an existence that a time precedes etc.; and analytic judgements can be drawn therefrom. But the concept of a cause indicates something different from what occurs and is not contained within that latter representation at all. How then do I come to say something about what occurs *simpliciter* that is entirely different from it and nevertheless cognise the concept of a cause as pertaining to it even though it is not contained within it? What is the X here upon which the understanding supports itself when it believes itself to find outside the concept of A a predicate foreign to it that is nevertheless connected thereto? It cannot be experience because the aforesaid principle adds that second representation to the first not only with greater universality than experience can provide but also with the expression of necessity and therefore totally *apriori* and from mere concepts. Upon such synthetic (i.e. expansive) principles rests the entire final-intention of our speculative *apriori* cognition, for analytic principles are admittedly of the utmost importance and necessity but only in order to arrive at the perspicuity of concepts that is requisite for a secure and widespread synthesis as an actually new addition.

A certain mystery therefore lies concealed here[[2]](#footnote-2) whose unlocking alone can render progress secure and reliable within the boundless field of pure intellectual-cognition: viz. to uncover with appropriate universality the ground of the possibility of synthetic *apriori* judgements, to comprehend the conditions that render each kind of them possible, and to determine all such cognition (which constitutes its own genus) in a system in respect of its original sources, divisions, extent, and limits completely and sufficiently for every use and not merely to characterise it through a perfunctory circumscription. So much precursorily for the peculiarities that synthetic judgements have *per se*.

From all this results the idea of a particular science that could serve for the critique of pure reason. Yet every cognition is called *pure* that is mixed with nothing of a foreign kind. Particularly, however, a cognition is called ‘absolutely pure’ into which absolutely no experience or sensation mixes itself and which is therefore possible fully-*apriori*. Now, reason is the capacity that delivers the principles of *apriori* cognition. Therefore, pure reason is reason that contains the principles to cognise something absolutely-*apriori*. An organon of pure reason would be a complex of those principles according to which all pure *apriori* cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about. A thorough application of such an organon would provide a system of pure reason. But since that demands a great deal and it still remains to be seen whether such an expansion of our cognition is even possible at all and in which cases it might be possible, we can regard a science of the mere judgement of pure reason, its sources, and its limits as the propædeutic to a system of pure reason. Such a propædeutic would have to be called not a ‘doctrine’ but rather merely a ‘critique’ of pure reason, and its utility would actually be merely negative: serving not for the expansion but rather merely for the purgation of our reason and to keep it free from errors, whereby a great deal is already gained. I call all cognition *transcendental* that is occupied not so much with objects as rather with our *apriori* concepts of objects *simpliciter*. A system of such concepts would be called ‘transcendental philosophy’. That is again too much to begin with, however. For since such a science would have to completely contain all analytic *apriori* cognition as well as all synthetic *apriori* cognition, it is of too broad an extent insofar as our intention is concerned because we may pursue analysis only so far as it is indispensably needed in order to comprehend the principles of *apriori* synthesis in their total extent, which are all that concern us. This investigation – which we can properly call not ‘doctrine’ but rather merely ‘transcendental critique’ because it has as its intention not an expansion of the cognitions themselves but rather merely their correction and shall yield the touchstone of the value or valuelessness of all *apriori* cognitions – is that with which we now occupy ourselves. Such a critique is thus a preparation for an organon (where possible) and if that should not be successful, then at least for a canon of pure reason: according to which, the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason could perhaps someday be presented – whether it consists in expansion or mere delimitation of pure reason’s cognition, both analytic and synthetic. For that this is possible and indeed that such a system could not even be of too great an extent for us to hope to complete it entirely can already be gauged in advance from the fact that there it is not the nature of things (which is inexhaustible) that constitutes the object but rather the understanding that judges concerning the nature of things, and even that in turn only in respect of its *apriori* cognition; and the understanding’s inventory cannot remain concealed from us because we need not seek it externally and, in accordance with all surmise, it is small enough to be completely received, judged in regard to its value or valuelessness, and subjected to a correct estimation.

0.3. Division of Transcendental Philosophy

Transcendental philosophy is here only an idea for which the critique of pure reason shall delineate the whole plan *architectonically* (i.e. from principles) with full guarantee of the completeness and sureness of all of the components that constitute that edifice. That this critique is not already itself called ‘transcendental philosophy’ rests merely upon the fact that in order to be a complete system, it would also have to contain a thorough analysis of human *apriori* cognition in its entirety. Now, our critique must also admittedly present a complete enumeration of all stem-concepts that constitute the aforesaid pure cognition. Only it refrains from a thorough analysis of those concepts themselves and the complete recension of the concepts derived from them: partly because that dissection would not serve the purpose since it would not have the doubt that is encountered in synthesis – for whose sake the entire critique exists – and partly because it would be contrary to the unity of the plan to occupy oneself with an apology of the completeness of such an analysis and derivation from which one could yet be excused in view of one’s intention. Nevertheless, both the dissection’s completeness as well as the derivation from the *apriori* concepts that are subsequently to be delivered are easy to supply if they only first exist as thorough principles of synthesis and nothing is lacking to them in respect of that essential intention.

Everything that constitutes transcendental philosophy thus belongs to the critique of pure reason; and that critique is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy but still not that science itself because it only goes so far in analysis as is required for the complete judgement of synthetic *apriori* cognition.

The primary aim in the division of such a science is that absolutely no concepts must enter that contain something empirical within them, i.e. that the *apriori* cognition be fully pure. Therefore, although the highest principles of morality and its fundamental concepts are *apriori*, they still do not pertain to transcendental philosophy because the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, the concepts of desires and inclinations, the concept of volition, etc. – which are, *in toto*, of empirical origin – must be presupposed therein. Therefore, transcendental philosophy is a secular-wisdom of pure, merely speculative reason. For everything practical, so far as it contains motivational grounds, relates to feelings: which pertain to empirical cognitive-sources.

If one shall now institute the division of this science from the universal viewpoint of a system *simpliciter*, then the science we will now present must contain firstly an **elementology** and secondly a **methodology** of pure reason. Each of these main parts would have its subdivision, whose grounds nevertheless cannot be presented here. For an introduction or preliminary reminder, it seems that we need say only that there are two stems of human cognition, viz. *sensibility* and *understanding*: which perhaps derive from a common root, although it is unknown to us. Through sensibility, objects are given to us; but through the understanding, they are thought about. Now so far as sensibility should contain *apriori* representations that constitute the condition under which objects are given to us, it would belong to transcendental philosophy. Transcendental aesthesiology would have to belong to the first part of the elementary science because the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given precede those under which they are thought about.

1. Transcendental Elementology

1.1. Transcendental Aesthetic

In whichever way and through whichever media a cognition may relate to objects, the way whereby it relates to them immediately and at which all thought aims as a medium is intuition. Intuition occurs, however, only so far as an object is given to us; but that is in turn possible only through the object’s affecting the mind in a certain way. The faculty (receptivity) to receive representations through the way wherein we are affected by objects is called ‘sensibility’. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are *given* to us; and sensibility alone delivers intuitions to us. Through the understanding, however, they are thought about; and from it arise concepts. Yet all thought must ultimately relate to intuitions – be it directly (*directe*) or via a detour (*indirecte*) – and in us, to sensibility: because no object can be given to us in another way.

The effect of an object upon the representational faculty so far as we are affected by that object is *sensation*. An intuition that relates to its object through sensation is called *empirical*. The indeterminate object of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*.

In an appearance, I call that which corresponds to the sensation the *matter* of that appearance; but I call that which effects that the appearance’s manifold, ordered in certain relationships, becomes intuited the *form* of the appearance. Since that in which alone the sensations can order themselves and be placed into a certain form cannot itself in turn be sensation, the matter of all appearance is admittedly given to us only *aposteriori* but the form of all appearance must lie ready for them in its totality in the mind *apriori* and must therefore be capable of being considered abstractedly from all sensation.

I call all representations ‘pure’ (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing pertaining to sensation is encountered. Thus, the pure form of sensory intuitions *simpliciter* is encountered within the mind *apriori* wherein everything manifold in appearances becomes intuited in certain relationships. That pure form of sensibility will also itself be called ‘pure intuition’. So if I separate from the representation of a body everything that the understanding thinks thereof (such as substance, force, divisibility, etc.) and also everything therein that pertains to sensation (such as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.), something still remains to me from that empirical intuition: namely, extension and shape. Those pertain to the pure intuition: which occurs in the mind *apriori*, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation.

I call a science of all principles of sensibility *apriori*: *transcendental aesthetic*.[[3]](#footnote-3) There must thus be such a science, which constitutes the first part of transcendental elementology in contrast with the science that contains the principles of pure thought and which is called ‘transcendental logic’.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, therefore, we will first isolate sensibility through separating everything therein whereof the understanding thinks via its concepts in order that nothing but empirical intuition remains left over. Secondly, we will also separate from empirical intuition everything that pertains to sensation in order that nothing but pure intuition and the mere form of appearances remain left over, which are all that sensibility can deliver *apriori*. In this investigation, it will be found that there are two forms of sensory intuition, which are principles of cognition *apriori*: viz. space and time, with whose consideration we will now occupy ourselves.

1.1.1. On Space

By means of the external sense (which is a property of our mind), objects become represented to us as external to us and, *in toto*, in space. Their shape, size, and relationship to one another is therein determined or determinable. The internal sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its internal state, admittedly gives no intuition of the soul itself as an object; only there is nevertheless a determinate form under which alone the intuition of its internal state is possible, such that everything that pertains to internal determinations becomes represented in relationships of time. Time cannot be intuited externally, no more than space can be intuited as something in us. Now, what are space and time? Are they actual beings? Are they indeed merely determinations or even relationships of things, but nevertheless determinations or relationships that would belong to them *per se* even if they were not intuited; or are they determinations or relationships that adhere merely to the form of intuition alone and therefore to our mind’s subjective constitution, without which the predicates could be attributed to no thing whatsoever? In order to instruct ourselves about this, we shall first contemplate space.

1) Space is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from external experiences. For in order for certain sensations to become related to something external to me (i.e. to something in a location of space other than that wherein I find myself) and also in order for me to be capable of representing them as external to one another and therefore not merely as different but rather as in different locations, then the representation of space must already be underlying. Thus, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relationships of external appearance through experience; but rather that external experience is itself possible only through the aforesaid representation.

2) Space is a necessary *apriori* representation that underlies all external intuitions. One can never make for oneself a representation that no space is, even though one can very well think that no objects are encountered therein. Space is therefore regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances and not as a determination dependent upon them and is an *apriori* representation that necessarily underlies external appearances.

3) The apodictic certainty of all geometrical principles and the possibility of their *apriori* constructions are grounded upon that *apriori* necessity. If that representation of space were a concept acquired *aposteriori* that were extracted from general external experience, then the first principles of mathematical determination would be nothing but perceptions. They would therefore have all the contingency of perception; and it would not be necessary that between two points, there is only one straight line: but rather experience would always teach thus. What is borrowed from experience also has only comparative universality, i.e. through induction. One would therefore say only that as much as has been remarked up to the present time, no space has been found that has more than three dimensions.

4) Space is not a discursive or, as one says, general concept of relationships of things at all, but rather a pure intuition. For firstly, one can be presented with only a single space; and if one speaks of many spaces, then one thereby understands only parts of one and the same solitary space. Moreover, those parts cannot precede the single, all-encompassing space as its component parts (from which its composition would be possible) but can rather be thought of only within it. It is essentially single; the manifold within it, and therefore also the general concept of spaces *simpliciter*, rest merely upon restrictions. It follows therefrom that in regard to it, an *apriori* intuition (which is not empirical) underlies all concepts of it. So also all geometrical principles – e.g. that in a triangle, two sides together are greater than the third – are never derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather from intuition and indeed *apriori* with apodictic certainty.

5) Space is represented given as an infinite quantum. A general concept of space (which is common to a foot as well as an ell) can determine nothing in regard to quantity. Were it not for the limitlessness in the progress of intuition, then no concept of relationships would carry with it a principle of infinitude.

1.1.1.1. Conclusions from the Above Concepts

a) Space does not represent a property of any things *per se* at all nor them in their relationship to one another, i.e. a determination of them that adheres to objects themselves and which would remain even if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of intuition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited before the existence of the things to which they belong, and they therefore cannot be intuited *apriori*.

b) Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of external senses, i.e. the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone external intuition is possible for us. Now, since a subject’s receptivity to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all intuitions of those objects, it can be understood how the form of all appearances could be given before all actual perceptions and therefore *apriori* in the mind and how it – as a pure intuition in which all objects must become determined – could contain principles of the relationships of those objects before all experience.

We can therefore speak of space, extended beings, etc. only from the standpoint of a human. If we abandon the subjective condition under which alone we can receive external intuition (viz. how we may be affected by objects), then the representation of space signifies absolutely nothing. That predicate is attributed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e. are objects of sensibility. The constant form of that receptivity (which we call ‘sensibility’) is a necessary condition of all relationships wherein objects are intuited as external to us and, if one abstracts from those objects, a pure intuition that bears the name ‘space’. Since we cannot make the particular conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility of items but rather only of their appearances: we can well say that space encompasses all things that may appear to us externally but not all things *per se* whether they may be intuited or not or even by whichever subject one likes. For we cannot judge at all of the intuitions of other thinking beings whether they are bound to the aforesaid conditions that restrict our intuition and which are universally valid for us. If we add the restriction of a judgement to the concept of the subject, then the judgement holds unconditionally. The proposition ‘all things are beside one another in space’ holds only under the restriction ‘if those things are taken as objects of our sensory intuition’. If I join the condition to the concept here and say ‘all things *qua* external appearances are beside one another in space’, then that rule holds universally and without restriction. Our discussions thus teach the *reality* (i.e. the objective validity) of space in respect of everything that can be presented to us as an object externally, but simultaneously the *ideality* of space in respect of the things if they are considered *per se* through reason: i.e. without having regard to the constitution of our sensibility. We therefore assert the *empirical reality* of space (in respect of all possible external experience), but at the same time admittedly the *transcendental ideality* of space: i.e. that space is nothing as soon as we omit the condition of the possibility of all experience and assume it as something that underlies the things *per se*.

Beyond space, however, there is no other subjective representation related to something external that could be called ‘objective *apriori*’. Therefore, that subjective condition of all external appearances cannot be compared with another. The pleasant taste of a wine does not belong to the objective determinations of the wine and therefore of an object (even considered as an appearance), but rather to the particular constitution of the sense in the subject that enjoys it. Colours are not qualities of the bodies to whose intuition they attach, but rather they are also merely modifications of the sense of vision: which is affected by light in a certain way. In contrast: space, as a condition of external objects, necessarily belongs to their appearance or intuition. Taste and colours are absolutely not necessary conditions under which alone objects can become objects of the senses for us. They are conjoined with appearances only as contingently-attached effects of the particular organisation. They are therefore also not *apriori* representations, but rather grounded upon sensation – but a pleasant taste is even grounded upon feeling (of pleasure and displeasure), which is an effect of sensation. Moreover, no one can have a representation of a colour nor of any taste *apriori*: but space pertains only to the pure form of intuition and therefore includes no sensation (i.e. nothing empirical) in it; and all kinds and determinations of space can and must even be capable of being represented *apriori* if concepts of both shapes and relationships are to arise. Only through space is it possible that things are external objects for us.

The intention of this remark is merely to prevent one from allowing oneself to think of elucidating the asserted ideality of space through examples that are far from adequate: since (e.g.) colours, taste, etc. are rightly regarded not as qualities of things but rather merely as alterations of our subject, which can even be different in different humans. For in that case, what is itself originally only an appearance (e.g. a rose) is regarded as a thing *per se* in the empirical sense that can nevertheless appear differently to every sense in respect of its colour. In contrast, the transcendental concept of appearances in space is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is an item *per se* and that space is not a form of things that would perhaps pertain to them *per se*; but rather objects *per se* are not known to us at all: and what we call ‘external objects’ are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility whose form is space but whose true correlate (i.e. the thing *per se*) is not thereby cognised at all nor can be cognised but which is also never enquired about in experience.

1.1.2. On Time

1) Time is not an empirical concept that has somehow been abstracted from an experience. For simultaneity or succession would themselves not enter perception if the representation of time were not underlying *apriori*. Only under its presupposition can one represent to oneself that items [*einiges*] are at one and the same time (i.e. simultaneous) or in diverse times (i.e. successive).

2) Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. One cannot eliminate time itself in respect of appearances *simpliciter*, though admittedly one can well remove the appearances from time. Time is therefore given *apriori*. All actuality of appearances is possible in it alone. The appearances can therefore fall away *in toto*, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be eliminated.

3) The possibility of apodictic principles of relationships of time or axioms of time *simpliciter* is also grounded upon that *apriori* necessity. Time has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but rather successive (just as different spaces are not successive, but rather simultaneous). Those principles cannot be drawn from experience, for experience would give neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty. We would be able to say only ‘common perception teaches thus’, but not ‘it must be thus disposed’. Those principles hold as rules under which experiences are possible *simpliciter* and instruct us before experience and not through it.

4) Time is not a discursive or, as one says, general concept but rather a pure form of sensory intuition. Different times are merely parts of exactly the same time. But a representation that can be given through only a single object is intuition. Moreover, the principle that different times cannot be simultaneous could not be derived from a general concept. That principle is synthetic and cannot arise from concepts alone. It is therefore contained immediately in the intuition and representation of time.

5) The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that all determinate magnitude of time is possible only through restrictions of a single underlying time. Therefore, the original representation of time must be given as unrestricted. But wherever the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determinately represented only through restriction: the whole representation must not be given through concepts (for then the partial representations would precede), but rather its immediate intuition must be underlying.

1.1.2.1. Conclusions from Those Concepts

a) Time is not something that subsists by itself or which attaches to things as an objective determination and which would consequently remain left over if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of intuition. For in the first case, it would be something that would nevertheless be actual without an actual object. In respect to the second case, however: as a determination that attaches to things themselves or an order, time could not precede objects as their condition and be cognised and intuited *apriori* through synthetic propositions. In contrast, the latter very well occurs if time is nothing but the subjective condition under which all intuitions can occur in us. For then, that form of internal intuition can be represented before objects and consequently *apriori*.

b) Time is nothing but the form of the internal sense, i.e. of intuition of ourselves and of our internal state. For time cannot be a determination of external appearances: it belongs neither to a shape nor to a position etc. – in contrast, it determines the relationship of the representations in our internal state. And precisely because that internal intuition gives no shape, we even seek to replace that lack with analogies and represent the time-sequence through a line proceeding *in infinitum* in which the manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension and infer from the properties of that line to all properties of time except the single property that whereas the parts of the former are simultaneous, those of the latter are always successive. It is also clear therefrom that the representation of time itself is intuition because all of its relationships can be expressed in an external intuition.

c) Time is the formal *apriori* condition of all appearances *simpliciter*. As the pure form of all external intuition, space is (as an *apriori* condition) confined merely to external appearances. By contrast: since all representations, irrespective of whether they have external things for their objects or not, nevertheless belong *per se* (as determinations of the mind) to the internal state and that internal state belongs under the formal condition of internal intuition (viz. time), time is an *apriori* condition of all appearance *simpliciter* and indeed the immediate condition of all internal appearances (i.e. all appearances of our souls) and also precisely thereby mediately of all external appearances. If I can say *apriori* that all external appearances are in space and determined *apriori* in respect of the relationships of space, then I can say entirely universally from the principle of the internal sense that all appearances *simpliciter* (i.e. all objects of the senses) are in time and stand necessarily in relationships of time.

If we abstract from our way of intuiting ourselves internally and, by means of that intuition, also encompassing all external intuitions in our representational power and consequently take objects as they may be *per se*, then time is nothing. Time is of objective validity in respect of appearances only because they are already things that we assume as *objects of our senses*; but time is no longer objective if one abstracts from our intuition’s sensibility, and therefore from the mode of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks *of things simpliciter*. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (i.e. human) intuition (which is always sensory, i.e. so far as we are affected by objects) and nothing *per se*, outside the subject. Nevertheless, time is necessarily objective in respect of all appearances and therefore also in respect of all things that can be presented to us in experience. We cannot say ‘all things are in time’ because in the concept of things *simpliciter*, every mode of intuition of things also becomes abstracted from; but intuition is the genuine condition under which time belongs to representations of objects. If the condition is now added to the concept and it says ‘all things *qua* appearances (i.e. objects of sensory intuition) are in time’, then the principle has its good objective correctness and universality *apriori*.

Our assertions thus teach time’s *empirical reality*, i.e. its objective validity in respect of all objects that may ever be given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensory, an object can never be given to us in experience that does not belong under the condition of time. In contrast: we deny time all claim to absolute reality, wherein it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without having regard to the form of our sensory intuition. Moreover, such properties that belong to things *per se* can never be given to us through the senses. Time’s *transcendental ideality* therefore consists therein: according to which, time is absolutely nothing if one abstracts from the subjective conditions of sensory intuition and can be attributed to objects *per se* (without their relationship to our intuition) neither subsistently nor inherently. Yet that ideality is no more to be placed in comparison with the subreptions of sensations than the ideality of space. For therein one still presupposes that the appearance itself in which those predicates inhere has objective reality, which totally falls away in this case except so far as that objective reality is merely empirical (i.e. except so far as one regards the object itself merely as an appearance): in respect of which, the above remark in the first section is to be consulted.

1.1.2.2. Elucidation

Against this theory, which grants time empirical reality but denies it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from insightful men an objection so unanimous that I took therefrom that it must naturally occur with every reader for whom these contemplations are unusual. It reads thus: alterations are actual (the change in our own representations proves that, even if one wished to deny all external appearances together with their alterations). Now, alterations are possible only in time. Consequently, time is something actual. The answer is not at all difficult; I admit the whole argument. Time is indeed something actual, viz. the actual form of internal intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in respect of internal experience, i.e. I actually have the representation of time and of my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded as actual not as an object, but rather as the mode-of-representation of myself *qua* object. Yet if I myself or another being could intuit me without that condition of sensibility, then exactly the same determinations that now become represented to us as alterations would yield a cognition in which neither the representation of time nor therefore the representation of alteration would occur at all. Time’s empirical reality therefore remains as a condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality cannot be granted to it, according to what was said above. It is nothing but the form of our internal intuition.[[4]](#footnote-4) If one removes the particular condition of our sensibility from it, then the concept of time also vanishes; and time attaches not to objects themselves but rather merely to the subject that intuits them.

Yet the cause why that objection is made so unanimously, and indeed by those who nonetheless have nothing to object to the doctrine of the ideality of space, is as follows. They did not hope to be able to demonstrate the absolute reality of space apodictically because they were opposed by idealism: according to which, the actuality of external objects admits of no strict proof. In contrast, the actuality of the object of our internal senses (viz. myself and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness. Whereas the former could be a mere semblance, the latter is (in their opinion) undeniably something actual. Yet they did not consider that both, although one cannot dispute their actuality as representations, nevertheless pertain merely to the appearance – which always has two sides: one on which the object is considered *per se* (i.e. without regard to a way of intuiting it, although its constitution always remains problematic precisely for that reason) and another on which the form of intuition of that object is looked to: which must be sought not in the object *per se* but rather in the subject to whom it appears, although it nevertheless belongs actually and necessarily to the appearance of that object.

Time and space are thus two cognitive-sources from which diverse synthetic cognitions can be extracted *apriori*, of which pure mathematics especially gives a shining example in respect of cognitions of space and its relationships. For they are, taken together, the two pure forms of all sensory intuition and thereby render synthetic *apriori* propositions possible. But those *apriori* cognitive-sources determine their limits precisely thereby (viz. precisely through the fact that they are merely conditions of sensibility): namely, that they pertain to objects merely so far as they are considered as appearances but do not present things *per se*. The former alone are the field of their validity: outside which (if one leaves), no further objective use of them occurs. Moreover, that reality of space and time leaves experiential cognition’s sureness untouched: for we are just as certain of it irrespective of whether those forms necessarily attach to things *per se* or merely to our intuition of those things. In contrast, those who assert the absolute reality of space and time – irrespective of whether they assume them to be subsistent or merely inherent – must be at variance with the principles of experience itself. For if they decide for the first (which is commonly the party of mathematical natural-researchers): then they must assume two eternal and infinite, *per se* subsistent nonthings (viz. space and time) that exist (without there being something actual) merely in order to encompass everything actual within themselves. If they take the second party (some of whom are metaphysical doctors-of-nature) and space and time obtain for them as relationships of appearances (beside or after one another) that are abstracted from experience, though admittedly represented confusedly in that separation, then they must deny validity—or at least apodictic certainty—to all *apriori* mathematical doctrines in regard to actual things (e.g. in space) because apodictic certainty does not occur *aposteriori* at all and the *apriori* concepts of space and time are (according to this opinion) merely creations of the imaginal power whose source must actually be sought in experience, from whose abstracted relationships the imagination has made something that admittedly contains their universality but which cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has connected to them. The first party gain so far as they clear the field of appearances for mathematical assertions. In contrast, they greatly confuse themselves through precisely those conditions when the understanding wishes to go beyond that field. The second party admittedly gain relatively to the first in that the representations of space and time do not stand in the way when they wish to judge concerning objects not as appearances but rather merely in relationship to the understanding, but they can neither specify a ground of the possibility of mathematical *apriori* cognitions (because they lack a true and objectively-valid *apriori* intuition) nor bring the principles of experience into necessary consonance with those assertions. In our theory of the true constitution of those two original forms of sensibility, both difficulties are remedied.

Finally, that a transcendental aesthetic can contain no more than those two elements (viz. space and time) is clear because all other concepts pertaining to sensibility – even that of movement, which unites both elements – presuppose something empirical. For movement presupposes perception of something mobile. In space considered *per se*, however, nothing is mobile. Therefore, that which is mobilemust be something *that is found in space only through experience* and therefore an empirical datum. Likewise, a transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of alteration among its *apriori* data. For time itself does not alter, but rather something that is in time alters. Therefore, perception of an existence and of the succession of its determinations and therefore experience are required for that.

1.1.3. General Remarks on the Transcendental Aesthetic

First, it will be necessary to explain as perspicuously as possible what our opinion is in respect to the fundamental constitution of sensory cognition *simpliciter* in order to avert any misinterpretation of it.

We have thus intended to say that all of our intuition is nothing but representation of appearance; that the things we intuit are, *per se*, not what we intuit them to be, nor are their relationships constituted *per se* as they appear to us; and that if we eliminated our subject or even merely the subjective constitution of the senses *simpliciter*: then all of the constitution of the objects in space and time, all their relationships, and indeed even space and time would vanish and – as appearances – can exist not *per se* but rather only in us.

How the objects might be *per se* and separately from all that receptivity of our sensibility remains totally unknown to us. We know nothing but our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us and which also need not necessarily belong to every being: though it must admittedly belong to every human. We deal merely with that way of perceiving. Space and time are its pure forms; sensation *simpliciter* is its matter. We can cognise the former only *apriori* (i.e. before all actual perception), and it is therefore called ‘pure intuition’; but the latter is that in our cognition which renders it such that it is called ‘*aposteriori* cognition’ (i.e. empirical intuition). Whereas the former attach to our sensibility absolutely necessarily (irrespective of the kinds of our sensations), the latter can be highly diverse. Even if we could bring our intuition to the utmost degree of perspicuity, we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects *per se*. For in any event, we would still completely cognise only our mode of intuition (i.e. our sensibility) and would do so always only under the conditions of space and time that attach to the subject originally. What objects may be *per se* would still never become known to us through the most enlightened cognition of appearance, which alone is given to us.

Therefore, that our entire sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things that contains merely what belongs to them *per se* but only under an accumulation of characteristics and partial representations that we do not consciously expound is a falsification of the concept of sensibility and the concept of appearance that renders the entire doctrine of them useless and vacuous. The difference between an unperspicuous representation and a perspicuous representation is merely logical and does not concern their content. Without doubt, the concept of *law* of which the healthy understanding avails itself is exactly the same as that which the subtlest speculation can develop from it: only that in its common and practical usage, one is not conscious of those manifold representations in that thought. Therefore, one cannot say that the common concept is sensory and contains a mere appearance. For law cannot appear at all, but rather its concept lies in the understanding and represents a quality of actions that belongs to them *per se* (viz. their moral quality). In contrast, the representation of a *body* in intuition contains absolutely nothing that could belong to an object *per se* but rather merely the appearance of something and the way wherein we are affected through it; and that receptivity of our cognitive faculty is called ‘sensibility’ and remains astronomically different from cognition of the object *per se*, even if one were to scrutinise the appearance to its fundament.

The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has therefore assigned an entirely incorrect viewpoint to all investigations concerning the nature and origin of our cognitions because it regarded the difference between sensibility and the intellectual merely as logical although it is manifestly transcendental and concerns not merely their form of perspicuity or unperspicuity but rather their origin and content in such a way that through the former, we cognise the constitution of things *per se* not merely unperspicuously but rather not at all: and as soon as we remove our subjective constitution, the represented object with the properties that sensory intuition attributed to it is nowhere to be encountered at all nor can be encountered because precisely that subjective constitution determines the form of the object *qua* appearance.

Furthermore, amongst appearances, we distinguish that which attaches to intuition essentially and holds for every human sense *simpliciter* from that which belongs to intuition only contingently because it holds not for the relation of sensibility *simpliciter* but rather merely for a particular position or organisation of one sense or another. And so whereas one calls the first cognition a cognition that represents the object ‘*per se*’, one calls the second a cognition that represents only the object’s ‘appearance’. But that difference is merely empirical. If one stops at it (as often occurs) and one does not in turn regard that empirical intuition as a mere appearance (which should occur) such that absolutely nothing that concerns an item *per se* is to be encountered therein, then our transcendental difference is lost and we then still believe ourselves to cognise things *per se*: even though everywhere (in the sensible world) we deal with nothing but appearances, even with the deepest exploration of the objects of the sensible world. So we will admittedly call a rainbow a ‘mere appearance’ in a sunshower but will call the rain the ‘item *per se*’, which is even correct so far as we understand the latter concept merely physically as that which in universal experience, under all diverse circumstances for the senses, is nevertheless determined thus and not otherwise in intuition. But if we take that *empiricum* absolutely and, without turning to its consonance with every human sense, ask whether it also represents an object *per se* (not the raindrops; for as appearances, they are already empirical objects), then the question of the representation’s relation to the object is transcendental and not only are those drops mere appearances, but even their round shape and indeed even the space in which they fall are nothing *per se* but rather mere modifications or foundations of our sensory intuition, whereas the transcendental object remains unknown to us.

The second important concern of our transcendental aesthetic is that it not merely acquires some favour merely as a specious hypothesis but is rather as certain and indubitable as can ever be demanded of a theory that is to serve as an organon. In order to render that certainty fully patent, we shall select a case in light of which its validity can become obvious.

Thus if one supposes that space and time are objective *per se* and conditions of the possibility of things *per se*, then it is manifest firstly that *apriori* apodictic and synthetic propositions arise from both in great number: especially from space, which we shall hence investigate predominantly here as an example. Since the propositions of geometry are cognised synthetically *apriori* and with apodictic certainty, I ask: whence do you take such propositions, and on what does our understanding support itself in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths? There is no path except via concepts or via intuitions, but both as such that are given either *apriori* or *aposteriori*. The latter (viz. empirical concepts and also that on which they are grounded, viz. empirical intuition) cannot yield a synthetic proposition except one that is also merely empirical (i.e. an experiential proposition) and therefore can never contain necessity and absolute universality, which are nevertheless characteristic of all propositions of geometry. But in respect to what would be the first and sole means of arriving at such cognitions (viz. through mere concepts or *apriori* intuitions), it is clear that no synthetic cognition whatsoever can be attained from mere concepts, but rather merely analytic cognition. Take the proposition that absolutely no space can be enclosed with two straight lines (and therefore no figure is possible), and attempt to derive it from the concept of straight lines and the number 2 – or even that a figure is possible out of three straight lines, and likewise attempt to derive it merely from those concepts. All your endeavour is in vain; and you see yourself compelled to take your flight to intuition, as geometry also always does. You therefore give yourself an object in intuition – but of what kind is that intuition: is it a pure *apriori* intuition or an empirical intuition? Were it the latter, neither a universally valid proposition and still less an apodictic proposition could ever arise therefrom: for experience can never deliver such propositions. You must therefore give your object *apriori* in intuition and ground your synthetic proposition upon that object. Now if a capacity to intuit *apriori* did not lie within you, then that subjective condition in respect of form would not simultaneously be the universal *apriori* condition under which alone the object of that (external) intuition is itself possible; if the object (viz. the triangle) were something *per se* without relation to your subject, then how could you say that what necessarily lies in your subjective conditions of constructing a triangle must also necessarily accrue to the triangle *per se*? For you could indeed add nothing new (viz. the figure) to your concepts (of three lines) that would therefore necessarily have to be encountered in the object because that object would be given before your cognition and not through it. If space (and thus also time) were not a mere form of your intuition that contained *apriori* conditions under which alone things can be external objects for you that are nothing *per se* without those subjective conditions, then you could synthetically discern absolutely nothing about external objects *apriori*. It is therefore undoubtedly certain and not merely possible or even probable that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (i.e. both external and internal) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition in relationship to which, all objects are therefore mere appearances and not things that are given by themselves in that way: of which, much can also be said *apriori* in respect of their form, though nothing whatsoever can ever be said of the thing *per se* that may underlie those appearances.

1.2. Transcendental Logic

1.2.1. Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic

1.2.1.1. On Logic *Simpliciter*

Our cognition derives from two fundamental-sources of the mind: the first of which is the capacity to receive representations (i.e. a receptivity to impressions) and the second of which is the capacity to cognise an object through those representations (i.e. spontaneity of concepts). Through the first, an object is *given* to us. Through the second, that object is *thought* about in relationship to that representation (as amere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, in such a way that neither concepts without an intuition that corresponds to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. Whereas they are *empirical* if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein, they are *pure* if no sensation is admixed with the representation. One can call sensation the ‘matter’ of sensory cognition. Therefore, pure intuition contains merely the form under which something becomes intuited; and pure concept contains solely the form of thought of an object *simpliciter*. Whereas only pure intuitions or concepts are possible *apriori*, empirical intuitions or concepts are possible only *aposteriori*.

If we shall call our mind’s *receptivity* to receive representations so far as it is affected in some way ‘sensibility’: then its capacity to bring forth representations itself or the *spontaneity* of cognition is, by contrast, the *understanding*. Our nature brings with it that *intuition* can never be otherwise than *sensory*, i.e. that it contains only the way wherein we are affected by objects. In contrast, the capacity to *think* about an object of sensory intuition is the *understanding*. Neither of those properties is to be prioritised over the other. Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; and without understanding, none would be thought about. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. Therefore, it is just as necessary to render one’s concepts sensory (i.e. to attach the objects to them in intuition) as it is to render one’s intuitions intelligible to oneself (i.e. to bring them under concepts). The two capacities or faculties also cannot interchange their functions. The understanding is unable to intuit anything, and the senses are unable to think about anything. Cognition can arise only from their uniting with one another. For that reason, one must also not mix their contributions; but rather one has great cause to separate and distinguish each from the other carefully. Hence, we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility *simpliciter* (viz. aesthetic) from the science of the understanding’s rules *simpliciter* (viz. logic).

Logic can in turn be undertaken in two intentions: namely, either as logic of the understanding’s universal use or as logic of the understanding’s particular use. The first contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which absolutely no use of the understanding occurs and therefore addresses the understanding without regard to the diversity of the objects to which it may be directed. Logic of the understanding’s particular use contains the rules for thinking correctly about a certain kind of object. Whereas one can call the former ‘elementary logic’, one can call the latter the ‘organon’ of one science or another. For the most part, the latter is prefixed in the schools as a propædeutic to the sciences even though according to human reason’s course, it is in fact what it arrives at last: only when the science is already long completed and requires only the final touch for its correction and perfection. For one must already know objects to a considerably high degree if one wishes to specify the rules for how a science of them can be brought forth.

Universal logic is either pure or applied logic. In the first, we abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised (e.g. from the influence of the senses, the play of the imagination, the laws of memory, the power of custom, inclination, etc.) and therefore also from the sources of prejudices and indeed from absolutely all causes from which certain cognitions may arise or through which they may become suppressed for us because they pertain to the understanding merely under certain circumstances of its application: and in order to know those circumstances, experience is required. A *universal* yet *pure logic* therefore deals with pure *apriori* principles and is a *canon of the understanding* and of reason: though only in regard to the formal aspect of their use, whatever the content may be (empirical or transcendental). A universal logic is said to be *applied*, however, if it is directed to the rules of use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions of which psychology teaches us. It therefore has empirical principles, though it is indeed universal insofar as it addresses use of the understanding without distinction of objects. For that reason, it is also neither a canon of the understanding *simpliciter* nor an organon of particular sciences but rather merely a catharcticon of the common understanding.

In universal logic, therefore, the part that shall constitute the pure doctrine-of-reason must be totally separated from that which constitutes applied (though admittedly still universal) logic. Only the former part is truly science, albeit curt and dry, and as a scholastically-correct presentation of an elementology of the understanding requires. In the latter, therefore, logicians must always have two rules in view:

1) As universal logic, it abstracts from all content of intellectual cognition and the diversity of such cognition’s objects and deals with nothing but the mere form of thought.

2) As pure logic, it has no empirical principles and therefore extracts nothing (as one has sometimes persuaded oneself) from psychology, which therefore has absolutely no influence upon the canon of the understanding. It is therefore a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be fully *apriori* certain.

What I call ‘applied logic’ (contrarily to that word’s common signification, according to which it shall contain certain exercises for which pure logic provides the rule) is a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use *in concreto*: i.e. under the contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote that use and which are, *in toto*, given only empirically. It treats of attention, its hindrance and consequences, the origin of error, the state of doubt, scruple, conviction, etc.; and universal and pure logic relates to it as pure morality – which contains merely the necessary moral laws of a free will *simpliciter* – relates to aretology proper, which considers those laws under the hindrances of the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which humans are more-or-less subjected and which can never yield a true and demonstrated science because, just as much as the aforementioned applied logic, it requires both empirical and psychological principles.

1.2.1.2. On Transcendental Logic

As we showed, universal logic abstracts from all content of cognition (i.e. from all relation of cognition to its object) and contemplates only the logical form in the relationship of cognitions to one another (i.e. the form of thought *simpliciter*). But since there are pure as well as empirical intuitions (as the Transcendental Aesthetic demonstrates), a difference between pure and empirical thought about objects could also well be encountered. In that case, there would be a logic in which one would not abstract from all content of cognition; for a logic that contained merely the rules of pure thought about an object would exclude all those cognitions that were of empirical content. It would also address the origin of our cognitions of objects so far as it cannot be ascribed to the objects: whereas, by contrast, universal logic does not deal with that origin of cognition but rather contemplates representations (whether they are given primordially *apriori* within ourselves or only empirically) merely in respect to the laws according to which the understanding uses them in relationship to one another when it thinks and therefore treats only of the intellectual form that can be provided to the representations, whencesoever they may have arisen.

And here I make a remark that extends its influence to all subsequent contemplations and which one must well have in view: viz. that not every *apriori* cognition, but rather only those whereby we cognise that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied or possible merely *apriori* (i.e. those pertaining to the *apriori* use or possibility of cognition) must be called ‘transcendental’. Therefore, neither space nor an *apriori* geometrical-determination of it is a transcendental representation; but rather only the cognition that those representations are not at all of empirical origin and the possibility of how they can nevertheless relate to objects of experience *apriori* can be called ‘transcendental’. Moreover, use of the space of objects *simpliciter* would also be transcendental; but if it is restricted merely to objects of the senses, then it is called ‘empirical’. The difference between the transcendental and the empirical therefore pertains only to critique of cognitions and does not concern their relation to their objects.

In the expectation that there could perhaps be concepts that may relate to objects *apriori* not as pure or sensory intuitions but rather merely as actions of pure thought and which are therefore concepts but of neither empirical nor aesthetic origin, we generate in advance the idea of a science of the pure understanding and rational-cognition whereby we think about objects fully *apriori*. Such a science, which would determine the extent and objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be called *transcendental logic* because it deals merely with the laws of the understanding and reason, but merely so far as they become related to objects *apriori* and (unlike universal logic) not to both empirical and pure rational-cognitions without distinction.

1.2.1.3. On the Division of Universal Logic into *Analytic* and *Dialectic*

The ancient and famous question with which one thought to drive logicians into a corner and sought to bring them to a point at which they either had to allow themselves to be affected by a miserable diallelon or else confess their ignorance and consequently the idleness of their entire art is this: ‘**What is truth?**’. The nominal explanation of truth as cognition’s agreement with its object is granted and presupposed here, but one demands to know what the universal and sure criterion of each cognition’s truth is.

It is already a great and necessary proof of prudence or insight to know what one should rationally ask. For if the question is absurd *per se* and demands unnecessary answers, then beyond the shame of him who raises it, it also sometimes has the disadvantage of enticing an incautious hearer of it into absurd answers and of affording the risible sight of (as the ancients said) someone milking a goat whilst someone else holds a sieve underneath.

If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then that object must thereby be differentiated from others; for a cognition is false if it disagrees with the object to which it becomes related, even if it contains something that could well hold for other objects. Now, a universal criterion of truth would be one that would hold for all cognitions without distinction of their objects. It is clear, however, that since one abstracts from all content of cognition (i.e. relation to its object) with such a criterion and truth concerns precisely that content, it is entirely impossible and absurd to enquire after a mark of the truth of that content of cognitions and that it is therefore impossible to specify a sufficient and yet simultaneously universal distinguishing-sign of truth. Since we have already called a cognition’s content its ‘matter’ above, one will have to say that no universal distinguishing-sign of a cognition’s truth in respect of its matter can be demanded because it is contradictory *per se*.

In regard to cognition in respect of its mere form (setting aside all content), however, it is equally clear that a logic so far as it presents the universal and necessary rules of the understanding must propound criteria of truth precisely within those rules. For what contradicts them is false because the understanding therein conflicts with its universal rules of thought and consequently with itself. Yet those criteria concern only the form of truth (i.e. of thought *simpliciter*) and are, to that extent, entirely correct: but not sufficient. For even though a cognition might be fully accordant with logical form (i.e. not contradict itself), it can still always contradict the object. Therefore, the merely logical criterion of truth (viz. the agreement of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of the understanding and reason) is admittedly the *conditio sine qua non* and therefore the negative condition of all truth, but logic can go no further; and an error that concerns not form but rather content cannot be discovered by logic through any touchstone.

Universal logic resolves the entire formal task of the understanding and reason into its elements and presents them as principles of all logical judgement of our cognition. That part of logic can therefore be called ‘analytic’ and is the at least negative touchstone of truth precisely for that reason, since one must first of all examine and estimate all cognition in respect to its form in light of those rules before one investigates the cognitions themselves in respect to their content in order to discern whether they contain positive truth in regard to the object. But since a cognition’s mere form still far from suffices to secure material (objective) truth for that cognition – however much it may agree with logical laws – no one can venture to judge concerning objects and assert something concerning them without having previously gathered grounded information about them outside logic in order to thereafter attempt merely to use and connect that information in a coherent whole according to logical laws or, still better, merely examine it in light of those laws. Nevertheless, something so enticing lies in the possession of such a specious art of giving the understanding’s form to all our cognitions even though one may still be very destitute and poor in respect to content that the aforementioned universal logic, which is merely a *canon* for judging, has been used like an *organon* (as it were) for actually bringing forth at least the illusion of objective assertions and consequently in fact thereby misused. Universal logic as a purported organon is called *dialectic*.

Even as diverse as the signification is in which the ancients availed themselves of that denomination of a science or art, one can still assuredly take from their actual use of it that for them, dialectic was nothing other than the *logic of semblance*: a sophistical art of giving one’s ignorance – and indeed even one’s intentional illusions – the veneer of truth in such a way that one would imitate the method of profundity that logic *simpliciter* prescribes and use its topic to embellish every vacuous pretence. Now one can note as a sure and useful warning that universal logic *considered as an organon* is always a logic of semblance (i.e. dialectical). For since it teaches us nothing about cognition’s content but rather merely the formal conditions of its agreement with the understanding, which are also totally indifferent in regard to objects, the impertinence to use it as a tool (i.e. an organon) to broaden and expand one’s knowledge (at least according to the pretence) leads to nothing but garrulousness in order to assert whatever one wants with some semblance or even to challenge whatever one wants at discretion.

Such an instruction is in no way accordant with philosophy’s dignity. Hence, one has preferred to attribute the denomination of ‘dialectic’ to logic as a *critique of dialectical semblance*; and we also wish it to be understood as such a denomination here.

1.2.1.4. On the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic

In a transcendental logic, we isolate the understanding (just as above, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, we isolated sensibility) and set off from our cognition merely the part of thought that has its origin only within the understanding. Use of that pure cognition, however, rests upon the following fact as its condition: viz. that objects are given to us in intuition to which that cognition can be applied. For without intuition, all our cognition lacks objects: and it then remains completely empty. The part of transcendental logic that presents the elements of pure intellectual-cognition and the principles without which no object can be thought about at all is transcendental analytic and simultaneously a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it without simultaneously losing all content (i.e. all relation to an object) and consequently all truth. But since it is very alluring and enticing to avail oneself of those pure intellectual-cognitions and principles alone and even beyond the limits of experience, which solely and alone can deliver the matter (i.e. objects) to us to which those pure intellectual-concepts can be applied: the understanding drifts into danger of making a material use of the merely formal principles of the pure understanding through vacuous sophistries and judging indiscriminately concerning objects that are not yet given to us and which indeed perhaps cannot be given to us in any way. Since it should therefore be merely a canon of the judgement of empirical use, it is misused if one accepts it as the organon of a universal and unrestricted use and ventures to synthetically judge, assert, and decide about objects *simpliciter* with the pure understanding alone. Use of the pure understanding would then therefore be dialectical. The second part of transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of that dialectical semblance and is called ‘transcendental dialectic’: not as an art of arousing such semblance (an unfortunately very passable art of manifold metaphysical juggleries), but rather as a critique of the understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use in order to uncover the false semblance of their groundless pretensions and diminish their claims to invention and expansion, which they purport to attain merely by means of transcendental principles, to the mere judgement of the understanding and its preservation from sophistical illusions.

1.2.2. The Transcendental Analytic

This analytic is the dissection of our total *apriori*-cognition into the elements of pure intellectual-cognition. The following components are at issue herein: (1) that the concepts be pure and not empirical concepts; (2) that they pertain not to intuition and sensibility but rather to thought and understanding; (3) that they be elementary concepts and well differentiated from the derived concepts or those concepts that are composed of them; (4) that their table be complete and totally fill the whole field of the pure understanding. Now, that completeness of a science cannot be reliably assumed on the basis of an estimate of an aggregate that has been brought forth merely through experiments; therefore, it is possible only by means of an *idea of the whole* of *apriori* intellectual-cognition and through the division of the concepts constituting that cognition that is determined from the idea and therefore only through their *coherence in a system*. The pure understanding fully separates itself not only from everything empirical, but even from all sensibility. It is therefore a unity that is constant by itself, self-sufficient, and cannot be augmented through any additions accruing externally. Therefore, the complex of its cognition will constitute a system that is to be encompassed and determined under an idea and whose completeness and articulation can simultaneously yield a touchstone of the correctness and genuineness of all cognitive components that fit into it. This whole part of the Transcendental Logic consists of two *books*, one of which contains the *concepts* and the other the *principles* of the pure understanding.

1.2.2.1. The Analytic of the Concepts

By an ‘analytic of the concepts’, I understand not an analysis of them nor the usual procedure in philosophical investigations wherein concepts that offer themselves are dissected in respect of their content and rendered perspicuous, but rather the still little attempted *dissection of the intellectual-capacity* itself in order to investigate the possibility of *apriori* concepts through seeking them out within the understanding alone (which is their birthplace) and analysing the understanding’s pure use *simpliciter*. For the latter is the peculiar task of a transcendental philosophy; the rest is the logical treatment of the concepts in philosophy *simpliciter*. We will therefore pursue the pure concepts to their first germs and dispositions within the human understanding, in which they lie prepared until they are finally developed on occasion of experience and – freed through the very same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to them – presented in their limpidity.

1.2.2.1.1. On the Guiding Thread for the Discovery of All Pure Intellectual-Concepts

When one brings a cognitive capacity into play, diverse concepts manifest themselves on various occasions that render that capacity knowable and which can be collected in a more or less thorough essay after observation of them has been conducted for a long time or with greater sharpsightedness. When that investigation will be completed can never be surely determined through that, as it were, mechanical procedure. Moreover, the concepts that one thus finds only on occasion are discovered in no order and systematic unity but rather ultimately grouped merely according to similarities and placed in series according to the magnitude of their content from the simple to the more composite, which are brought forth less than systematically though in a certain way methodically.

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation of seeking out its concepts according to a principle because it must arise from the understanding pure and unmixed, as an absolute unity, and must therefore itself cohere within itself according to a concept or an idea. Such a coherence delivers a rule, however, according to which the position of each intellectual concept can be determined for it and the completeness of all of them *in toto* can be determined for them *apriori*: all of which would otherwise depend upon discretion or contingency.

1.2.2.1.1.1. On the Understanding’s Logical Use *Simpliciter*

The understanding was explained merely negatively above: as a non-sensory cognitive-capacity. Now, we can partake of no intuition independently of sensibility. Therefore, the understanding is not a capacity for intuition. Beyond intuition, however, there is no other way of cognising except through concepts. Therefore, the cognition of every understanding (or at least of human understanding) is a cognition through concepts: not intuitive, but rather discursive. All intuitions, *qua* sensory, rest upon affections; all concepts therefore rest upon functions. By the term ‘function’, however, I understand the unity of the action of ordering diverse representations under a common representation. Concepts are therefore grounded upon a spontaneity of thought, just as sensory intuitions are grounded upon a receptivity to impressions. Now, the understanding can make no use of those concepts except that it thereby judges. Since no representation concerns its object immediately except merely intuition, a concept never becomes related to an object immediately but rather to another representation of that object (be it an intuition or indeed even a concept). A judgement is therefore a mediate cognition of an object and therefore a representation of a representation of that object. In every judgement, there is a concept that holds for many and, amongst those many, also comprehends a given representation; and the latter representation then becomes related to the object immediately. So (e.g.) in the judgement ‘all bodies are divisible’, the concept of the divisible relates to diverse other concepts; but among them, it here becomes related particularly to the concept of a body: and the latter concept becomes related to certain appearances that are presented to us. Therefore, those objects become represented mediately through the concept of divisibility. All judgements are thus functions of the unity of our representations: since instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation that comprehends that representation and multiple others under itself is used for cognition of the object and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can reduce all actions of the understanding to judgements, however; so the *understanding simpliciter* can be represented as a *capacity to judge*. For according to the above, it is a capacity to think. Thought is cognition through concepts. As predicates of possible judgements, however, concepts relate to a representation of a still indeterminate object. So the concept of a body signifies something (e.g. metal) that can be cognised through that concept. It is therefore a concept only through the fact that other representations are contained under it by means of which it can relate to objects. It is therefore the predicate for a possible judgement, e.g. ‘every metal is a body’. The functions of the understanding can therefore be found *in toto* if one can present the functions of the unity in judgements completely. The following section will show, however, that that can very well be accomplished.

1.2.2.1.1.2. On the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements

If we abstract from all content of a judgement *simpliciter* and attend only to the mere intellectual-form therein, then we find that the function of thought within that judgement can be brought under three titles: each of which contains three moments under it. They can be aptly represented in the following table:

**Table of Judgements**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1. Quantity of Judgements** |  |
|  | Universal |  |
|  | Particular |  |
|  | Individual |  |
| **2. Quality** |  | **3. Relation** |
| Affirmative |  | Categorical |
| Negative |  | Hypothetical |
| Infinite |  | Disjunctive |
|  | **4. Modality** |  |
|  | Problematic |  |
|  | Assertoric |  |
|  | Apodictic |  |

Since this division seems to deviate from the customary technique of logicians in some (albeit inessential) components, the following precautions against worrisome misunderstanding will not be unnecessary.

1) Logicians rightly say that in using judgements in rational inferences, individual judgements can be treated the same as universal judgements. For precisely because a universal judgement has absolutely no extent, its predicate cannot become related merely to some of what is contained under the concept of its subject but excluded from something else. Its predicate therefore holds for that concept without exception, just as if that concept were a commonly-valid concept that had an extent for whose entire signification the predicate held. In contrast: if we compare an individual judgement with a commonly-valid judgement merely *qua* cognition in respect of its quantity, then the former relates to the latter as unity relates to infinitude and is therefore essentially different therefrom *per se*. Therefore: if I estimate an individual judgement (*iudicium singulare*) not merely in respect to its internal validity but also *qua* cognition *simpliciter* in respect to the quantity that it has in comparison with other cognitions, then it is indeed different from commonly-valid judgements (*iudicia communia*) and deserves a special place in a complete table of the moments of thought *simpliciter* (though admittedly not in logic restricted merely to the use of judgements amongst one another).

2) Likewise, in a transcendental logic, *infinite judgements* must also be distinguished from *affirmative* judgements: even if they are rightly counted with them in universal logic and do not constitute a discrete component of the division. For whereas universal logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even if it is negative) and looks only to whether the predicate is attributed or opposed to the subject, transcendental logic considers the judgement also in respect to the value or content of that logical affirmation by means of a merely negative predicate and what gain that affirmation provides in regard to the total cognition. If I said of the soul ‘it is immortal’, then I would at least have averted an error through a negative judgement. Through the proposition ‘the soul is immortal’, I have indeed actually affirmed according to its logical form by positing the soul in the unrestricted extent of the immortal beings. Now, since the *mortalia* contain one part of the total extent of possible beings and the *immortalia* contain the other, nothing is said through my proposition except that the soul is one of the infinite multitude of things that remain left over when I remove the *mortalia* in their totality. Through that, however, the infinite sphere of all *possibilia* is merely restricted insofar as the *mortalia* are separated therefrom and the soul is posited in the remaining portion of its extent. Yet that space still always remains infinite despite that exception, and still more parts of it can be removed without the concept of the soul consequently growing and becoming determined affirmatively in the slightest. Those infinite judgements in regard to logical extent are therefore actually merely restrictive in regard to content of cognition *simpliciter*; and to that extent, they must not be passed over in a transcendental table of all moments of thought in judgements because the function of the understanding that is exercised therein can perhaps be important in the field of the understanding’s pure *apriori* cognition.

3) All of the cogitative relationships in judgements are (a) that of a predicate to a subject, (b) that of a ground to a consequence, (c) that of a divided cognition and the collected components of the division between one another. In the first kind of judgement, there are only two concepts. In the second, two judgements are considered in relationship to one another. In the third, multiple judgements are considered in relationship to one another. The hypothetical proposition ‘if a perfect justice exists, then persistent badness is punished’ in fact contains the relationship of two propositions: namely, ‘a perfect justice exists’ and ‘persistent badness is punished’. Whether both of those propositions are true *per se* remains undiscerned here. It is only the consequence that is thought of through that judgement. Finally, a disjunctive judgement contains a relationship of two or more propositions to one another: though not of sequence but rather of logical opposition so far as the sphere of one excludes that of the other, but yet simultaneously of community insofar as they together fill the sphere of the genuine cognition and therefore a relationship of the parts of a cognition’s sphere wherein the sphere of each part is a complementary component of the sphere of the other for the whole complex of the divided cognition; e.g. ‘the world exists either through a blind contingency or through internal necessity or through an external cause’. Whereas each of those propositions takes in a part of the sphere of the possible cognition concerning the existence of a world *simpliciter*, all together take in the whole sphere. Removing the cognition from one of those spheres means positing it in one of the others; and in contrast, positing it in one sphere means removing it from the others. There is therefore a certain community of cognitions in a disjunctive judgement that consists in the fact that they mutually exclude one another but thereby nevertheless determine the true cognition *in its totality* by collectively constituting the entire content of a single given cognition. And that is also all that I find necessary to remark here in connection with the following.

4) The modality of judgements is a wholly peculiar function of them that has in it the distinguishing feature that it contributes nothing to a judgement’s content (for beyond quantity, quality, and relationship, there is nothing more that could constitute a judgement’s content) but merely concerns the value of its copula in relation to thought *simpliciter*. *Problematic* judgements are those wherein one assumes the affirmation or denial as merely possible (i.e. arbitrary); *assertoric* judgements are those wherein it is regarded as *actual* (i.e. true); *apodictic* judgements are those in which one regards it as *necessary*.[[5]](#footnote-5) So the two judgements whose relationship constitutes a hypothetical judgement (viz. the *antecedens* and the *consequens*) and also those in whose reciprocation a disjunctive judgement consists (i.e. the components of the division) are *in toto* merely problematic. In the above example, the proposition ‘a perfect justice exists’ is not said assertorically but is rather thought of merely as an arbitrary judgement whereof it is possible that someone assumes it; and only the consequence is assertoric. Therefore, such judgements can also be manifestly false and yet, taken problematically, conditions of cognising the truth. So the judgement ‘the world exists through blind contingency’ in the disjunctive judgement is of only problematic significance, i.e. such that someone may assume it in a moment, and yet serves (like demarcating the false path among the number of all those that one may take) to find the true path. A problematic proposition is therefore a proposition that expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective), i.e. a free choice to accept such a proposition – a merely arbitrary assumption of it into the understanding. An assertoric proposition speaks of logical actuality or truth (like, e.g., in a hypothetical rational-inference, the antecedent occurs problematically in the major premise and assertorically in the minor premise) and indicates that the proposition is already conjoined with the understanding according to its laws. The apodictic proposition thinks of the assertoric proposition as itself determined through those laws of the understanding and therefore assertively *apriori* and, in such a way, expresses logical necessity. Now, since everything incorporates itself into the understanding gradually here in such a way that one first judges something problematically, thereupon also indeed assumes it as true assertorically, and finally asserts it as inseverably conjoined with the understanding (i.e. as necessary and apodictically): one can call those three functions of modality also three ‘moments of thought’ *simpliciter*.

1.2.2.1.1.3. On the Pure Intellectual-Concepts or Categories

As has already been said multiple times, universal logic abstracts from all content of cognition and expects that representations be given to it from elsewhere (wherever it may be) in order for it to first transform them into concepts, which proceeds analytically. In contrast, transcendental logic has a manifold of sensibility *apriori* lying before it that transcendental aesthetic offers to it: without which, it would be without any content and therefore completely empty. Now, space and time contain a manifold of pure *apriori* intuition but nevertheless belong to the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, under which alone our mind can receive representations from objects and which must therefore also always affect the concept of those objects. Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that that manifold first be gone through, received, and conjoined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made therefrom. I call that action ‘synthesis’.

By the term ‘synthesis’ in its most general signification, however, I understand the action of adding diverse representations to one another and comprehending their manifold within a cognition. Such a synthesis is *pure* if the manifold is given not empirically but rather *apriori* (like that in space and time). Before all analysis of our representations, those representations must first of all be given; and no concepts can arise analytically *in respect to their content*. Yet synthesising a manifold (whether it be given empirically or *apriori*) first brings forth a cognition that can admittedly still be rough and confused and therefore in need of analysis. Only synthesis is nevertheless that which truly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content, and it is therefore that to which we must first attend if we wish to judge concerning the first origin of our cognition.

As we will subsequently see, synthesis *simpliciter* is the mere effect of the imaginal power: a blind though indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever but of which we are seldom even conscious. Only bringing that synthesis *to concepts* is a function that appertains to the understanding and through which the understanding first provides us with cognition in the true signification.

*Pure synthesis*, *represented generally*, yields pure intellectual-concepts. By pure synthesis, however, I understand that synthesis which rests upon a ground of synthetic *apriori* unity. Thus, our counting (and this is primarily more noticeable with greater numbers) is a *synthesis according to concepts* because it occurs according to a common ground of unity (e.g. the decad). Under that concept, therefore, the unity in synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary.

Analytically, diverse representations are brought *under* a concept (a task whereof universal logic treats). But transcendental logic teaches not of bringing representations under concepts, but rather of bringing the *pure synthesis* of representations *to* concepts. What must first be given to us for the behoof of *apriori* cognition of all objects is the *manifold* of pure intuition; the *synthesis* of that manifold through the imaginal power is what is required secondly, but still does not yield a cognition. The concepts that give *unity* to that pure synthesis and which consist merely in the representation of that necessary synthetic unity accomplish what is required thirdly for cognition of a presented object and rest upon the understanding.

The same function that gives unity to the diverse representations *within a judgement* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of diverse representations *within an intuition*: which, expressed generally, is called a ‘pure intellectual-concept’. Through exactly the same actions whereby it would bring about the logical form of a judgement by means of analytic unity, the same understanding also therefore brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition *simpliciter*; and hence they are called ‘pure intellectual-concepts’, which concern objects *apriori*: which universal logic cannot accomplish.

In such a way, just as many pure intellectual-concepts arise (which concern objects of intuition *apriori*) as there were logical functions in all possible judgements in the previous table: for the understanding is fully exhausted through the aforesaid functions, and its capacity is thereby totally measured. Following *Aristotle*, we shall call these concepts *categories*. For our intention is primordially identical to his, even though it greatly distances itself therefrom in its execution.

**Table of the Categories**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1. Quantity** |  |
|  | Unity |  |
|  | Plurality |  |
|  | Omnitude |  |
| **2. Quality** |  | **3. Relation** |
| Reality |  | Inherence and Subsistence  (*substantia et accidens*) |
| Negation |  | Causality and Dependence  (Cause and Effect) |
| Limitation |  | Community (Interaction between an Agent  and a Patient) |
|  | **4. Modality** |  |
|  | Possibility – Impossibility |  |
|  | Existence – Non-being |  |
|  | Necessity – Contingency |  |

This is a documentation of all the pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within it *apriori* and because of which it is also merely a pure understanding, since only through them can it think about something in the manifold of intuition (i.e. think about an object of intuition). This division is generated systematically from a common principle – namely, the capacity to *judge* (which equates to the capacity to think) – and has not arisen rhapsodically from a haphazardly undertaken search for pure concepts of whose completeness one can never be certain because it is merely inferred through induction without one’s considering that, in the latter way, one still never comprehends why then precisely those concepts and not others dwell within the pure understanding. *Aristotle*’s attempt to seek out those fundamental concepts was one worthy of an acuminous man. But since he had no principle, he snatched them up as he encountered them and first mustered ten of them: which he called *categories*. He subsequently believed himself to have also found five more of them, which he added under the name of the ‘postpredicaments’. Yet his table still remains defective. Furthermore, several modesof pure sensibility are also found amongst them (viz. *quando*, *ubi*, *situs*, and also *prius* and *simul*) and also an empirical mode (viz. *motus*), which do not belong in that genealogy of the understanding at all; or even the derived concepts are counted among the originary concepts (e.g. *actio* and *passio*): and some of the latter are missing altogether.

In regard to the latter, it is therefore still to be remarked that the categories – as the true *stem-concepts* of the pure understanding – also have their equally pure *derived concepts* that can by no means be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but with whose mere mention I can be satisfied in a merely critical enquiry.

Let me be permitted to call those pure but derived intellectual-concepts the *predicables* of the pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments). When one has the original and primitive concepts, the derived and subaltern concepts can easily be added and the genealogical tree of the pure understanding fully depicted. Since I am here concerned not with the system’s completeness but rather merely with the principles for a system, I save that supplementation for another enterprise. One can attain that goal considerably well if one takes ontological textbooks in hand and (e.g.) subordinates the predicables of force, action, and suffering to the category of causality, the predicables of the present and resistance to the category of community, and the predicables of arising, passing away, alteration, etc. to the predicaments of modality. The categories conjoined with the modes of pure sensibility, or even amongst one another, yield a great multitude of derived *apriori* concepts; and although remarking and (where possible) demarcating them so as to attain completeness would be a useful and not unpleasant endeavour, it is dispensable here.

I deliberately excuse myself from providing definitions of the aforesaid categories in this treatise, even if I might be in possession of them. I will subsequently dissect those concepts to an extent that is sufficient in relation to the methodology that I elaborate. Although one would be able to rightfully demand them from me in a system of pure reason, they would merely cause us to lose sight of the main point of the investigation here by arousing doubt and attacks that one can very well defer to another enterprise without detracting anything from the essential intention. Nevertheless, it is perspicuously lucid from the little that I have said thereof that it would be not only possible but also easy to bring forth a complete dictionary with all of the explanations required for that end. The disciplines even exist; it is merely necessary to fill them – and a systematic topic like this does not readily allow one to miss the place where each concept peculiarly belongs and, at the same time, readily allows one to notice the places that are still empty.

1.2.2.1.2.1. On the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction *Simpliciter*

In a legal action, when they talk of authorities and usurpations, jurists distinguish between the question of what is lawful (*quid iuris*) and the question of the fact (*quid facti*); and in demanding proof of both, they call the first (which shall demonstrate an authority or even a legal claim) a *deduction*. We avail ourselves of a multitude of empirical concepts without anyone objecting and even deem ourselves justified in appropriating a sense and an imagined signification for them without deduction because we always have experience to hand to demonstrate their objective reality. Nevertheless, there are also usurped concepts (like, e.g., *happiness* and *fate*) that admittedly circulate with almost universal indulgence but which are still sometimes challenged through the question ‘*quid iuris*’, wherein one then drifts into no small perplexity in respect to their deduction because one can adduce no perspicuous legal-ground from either experience or reason whereby the authority for their use would become perspicuous.

Amongst the various concepts that constitute the greatly mixed fabric of human cognition, there are some that are even determined for pure use *apriori* (fully independently of all experience); and an authority for that use always requires a deduction because although proofs from experience are insufficient for the legitimacy of such a use, one must nevertheless know how those concepts can relate to objects that they do not derive from an experience. Hence, I call an explanation of the way wherein concepts can relate to objects *apriori* a ‘transcendental deduction’ of them and distinguish such a deduction from an *empirical* deduction, which indicates the way in which a concept was acquired through experience and reflection upon it and which therefore concerns not the legitimacy of the possession, but rather the factum whereby the possession arose.

We now already have concepts of two entirely different kinds that can nevertheless accord with one another in that they both relate to objects fully *apriori*: namely, the concepts of space and time (as forms of sensibility) and the categories (as concepts of the understanding). Seeking an empirical deduction of them would be entirely futile labour because the distinguishing feature of their nature lies precisely in the fact that they relate to their objects without having borrowed anything from experience for their representation. Therefore, if a deduction of them is needed, it will always have to be transcendental.

Nevertheless, as with all cognition, one can seek within experience if not the principle of the possibility of those concepts, then nevertheless the occasional causes of their generation: where then the impressions of the senses give the first occasion to manifest the whole cognitive-power in regard to them and bring about experience – which always contains two highly inhomogeneous elements: namely, a *matter* for cognition from the senses and a certain *form* to order it from the inner source of pure intuition and thought, which are first brought into exercise on occasion of the former and bring forth concepts. Such a tracing of the first endeavours of our cognitive power in order to climb from individual perceptions to general concepts undoubtedly has its great utility, and one has the famous *Locke* to thank for first opening the path thereto. Only a *deduction* of the pure *apriori* concepts never comes about thereby; for it does not lie on that path at all: since in regard to their future use (which shall be wholly independent of experience), they had to show an entirely different birth-certificate than that of origination from experiences. Hence, I shall call that attempted physiological derivation (which cannot truly be called a ‘deduction’ at all because it concerns a *quaestio facti*) an explanation of the *possession* of a pure cognition. It is therefore clear that there can be solely a transcendental deduction, and in no way an empirical deduction, of the aforesaid concepts and that the latter are nothing but idle ventures in respect to pure *apriori* concepts with which someone can occupy himself only if he has not comprehended the entirely peculiar nature of those cognitions.

Now, even if the sole kind of a possible deduction of pure *apriori* cognition is admitted (viz. a deduction on the transcendental path), it is still not thereby manifest that such a deduction is thus unavoidably necessary. We earlier pursued the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction and explained and determined their objective *apriori* validity. Nevertheless, geometry takes its secure steps through mere *apriori* cognitions without needing to request a certificate of authenticity from philosophy in respect to the pure and legitimate descent of its fundamental concept of space. Only the use of that concept in that science also concerns only the external sensory-world, of whose intuition space is the pure form and in which all geometrical cognition therefore has immediate evidence (because it is grounded upon *apriori* intuition) and objects are given *apriori* in intuitionthrough cognition itself (in respect of their form). In contrast: with the *pure intellectual-concepts*, the unavoidable requirement arises of seeking a transcendental deduction not only of those concepts themselves but also of space because, since they speak of objects through predicates not of intuition and sensibility but rather of pure *apriori* thought, they relate to objects universally without any conditions of sensibility and since they are not grounded upon experience, they also cannot indicate an object in *apriori* intuition upon which they could ground their synthesis before all experience; and they therefore not only arouse suspicion concerning the objective validity and limits of their use, but also render the aforesaid *concept of space* ambiguous through being inclined to use it beyond the conditions of sensory intuition: for which reason, a transcendental deduction was also needed for that concept above. So, then, the reader must be convinced of the unavoidable necessity of such a transcendental deduction before he has made a single step within the field of pure reason because he otherwise proceeds blindly and, after he has wandered around manifoldly, must nevertheless return again to the ignorance from which he had set out. Yet he must also perspicuously discern the unavoidable difficulty beforehand in order that he does not complain about obscurity where the issue itself is deeply enveloped or become annoyed too early about the removal of hindrances because it is a matter of either completely abandoning all claims to insights of pure reason (which is the most popular field, viz. that beyond the limits of all possible experience) or bringing that critical investigation to perfection.

In respect to the concepts of space and time, we were earlier able to render it comprehensible with little effort how they, as *apriori* cognitions, must nevertheless relate to objects necessarily and could render a synthetic cognition of objects independent of all experience possible. For since an object can appear to us (i.e. be an object of empirical intuition) only by means of such pure forms of sensibility, space and time are pure intuitions that contain the condition of the possibility of objects *qua* appearances *apriori*: and the synthesis within them has objective validity.

In contrast, the understanding’s categories do not at all represent the conditions under which objects are given to us in intuition. Consequently, objects can indeed appear to us without their necessarily having to relate to functions of the understanding and without the understanding thus containing their conditions *apriori*. Therefore, a difficulty manifests itself here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility: namely, how *subjective conditions of thought* should have *objective validity* (i.e. yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects); for appearances can indeed be given to us in intuition without functions of the understanding. I may take (e.g.) the concept of a cause: which signifies a special kind of synthesis wherein upon something A, something entirely different B is posited according to a rule. It is not clear *apriori* why appearances should contain something such as that (for one cannot adduce experiences as proof, since the objective validity of that concept must be capable of being demonstrated *apriori*); and it is therefore *apriori* doubtful whether such a concept is not entirely empty and encounters no object at all amongst appearances. For that objects of sensory intuition must be accordant with the formal conditions of sensibility that lie within the mind *apriori* is clear because otherwise they would not be objects for us; but the inference that they must also additionally be accordant with the conditions that the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought is not so easy to discern. For appearances could well perhaps be so constituted that the understanding did not find them at all accordant with the conditions of its unity and everything would thus lie in confusion: in such a way that (e.g.) in the serial sequence of appearances, nothing would offer itself that would deliver a rule of synthesis and therefore correspond to the concept of cause and effect; and that concept would therefore be entirely empty, null, and without significance. Appearances would nevertheless offer objects for our intuition, for intuition does not require the functions of thought in any way.

If one thought to release oneself from the arduousness of that investigation through saying that experience unremittingly offers examples of such a regularity of appearances that give sufficient occasion to abstract the concept of a cause therefrom and thereby prove the objective validity of such a concept, then one does not remark that the concept of a cause cannot arise in that way at all but rather must either be grounded fully *apriori* within the understanding or be totally abandoned as a mere figment of the brain. For that concept absolutely requires that something A be of such a kind that something else B follows therefrom *necessarily and according to an absolutely universal rule*. Experiences very well deliver cases from which a rule is possible according to which something usually occurs, but never such that the result is *necessary*. Hence, a dignity also attaches to the synthesis of cause and effect that one cannot express empirically at all: viz. that the effect does not merely accrue to the cause, but is rather posited *through* the cause and results *from* it. Moreover, strict universality of rules is absolutely not a property of empirical rules: which can receive none other than comparative universality (i.e. widespread usability) through induction. The use of the pure intellectual-concepts would totally alter if one sought to treat them merely as empirical products.

1.2.2.1.2.2. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

Only two cases are possible in which a synthetic representation and its object can necessarily relate to one another and (as it were) meet one another: either when the object renders the representation possible or when the representation alone renders the object possible. In the first case, that relation is merely empirical and the representation is never possible *apriori*. And that is the case with appearances in respect to that within them which pertains to sensation. But in the second case: since representation *per se* (for the talk here is not at all of its causality by means of the will) does not bring forth its object *in respect to its existence*, the representation is nevertheless determinative *apriori* if it is possible to *cognise* something *as an object* through it alone. Yet there are two conditions under which alone a cognition of an object is possible: firstly *intuition*, whereby an object is given: though only as an appearance; and secondly *concept*, whereby an object corresponding to that intuition is thought about. It is clear from the above, however, that the first condition (viz. that under which alone objects can be intuited) in fact underlies the objects in respect to their form *apriori* within the mind. Therefore, all appearances are necessarily consonant with that formal condition of sensibility because they can appear (i.e. be empirically intuited and given) only through it. The question is, whether there are also *apriori* concepts that are precedent as conditions under which alone something becomes, if not intuited, then nevertheless thought about as an object. For then, all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily accordant with such concepts: because without their presupposition, nothing is possible as an *object of experience*. Now, besides containing a sensory intuition, all experience contains a *concept* of an object that is given (i.e. appears) within that intuition. Thus, concepts of objects *simpliciter* will underlie all experiential cognition as *apriori* conditions; and consequently, the objective validity of the categories as *apriori* concepts will rest upon the fact that experience is possible through them alone (in respect of the form of thought). For they then relate to objects of experience necessarily and *apriori*, because only by means of them can an object of experience be thought about *tout court*.

The transcendental deduction of all *apriori* concepts therefore has a principle to which the entire investigation must be directed: namely, that they must be cognised as *apriori* conditions of the possibility of experience (be it of the intuition that is encountered within it or of the thought). Concepts that yield the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary precisely because they do so. Yet the development of the experience wherein they are encountered is not their deduction (but rather their illustration), since they would therein still be merely contingent. Without that original relation to possible experience, in which all objects of cognition are presented, cognition’s relation to an object could not be comprehended at all.

There are, however, three original sources (i.e. faculties or capacities of the soul) that contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience and which cannot themselves be derived from another capacity of the mind: viz. *sense*, *imaginal power*, and *apperception*. Upon them are grounded (1) the *synopsis* of the *apriori* manifold through sense; (2) the *synthesis* of that manifold through the imaginal power; and finally (3) the *unity* of that synthesis through original apperception. Besides their empirical use, all of these capacities also have a transcendental use that concerns merely form and which is possible *apriori*. We have spoken of the latter *in respect to the senses* above, in the first part; but we shall now endeavour to comprehend the two others in respect of their nature.

1.2.2.1.2.3. On the *Apriori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience

That a concept shall be generated and relate to an object completely *apriori* even though it neither itself belongs to the concept of possible experience nor consists of elements of a possible experience is totally contradictory and impossible. For it would then have no content because no intuition would correspond to it: since intuitions *simpliciter*, whereby objects can be given to us, constitute the field or the total object of possible experience. An *apriori* concept that did not relate to possible experience would be merely the logical form for a concept but not the concept itself whereby something would be thought about.

If therefore there are pure *apriori* concepts: then although they can admittedly contain nothing empirical, they must nevertheless be mere *apriori* conditions for a possible experience – as that upon which alone their objective reality can rest.

Therefore, if one wishes to know how pure intellectual-concepts are possible, then one must investigate what the *apriori* conditions are upon which the possibility of experience rests and which underlie it even if one abstracts from everything empirical in appearances. A concept that expresses that formal and objective condition of experience universally and sufficiently would be called a ‘pure intellectual-concept’. Even if I have pure intellectual-concepts, I can also well think of objects that are perhaps impossible or are perhaps possible *per se* yet incapable of being given in an experience because something can be omitted in the connection of those concepts that nevertheless pertains necessarily to the condition of a possible experience (e.g. the concept of a spirit) or pure intellectual-concepts could, say, be extended further than experience can reach (e.g. the concept of God). Nevertheless, although the *elements* for all *apriori* cognitions – even for arbitrary and absurd inventions – admittedly cannot be borrowed from experience (for otherwise, they would not be *apriori* cognitions), they must always contain the pure *apriori* conditions of a possible experience and an object of it; for otherwise not only would absolutely nothing be thought about through them but also, without data, they would not even be capable of arising in thought themselves. We find those concepts, which contain *apriori* the pure thought in every experience, in the categories; and it is already a sufficient deduction of them and justification of their objective validity if we can prove that only by means of them can an object be thought about. Yet since more than the sole capacity to think (viz. the understanding) is occupied in such a thought and the understanding itself, as a cognitive capacity that shall relate to objects, is just as much in need of an elucidation in respect of the possibility of that relation: we must first consider the subjective sources that constitute the *apriori* foundation for the possibility of experience not in regard to their empirical constitution, but rather in regard to their transcendental constitution.

If every individual representation were wholly foreign to and (as it were) isolated and separated from every other individual representation, then something such as cognition (which is a whole of compared and connected representations) would never arise. If I attribute a synopsis to sense because it contains a manifold within its intuition, then a synthesis always corresponds to that synopsis: and *receptivity* can render cognitions possible only conjointly with *spontaneity*. Now, spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis that occurs necessarily in all cognition: viz. *apprehension* of representations *qua* modifications of the mind in intuition, *reproduction* of them in imagination, and *recognition* of them in concepts. They provide guidance to three subjective cognitive-sources that even render the understanding possible and, through it, all experience: which is an empirical product of the understanding.

1.2.2.1.2.3.1. Precursory Reminder

The deduction of the categories is conjoined with so many difficulties and requires one to penetrate so deeply into the first grounds of the possibility of our cognition *simpliciter* that – in order to avoid the farreachingness of a complete theory and yet to neglect nothing in such a necessary investigation – I have found it more advisable to more prepare than instruct the reader through the following four sections and to represent the discussion of those elements of the understanding systematically only in the subsequent, third section. For that reason, the reader cannot let himself be deterred through the obscurity that is initially unavoidable on a path that is still wholly untrodden but which (I hope) shall be enlightened in the aforesaid section until complete insight is attained.

1.2.2.1.2.3.2. On the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

Whencesoever our representations might derive – whether they are effected through the influence of external things or through internal causes; whether they have arisen *apriori* or empirically as appearances – they nevertheless belong, as modifications of the mind, to the internal sense; and as such, all our cognitions are still ultimately subjected to the formal condition of the internal sense, viz. time: in which they *in toto* must be ordered, connected, and brought into relationships. That is a general remark that one must take as a basis absolutely in what follows.

Every intuition contains a manifold within it that would not be represented as a manifold if the mind did not distinguish the time in the sequence of impressions upon one another: for *as contained within a moment*, no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. Now, in order for unity of intuition to arise from that manifold (like, say, in a representation of space), firstly traversing the manifold and then collecting it is necessary – an action that I call the *synthesis of apprehension* because it is directed straight towards intuition: which admittedly offers a manifold, but never *qua* manifold and which can never contain it *within one representation* without a synthesis occurring therein.

That synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised *apriori*, i.e. in respect to representations that are not empirical. For without it, we would be incapable of having representations of space or time *apriori*: since those can be generated only through synthesis of the manifold that sensibility offers in its original receptivity. Therefore, we have a pure synthesis of apprehension.

1.2.2.1.2.3.3. On the Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination

It is admittedly a merely empirical law according to which, representations that have often followed or accompanied one another ultimately associate with one another and thereby bring themselves into a connection wherein, even without the presence of the object, one of those representations brings forth a transition of the mind to the other according to a constant rule. This law of reproduction presupposes, however, that the appearances themselves are actually subjected to such a rule and that within the manifold of their representations, a concomitance or sequence accordant with certain rules occurs. For without that, our empirical imaginal-power would never receive the opportunity to do something accordant with its capacity and would consequently remain concealed within the mind’s interior like a dead capacity that is unknown to us. If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, and sometimes heavy; if a human were sometimes altered into one animal form and sometimes into another; and if on the longest day, the land were sometimes covered with fruit and sometimes with ice and snow: then my empirical imaginal-power could not even receive an opportunity to receive the heavy cinnabar into thought with the representation of the red colour – or if a certain word were sometimes applied to one thing and sometimes to another; or if even exactly the same thing were sometimes named in one way and sometimes in another without a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected by themselves governing therein: then no empirical synthesis of reproduction could occur.

There must therefore be something that itself renders that reproduction of the appearances possible through its being the *apriori* ground of a necessary synthetic unity of them. One soon encounters it, however, if one considers that appearances are not things *per se* but rather the mere play of our representations: which, in the end, amount to determinations of the internal sense. If we can demonstrate that even our purest *apriori* intuitions can provide no cognition except so far as they contain such a conjunction of the manifold that renders a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction possible: then that synthesis of the imaginal power is also grounded upon *apriori* principles prior to all experience, and one must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of the imaginal power that underlies even the possibility of all experience (which appearances’ reproducibility necessarily presupposes). Now, it is manifest that if I wish to draw a line in thought, or think about the time from one midday to another, or even merely represent a certain number to myself: then firstly I must necessarily conceive one of those manifold representations after another in thought. But if I always lost the preceding representations (viz. the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of the time, or the successively-represented unities) from thought and did not reproduce them because I progressed to the following representations, then no whole representation nor any of the aforementioned thoughts nor indeed even the purest and first fundamental-representations of space and time could ever arise.

Synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseverably conjoined with synthesis of reproduction. And since the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all cognitions *simpliciter* (i.e. not merely of empirical cognitions, but also of pure *apriori* cognitions), the imaginal power’s reproductive synthesis is among the mind’s transcendental actions: and in light of them, we shall also call that capacity the imaginal power’s ‘transcendental capacity’.

1.2.2.1.2.3.4. On the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts

Without consciousness that what we think about is exactly the same as what we thought about a moment previously, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. For there would be a new representation in the current state that did not at all belong to the act whereby it is supposed to have been gradually generated, and the manifold of that representation would never constitute a whole because it would lack the unity that only consciousness can provide to it. If in counting, I forget that the unities that now float before my senses have been added to one another by me one-by-one, then I would not cognise the generation of the multitude through that successive addition of one to one and would therefore also not cognise the number; for that concept consists merely in a consciousness of that unity of a synthesis.

The word ‘concept’ could by itself already guide us towards that observation. For it is that *one* consciousness that unifies the manifold, what is gradually intuited, and then also what is reproduced within one representation. That consciousness can often be only weak, to the extent that we connect it to the generation of the representation only within the effect but not within the act itself (i.e. immediately); but despite that difference, one consciousness must still always be encountered even if it lacks salient clarity: and without it, concepts and with them cognition of objects are entirely impossible.

And here, then, it is necessary to render oneself intelligible in respect of what one means by the expression ‘an object of representations’. We said above that appearances themselves are nothing but representations that must not be regarded as objects *per se* (outside the representational power) in exactly the same mode. What does one understand, then, when one speaks of an object corresponding to a cognition and therefore also distinct therefrom? It is easy to discern that that object must be thought of only as something *simpliciter* = X because we indeed have nothing outside our cognition that we could oppose to that cognition as corresponding.

Yet we find that, of necessity, our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something with it: viz. that since that object is regarded as that which is opposed to all cognition, our cognitions are determined not haphazardly or arbitrarily but rather *apriori* in a certain way because, since they shall relate to an object, they also necessarily agree with one another in relation to that object – i.e. they must have the unity that constitutes the concept of an object.

It is clear, however, that since we deal only with the manifold in our representations, and that X that corresponds to them (viz. the object) is nothing for us because it shall be something distinct from all our representations, the unity that the object renders necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in synthesis of the manifold in representations. We say that we cognise an object when we have effected synthetic unity in the intuitional manifold. That is impossible, however, if intuition has not been capable of being brought forth through such a function of synthesis according to a rule that renders the reproduction of the manifold necessary *apriori* and renders a concept possible in which that manifold unifies itself. Thus, we think of a triangle as an object in being conscious of the composition of three straight lines according to a rule according to which such an intuition can always be presented. That *unity of the rule* determines everything manifold and restricts it to conditions that render the unity of apperception possible, and the concept of that unity is a representation of the object = X of which I think through the aforementioned predicates of a triangle.

All cognition requires a concept: however imperfect or obscure it may be; and that concept is always something general, in respect of its form, and something that serves as a rule. Thus, the concept of a body – according to the unity of the manifold that is thought of through it – serves as a rule for our cognition of external appearances. It can be a rule of intuitions, however, only through representing the necessary reproduction of the manifold in given appearances and therefore the synthetic unity in consciousness of them. Thus, in perception of something external to us, the concept of a body renders the representation of extension and, with it, those of impenetrability, shape, etc. necessary.

All necessity is always underlain by a transcendental condition. Therefore, a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in synthesis of the manifold in all our intuitions and therefore also of the concepts of the objects *simpliciter* and consequently also of all objects of experience must be encountered without which it would be impossible to think of any object for our intuitions: for such an object is nothing more than the something whose concept expresses such a necessity in synthesis.

That original and transcendental condition is none other than *transcendental apperception*. Consciousness of oneself according to the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical and always mutable (there can be no stable or abiding self in that flux of internal appearances): and it is usually called the *internal sense* or *empirical apperception*. That which shall *necessarily* be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought of as numerically identical through empirical data. There must be a condition that precedes all experience and renders experience itself possible that shall validate such a transcendental presupposition.

No cognitions and no connection and unity of them amongst one another can occur without the unity of consciousness that precedes all data of intuitions and in relation to which alone all representation of objects is possible. I shall call that pure, original, and immutable consciousness *transcendental apperception*. That such apperception deserves that name is already manifest from the fact that even the purest objective unity – namely, that of the *apriori* concepts (e.g. space and time) – is possible only through a relation of intuitions to it. The numerical unity of that apperception therefore *apriori* underlies all concepts just as much as the multiplicity of space and time *apriori* underlies sensibility’s intuitions.

From all possible appearances that can ever be together within an experience, however, precisely that transcendental unity of apperception makes a nexus of all those representations according to laws. For that unity of consciousness would be impossible if in cognition of the manifold, the mind could not be conscious of the identity of the function whereby it synthetically conjoins that manifold within a cognition. Therefore, the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is simultaneously a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts (i.e. according to rules) that do not only render it necessarily reproducible, but which also thereby determine an object of their intuition: i.e. the concept of something wherein they necessarily cohere – for it would be impossible for the mind to think about the identity of itself in the multiplicity of its representations and indeed *apriori* if it did not have in view the identity of its action that subjects all apprehensional synthesis (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity and renders their coherence according to rules *apriori* possible for the first time. We will now also be able to determine our concepts of an *object simpliciter* more correctly. As representations, all representations have their object; and all representations can in turn themselves be objects of other representations. Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that which therein relates immediately to the object is called ‘intuition’. But those appearances are not things *per se* but rather themselves merely representations that in turn have their object, which therefore cannot further be intuited by us and which may hence be called the ‘non-empirical’ (i.e. transcendental) object = X.

The pure concept of that transcendental object (which is actually always identical with all our cognitions = X) is that which can provide relation to an object (i.e. objective reality) to all our empirical concepts *simpliciter*. That concept can contain no determinate intuition whatsoever and will therefore concern nothing other than the unity that must be encountered within a manifold of cognition so far as it stands in relation to an object. That relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness and therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of the mind to conjoin it within a representation. Since that unity must be regarded as necessary *apriori* (because cognition would otherwise be without an object), the relation to a transcendental object (i.e. the objective reality of our empirical cognition) will rest upon the transcendental law that all appearances, so far as objects shall be thereby given to us, must stand under *apriori* rules of their synthetic unity according to which alone their relationship within empirical intuition is possible – i.e. that they must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception in experience just as they must stand under the formal conditions of space and time in mere intuition and, indeed, that each cognition first becomes possible only through the conditions of the necessary unity of apperception.

1.2.2.1.2.3.5. Precursory Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories as *Apriori* Cognitions

There is only one experience in which all perceptions are represented in thoroughgoing and systematic coherence: just as there is only one space and time in which all forms of appearance and every relationship of being or non-being occur. If one speaks of diverse experiences, then they are merely diverse perceptions so far as they belong to one and the same general experience. For the thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of all perceptions constitutes precisely the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of all appearances according to concepts.

A unity of synthesis according to empirical concepts would be entirely contingent; and were it not grounded upon a transcendental ground of unity, then it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill our soul without it being the case that experience could ever arise therefrom. But then, all relation of cognition to objects would also fall away because it would lack a connection according to universal and necessary laws; and it would therefore admittedly be thoughtless intuition but never cognition: and for us, it would thus be tantamount to absolutely nothing.

The *apriori* conditions of a possible experience *simpliciter* are simultaneously conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. Now I assert that the *categories* adduced above are nothing other than the *conditions of thought within a possible experience,* just as *space and time* contain *the conditions of intuition* for precisely that experience. Therefore, the categories are also fundamental concepts to think about objects *simpliciter* for appearances and therefore have *apriori* objective validity, which is what we truly wished to know.

Nevertheless, the possibility and indeed even the necessity of those categories rests upon the relation that sensibility in its entirety and, with it, also all possible appearances have to the original apperception in which everything is necessarily accordant with the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, i.e. in which everything must stand under universal functions of synthesis: i.e. synthesis according to concepts, in which alone apperception can demonstrate its thoroughgoing and necessary identity *apriori*. Thus, the concept of a cause is nothing other than a synthesis (of what follows in the time series, with other appearances) *according to concepts*; and without such a unity (which has its *apriori* rule and which subjects appearances to itself) thoroughgoing and universal and therefore necessary unity of consciousness would not be encountered within the manifold of perceptions. But then, the perceptions would also not belong to an experience and would consequently be without an object and nothing more than a blind play of representations, i.e. less than a dream.

All attempts to derive those pure intellectual-concepts from experience and ascribe a merely empirical origin to them are therefore totally idle and vain. I shall mention nothing of the fact that (e.g.) the concept of a cause carries with it the feature of necessity, which absolutely no experience can give: which admittedly teaches us that upon one appearance, something else usually follows but not that it must necessarily follow upon it nor that one can infer *apriori* and entirely universally from it *qua* condition to its consequence. Yet that empirical rule of *association* that one must still thoroughgoingly assume when one says that everything in the serial sequence of occurrences stands under rules in such a way that nothing ever occurs that is not preceded by something upon which it always follows – upon what does it rest, as a law of nature?, I ask; and how is even that association possible? The ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, so far as that ground lies within the object, is called the *affinity* of the manifold. I therefore ask: how do you render the thoroughgoing affinity of all appearances comprehensible to yourself (whereby they *must* stand and belong under constant laws)?

According to my principles, it is very well comprehensible. As representations, all possible appearances belong to the total possible self-consciousness. The numerical identity of that self-consciousness (as a transcendental representation) is inseverable and *apriori* certain, however, because nothing can enter cognition except by means of that original apperception. Now, since that identity must necessarily enter the synthesis of everything manifold within appearances so far as it shall become empirical cognition, the appearances are subjected to *apriori* conditions with which their (apprehensional) synthesis must be thoroughgoingly accordant. But a representation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold *can* be posited (and therefore posited in a unitary way) is called a *rule*; and if it *must* be thus posited, it is called a *law*. Therefore, all appearances stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws and therefore in a *transcendental affinity*, of which their *empirical* affinity is the mere consequence.

That nature must comply with our subjective ground of apperception and indeed even depend upon it in respect of its lawfulness sounds very well absurd and strange. But if one considers that that nature *per se* is nothing but a complex of appearances and therefore not a thing *per se* but rather merely a multitude of mental representations, then one will not be surprised to see it merely in the radical capacity of all our cognition, viz. transcendental apperception – i.e. the unity because of which alone it can be called ‘the object of all possible experience’ (i.e. nature) – and that we can also therefore cognise that unity *apriori* and therefore also as necessary: which we would well have to forsake were it given *per se*, independently of the primary sources of our thought. For then, I would not know whence we would derive the synthetic propositions of such a universal unity-of-nature because in such a case, one would have to borrow it from the objects of nature themselves. But since that could occur only empirically, none other than merely contingent unity could be drawn therefrom: which is far from extending to the necessary coherence that one intends when one says ‘nature’.

1.2.2.1.2.4. On the Understanding’s Relationship to Objects *Simpliciter* and the Possibility of Cognising Them *Apriori*

We shall now unitarily and connectedly represent what we presented separately and individually in the previous section. There are three subjective cognitive-sources upon which the possibility of an experience *simpliciter* and cognition of its objects rest: viz. *sense*, *imaginal power*, and *apperception*. Each of them can be considered as empirical (i.e. in their application to given appearances), but they are all also *apriori* elements or foundations that render even that empirical use possible. *Sense* presents appearances empirically in *perception*; the *imaginal power* presents appearances in *association* (and reproduction); *apperception* presents appearances in *empirical consciousness* of the identity of those reproductive representations with the appearances whereby they were given and therefore in *recognition*.

Nevertheless, perception in its totality is underlain *apriori* by pure intuition (and, in respect to it as a representation, by the form of internal intuition: viz. time); association is underlain *apriori* by the imaginal power’s pure synthesis; and empirical consciousness is underlain *apriori* by pure apperception, i.e. the thoroughgoing identity of itself in respect of all possible representations.

If we now wish to pursue the internal ground of that connection of representations to the point at which they must all converge in order to therein first receive unity of cognition for a possible experience, then we must begin from pure apperception. All intuitions are nothing for us and do not impinge upon us in the slightest if they cannot be received into consciousness, whether they influence it directly or indirectly; and only through consciousness is cognition possible. We are conscious *apriori* of the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves in respect to all representations that can ever belong to our cognition, which is a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations (because they represent something within me only through the fact that they belong to one consciousness with everything else and must therefore at least be capable of being connected therein). That principle stands fast *apriori* and can be called the *transcendental principle of the unity* of everything manifold within our representations (and therefore also within intuition). The unity of the manifold within a subject is synthetic: therefore, pure apperception delivers a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Nevertheless, that synthetic unity presupposes another or includes it; and if the former shall be *apriori* necessary, then the latter must also be an *apriori* synthesis. Therefore, the transcendental unity of apperception relates to the imaginal power’s pure synthesis, which is an *apriori* condition of the possibility of all composition of the manifold within a cognition. Yet only the *imaginal power’s productive synthesis* can occur *apriori*; for its *reproductive* synthesis rests upon experiential conditions. Therefore, the principle of the necessary unity of the imaginal power’s pure (i.e. productive) synthesis is the ground of all cognition – and particularly of experience – prior to apperception.

We call the synthesis of the manifold in the imaginal power ‘transcendental’ if, without distinction of intuitions, it concerns nothing but merely the conjunction of the manifold *apriori*; and the unity of that synthesis is called ‘transcendental’ if it is represented as *apriori* necessary in relation to the original unity of apperception. Now, since the latter underlies the possibility of all cognitions, the transcendental unity of the imaginal power’s pure synthesis is the pure form of all possible cognition: through which, all objects of possible experience must consequently be represented.

*The unity of apperception in relation to the imaginal power’s synthesis is the understanding*, and the very same *unity* relative to the *imaginal power’s transcendental synthesis is the pure understanding*. Therefore, there are pure *apriori* cognitions within the understanding that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imaginal power in respect to all possible appearances. Those cognitions are the *categories* (i.e. pure intellectual-concepts), however. Consequently, man’s empirical cognitive-power necessarily contains an understanding that relates to all objects of the senses: though only by means of intuition and its synthesis through imaginal power, under which all appearances therefore stand as data for a possible experience. Now, since that relation of all appearances to possible experience is likewise necessary (because without it, we would receive no cognition through them whatsoever: and consequently, they would not impinge upon us at all), it follows that the pure understanding by means of the categories is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences and that appearances have a *necessary relation to the understanding*.

We shall now present the understanding’s necessary coherence with all appearances by means of the categories through beginning from the bottom up, i.e. from the empirical. What is given to us first is appearance, which is called ‘perception’ when it is conjoined with consciousness (without that relationship to an at least possible consciousness, appearance could never become an object of cognition for us and would therefore be nothing for us and – since it has no objective reality *per se* and exists only within cognition – nothing at all). But since every appearance contains a manifold, and diverse perceptions are consequently encountered within the mind dispersedly *per se* and individually: a conjunction of them is needed that they cannot have in sense itself. There is therefore an active capacity to synthesise that manifold within us: which we call ‘imaginal power’ and whose action I call ‘apprehension’, which is exercised immediately upon perceptions.[[7]](#footnote-7) For the imaginal power shall bring the intuitional manifold into an *image*; therefore, it must theretofore receive the impressions in its activity (i.e. apprehend them).

It is clear, however, that even that apprehension of the manifold would still bring forth neither an image nor a nexus of the impressions if a subjective ground did not exist to recall a perception from which the mind has transitioned to another perception in order for that perception to proceed to the subsequent perceptions and thus to present the entire series of them: i.e. a reproductive capacity of the imaginal power, which is then also merely empirical.

Yet since no determinate nexus but rather merely ruleless masses of representations and therefore no cognition whatsoever would arise if representations reproduced one another without distinction in the manner wherein they drift together, their reproduction must have a rule according to which each representation enters into conjunction with one representation rather than with another. One calls that subjective and *empirical* ground of reproduction according to rules the *association* of representations.

Yet if that unity of association did not also have a subjective ground such that it is impossible for appearances to be apprehended by the imaginal power except under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of that apprehension, then it would also be entirely contingent that appearances fit into a nexus of human cognition. For even if we had the capacity to associate perceptions, it would nevertheless remain *per se* entirely indeterminate and contingent whether they were also associable; and in the case that they were not associable, a multitude of perceptions and also indeed an entire sensibility would be possible in which much empirical consciousness would be encounterable within my mind but dividedly and without belonging *to one* consciousness of myself: which is, however, impossible. For only through attributing all perceptions to one consciousness (viz. original apperception) can I say in respect of all perceptions that I am conscious of them. There must therefore be an objective ground (i.e. a ground discernible *apriori* prior to all empirical laws of the imaginal power) upon which rest the possibility and indeed even the necessity of a law, extending through all appearances, to regard them thoroughgoingly as such data of the senses that are *per se* associable and subjected to universal rules of a thoroughgoing connection in reproduction. I call that objective ground of all association of appearances their *affinity*. Yet we can encounter that ground nowhere except in the principle of the unity of apperception in respect of all cognitions that shall belong to me. According to that principle, absolutely all appearances must enter the mind or be apprehended in such a way that they harmonise for the unity of apperception: which would be impossible without synthetic unity in their connection, which is therefore also objectively necessary.

The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness within one consciousness (viz. original apperception) is therefore the necessary condition even of all possible perception, and the affinity of all appearances (near or distant) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis within the imaginal power that is grounded *apriori* upon rules.

The imaginal power is therefore also a capacity for an *apriori* synthesis: because of which, we give it the name of the ‘productive imaginal-power’; and so far as it has nothing more as its aim in respect of everything manifold within appearance than a necessary unity in the synthesis of that appearance, the latter synthesis can be called the imaginal power’s ‘transcendental function’. It is therefore admittedly strange yet nevertheless manifest from the foregoing that even the affinity of appearances, with it association, and through association finally reproduction according to laws, and consequently experience itself become possible only by means of that transcendental function of the imaginal-power: because without it, absolutely no concepts of objects would coalesce into an experience.

For the stable and abiding ego (of pure apperception) constitutes the correlate of all our representations so far as it is merely possible to become conscious of them; and all consciousness belongs to an all-encompassing pure apperception just as all sensory intuition *qua* representation belongs to a pure internal intuition, viz. time. It is that apperception that must accrue to the pure imaginal-power in order to render its function intellectual. For *per se*, the imaginal power’s synthesis is, despite being exercised *apriori*, nevertheless always sensory because it conjoins the manifold only in the manner wherein it *appears* in intuition: e.g. the shape of a triangle. Yet through the manifold’s relationship to the unity of apperception, concepts arise that belong to the understanding but which can come about only by means of the imaginal power in relation to sensory intuition.

We therefore have a pure imaginal-power as a fundamental-capacity of the human soul that underlies all cognition *apriori*. By means of it, we bring the intuitional manifold, on the one hand, into conjunction with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception, on the other. Both extreme ends, viz. sensibility and understanding, must necessarily cohere by means of that transcendental function of the imaginal power because sensibility would otherwise admittedly give appearances, but no objects of an empirical cognition and therefore no experience. Actual experience – which consists of apprehension, reproductive association, and finally recognition of appearances – contains concepts within the third of those elements (which is the highest of experience’s merely empirical elements) that render experience’s formal unity possible and, with it, all objective validity (i.e. truth) of empirical cognition. These grounds of recognition of the manifold, so far as they impinge *merely upon the form of an experience simpliciter*, are the aforesaid *categories*. All formal unity in the imaginal power’s synthesis and, by means of that synthesis, also all empirical use of the imaginal power (in recognition, reproduction, association, and apprehension) all the way down to appearances are therefore grounded upon them because appearances can belong to cognition, to our consciousness in general, and consequently to ourselves only by means of those elements.

We ourselves bring the order and regularity in the appearances that we call *nature* into them and would not even be able to find them therein had we or the nature of our mind not originally laid them therein. For that unity of nature shall be a necessary (i.e. *apriori* certain) unity of the connection of the appearances. Yet how indeed would we be able to bring forth a synthetic unity *apriori* if there were not subjective grounds of such unity contained *apriori* within the original cognitive-sources of our mind and if those subjective conditions were not simultaneously objectively-valid because they are grounds of the possibility of cognising an object within experience in general.

We have explained the understanding in various ways above: as a spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of sensibility), as a capacity to think, and even as a capacity for concepts or even of judgements – explanations that amount to the same if one examines them in a suitable light. We can now characterise it as the *capacity for rules*. This distinguishing sign is more fruitful and treads closer to the understanding’s essence. Whereas sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), the understanding gives us rules. The understanding is always busy inspecting appearances in the intention of finding some rule in them. Rules so far as they are objective (and therefore necessarily attach to cognition of the object) are called ‘laws’. Even if we learn many laws through experience, they are nevertheless merely particular determinations of still higher laws: the highest amongst which (under which all others stand) derive *apriori* from the understanding itself and are not borrowed from experience, but must rather provide appearances with their lawfulness and precisely thereby render experience possible. The understanding is therefore not merely a capacity to obtain rules through comparing appearances: it is itself the legislation for nature – i.e. without understanding, there would be no nature at all (i.e. synthetic unity of the manifold within appearances according to rules); for appearances cannot occur externally to us as appearances, but rather exist only within our sensibility. But as an object of cognition within an experience with all that it may contain, sensibility is possible only in the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception, however, is the transcendental ground of the necessary lawfulness of all appearances within an experience. The very same unity of apperception in respect of a manifold of representations (i.e. to determine that manifold from a single representation) is the rule and the capacity of those rules, viz. the understanding. As possible experiences, all appearances therefore lie just as *apriori* within the understanding and obtain their formal possibility from it as they (as mere intuitions) lie within sensibility and are possible in respect of their form through it alone.

Therefore, even as excessive and absurd as it sounds to say that the understanding is itself the source of nature’s laws and therefore of its formal unity, such an assertion is nonetheless just as correct and congruent with the object (viz. experience). Admittedly, empirical laws as such can in no way derive their origin from the pure understanding: no more than the immeasurable multiplicity of appearances can be sufficiently comprehended from the pure form of sensory intuition. Yet all empirical laws are merely particular determinations of the understanding’s pure laws, under which and according to whose form those empirical laws are first possible; and the appearances assume a lawful form: just as all appearances, despite the diversity of their empirical form, must still always be accordant with the conditions of the pure form of sensibility.

In the categories, the pure understanding is therefore the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances and thereby renders experience possible in respect of its form for the first time and originally. We had to accomplish nothing more in the transcendental deduction of the categories than to render comprehensible that relationship of the understanding to sensibility and, by means of it, to all objects of experience and therefore the objective validity of all of the understanding’s pure *apriori* concepts and thereby to establish its origin and truth.

1.2.2.1.2.5. Summary Representation of the Correctness and Sole Possibility of This Deduction of the Pure Intellectual-Concepts

If the objects with which our cognition deals were things *per se*, then we would be unable to have any *apriori* concepts of them at all. For whence would we take them? If we take them from the object (again without investigating here how that object could become known to us), then our concepts would be merely empirical and not *apriori* concepts. If we take them from ourselves: what is merely within us cannot determine the constitution of an object distinct from our representations, i.e. be a ground why there shall be such a thing to which something such as what we have in thought belongs and why all that representation shall not instead be empty. In contrast: if we only ever deal with appearances, then it is not only possible but also necessary that certain *apriori* concepts precede empirical cognition of objects. For as appearances, they constitute an object that is merely within us because a mere modification of our sensibility cannot be encountered externally to us at all. Now, even that conception that all those appearances and therefore all objects with which we can occupy ourselves are *in toto* within me (i.e. are *in toto* determinations of my identical self) expresses a thoroughgoing unity of them within one and the same apperception as necessary. The form of all cognition of objects (whereby the manifold is thought of as pertaining to one object) also consists in that unity of possible consciousness, however. Therefore, the way in which the manifold of sensory representation (i.e. intuition) belongs to one consciousness precedes all cognition of the object as that cognition’s intellectual form and itself constitutes a formal *apriori* cognition of all objects *simpliciter* so far as they are thought about (i.e. categories). The synthesis of the latter through the pure imaginal-power and the unity of all representations in relation to original apperception precede all empirical cognition. Pure intellectual-concepts are therefore *apriori* possible and indeed even necessary in relation to experience because our cognition deals with nothing but appearances, whose possibility lies within us ourselves and whose connection and unity (in the representation of an object) is merely encountered within usand must therefore precede all experience and also render all experience possible for the first time in respect of its form. And from that ground – the sole possible ground amongst all – our deduction of the categories has then also been conducted.

1.2.2.2. The Analytic of the Principles

Universal logic is constructed on a ground plan that coincides entirely exactly with the division of the higher cognitive-powers. They are: **understanding**, **judging power**, and **reason**. That doctrine therefore treats of *concepts*, *judgements*, and *inferences* in its analytic precisely according to the functions and the order of those mental powers, which one comprehends under the farreaching denomination of the ‘understanding’ *simpliciter*.

Since the aforementioned merely formal logic abstracts from all content of cognition (whether that cognition be pure or empirical) and occupies itself merely with the form of thought (i.e. of discursive cognition) *simpliciter*, it can in its analytic part also concomitantly encompass the canon for reason: whose form has its sure prescription that can be comprehended *apriori* through merely dissecting reason’s actions into their moments without one’s taking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition used therein.

Since transcendental logic is restricted to a determinate content (viz. merely that of pure *apriori* cognitions), it cannot imitate the aforesaid merely formal logic in that division. For it is manifest that *reason’s transcendental use* is not objectively valid at all and therefore does not belong to *logic of truth* (i.e. analytic) but rather requires, as a *logic of semblance*, a particular part of the scholastic doctrinal-edifice under the name of ‘transcendental *dialectic*’.

Understanding and judging-power thus have their canon of their objectively valid and therefore true use within transcendental logic and therefore pertain to transcendental logic’s analytic part. Only in its attempts to discern something concerning objects *apriori* and to expand cognition beyond the limits of possible experience is entirely and absolutely *dialectical*; and its spurious assertions do not at all fit within a canon the like of which the analytic shall indeed contain.

The *analytic of the principles* will thus be merely a canon for the *judging power*, which it teaches to apply the intellectual concepts that contain the condition for rules *apriori* to appearances. Because of that: in taking the genuine *principles of the understanding* for the theme, I will avail myself of the demonination of a *doctrine of the judging-power*, whereby that task is designated more precisely.

1.2.2.2.1. On the Transcendental Judging-Power *Simpliciter*

If the understanding *simpliciter* is explained as the capacity for rules, then judging power is the capacity to *subsume* under rules: i.e. to discern whether something stands under a given rule (*casus datae legis*) or not. Universal logic contains no prescriptions for the judging power whatsoever, and nor can it contain them. For since it *abstracts from all content of cognition*, nothing remains left over for it except the task of analytically expounding the mere form of cognition in concepts, judgements, and inferences and thereby bringing forth formal rules of all use of the understanding. Now, if it wished to show universally how one should subsume under those rules (i.e. discern whether something stands thereunder or not), then that could not occur except again through a rule. But precisely because it is a rule, such a rule requires an instruction of the judging power anew; and it is thus manifest that whereas the understanding indeed admits of an instruction and equipment through rules, judging power is a special talent that shall not be instructed at all but rather merely exercised. Hence, judging power is also the specific of the so-called motherwit: whose absence no school can replace. For even though a school can abundantly proffer rules borrowed from foreign insight to a restricted understanding and (as it were) graft them onto it, a capacity to avail himself of those rules correctly must nevertheless belong to the student himself; and no rule that one might prescribe to him in that intention is secure from misuse in the absence of such a natural gift.[[8]](#footnote-8) Hence: a doctor, a judge, or a political scientist can have many fine pathological, juristic, or political rules in his head to the extent that he can himself be a profound teacher therein and yet will readily offend in their application either because he lacks natural judging-power (though not understanding) and although he admittedly discerns the universal *in abstracto*, he cannot discern whether a case belongs thereunder *in concreto* or even because he has not sufficiently been trained for that judgement through examples and actual tasks. That examples sharpen the judging power is even their sole and great utility. For they instead commonly detract somewhat from intellectual insight’s correctness and precision because they only seldom fulfil the rule’s condition adequately (as *casus in terminis*) and, moreover, often weaken the understanding’s effort to universally comprehend rules in respect of their sufficiency independently from the particular experiential circumstances and hence ultimately accustom it to using them more like formulae than principles. Thus, examples are the judging power’s leading strings: with which someone who lacks natural talent in respect of his judging power can never do without.

Yet even if *universal logic* can give no prescriptions to the judging power, the situation is nevertheless entirely different with *transcendental logic*: even to the extent that it seems that the latter has as its proper task the correction and securement of the judging power in the use of the pure understanding through determinate rules. For philosophy seems not to be needed at all or rather seems to be badly-deployed because one has gained little or even no ground therewith after all one’s previous enquiries; but rather as critique, philosophy is summoned with all its acuteness and examinatory art to prevent lapses of the judging power (*lapsus iudicii*) in the use of the few pure intellectual-concepts that we have (even though its utility is then merely negative).

Nevertheless, transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that, beyond the rule (or rather the universal condition for rules) that is given within the pure intellectual-concept, it can simultaneously indicate *apriori* the case to which it shall be applied. The cause of the advantage that it has over all other didactic sciences (except mathematics) in that respect lies precisely in the fact that it treats of concepts that shall relate to their objects *apriori*. Consequently, it cannot demonstrate their objective validity *aposteriori*: for that would leave their aforementioned dignity entirely untouched; but rather it must simultaneously propound the conditions under which objects can be given in agreement with those concepts in universal yet sufficient distinguishing-signs. Otherwise, they would be devoid of all content and would consequently be mere logical forms and not pure intellectual-concepts.

That *transcendental doctrine of the judging-power* will contain two main components. The *first* componenttreats of the sensory conditions under which alone pure intellectual-concepts can be used (i.e. the schematism of the pure understanding). The *second* component, however, treats of the synthetic judgements that flow from pure intellectual-concepts under those *apriori* conditions and which underlie all other *apriori* cognitions (i.e. the principles of the pure understanding).

1.2.2.2.2. On the Schematism of the Pure Intellectual-Concepts

In all subsumptions of an object under a concept, the representation of the former must be *homogeneous* with the latter: i.e. the concept must contain what is represented *in* the object that is to be subsumed thereunder; for the expression ‘an object is contained *under* a concept’ signifies precisely that. Thus, the empirical concept of a *plate* is homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a *circle* because the roundness that is thought of in the former can be intuited in the latter.

Pure intellectual-concepts are entirely *inhomogeneous* in comparison with empirical intuitions (and indeed sensory intuitions in general), however, and can never be encountered within any intuition. Now, how is the *subsumption* of the latter under the former and therefore the *application* of a category to appearances possible? For no one will say that (e.g.) causality can also be intuited through senses and contained within an appearance. This highly natural and important question is in fact the cause that renders a transcendental doctrine of the judging power necessary: namely, in order to show how *pure intellectual-concepts* can be applied to appearances *simpliciter*. In all other sciences wherein the concepts through which the object is thought about generally are not as different and heterogeneous from those that represent that object *in concreto* as it is given, it is unnecessary to provide a special discussion concerning the application of the former to the latter.

It is clear that there must a *tertium quid* that must be homogeneous with, on the one hand, the category and, on the other hand, the appearance and which renders the application of the former to the latter possible. That mediating representation must be pure (i.e. devoid of everything empirical) and yet *intellectual*, on the one hand, and *sensory*, on the other. Such a representation is the *transcendental schema*.

An intellectual concept contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold *simpliciter*. As the formal condition of the manifold of the internal sense and therefore of the connection of all representations, time contains an *apriori* manifold within pure intuition. A transcendental temporal-determination is homogeneous with a *category* (which constitutes its unity) so far as it is *universal* and rests upon a rule *apriori*. Yet, on the other hand, it is homogeneous with an *appearance* so far as *time* is contained within every empirical representation of the manifold. Therefore, applying a category to appearances will be possible by means of a transcendental temporal-determination: which, as the schema of the intellectual concepts, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former.

According to what was shown in the deduction of the categories, hopefully no one will be in doubt in deciding concerning the question of whether those pure intellectual-concepts are of merely empirical use or also of transcendental use: i.e. whether they relate merely to appearances *apriori* as conditions of a possible experience or whether they can be extended to objects *per se* as conditions of the possibility of things *simpliciter* (without any restriction to our sensibility). For we saw there: that concepts are entirely impossible and can have no significance where no object is given either for themselves or at least for the elements of which they consist and therefore cannot concern things *per se* at all (without regard to whether and how they may be given to us); that, furthermore, the sole way wherein objects are given to us is modification of our sensibility; and finally, that besides a function of the understanding in a category, pure *apriori* concepts must also contain formal *apriori* conditions of sensibility (viz. of the internal sense) that contain the universal condition under which alone a category can be applied to an object. We shall call that formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the intellectual concept is restricted in its use the *schema* of that intellectual concept and shall call the understanding’s procedure with those schemata the *schematism* of the pure understanding.

The schema is *per se* always merely a product of the imaginal power; but since the synthesis of the latter has as its aim not an individual intuition but rather solely the unity in a determination of sensibility, a schema is nevertheless to be distinguished from an image. So if I place five points behind one another: . . . . ., that is an image of the number five. In contrast: if I merely think of a number *simpliciter* (which can be five or a hundred), then that thought is more a representation of a method of representing a multitude (e.g. a thousand) in an image in accordance with a certain concept than that image itself: which I could hardly survey and compare with the concept in the latter case. Now, I call that representation of a general procedure of the imaginal power for providing a concept with its image the ‘schema’ for that concept.

In fact, our pure sensory concepts are underlain not by images of the objects but rather by schemata. Absolutely no image of a triangle *simpliciter* would ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle. For it would not attain the concept’s universality, which effects that the concept holds for all triangles (e.g. right- or oblique-angled triangles, etc.); but rather it would always be restricted to only a part of that sphere. The schema of a triangle can never exist anywhere except in thoughts and signifies a rule of the imaginal power’s synthesis in respect of pure shapes in space. Much less still does an object of experience or an image thereof ever attain an empirical concept; but rather such a concept always relates immediately to a schema of the imaginal power, which is a rule of determination of our intuition according to a certain general concept. The concept of a dog signifies a rule according to which my imaginal power can universally delineate the shape of a quadripedal animal without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers to me or even to every possible image that I can presented *in concreto*. This schematism of our understanding in respect of appearances and their mere form is an arcane art in the depths of the human soul whose true handles we will hardly ever divine from nature and display uncovered. We can say only that an *image* is a product of the empirical capacity of the productive imaginal-power and that a *schema* of sensory concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and, as it were, a monogram of the pure *apriori* imaginal-power whereby and according to which images first become possible: although those images must be connected to the concept always only by means of the schema that they designate and are not fully congruent with it in themselves. In contrast, the schema of a pure intellectual-concept is something that cannot be brought into an image at all but is rather merely pure synthesis according to a rule of unity according to concepts *simpliciter* that a category expresses and is a transcendental product of the imaginal power that pertains to determination of the internal sense *simpliciter* according to conditions of its form (viz. time) in respect to all representations so far as they shall cohere *apriori* within a concept according to the unity of apperception.

Without dwelling upon a dry and tedious dissection of what is required for transcendental schemata of pure intellectual-concepts *simpliciter*, we shall instead present them according to the order of the categories and in connection with them.

Whereas the pure image of all quanta for the external senses is space, the pure image of all objects of the senses *simpliciter* is time. The *pure schema of quantity* as a concept of the understanding, however, is *number*: which is a representation that combines the successive addition of one to one (i.e. *homogenea*). Therefore, number is nothing other than the unity of synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition *simpliciter* through my generating time itself in intuitional apprehension.

Reality in a pure intellectual-concept is that which corresponds to a sensation *simpliciter* and therefore that whose concept *per se* indicates a being (in time); negation is that whose concept represents a non-being (in time). The opposition of both therefore occurs in a differentiation of the same time as a filled or empty time. Since time is merely the form of intuition and therefore of objects *qua* appearances, that which corresponds to those objects in them is the transcendental matter of all objects *qua* things *per se* (i.e. itemhood or reality). Now, every sensation has a degree or magnitude whereby it can fill the same time (i.e. the internal sense) more or less in respect of the same representation of an object until it ceases in nothing (= 0 = *negatio*). Therefore, it is a relationship and coherence or rather a transition from reality to negation that represents every reality as a quantum; and the schema of a reality as the quantity of something so far as it fills time is precisely that continuous and uniform generation of it in time through one’s descending in time from a sensation that has a certain degree until that sensation vanishes or one’s gradually ascending from a sensation’s negation to its magnitude.

The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e. the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical temporal-determination *simpliciter* that therefore remains whilst everything else changes. (Time does not pass, but rather the existence of the mutable passes within it. Within appearances, therefore, what is immutable in existence (i.e. substance) corresponds to time: which itself is immutable and abiding; and merely within time can the sequence and simultaneity of appearances be determined in respect to time).

The schema of cause and the causality of a thing *simpliciter* is a *reale* upon which something else always follows when it is posited at discretion. Therefore, it consists in the succession of a manifold insofar as that succession is subject to a rule.

The schema of community (i.e. interaction) or of the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents is the simultaneity of the determinations of one substance with those of the others according to a universal rule.

The schema of possibility is a harmony of a synthesis of diverse representations with the conditions of time *simpliciter* (e.g. that opposites cannot be in a thing simultaneously, but rather only successively) and therefore a determination of a representation of a thing at a time.

The schema of actuality is existence within a determinate time.

The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all time.

One sees from all this that the schema of each category contains and represents solely a determination of time: e.g. the schema of quantity contains and represents the generation (i.e. synthesis) of time itself in successive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality contains and represents the synthesis of sensation (i.e. perception) with the representation of time, i.e. the filling of time; the schema of relation contains and represents the relationship of perceptions between one another at all time (i.e. according to a rule of temporal determination); and finally the schema of modality and its categories contains and represents time itself as the correlate of the determination of an object in respect of whether and how the object belongs to time. The schemata are therefore nothing but *apriori temporal-determinations* according to rules; and according to the order of the categories, they concern: the *time series*, the *content of time*, the *order of time*, and finally the *complex of time* in respect of all possible objects.

It is manifest therefrom that the schematism of the understanding through the imaginal power’s transcendental synthesis amounts to nothing other than the unity of everything manifold within intuition in the internal sense and thus indirectly the unity of apperception as a function that corresponds to the internal sense (i.e. to a receptivity). Therefore, the schemata of the pure intellectual-concepts are the true and only conditions for providing those concepts with a relation to objects and therefore with *significance*; and the categories are therefore, in the end, of none other than a possible empirical use because they serve merely to subject appearances to universal rules of synthesis through grounds of an *apriori* necessary unity (due to the necessary unification of all consciousness within an original apperception) and thereby render them apt for thoroughgoing connection within an experience.

All our cognitions, however, lie within the totality of all possible experience; and transcendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and renders it possible, consists in a universal relation to possible experience.

It is also conspicuous, however, that even though the schemata of sensibility first realise the categories, they can also nevertheless restrict them: i.e. constrain them to conditions that lie outside the understanding (viz. in sensibility). Therefore, a schema is in fact merely the phenomenon or sensory concept of an object in agreement with the category (numerus *est quantitas phaenomenon*, sensatio *realitas phaenomenon*, constans *et perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon* – – aeternitas *necessitas phaenomenon etc.*). If we omit a restrictive condition, then (as it seems) we amplify the previously constrained concept; so the categories in their pure signification should hold for things *simpliciter*, *as they are*,without any conditions of sensibility instead of their schemata representing them only *as they appear*: and therefore, the categories should have a signification that is independent of all schemata and which extends much further than them. In fact, an admittedly merely logical signification pertaining to the mere unity of representations remains for the pure intellectual-concepts even after abstraction of every sensory condition; but no object and therefore also no signification is given to those representations that could yield a concept of the object. So (e.g.) if one omits the sensory determination of persistence, then substance would signify nothing more than a something that can be thought of as a subject (without being a predicate of something else). I can make nothing of that representation because it does not at all indicate to me which determinations the thing has that is to be regarded as such a primary subject. Therefore, without schemata, the categories are merely functions of the understanding for concepts but represent no object. That signification accrues to them from sensibility, which realises the understanding by simultaneously restricting it.

1.2.2.2.3. System of All Principles of the Pure Understanding

In the previous main-component, we considered the transcendental judging-power only in respect to the universal conditions under which alone it is authorised to use the pure intellectual-concepts for synthetic judgements. Now, our task is to present in systematic conjunction the judgements that the understanding actually brings forth *apriori* with this critical foresight: to which end, our table of the categories must undoubtedly give us natural and sure guidance. For it is precisely those judgements whose relation to possible experience must constitute all pure *apriori* intellectual-cognition and whose relationship to sensibility *simpliciter* will for that reason propound all transcendental principles of the understanding’s use completely and in a system.

*Apriori* principles bear this name not merely because they contain within them the grounds of other judgements, but also because they are not themselves grounded in higher and more universal cognitions. Yet that property does not always exempt them from requiring a proof. For even though such a principle could be led no further objectively but rather underlies all cognition of its object, that does not preclude that it is possible or even necessary to create a proof from the subjective sources of the possibility of a cognition of an object *simpliciter* because the principle would otherwise incur the greatest suspicion of being a merely inveigled assertion.

Secondly, we will confine ourselves merely to those principles that relate to the categories. The principles of the Transcendental Aesthetic – according to which, space and time are the conditions of the possibility of all things *qua* appearances – and also the restriction of those principles in such a way that they cannot become related to things *per se* therefore do not belong to our demarcated field of investigation. Likewise, mathematical principles do not constitute a part of this system because they are drawn only from intuition but not from the pure intellectual-concepts. Nevertheless, since they are nonetheless synthetic *apriori* judgements, their possibility will necessarily find a place here and indeed not in order for their correctness and apodictic certainty to be proved (of which they have absolutely no need), but rather merely in order for the possibility of such evident *apriori* cognitions to be rendered comprehensible and deduced.

Yet we will also have to speak of the principle of analytic judgements and indeed speak of it in contrast with the principle of synthetic judgements (with which we are truly occupied) because precisely that opposition frees the theory of synthetic judgements from all misunderstanding and perspicuously displays them in their peculiar nature.

1.2.2.2.3.1. On the Highest Principle of All Analytic Judgements

Whatever content our cognition may have and however it may relate to the object, the universal though merely negative condition of all our judgements *simpliciter* is nevertheless that they do not contradict themselves; otherwise, those judgements *per se* are nothing (even without regard to the objects). Yet even if there is no contradiction in our judgement, it can still nevertheless conjoin concepts in a manner that the object does not bring with it or even without any ground being given to us either *apriori* or *aposteriori* that would justify such a judgement; and so a judgement can still be either false or groundless despite being free from all internal contradiction.

The principle that no predicate belongs to a thing that contradicts it is called the ‘principle of contradiction’ is a universal though admittedly merely negative criterion of all truth, but also belongs merely to logic because it holds for cognitions merely *qua* cognitions *simpliciter* regardless of their content and says that contradiction totally annihilates and eliminates them.

Nevertheless, one can also make a positive use of that principle: i.e. not merely to banish falsity and error (so far as that error rests merely upon contradiction), but also to cognise truth. For *if a judgement is analytic* (irrespective of whether it is negative or affirmative), then its truth must always be capable of being sufficiently cognised in light of the principle of contradiction. For contradiction is always rightly denied of that which already lies and is thought of within a cognition of an object *qua* concept, but the concept itself must necessarily be affirmed of the object because the concept’s contrary would contradict the object.

Therefore, we must also accept the *principle of contradiction* as the universal and fully sufficient *principle of all analytic cognition*; but its authority and usability also do not go further, as those of a sufficient criterion of truth. For that absolutely no cognition could be contrary to it without annihilating itself indeed renders that principle a *conditio sine qua non*, but not a determinative ground of the truth of our cognition. Now, since we have truly been dealing only with the synthetic part of our cognition, we have admittedly always been mindful never to act contrarily to that inviolable principle; but we can never expect any information in respect of the truth of such a kind of cognition.

Nevertheless, there is a formulation of that famous principle (which is, however, divested of all content and merely formal) that contains a synthesis that has been mixed into it due to a lack of foresight and entirely needlessly. It reads as follows: it is impossible that something *simultaneously* is and is not. Besides the fact that apodictic certainty has been superfluously attached here (through the word ‘impossible’), which must indeed be capable of being understood by itself from the principle, the principle is affected through the condition of time and says (as it were) that a thing = A that is something = B cannot at the same time be not-B, though it can well be both (i.e. both B and not-B) successively. E.g. a human who is young cannot simultaneously be old, but the very same human can very well be young at one time and not-young (i.e. old) at another time. Now, as a merely logical principle, the principle of contradiction must by no means confine its pronouncements to temporal relationships; therefore, such a formulation is entirely contrary to its purpose. The misunderstanding stems merely from the fact that one first abstracts a predicate of a thing from the concept of that thing and thereafter connects its contrary to that predicate: which never yields a contradiction with the subject but rather merely with its predicate, which has been synthetically conjoined with the former, and indeed only when the first and second predicate are posited at the same time. If I say ‘a human who is scholarly is not scholarly’, then the condition ‘simultaneously’ must stand therein; for someone who is unscholarly at one time can very well be scholarly at another. Yet if I say ‘no unscholarly human is scholarly’, then the proposition is analytic because the characteristic (of unscholarliness) now concomitantly constitutes the concept of the subject: and then, the negative proposition is immediately manifest from the principle of contradiction without the condition ‘simultaneously’ needing to accrue to it. That, then, is also the cause why I above altered the formulation of the principle of contradiction in such a way that the nature of an analytic principle is thereby perspicuously expressed.

1.2.2.2.3.2. On the Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgements

Explaining the possibility of synthetic judgements is a problem with which universal logic does not occupy itself at all and whose name universal logic may not even know. Yet it is the most important task amongst all in a transcendental logic and even the sole task if the talk is of the possibility of synthetic *apriori* judgements and the conditions and extent of their validity. For after its completion, transcendental logic can perfectly fulfil its purpose: namely, to determine the extent and limits of the pure understanding.

In an analytic judgement, I remain with the given concept in order to discern something concerning it. If the judgement shall be affirmative, then I attribute to that concept only what was already thought of within it; but if it shall be negative, then I merely exclude the concept’s contrary from it. In synthetic judgements, however, I shall merely pass outside the given concept in order to consider something entirely different than what was thought of within it in relationship to it: which is therefore never a relationship of identity nor of contradiction and in respect of which, neither truth nor error can be detected within the judgement *per se*.

Therefore, granted that one must pass outside a given concept in order to compare it with another synthetically, a *tertium quid* is needed in which alone the synthesis of two concepts can arise. But what is that *tertium quid*, i.e. the medium of all synthetic judgements? There is only one complex wherein all our representations are contained: namely, the internal sense and its *apriori* form (viz. time). Whereas the synthesis of the representations rests upon the imaginal power, their synthetic unity (which is requisite for judgement) rests upon the unity of apperception. The possibility of synthetic judgements and – since all three contain the sources of *apriori* representations – also the possibility of pure synthetic *apriori* judgements are therefore to be sought therein, and they will indeed even be necessary from those grounds if a cognition of objects is to come about that rests merely upon a synthesis of the representations.

If a cognition is to have objective reality (i.e. relate to an object and have significance and sense in that object), then the object must be capable of being *given* in some way. Without that, the concepts are empty: and although one has admittedly thereby thought of something, one has in fact cognised nothing through that thought but rather merely played with representations. To give an object – if that object shall not again be intended only mediately, but rather immediately presented within intuition – is nothing other than to relate one’s representation to experience (be it actual or indeed possible). Even space and time – even as pure as those concepts are from everything empirical and even as certain as it is that they are represented within the mind fully *apriori* – would nevertheless be without objective validity and without sense and significance if their necessary use were not shown in light of the objects of experience. Indeed, their representation is a mere schema that always relates to the reproductive imaginal-power, which invokes the objects of experience: without which, they would have no significance; and so it is with all concepts without distinction.

The *possibility of experience* is therefore that which gives objective reality to all our *apriori* cognitions. Now, experience rests upon the synthetic unity of appearances (i.e. upon a synthesis according to concepts of the object of the appearances *simpliciter*): without which, it would not even be experience but rather a rhapsody of perceptions that would not fit together within a nexus according to rules of a thoroughgoingly connected (possible) consciousness and which would therefore not even fit together for the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Experience is therefore underlain by *apriori* principles of its form: namely, universal rules of unity in synthesis of appearances whose objective reality as necessary conditions can always be shown within experience and indeed even in its possibility. Outside that relation, however, synthetic *apriori* propositions are totally impossible because they have no *tertium quid* (i.e. no object) in light of which the synthetic unity of their concepts could demonstrate objective reality.

Therefore, even though we cognise so much *apriori* in synthetic judgementsabout space *simpliciter* or about the shapes that the productive imaginal-power delineates within it to the extent that we actually require no experience at all to do so, that cognition would nevertheless be absolutely nothing but rather occupation with a mere figment of the brain if space were not to be regarded as a condition of the appearances that constitute the material for external experience. Therefore, the aforesaid pure synthetic judgements relate (albeit only mediately) to possible experience or rather to the possibility of experience and ground the objective validity of their synthesis thereupon.

Since experience *qua* empirical synthesis is therefore, in its possibility, the sole kind of cognition that gives reality to all other synthesis: it also, as *apriori* cognition, has truth (i.e. consonance with its object) only through the fact that it contains nothing beyond what is necessary for the synthetic unity of experience *simpliciter*.

The highest principle of all synthetic judgements is therefore that every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the intuitional manifold within a possible experience.

In such a way, synthetic *apriori* judgements are possible if we relate the formal *apriori* conditions of intuition, the imaginal power’s synthesis, and the necessary unity of that synthesis within a transcendental apperception to a possible experiential-cognition *simpliciter* and say that the conditions of the *possibility of experience simpliciter* are simultaneously conditions of the *possibility of the objects of experience* and therefore have objective validity within a synthetic *apriori* judgement.

1.2.2.2.3.3. Systematic Representation of All Synthetic Principles of the Pure Understanding

That principles occur anywhere at all is to be ascribed merely to the pure understanding: which is not only the capacity for rules in respect of what occurs but even the sources of the principles according to which everything (that can be presented to us as an object) necessarily stands under rules because without such rules, cognition of an object corresponding to appearances could never accrue to the appearances. Even laws of nature (if they are considered as principles of empirical use of the understanding) simultaneously carry with them an expression of necessity and therefore at least the surmise of a determination from grounds that are valid *apriori* and prior to all experience. Yet all laws of nature without distinction stand under higher principles of the understanding because they merely apply them to particular cases of appearance. Whereas those principles alone therefore give the concept that contains the condition and (as it were) the exponent for a rule *simpliciter*, experience gives the case that stands under the rule.

There can therefore indeed truly be no danger that one might regard merely empirical principles as principles of the pure understanding or even *vice versa*; for the necessity according to concepts that distinguishes the latter and whose lack is easily perceived in every empirical proposition (however universally it may hold) can easily prevent that confusion. Yet there are pure *apriori* principles that I might nevertheless not attribute to the pure understanding because they are drawn not from pure concepts but rather from pure intuitions (albeit by means of the understanding), whereas understanding is the capacity for concepts. Mathematics has such principles, but their application to experience and therefore their objective validity and indeed the possibility of such synthetic *apriori* cognition (i.e. a deduction of it) still always rests upon the pure understanding.

Therefore, I will not count the principles of mathematics among my principles; but I will indeed count those upon which their possibility and objective *apriori* validity is grounded and which are therefore to be regarded as a principle of those principles: and I will proceed *from concepts* to intuition, but not *from intuition* to concepts.

In the application of the pure intellectual-concepts to possible experience, the use of their synthesis is either *mathematical* or *dynamic*: for their synthesis partly concerns merely *intuition* and partly the *existence* of an appearance *simpliciter*. Whereas the *apriori* conditions of intuition are thoroughly necessary, those of the existence of the objects of a possible empirical intuition *per se* are merely contingent. Therefore, the principles of the mathematical use will be unconditionally necessary (i.e. apodictic); but those of the dynamic use will also admittedly carry with them the character of an *apriori* necessity, though only under the condition of empirical thought within an experience and therefore only mediately and indirectly and consequently will not contain the immediate evidence that the others possess (notwithstanding their certainty, which relates to experience universally). Yet that will be better able to be judged at the end of this system of principles.

The table of the categories gives us entirely natural direction towards the table of the principles because the latter are indeed nothing other than rules of the objective use of the former. All principles of the pure understanding are thus:

**Table of Principles**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1. Axioms** |  |
|  | of |  |
|  | *Intuition* |  |
| **2. Anticipations** |  | **3. Analogies** |
| of |  | of |
| *Perception* |  | *Experience* |
|  | **4. Postulates** |  |
|  | of |  |
|  | *Empirical Thought* |  |
|  | *Simpliciter* |  |

I have chosen these denominations with foresight in order not to leave the differences in respect of the evidence and exercise of these principles unremarked. It will soon become manifest, however, that in respect to the evidence and determination of appearances *apriori* in accordance with the categories of *quantity* and *quality* (if one attends merely to the form of the latter), the principles of those categories nominally distinguish themselves from those of the other two categories because whereas the former admit of an intuitive certainty, the latter admit merely of a discursive certainty: though both indeed admit of a full certainty. Hence, I will call the former the *mathematical* principles and the latter the *dynamic* principles. Yet one will well remark that I no more have the principles of mathematics in mind in the former case than I have the principles of general (physical) dynamics in mind in the latter case but rather have in mind only the principles of the pure understanding in relationship to the internal sense (without distinction of the representations given therein), whereby the former *in toto* receive their possibility. I thus name them more in consideration of their application than because of their content and now proceed to consider them in the order wherein they are represented in the table.

1.2.2.2.3.3.1. On the Axioms of Intuition

*Principle of the pure understanding*: all appearances are extensive quanta in respect to their intuition.

I call a quantum ‘extensive’ in which a representation of the parts renders a representation of the whole possible (and therefore necessarily precedes it). However small a line may be, I cannot represent it to myself without drawing it in thought: i.e. without generating all of its parts from one point one-by-one and thereby delineating that intuition for the first time. It is also exactly the same with every time – including even the smallest. I therein think only of a successive progression from one moment to another where through all parts of time and their addition, a determinate quantum of time is finally generated. Since mere intuition in all appearances is either space or time, every appearance *qua* intuition is an extensive quantum because it can be cognised only through successive synthesis (from part to part) in apprehension. All appearances are thus intuited as aggregates (i.e. multitudes of previously given parts): which is not the case with every kind of quantum, but rather only with those that are represented and apprehended by us *extensively* as quanta.

In that successive synthesis of the productive imaginal-power in generating shapes, the mathematics of extension (i.e. geometry) is grounded with its axioms: which express the conditions of sensory intuition *apriori* under which alone the schema of a pure concept of external appearance can come about – e.g. between two points, only one straight line is possible; two straight lines enclose no space; etc. Those are the axioms that truly concern only quanta as such.

Yet in respect of quantity (*quantitas*), i.e. the answer to the question of how great something is: even though various of those propositions are synthetic and immediately certain (i.e. *indemonstrabilia*), there are nevertheless no axioms in the true sense. For that an equal added to or subtracted from an equal yields an equal are analytic propositions because I am immediately conscious of the identity of one generation of a quantum with another, but axioms shall be synthetic *apriori* propositions. In contrast: evident propositions concerning numerical relationships are admittedly synthetic, but not universal like those of geometry; and precisely for that reason, they are also not axioms but can rather be called ‘numerical formulae’. That 7 + 5 = 12 is not an analytic proposition. For I think of the number 12 neither in the representation of 7, nor in the representation of 5, nor in the representation of the composition of both; (that I shall think of it *in the addition* of both is not at issue here; for with an analytic proposition, there is only the question of whether I actually think of the predicate in the representation of the subject). Yet even though that proposition is synthetic, it is nevertheless merely an individual proposition. So far as one looks merely to the synthesis of *homogenea* (i.e. unities) here, the synthesis can occur in only a single way here although the *use* of those numbers is universal thereafter. If I say that with three lines of which two taken together are greater than the third, a triangle can be drawn: then I have there the mere function of the productive imaginal-power, which can draw the lines larger or smaller and also allow them to meet at all manner of arbitrary angles. In contrast: the number 7 is possible in only a single way, as is the number 12 that is generated through the synthesis of the former with 5. One must therefore call such propositions not ‘axioms’ (for otherwise there would be an infinity of them), but rather ‘numerical formulae’.

That transcendental principle of the mathematics of appearances provides great expansion to our *apriori* cognition. For it is that principle alone which renders pure mathematics applicable to the objects of experience in its entire precision, which might not thus be manifest by itself without that principle and indeed has even engendered some contradiction. Appearances are not things *per se*. Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition (of space and time); what geometry says of the latter also therefore holds for the former without objection, and excuses as if objects of the senses need not be accordant with the rules of construction in space (e.g. the infinite divisibility of lines or angles) must fall away. For one thereby denies objective validity to space and, with it, simultaneously to all mathematics and no longer knows why and to what extent it is to be applied to appearances. As the essential form of all intuition, the synthesis of spaces and times is that which simultaneously renders apprehension of appearance, and therefore every external experience, and also consequently all cognition of its objects possible; and what mathematics proves in pure use of the former also necessarily holds for the latter. All objections to the contrary are merely chicaneries of a falsely instructed reason that erroneously thinks to release the objects of the senses from the formal condition of our sensibility and – even though they are merely appearances – represents them as objects *per se*,given to the understanding: in which case, absolutely nothing could indeed be cognised about them *apriori* and nor therefore synthetically through pure concepts of space; and the science that determines those concepts (viz. geometry) would not itself be possible.

1.2.2.2.3.3.2. The Anticipations of Perception

The *principle* that anticipates all perceptions as such reads thus: in all appearances, the sensation and the *reale* that corresponds to it in the object (i.e. *realitas phaenomenon*) has an *intensive* quantity (i.e. a degree).

One can call all cognition whereby I can cognise and determine that which belongs to empirical cognition *apriori* an ‘anticipation’; and without doubt, that is the signification in which *Epicurus* used his term ‘*prolepseis*’ [προλήψεις]. But since there is something within appearances that is never cognised *apriori* and which therefore also constitutes the true difference between the empirical and *apriori* cognition, viz. sensation (as matter of perception), it follows that it is sensation that cannot be anticipated at all. In contrast, we would be able to call pure determinations in space and time (in respect to both shape and quantity) ‘anticipations of appearances’ because they represent *apriori* that which may always be given *aposteriori* within experience. But if one supposes that there were nevertheless something that could be cognised *apriori* in every sensation *qua* sensation *simpliciter* (without a particular sensation needing to be given), then it would deserve to be called ‘anticipation’ in the exceptional sense because it seems strange to anticipate experience in respect of that which pertains precisely to its matter, which one can only extract from it. And that is actually the case here.

Apprehension merely by means of sensation fills only a moment (if I do not consider the succession of many sensations). As something within an appearance whose apprehension is not a successive synthesis that progresses from parts to a whole representation, it therefore has no extensive quantity: the absence of sensation in the same moment would represent that moment as empty and therefore = 0. What corresponds to sensation in empirical intuition is reality (i.e. *realitas phaenomenon*); what corresponds to its absence is negation = 0. Now, every sensation admits of a reduction in such a way that it can decrease and thus gradually vanish. Therefore, between reality and negation in appearance, there is a continuous nexus of many possible intermediate-sensations whose difference from one another is always smaller than the difference between the given intermediate-sensation and zero or total negation. I.e. although the *reale* in appearance always has a quantity, that quantity is not encountered in apprehension because apprehension occurs in a moment by means of mere sensation and not through successive synthesis of many sensations and therefore does not proceed from parts to a whole. The *reale* in appearance therefore admittedly has a quantity, but not extensive quantity.

I call a quantity that can be apprehended only as a unity and in which plurality can be represented only through approximation to negation = 0 *intensive quantity*. Therefore, every reality in appearance has intensive quantity (i.e. a degree). If one considers that reality as a cause (be it of sensation or of other reality in appearance, e.g. a sensation), then one calls the degree of the reality *qua* cause a ‘moment’ (e.g. a moment of gravity) and indeed because a degree characterises only a quantity whose apprehension is not successive but rather momentary. I touch upon this only in passing, however, because for now I am not yet dealing with causality.

Thus, however small it may be, every sensation and therefore also every reality in appearance has a degree (i.e. an intensive quantity) that can still always be diminished; and between reality and negation, there is a continuous nexus of possible realities and possible smaller perceptions. Every colour (e.g. red) has a degree that, however small it may be, is never the smallest; and the situation is always the same with warmth, moments of gravity, etc.

The property of quantities according to which no part of them is the smallest possible part (i.e. no part of them is simple) is called their ‘continuity’. Space and time are *quanta continua* because no part of them can be given without being enclosed between limits (viz. points and moments) and therefore only in such a way that that part is itself in turn a space or a time. Space therefore consists only of spaces, whereas time consists only of times. Points and moments are merely limits, i.e. mere locations of their constrainment; but locations always presuppose the intuitions that they shall restrict or determine: and neither space nor time can be composed from mere locations as component parts that could be given before the space or time. One can also call such quantities *flowing* quantities because the synthesis (of the productive imaginal-power) in their generation is a progression within time, whose continuity one tends to designate particularly with the term ‘flowing’ (i.e. passing).

All appearances *simpliciter* are thus continuous quanta, both in respect of their intuition as extensive quantities and in respect of mere perception (i.e. sensation and therefore reality) as intensive quanta. If the synthesis of the manifold of appearance is interrupted, then that manifold is an aggregate of many appearances (and not truly an appearance *qua* quantum) that is generated not through the mere continuation of productive synthesis of a certain kind, but rather through repetition of an ever ceasing synthesis. If I call 13 talers a ‘quantum of money’, then I name it correctly so far as I understand thereby the content of a mark of fine silver: which is, however, admittedly a continuous quantity in which no part is the smallest; but rather every part could constitute a monetary piece that would always contain matter for still smaller monetary-pieces. But if by that denomination I understand 13 round talers as so many coins (whatever their silver content may be), then I name it inaptly in calling it a ‘quantum of talers’; but rather it must be called an ‘aggregate’, i.e. a number, of monetary pieces. Now, since unity must nevertheless underlie all number, an appearance *qua* unity is a quantum and, as such, always a continuum.

If all appearances are continuous quanta (considered both extensively and intensively), then the principle that all alteration (i.e. every transition of a thing from one state into another) is also continuous could be proved here easily and with mathematical evidence if the causality of an alteration *simpliciter* did not lie entirely outside the limits of a transcendental philosophy and presuppose empirical principles. For the understanding gives us no indication that a cause is possible that would alter the state of things (i.e. determine them contrarily to a certain given state): not merely because it does not at all discern the possibility thereof (for we lack that insight in multiple *apriori*-cognitions), but also because alterability impinges upon only certain determinations of appearances of which experience alone can teach – even though their cause is to be encountered in what is unalterable. Yet since we have nothing before us here whereof we can avail ourselves except the pure fundamental-concepts of all possible experience (amongst which there must be nothing empirical whatsoever), we cannot anticipate general natural-science – which is constructed upon certain fundamental-experiences – without compromising the unity of the system.

Nevertheless, we do not lack proofs of the great influence that that principle has to anticipate perceptions and even to supplement a lack of them so far as it blocks all false inferences that might be drawn therefrom.

If all reality in perception has a degree between which and negation an infinite graded-sequence of ever lower degrees occurs and yet every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity to sensations, then no perception and therefore also no experience is possible that would demonstrate a total absence of *realia* within appearance: be it immediately or mediately (and through whatever detour in inference one likes) – i.e. a demonstration of empty space or an empty time can never be drawn from experience. For a total absence of *realia* in sensory intuition firstly cannot itself be perceived; and secondly, such an absence cannot be inferred from any single appearance and the difference in the degree of its reality and also must never be assumed to explain them. For even if the entire intuition of a determinate space or time is real through-and-through (i.e. no part of it is empty): since every reality has its degree, which can decrease to nothing (i.e. to the void) via infinite steps despite the unaltered extensive quantity of the appearance, there must nevertheless be infinitely diverse degrees with which space or time are filled and the intensive quantity must be capable of being smaller or greater in diverse appearances even though the extensive quantity of the intuition is the same.

We shall give an example thereof. Since they perceive a great difference in the quantity of matter of diverse kinds with equal volume (partly through the moment of gravity or weight and partly through the moment of resistance to other moving matters), almost all doctors of nature unanimously infer therefrom that that volume (i.e. that extensive quantity of appearance) must be empty in all matters, albeit to different extents. Who would ever indeed have thought of those mostly mathematical and mechanical researchers-of-nature that they grounded their inference merely upon a metaphysical presupposition that they yet pretended so much to avoid, because they assume that the *reale* in space (I cannot call it ‘impenetrability’ or ‘weight’ here because they are empirical concepts) is *everywhere identical* and can differ only in respect of its extensive quantity (i.e. multitudinousness). To that presupposition, for which they could have no ground within experience and which is therefore merely metaphysical, I oppose a transcendental proof that admittedly shall not explain the difference in the filling of spaces but nevertheless fully eliminates the purported necessity of that presupposition that one cannot explain the aforementioned difference except through empty spaces that are to be assumed and has the merit of at least freeing the understanding to also think of that diversity in another way if natural explanation should render a hypothesis necessary for that purpose. For we see there that although equal spaces may be perfectly filled by diverse matters in such a way that there is no point in any of them at which their presence would not be encounterable, every *reale* of the same quality nevertheless has its degree (of resistance or weight) that can be smaller *in infinitum* without diminution of its extensive quantity or multitudinousness before that reality transitions into the void and vanishes. Thus, an expanse that fills a space (e.g. warmth) and, in the same way, every other reality (in appearance) can decrease in its degrees *in infinitum* without leaving even the smallest part of that space empty in the slightest and nonetheless fill space with those smaller degrees just as well as another appearance with greater degrees. My intention here is by no means to assert that that is actually the case with the diversity of matters in respect of their specific gravity, but rather merely to demonstrate from a principle of the pure understanding that the nature of our perceptions renders such a mode of explanation possible and that one would falsely assume the *reale* of appearance to be equal in respect of its degree and diverse only in respect of aggregation and its extensive quantity and even purportedly assert that through an *apriori* principle of the understanding.

Nevertheless, for an investigator accustomed to transcendental reflection who has thereby become cautious, this anticipation of perception always has something conspicuous in it and arouses some doubt that the understanding can anticipate a synthetic principle such as that of the degree of every *reale* in appearances and consequently the possibility of the internal difference of sensation itself if one abstracts from its empirical quality; and it is therefore still a question not unworthy of resolution how the understanding can therein express something synthetically about appearances *apriori* and even anticipate appearances in respect of what is truly and merely empirical (viz. what impinges upon sensation).

The *quality* of sensation is always merely empirical and cannot be represented *apriori* at all (e.g. colours, taste, etc.). But the *reale* that corresponds to sensations *simpliciter* in contrast with negation = 0 merely represents something whose concept *per se* contains a being [*Sein*] and signifies nothing but a synthesis within an empirical consciousness *simpliciter*. For in the internal sense, empirical consciousness can be elevated from 0 to every greater degree in such a way that exactly the same extensive quantity of intuition (e.g. an illuminated surface) arouses sensation as great as that aroused by an aggregate of many others (e.g. less-illuminated surfaces) together. One can therefore totally abstract from the extensive quantity of appearance and nevertheless represent to oneself within a moment a synthesis of a uniform increase from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness. All sensations are therefore admittedly given as sensations only *aposteriori*, but the property of them that they have a degree can be cognised *apriori*. It is noteworthy that we can cognise only a single quality *apriori* in quantities *simpliciter* (viz. continuity) but can cognise nothing *apriori* in all quality (i.e. the *reale* of appearances) except the intensive quality of the appearances (i.e. that they have a degree); everything else is left to experience.

1.2.2.2.3.3.3. The Analogies of Experience

The universal *principle* of these is that in respect of their existence, all appearances stand *apriori* under rules of the determination of their relationship between one another within a time.

The three modes of time are *persistence*, *sequence*, and *simultaneity*. Therefore, three rules of all temporal relationships between appearances according to which each appearance’s existence can become determined in respect to the unity of all time will precede all experience and first render it possible.

The universal principle of all three analogies rests upon the necessary *unity* of apperception in respect of all possible empirical consciousness (i.e. perception) *at every time* and consequently – since that unity is fundamental *apriori* – upon the synthetic unity of all appearances according to their relationships within time. For original apperception relates to the internal sense (i.e. the complex of all representations) and indeed *apriori* to the form of that complex, i.e. the relationship of a manifold empirical consciousness within time. All of that manifold shall be unified in respect of its temporal relationships within original apperception; for that is expressed by that manifold’s transcendental unity *apriori*, under which everything that shall belong to my (i.e. my own) cognition and can therefore become an object for me stands. That *synthetic unity* in the temporal relationship of all perceptions, which is *determined apriori*, is therefore the law that all empirical temporal-determinations must stand under rules of universal temporal-determination; and the analogies of experience of which we shall now treat must be such rules.

Those principles have in them the particularity that they do not consider appearances and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but rather merely their *existence* and their *relationship* between one another in respect of their existence. Now, the way in which something is apprehended in appearance can be determined *apriori* in such a way that the rule of the appearance’s synthesis can simultaneously give that intuition *apriori* in every available empirical example, i.e. bring it forth therefrom. Only the existence of appearances cannot be cognised *apriori*; and even if we could come to infer an existence via that path, we would still not cognise that existence determinately: i.e. be able to anticipate that whereby its empirical intuition distinguishes itself from others.

The previous two principles, which I called the ‘mathematical’ principles in consideration of the fact that they justified applying mathematics to appearances, concerned appearances in respect of their mere possibility and taught how they could be generated both in respect to their intuition and in respect to the *reale* of their perception according to rules of a mathematical synthesis. Hence, with both principles, numerical quantities and with them the determination of appearances as quanta can be used. So (e.g.) I will be able to compose the degree of the sensations of sunlight from approximately 200,000 illuminations via the Moon and give them determinately *apriori*, i.e. construct them. We can therefore call the first principles ‘constitutive’.

The situation must be entirely different with those principles that shall bring the existence of appearances under rules *apriori*. For since that existence cannot be constructed, they will concern only the relationship of existence and will be capable of yielding none other than merely *regulative* principles. Neither axioms nor anticipations are therefore to be thought of; but rather if a perception is given to us in a temporal relationship to another (albeit indeterminate) perception, then it will not be able to be said *apriori which* other perception it is and *how great* it is: but rather only how the latter is necessarily conjoined with the former in respect of its existence in that mode of time. In philosophy, analogies signify something very different from what they represent in mathematics. In mathematics, analogies are formulae that express the equality of two quantitative relationships and always *constitutively* in such a way that if three elements of the proportion are given, then the fourth is also thereby given (i.e. can be constructed). In philosophy, however, an analogy is the equality not of two quantitative relationships but rather of two qualitative relationships where from three given elements, I can cognise and give *apriori* only their *relationship* to a fourth but not that fourth *element* itself: though I indeed have a rule to seek it within experience and a characteristic to find it therein. An analogy of experience will therefore be only a rule according to which unity of experience shall arise from perceptions (and not of how perception itself, i.e. empirical intuition *simpliciter*, shall arise) and will therefore hold not *constitutively* but rather merely *regulatively* as a principle of the objects (i.e. the appearances). Yet exactly the same will also hold for the postulates of empirical thought *simpliciter*: which together concern the synthesis of mere intuition (i.e. the form of appearance), perception (i.e. the matter of appearance), and experience (i.e. the relationship between those perceptions) – namely, that they are merely regulative principles and distinguish themselves from the mathematical principles (which are constitutive) admittedly not in respect of their certainty (which in both cases stands fast *apriori*) but nevertheless in respect of the mode of their evidence, i.e. their intuitiveness (and therefore also in respect of the mode of their demonstration).

Nevertheless, what was recalled in connection with all synthetic principles and must especially be remarked here is that these analogies have their sole significance and validity not as principles of the understanding’s transcendental use but rather merely as principles of its empirical use and can therefore be proved only as such principles: in such a way that consequently, appearances do not stand under the categories *simpliciter* but must rather be subsumed only under their schemata. For if the objects to which those principles shall become related were things *per se*, then it would be entirely impossible to cognise something about them *apriori*. Now, they are nothing but appearances whose complete cognition – to which all *apriori* principles must indeed always ultimately lead – is merely possible experience. Consequently, those principles have as their goal nothing but merely the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of appearances. But those conditions are thought about only in the schema of a pure intellectual-concept: the function of whose unity *qua* synthesis *simpliciter*, which is restricted through no sensory condition, is contained within the category.

We will therefore be justified in composing appearances by means of these principles only according to an analogy with the logical and universal unity of the concepts and will hence admittedly avail ourselves of a category in the principle itself but will put the category’s schema in its place as the key to its use or rather put the schema alongside the category as a restrictive condition under the name of a ‘formula’ of the former.

1.2.2.2.3.3.3.A. First Analogy

**Principle of Persistence**

All appearances contain the *persistens* (i.e. *substance*) as the object itself and the mutable as its mere determination, i.e. a way in which the object exists.

**Proof of the First Analogy**

All appearances are in time. Time can determine the relationship *in their existence* in a twofold way, so far as they are either *successive* or *simultaneous*. In consideration of the first, time will be considered as a *time series*. In respect to the second, time will be considered as an *extent of time*.

Our *apprehension* of the manifold of appearance is always successive and is therefore always changing. We therefore can never determine through that apprehension alone whether that manifold (*qua* object of experience) is simultaneous or follows successively where there is not something fundamental in it that *always is* (i.e. something *abiding* and *persistent*) of which all change and simultaneity are nothing but many ways (i.e. modes of time) in which the *persistens* exists. Only in the *persistens* are temporal relationships therefore possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relationships within time), i.e. the *persistens* is the *substratum* of the empirical representation of time itself in which alone all temporal determination is possible. In general, persistence expresses time as the constant correlate of all existence of appearances, all change, and all concomitance. For change does not impinge upon time itself but rather merely upon the appearances in time (just as simultaneity is not a mode of time itself: in which absolutely no parts are simultaneous, but rather all are successive). If one wished to attribute a successive sequence to time itself, then one would have to think of yet another time in which that sequence were possible. Through the *persistens* alone, *existence* receives a *quantity* in diverse parts of the time-series successively: which one calls *duration*. For in a mere sequence alone, existence is always vanishing and starting and never has the slightest quantity. Without that *persistens*, therefore, there is no temporal relationship. Now, time *per se* cannot be perceived; therefore, that *persistens* in appearances is the substratum of all temporal determination and consequently also the condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions (i.e. of experience); and in that *persistens*, all existence and all change in time can be regarded only as a mode of the existence of what remains and persists. Therefore, in all appearances, the *persistens* is the object itself: i.e. the substance (*phaenomenon*); but everything that changes or can change belongs only to the way in which that substance or those substances exist and therefore to their determinations.

I find that at all times, not merely philosophers but even the common understanding have presupposed that persistence as a substratum of all change in appearances and will also always assume it as indubitable; only philosophers express themselves somewhat more determinately in respect of it by saying that in all alterations within the world, the *substance* abides and only the *accidents* change. Yet I nowhere encounter even an attempt at a proof of that highly synthetic proposition; indeed, that proposition also stands only seldom at the pinnacle of the pure and fully *apriori* subsistent laws of nature: which is yet owed to it. In fact, the proposition that substance is persistent is tautological. For merely that persistence is the ground why we apply the category of substance to appearance; and one would have to prove that in all appearances, there is something persistent in which what is mutable is nothing but a determination of its existence. Yet since such a proof can never be conducted dogmatically (i.e. from concepts) because it concerns a synthetic *apriori* proposition and one never considered that such propositions hold only in relation to possible experience and can therefore also be proved only through a deduction of the latter’s possibility, it is no wonder if that proposition is admittedly taken as a basis in all experience (because one feels a need for it in empirical cognition) but has never been proved.

A philosopher was asked: how much does smoke weigh? He answered: if you subtract the weight of the remaining ash from the weight of the burnt wood, then you have the weight of the smoke. He therefore presupposes it as incontrovertible that even in fire, matter (i.e. substance) does not pass away: but rather only its form suffers a modification. Likewise, the proposition that nothing comes to be from nothing was merely another corollary from the principle of persistence or rather of the everlasting existence of the genuine subject in appearances. For if what one wishes to call ‘substance’ in appearance is to be the genuine substratum of all temporal determination, then both all existence in past time and all existence in future time must be capable of becoming determined solely therein. Therefore, we can give an appearance the name ‘substance’ only because we presuppose its existence at all time: which is not even well expressed through the word ‘persistence’ because that word pertains more to future time. Yet the internal necessity to persist is nevertheless inseverably conjoined with the necessity to always have been; and the term may therefore remain. ‘*Gigno de nihilo nihil*’ and ‘*in nihilum nil posse reverti*’ were two propositions that the ancients connected inseverably and which one now sometimes separates out of misunderstanding because one conceives that they concern things *per se* and that the former might be contrary to the world’s dependence upon a highest cause (even in respect of its substance) – a worry that is needless because the talk here is only of appearances within the field of experience, whose unity would never be possible if we sought to allow new things (vis-à-vis their substance) to arise. For then, that which alone can represent the unity of time would fall away (viz. the identity of the substratum, as that in which alone all change has thoroughgoing unity). Yet that persistence is nevertheless nothing more than our way of representing the existence of things (within appearance) to ourselves.

The determinations of a substance, which are nothing but particular ways in which the substance exists, are called *accidents*. They are always real because they pertain to the substance’s existence (negations are only determinations that express the non-being of something in the substance). If one attributes a particular existence to that *reale* in the substance (e.g. movement, as an accident of matter), then one calls that existence ‘inherence’ in distinction from the substance’s existence: which one calls ‘subsistence’. Only many misinterpretations arise therefrom, and one speaks more precisely and more correctly if one characterises accidents only through the way in which a substance’s existence is positively determined. Yet by means of the conditions of logical use of our understanding, it is nevertheless unavoidable that one (as it were) abstracts that which can change in the existence of a substance whilst the substance abides and considers it in relationship to the genuine *persistens* and *radicale*. Therefore, that category also stands under the title of ‘relationships’ more as their condition than because it itself contains a relationship.

The correction of the concept of *alteration* is also grounded upon that persistence. Arising and passing away are not alterations of that which arises or passes away. Alteration is a way of existing that follows upon another way in which the very same object exists. Therefore, everything that is altered *abides*; and only its *state changes*. Since that change therefore impinges only upon determinations that can cease or even start, we can say – in an expression that seems somewhat paradoxical – that only the *persistens* (i.e. substance) is altered; what is mutable suffers no alteration but rather a *change* wherein some determinations cease and others start.

Alteration can therefore be perceived only in substances; and arising or passing-away *simpliciter*, without pertaining merely to a determination of the *persistens*, cannot be a possible perception at all because precisely that *persistens* enables a representation of a transition from one state into another and from non-being into being, which can therefore be empirically cognised only as changing determinations of what abides. If you assume that something absolutely begins to be, then you must have a temporal point at which it was not. But to what would you affix that temporal point if not to what already exists? For an empty time that preceded would not be an object of perception; but if you connected that arising to things that previously were and which endure up to that which arises, then the latter would be merely a determination of the former as the *persistens*. It is also exactly the same with passing away: for passing-away presupposes an empirical representation of a time wherein an appearance no longer is.

Substances (in appearances) are the substrate of all temporal determinations. The arising of some and the passing-away of others would even eliminate the sole condition of the empirical unity of time; and the appearances would then relate to one another in two times in which existence would pass in parallel, which is absurd. For there is *only one* time: in which all diverse times must be posited not simultaneously, but rather successively.

Persistence is thus a necessary condition under which alone appearances *qua* things or objects are determinable within a possible experience. But in respect to the empirical criterion of that necessary persistence and, with it, of the substantiality of appearances, the following will give us an opportunity to remark what is needed.

1.2.2.2.3.3.3.B. Second Analogy

**Principle of Generation**

Everything that *occurs* (i.e. starts to be) presupposes something upon which it follows *according to a rule*.

**Proof**

Apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts follow upon one another. Whether they also follow within the object is a second point of reflection that is not contained within the first. Now, one can admittedly call everything and even every representation (so far as one is conscious of it) an ‘object’; only what that word shall signify in appearances not insofar as they (*qua* representations) are objects but rather insofar as they merely designate an object belongs to a deeper investigation. So far as they (merely *qua* representations) are simultaneously objects of consciousness, they are not at all distinguished from the apprehension (i.e. reception into the imaginal-power’s synthesis): and one must therefore say that the manifold of appearances is always generated successively within the mind. If appearances were things *per se*, then no human would be able to gauge from the succession of representations how their manifold is conjoined within the object. For we deal only with our representations; how things may be *per se* (without regard to representations whereby they affect us) is totally outside our cognitive sphere. Now, even though appearances are not things *per se* and yet are all that can be given to us for cognition, I shall indicate what manner of conjunction accrues to the manifold within appearances themselves even though the representation of the manifold in apprehension is always successive. So (e.g.) the apprehension of a manifold in the appearance of a house that stands before me is successive. Now, the question is whether the manifold of that house is also successive *per se*: which admittedly no one will concede. Yet as soon as I elevate my concepts of an object to transcendental significance, the house is not a thing *per se* at all but rather merely an appearance (i.e. a representation) whose transcendental object is unknown. What, therefore, do I understand by the question of how the manifold may be conjoined within the appearance itself (which yet is nothing *per se*)? Here, what lies within the successive apprehension is regarded as representation; but the appearance that is given to me – even though it is nothing more than a complex of those representations – is regarded as the object of that representation with which my concept (which I draw from the apprehensional representations) shall harmonise. One soon sees that since agreement of cognition with the object is truth, only the formal conditions of empirical truth can be enquired about here; and appearance, in contrast with the apprehensional representations, can thereby be represented as the object distinct therefrom only if it stands under a rule that distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates a way of conjoining the manifold. That within the appearance which contains the condition of that necessary rule of apprehension is the object.

Now let us proceed to our problem. That something occurs (i.e. that something or a state arises that previously was not) cannot be empirically perceived where an appearance is not precedent that does not contain that state within it; for an actuality that follows upon an empty time (and therefore an arising that no state of the things precedes) can no more be apprehended than the empty time itself. Every apprehension of an occurrence is therefore a perception that follows upon another perception. Yet since this is the case with all apprehensional synthesis (as I have shown above in the appearance of a house), it does not yet thereby distinguish itself from others. Only I also remark that if in an appearance that contains an occurrence, I call the preceding state of perception ‘A’ and the following state of perception ‘B’, then B can only follow upon A in the apprehension whereas the perception A cannot follow upon B but rather can only precede it. I see (e.g.) a ship sail downstream. My perception of its position downstream follows upon my perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible that the ship should first be perceived downstream and thereafter perceived upstream in my apprehension of that appearance. The order in the sequence of perceptions in my apprehension is therefore determined here, and my apprehension is bound to that order. In the previous example of a house, my perceptions could begin in my apprehension of the top of the house and end at its base but could also begin from below and end above; or I could apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition rightwards or leftwards. There was therefore no determinate order in the series of those perceptions that would render it necessary where I would have to begin in the apprehension in order to conjoin the manifold empirically. But that rule is always to be encountered in a perception of what occurs, and it renders the order of the perceptions that follow upon one another (in the apprehension of that appearance) *necessary*.

In our case, therefore, I will have to derive the *subjective sequence* of the apprehension from the *objective sequence* of the appearances because the former is otherwise totally indeterminate and does not distinguish one appearance from another. The former sequence alone proves nothing concerning the connection of the manifold in the object because it is entirely arbitrary. That connection will therefore consist in the order of the manifold of the appearance: according to which, the apprehension of something (that appears) follows upon the apprehension of something else (that precedes) *according to a rule*. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself and not merely of my apprehension that a sequence is to be encountered in the appearance, which signifies so much as that I cannot conduct the apprehension otherwise than in precisely that sequence.

According to such a rule, therefore: in that which, in general, precedes an occurrence, there must lie the condition for a rule according to which that occurrence always and necessarily follows; but conversely, I cannot go backwards from the occurrence and determine (through apprehension) that which precedes. For although no appearance goes backwards from the following temporal-point, it nevertheless relates to *some previous temporal-point*; but from a given time, by contrast, progressing to the determinate following time is necessary. Therefore, since there is nevertheless something that follows, I must necessarily relate it to something else *simpliciter* that precedes and upon which it follows according to a rule (i.e. necessarily) in such a way that the occurrence, as the *conditionatum*, gives sure indication of some condition; and that condition determines the occurrence.

If one supposes that nothing preceded an occurrence upon which it must follow according to a rule, then all sequence of the perception would merely in the apprehension (i.e. merely subjective); but thereby it would not at all be objectively determined what is truly precedent and what is truly subsequent within the perceptions. In such a way, we would have only a play of representations that would relate to no object whatsoever – i.e. through our perception, an appearance would not at all be distinguished from every other in respect of temporal relationships because the succession in the apprehension would be everywhere identical: and there is therefore nothing within the appearance that determines it in such a way that a certain sequence is thereby rendered necessary as objective. I will therefore say not that two states follow upon one another in the appearance, but merely that one apprehension follows upon the other: which is merely something subjective and determines no object and therefore cannot at all be regarded as cognition of an object (not even in appearance).

When we experience that something occurs, therefore, we always presuppose that something precedes upon which it follows according to a rule. For without that, I would not say of the object that it follows because the mere sequence in my apprehension justifies no sequence in the object if it is not determined through a rule in relation to something preceding. Therefore, it is always in regard to a rule according to which the appearances in their sequence (i.e. in the manner wherein they occur) are determined through the previous state that I render my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective; and only merely under that presupposition alone is even an experience of something that occurs possible.

Admittedly, it seems as if that would contradict all observations that one has always made concerning the course of our understanding’s use: according to which, it is only through the perceived and compared agreeing sequences of many occurrences upon preceding appearances that we have been led to discover a rule according to which certain occurrences always follow upon certain appearances and thereby first incited to make for ourselves the concept of a cause. On such a footing, that concept would be merely empirical; and the rule that it provides, viz. that everything that occurs has a cause, would be just as contingent as experience itself: its universality and necessity would then be merely imputed and would have no true universal validity because they would be grounded not *apriori* but rather merely upon induction. Yet the situation here is just as it is with other pure *apriori* representations (e.g. space and time), which we can extract from experience as clear concepts only because we had laid them in experience and had therefore first brought experience about only through them. Admittedly, the logical clarity of that representation of a rule that determines the series of occurrences, as a concept of a cause, is possible only if we have made use of it within experience; but a regard to that representation as a condition of the synthetic unity of all appearances in time was nevertheless the ground of experience itself and therefore preceded it *apriori*.

It is therefore a matter of showing in an example that even in experience, we never attribute the sequence (of an occurrence wherein something occurs that previously was not) to the object and distinguish it from the subjective sequence of our apprehension except when a rule is underlying that compels us to observe that order of the perceptions rather than another and indeed that it is in fact that compulsion that first renders the representation of a succession in the object possible.

We have representations within us whereof we can also become conscious. Yet that consciousness may extend as far and be as precise or punctual as one likes: they nevertheless remain always only representations, i.e. internal determinations of our mind in one temporal relationship or another. Now, how do we come to posit an object for those representations or to also attribute an objective reality to them (I know not what) beyond their subjective reality as modifications? Objective significance cannot consist in a relation to another representation (of what one would wish to say of the object); for otherwise, the question would be renewed: how does that representation in turn proceed outside itself and also receive objective significance beyond the subjective significance that belongs to it as a determination of a mental state? If we investigate what then *relation to an object* gives to our representations in the way of a new quality and what the dignity is that they thereby obtain, then we find that it does nothing more than necessitate the conjunction of the representations in a certain way and subject them to a rule and that conversely, it is only through the fact that a certain order is necessary in the temporal relationship of our representations that objective significance is imparted to them.

In the synthesis of appearances, the manifold of the representations always follows successively. Now, no object whatsoever is thereby represented because through that sequence (which is common to all apprehensions), nothing becomes distinguished from anything else. Yet as soon as I perceive or antecedently assume that within that sequence, there is a relation to the preceding state from which the representation follows according to a rule: then something represents itself as an occurrence or what therein occurs: i.e. I cognise an object that I must posit in time at a determinate position that cannot be otherwise imparted to it after the preceding state. If I therefore perceive that something occurs, then within that representation is firstly contained that something precedes because the appearance receives its temporal relationship precisely in relation to it: namely, to exist after a preceding time in which it was not. Yet the appearance can receive its determinate temporal-position in that relationship only through the fact that something in the preceding state is presupposed upon which it always follows, i.e. follows according to a rule – from which, then, it results that I firstly cannot reverse the series and prefix that which occurs to that whereupon it follows and secondly that if the state that precedes is posited, then that determinate occurrence follows inevitably and necessarily. It thereby occurs that an order arises amongst our representations in which what is present (so far as it has come to be) gives indication of some preceding state as an (admittedly still indeterminate) correlate of that event that is given that relates to that event as determining its sequence and necessarily connects it to itself within the time-series.

If it is a necessary law of our sensibility and therefore *a formal condition* of all perceptions that the previous time necessarily determines the following time (because I cannot reach the following time except via the preceding time), then it is also an indispensable *law of empirical representation* of the time-series that the appearances of the past time determines every existence in the following time and that the latter (*qua* occurrences) cannot occur except so far as the former determine their existence within time, i.e. ordain it according to a rule. *For only in the appearances can we empirically cognise that continuity in the nexus of times*.

To all experience and its possibility belongs understanding; and what understanding does firstly for them is not that it renders the representation of the objects perspicuous, but rather that it renders the representation of an object possible *simpliciter*. That occurs through the fact that the understanding transfers the order of time to the appearances and their existence by conferring upon each of them *qua* sequence a position in time that is determinate *apriori* in respect to the preceding appearances: without which it would not accord with time itself, which determines the position of all its parts *apriori*. Now, that determination of the position cannot be borrowed from the relationship of appearances to absolute time (for absolute time is not an object of perception); but rather conversely, the appearances must themselves determine their positions in time for one another and render those positions necessary within the order of time – i.e. that which follows or occurs therein must follow upon what was contained within the previous state according to a universal rule: from which a series of the appearances arises that, by means of the understanding, brings forth and necessitates the very same order and constant coherence within the series of possible perceptions as is encountered *apriori* within the form of internal intuition (viz. time), wherein all perceptions must have their position.

That something therefore occurs is a perception that belongs to a possible experience that thereby becomes actual when I regard the appearance as determined in respect of its position in time and consequently as an object that can always be found within the nexus of the perceptions according to a rule. But that rule to determine something in respect of a time-sequence is that in that which precedes, the condition is to be encountered under which the occurrence always (i.e. necessarily) follows. Therefore, the principle of sufficient ground is the ground of possible experience: i.e. of objective cognition of the appearances in respect to their relationship within the serial sequence of time.

The probative-ground of that principle, however, rests merely upon the following moments. To all empirical cognition belongs the synthesis of the manifold through the imaginal power, which is always successive: i.e. the representations always follow upon one another within it. Yet the sequence is not at all determined within the imaginal power in respect of its order (i.e. what must precede and what must follow), and the series of the representations that follow upon one another can just as well be taken backwards as forwards. But if that synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given appearance), then the order in the object is determined or (to speak more precisely) there is therein an order of the successive synthesis that determines an object according to which something must necessarily precede and if it is posited, then something else must necessarily follow. If my perception shall therefore contain a cognition of an occurrence wherein something actually occurs, then it must be an empirical judgement in which one thinks that the sequence is determined: i.e. that it presupposes another appearance in respect to time upon which it follows necessarily or according to a rule. Otherwise, if I posited that which precedes and the occurrence did not necessarily follow upon it: then I would have to take it to be merely a subjective play of my imaginings and, if I nevertheless represented something objective thereunder, call it a mere dream. Therefore: the relationship of appearances (as possible perceptions) according to which what is subsequent (i.e. what occurs) is determined necessarily and according to a rule in time through something preceding in respect of its existence and consequently the relationship of a cause to its effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgements in respect to the series of perceptions and consequently of their empirical truth and therefore of experience. The principle of the causal relationship in the sequence of appearances also therefore holds prior to all objects of experience (under the conditions of succession) because it is itself the ground of the possibility of such an experience.

A doubt nevertheless manifests itself here that must be resolved. Whereas the principle of the causal connection between appearances is confined to their serial sequence in our formulation, it nevertheless occurs in use of that principle that it can also apply to their concomitance and that cause and effect can be simultaneous. There is (e.g.) warmth in the room that is not encountered in the open air. I look for the cause and find a heated oven. Now, the oven *qua* cause is simultaneous with its effect (viz. the room’s warmth); there is therefore no serial sequence in respect to time between cause and effect here, but rather they are simultaneous: and yet the law holds. The greatest part of the efficient causes within nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the time sequence of the latter is engendered only through the fact that the cause cannot bring forth its whole effect within a moment. Yet in the moment wherein that effect first arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause because if that causality had ceased to be one moment previously, then the effect would not have arisen at all. Now, one must well remark here that it is the *order* of time and not its *course* that is at issue: the relationship remains even if no time has passed. The time between the causality of a cause and its immediate effect can be *evanescent* (and they therefore simultaneous), but the relationship of one to the other always remains determinable in respect to time. If I consider a ball that lies upon a stuffed cushion and presses a dimple therein as a cause, then it is simultaneous with the effect. Only I do not distinguish them through the temporal relationship of the dynamic connection of both. For if I lay the ball upon the cushion, then the dimple follows upon the cushion’s previous flat shape; but if the cushion has a dimple (I know not whence), then a lead ball does not follow thereupon.

Thus, the time sequence is admittedly the sole empirical criterion of an effect in relation to the causality of the cause, which precedes. A glass is the cause of the rising of water above its horizontal surface even though both appearances are simultaneous. For as soon as I scoop the water from a larger receptacle with the glass, then something results: namely, the alteration of the horizontal position that it had there into a concave position that it assumes in the glass.

That causality leads to the concept of action; action leads to the concept of force and thereby to the concept of substance. Since I do not wish to mix my critical project (which addresses merely the sources of synthetic *apriori* cognition) with dissections that impinge merely upon the elucidation (and not the expansion) of the concepts, I leave the circumstantial discussion of the concepts to a future system of pure reason: although one also already encounters such an analysis to a large extent within hitherto familiar textbooks of that kind. Only I cannot leave untouched the empirical criterion of a substance so far as the substance seems to manifest itself not through the persistence of appearance, but rather better and more easily through action.

Where action and consequently activity and force are, there also is substance; and the seat of that fruitful source of appearances must be sought in substance alone. That is entirely well said: but if one shall explain oneself in respect of what one understands by the term ‘substance’ and therein wishes to avoid the vicious circle, then it is not so easy to justify oneself. How shall one immediately infer *to the persistence* of the agent, which is yet such an essential and peculiar distinguishing-sign of a substance (*phaenomenon*)? Only after our previous remarks, the resolution of the question is indeed attended by no such difficulty even though it would be entirely unresolvable in the common way (i.e. proceeding merely analytically with one’s concepts). ‘Action’ already signifies the relationship of a subject of causality to an effect. Now, since all effect consists in what occurs therein and therefore in the *mutabile* that designates time in respect to succession, the ultimate subject of that *mutabile* is the *persistens* as the substratum of everything that changes (i.e. substance). For according to the principle of causality, actions are always the first ground of all change in appearances and therefore cannot lie within a subject that itself changes because otherwise other actions and another subject that determined that change would be requisite. By virtue of that, action demonstrates substantiality as a sufficient empirical criterion of it without my needing to first seek the persistence thereof through compared perceptions: which could not occur via that route with thoroughness, which is requisite for the magnitude and strict universal-validity of the concept. For that the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing-away cannot itself arise and pass-away (in the field of appearances) is a sure inference that leads to empirical necessity and persistence in existence and therefore to the concept of a substance *qua* appearance.

If something occurs, then the mere arising without regard to that which arises is already *per se* an object of investigation. The transition from the non-being of a state into that state – assuming that the state also contains no quality in appearance – already, on its own, needs to be investigated. As was shown in section A, that arising impinges not upon substance (for substance does not arise) but rather upon its state. The arising is therefore merely alteration and not origination from nothing. If that origination is regarded as an effect of a foreign cause, then it is called ‘creation’: which cannot be admitted as an occurrence amongst appearances because its possibility alone would already eliminate the unity of experience. Yet if I consider all things not as phenomena but rather as things *per se* and as objects of the mere understanding: then although they are substances, they can nevertheless admittedly be regarded as dependent upon a foreign cause in respect of their existence; but that then brings with it entirely different verbal-significations and would not apply to appearances as possible objects of experience.

We have not the slightest concept *apriori* of how something can be altered at all and how it is possible that upon one state at one temporal point, an opposite state can follow at another temporal point. For that, knowledge of actual forces is required: which can be given only empirically – e.g. knowledge of motive forces or, what is the same, knowledge of certain successive appearances (*qua* movements) that indicate such forces. Yet the form of every alteration, the condition under which alone it can occur (whatever the content of the alteration may be, i.e. whatever state may be altered), and consequently the succession of the states themselves (i.e. what occurs) can nevertheless be considered in light of the law of causality and the conditions of time *apriori*.[[9]](#footnote-9)

If a substance transitions from one state *a* into another state *b*, then the temporal point of the second state is distinct from the temporal point of the first state and follows it. Likewise, the second state *qua* reality (in appearance) is distinct from the first state (wherein that reality was not) as *b* is distinct from zero – i.e. if the state *b* also distinguishes itself from the state *a* only in respect of quantity, then the alteration is an arising of *b*–*a*: which was not in the previous state and in respect of which, the previous stateis = 0.

It is therefore asked how a thing transitions from one state = *a* into another state = *b*. Between two moments, there is always a time; and between two states in those moments, there is always a difference that has a quantity (for all parts of appearances are always in turn quanta). Therefore, every transition occurs from one state into another state in a time that is contained between two moments: the first of which determines the state that the thing leaves and the second of which determines the state that it attains. Both are therefore limits of the time of an alteration and consequently of the intermediate-state between the two states and, as such, belong to the total alteration. Now, every alteration has a cause that demonstrates its causality in the total time in which the alteration occurs. Therefore, that cause brings forth its alteration not suddenly (i.e. at once or within a moment) but rather in a time in such a way that just as the time grows from the initial-moment *a* until its completion in *b*, the quantity of the reality (*b*–*a*) is also generated via all of the smaller degrees that are contained between the first degree and the last degree. All alteration is therefore possible only through a continuous action of causality: which, so far as it is uniform, is called a ‘moment’. The alteration does not consist of those moments, but is rather generated thereby as their effect.

That is the law of the continuity of all alteration, whose ground is that neither time nor even the appearance within time consists of parts that are the smallest and that the state of a thing in its alteration nevertheless transitions to its second state via all those parts *qua* elements. *No difference* of the *reale* within appearance is *the smallest*, just as no difference in the quantity of time is the smallest; and so the new state of a reality arises from the first state (wherein that reality was not) via all of the infinite degrees of that reality, whose differences from one another are *in toto* smaller than the difference between 0 and *a*.

What utility that principle may have in natural research does not concern us here at all. Yet how such a principle that seems to thus expand our cognition of nature is possible completely-*apriori* indeed greatly requires our examination, even if an inspection demonstrates that the principle is actual and correct and one might consequently believe oneself to be relieved of the question of how it was possible. For there are so many ungrounded pretensions to the expansion of our cognition through pure reason that it must be assumed as a universal principle that one shall consequently be thoroughly mistrustful and believe and assume nothing of that sort without documents that can provide a profound deduction, even on the basis of the clearest dogmatic proof.

All increase of empirical cognition and every progress of perception is nothing but an expansion of the determination of the internal sense (i.e. a progress in time), whatever the objects may be (e.g. appearances or pure intuitions). That progress in time determines everything and is determined through nothing further *per se*: i.e. the parts of that progress are given only in time and through its synthesis, but not prior to it. Because of that, every transition in perception to something that follows in time is a determination of time through the generation of that perception and – since time is always a quantum and is a quantum in all its parts – through the generation of a perception as a quantum via all degrees (of which none is the smallest), from zero up to its determinate degree. From that, the possibility of cognising a law of alterations in respect of their form *apriori* becomes manifest. We anticipate only our own apprehension, whose formal condition must indeed be capable of being cognised *apriori* because it itself dwells within us prior to all given appearance.

Thus, just as time contains the *apriori* sensory-condition of the possibility of a continuous progression of the existent to what follows, the understanding by means of the unity of apperception is the *apriori* condition of the possibility of a continuous determination of all positions for the appearances in that time through the series of causes and effects: the former drawing the latter’s existence inevitably behind them and thereby rendering empirical cognition of temporal relationships valid for every time (i.e. universally valid) and therefore objectively valid.

1.2.2.2.3.3.3.C. Third Analogy

**Principle of Community**

All substances, so far as they *are simultaneous*,stand in thoroughgoing community (i.e. interaction between one another).

**Proof**

Things are simultaneous so far as they exist in one and the same time. But whereby does one cognise that they are in one and the same time? If the order in the synthesis of the apprehension of that manifold is a matter of indifference: i.e. if it can pass from A via B, C, and D to E or even conversely from E to A. For if they were in time successively (in the order that starts from A and ends in E), then it would be impossible to start the apprehension within perception from E and proceed backwards to A because A would belong to the past time and would therefore no longer be capable of being an object of apprehension.

If you now assume that each of the substances within a multiplicity of substances (*qua* appearances) were fully isolated (i.e. that none worked upon another and received influences from it reciprocally), then I say that their *simultaneity* would not be an object of a possible perception and that the existence of one could not lead to the existence of another via any path of empirical synthesis. For if you suppose that they were separated through a completely empty space, then a perception that proceeds from one to another in time would admittedly determine the existence of the latter by means of a following perception but would be unable to discern whether the appearance follows upon the other objectively or is instead simultaneous with it.

There must therefore be something beyond mere existence whereby A determines B’s position in time and B also in turn conversely determines A’s position in time, because only under that condition can the aforesaid substances be empirically represented as *simultaneously existent*. Now, only something that is the cause of something else or its determinations determines its position in time. Therefore, each substance (since it can be a consequence only in respect of its determinations) must contain within it the causality of certain determinations in another substance and simultaneously the effects of another substance’s causality: i.e. they must stand in dynamic community (immediately or mediately) if the simultaneity is to be cognised in a possible experience. But everything without which experience of the objects of experience would be impossible is necessary in respect of the objects of experience. Therefore: it is necessary for all substances in appearance, so far as they are simultaneous, to stand in thoroughgoing community of interaction between one another.

The word ‘*Gemeinschaft*’ [sc. ‘community’] is ambiguous in our language, and it can signify so much as *communio* or even *commercium*. We avail ourselves of it in the latter sense here: i.e. in the sense of a dynamic community, without which even a locational community (i.e. *communio spatii*) could never be cognised empirically. In our experiences, it is easy to remark that: only the continuous influences in all spatial positions can lead our sense from one object to another; the light that plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies effects a mediate community between us and those bodies and thereby demonstrates the simultaneity of the latter; we cannot alter a location empirically (i.e. perceive that alteration) without matter everywhere rendering our perception of our position possible, and only by means of matter’s reciprocal influence can that perception demonstrate matter’s simultaneity and the coexistence of even the remotest objects (albeit only mediately). Without community, every perception (of appearance in space) is detached from every other perception and the chain of empirical representations (i.e. experience) would begin entirely from the beginning with a new object without it being possible for the previous objects to cohere therewith or stand in temporal relationship thereto in the slightest. I by no means wish to thereby reject empty space: for it may always be where perceptions cannot reach at all and therefore where no empirical cognition of simultaneity occurs, but then it would not be an object for any of our possible experience at all.

The following can serve for elucidation. Within our mind, all appearances (as contained within a possible experience) must stand in community (*communio*) of apperception; and so far as the objects shall be represented as connected in simultaneous existence, they must reciprocally determine their position in a time and thereby constitute a totality. If that subjective community is to rest upon an objective ground or become related to appearances *qua* substances, then the perception of one substance *qua* ground must render the perception of another substance possible and thus conversely: not in order for the succession that is always in the perceptions *qua* apprehensions to be attributed to the objects, but rather in order for the objects to be capable of becoming represented as simultaneously existent. But that is a reciprocal influence, i.e. a real community (*commercium*) of the substances: without which, therefore, the empirical relationship of simultaneity could not occur within experience. Through that *commercium*, the appearances (so far as they stand outside one another and yet in connection) constitute a composite (i.e. *compositum reale*) and such composites become possible in various ways. The three dynamic relationships from which all others derive are therefore those of inherence, consequence, and composition.

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These are therefore the three analogies of experience. They are nothing other than principles of the determination of the existence of appearances in time according to all three modes of time: viz. their relationship to time itself as a quantum (the quantity of existence, i.e. duration), their relationship within time as a series (i.e. successively), and finally also within time as a complex of all existence (i.e. simultaneously). This unity of the temporal determination is dynamic through-and-through – i.e. time is not regarded as that wherein experience immediately determines the position of each existence (which is impossible because absolute time is not an object of perception with which appearances could be held together), but rather the rule of the understanding through which alone the existence of the appearances can receive synthetic unity according to temporal relationships determines the position of each of them within time and therefore *apriori* and validly for all and every time.

By the term ‘nature’ (in the empirical sense), we understand the coherence of all appearances in respect to their existence according to necessary rules (i.e. according to laws). There are therefore certain laws, and indeed *apriori*,that render a nature possible for the first time; the empirical laws can occur and be found only by means of experience and indeed in accordance with those original laws according to which even experience first becomes possible. Our analogies therefore in fact present the unity of nature in the coherence of all appearances under certain exponents: which express nothing other than the relationship of time (so far as it comprehends all existence within itself) to the unity of apperception, which can occur only in synthesis according to rules. Together, they therefore say that all appearances lie within a nature and must lie therein because without that *apriori* unity, no unity of experience and consequently also no determination of the objects within it would be possible.

Nevertheless, a remark is to be made regarding the kind of proof of which we have availed ourselves in respect of those transcendental laws-of-nature and its peculiarity that simultaneously must be highly important as a prescription for every other attempt to prove intellectual and simultaneously synthetic *apriori*-propositions. Had we sought to prove those analogies dogmatically (i.e. from concepts) – viz. that everything exists is encountered only in what is persistent; that every occurrence presupposes something in the previous state upon which it follows according to a rule; and finally that in a manifold that is simultaneous, the states are simultaneous in relation to one another according to a rule (i.e. stand in community) – then all endeavour would have been totally in vain. For one cannot at all proceed from one object and its existence to the existence of another object or its way of existing through mere concepts of those things, regardless of how one may dissect those concepts. Now, what remains to us? The possibility of experience as a cognition wherein all objects must ultimately be capable of being given to us if their representation is to have objective reality for us. In that *tertium quid*, whose essential form consists in the synthetic unity of apperception of all appearances, we found *apriori* conditions of a thoroughgoing and necessary temporal-determination of all existence in appearance without which even an empirical temporal-determination would be impossible and found rules of the synthetic *apriori* unity by means of which we could anticipate experience. In the absence of that method and in the delusion of wishing to dogmatically prove synthetic propositions that the understanding’s experiential use recommends as its principles, it has occurred that a proof of the principle of sufficient ground has very often been attempted but always in vain. Even though one has always silently availed oneself of the two other analogies,[[10]](#footnote-10) no one has ever thought of them because the guiding-thread of the categories has been absent that alone can uncover every gap of the understanding both in concepts and principles and render it noticeable.

1.2.2.2.3.3.4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought *Simpliciter*

1. What accords with the formal conditions of experience (in respect to intuition and concepts) is *possible*.

2. What coheres with the material conditions of experience (i.e. sensation) is *actual*.

3. Everything whose coherence with what is actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is (i.e. exists) *necessarily*.

**Elucidation**

The categories of modality have in them the particularity that they do not augment the concept to which they are adjoined as a determination of the object in the slightest, but rather merely express the relationship to the cognitive capacity. If the concept of a thing is already entirely complete, then I can still nevertheless ask of that object whether it is merely possible or also actual: or if it is the latter, whether it is also even necessary. No more determinations are thereby thought of within the object itself; but rather it is merely asked how it (together with all its determinations) relates to the understanding and its empirical use, to the empirical judging-power, and to reason (in its application to experience).

Precisely for that reason, the principles of modality are nothing more than explanations of the concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity in their empirical use and therewith simultaneously restrictions of all categories to a merely empirical use, without admitting and allowing a transcendental use. For if the categories are not to have a merely logical significance and express the form of *thought* analytically but shall rather concern *things* and their possibility, actuality, or necessity: then they must pertain to possible experience and its synthetic unity, in which alone objects of cognition are given.

The postulate of the *possibility* of things therefore demands that their concept harmonise with the formal conditions of an experience *simpliciter*. Those conditions (i.e. the objective form of experience *simpliciter*), however, contain all synthesis that is required for cognition of objects. A concept that comprises a synthesis within it is to be taken to be empty and relates to no object if that synthesis does not pertain to experience either as borrowed from it – and then it is called an *empirical concept* – or as a synthesis upon which, *qua apriori* condition, experience *simpliciter* (i.e. its form) rests: and then it is a *pure concept* that nevertheless pertains to experience because its object can be encountered only within experience. For whence shall one derive the character of the possibility of an object that has been thought about through a synthetic *apriori* concept if the synthesis does not occur that constitutes the form of empirical cognition of objects? That no contradiction must be contained within such a concept is admittedly a necessary logical condition; but it is far from enough for the concept’s objective reality, i.e. the possibility of such an object as is thought about through the concept. Thus, there is no contradiction in the concept of a figure that is contained within two straight lines: for the concepts of two straight lines and their meeting contain no negation of a figure; but rather the impossibility rests not upon the concept *per se* but rather upon its construction in space, i.e. upon the conditions of space and of its determination: although those conditions in turn have their objective reality (i.e. they pertain to possible things) because they contain within them the form of experience *simpliciter apriori*.

And now we shall display the widespread utility and influence of that postulate of possibility. If I represent to myself a thing that is persistent in such a way that everything that changes therein belongs merely to its state, then I can never cognise that such a thing is possible from such a concept alone. Or if I represent to myself something that shall be constituted in such a way that if it is posited, then something else always and inevitably follows thereupon: then that may admittedly be capable of being thus thought of without contradiction, but whether such a property (as causality) is encountered in any possible thing cannot thereby be judged. Finally, I can represent to myself diverse things (i.e. substances) that are constituted in such a way that the state of one draws a consequence in the state of the other behind it and thus reciprocally; but whether such a relationship can accrue to any things cannot at all be derived from those concepts, which contain a merely arbitrary synthesis. One therefore cognises the objective reality of those concepts (i.e. their transcendental truth) only in light of the fact that those concepts express the relationships of perceptions in every experience *apriori*; and one admittedly does so independently of experience, though not independently of all relation to the form of an experience *simpliciter* and the synthetic unity in which alone objects can be empirically cognised.

If one sought to make entirely new concepts of substances, forces, and interactions from the material that perception offers to us without borrowing the example of their connection from experience itself, however, then one would drift into mere figments of the brain whose possibility has absolutely no distinguishing-sign by itself because one neither assumes experience as a teacher in respect of them nor borrows those concepts from experience. Such invented concepts cannot receive the character of their possibility *apriori* like the categories, as conditions upon which all experience depends, but rather only *aposteriori* as concepts that are given through experience itself; and their possibility must either be cognised *aposteriori* and empirically or it cannot be cognised at all. A substance that were persistently present in space yet without filling it (like the *quid medium* between matter and thinking beings that some have sought to introduce) or a particular fundamental-power of our mind to *intuit* what is future in advance (not, say, merely to infer it) or finally a capacity of our mind to stand in a community of thoughts with other humans (however distant they may be) are concepts whose possibility is entirely groundless because it cannot be grounded upon experience and its known laws: and without them, it is an arbitrary cogitational-conjunction that, although it admittedly contains no contradiction, can nevertheless make no claim to objective reality and therefore no claim to the possibility of such an object as one wishes to think about therein. In respect to reality: thinking of a reality *in concreto* without invoking the aid of experience is indeed forbidden *per se* because reality can impinge only upon sensation as experience’s matter and does not concern the form of the relationship, with which one could perhaps play in inventions.

Nevertheless, I disregard everything whose possibility can be derived only from actuality in experience and consider here only the possibility of things through *apriori* concepts: of which I proceed to assert that they can never occur from such concepts alone by themselves, but rather only as formal and objective conditions of an experience *simpliciter*.

It admittedly seems as if a triangle’s possibility could be cognised from its concept *per se* (it is certainly independent of experience); for in fact, we can give an object for that concept entirely *apriori* (i.e. construct it). Yet since that is merely the form of an object, it will still always remain merely a product of the imagination: the possibility of whose object still remains doubtful as something for which something more is also required, viz. that such a figure be thought of merely under conditions upon which all objects of experience rest. That space is a formal *apriori* condition of external experiences and that exactly the same formative synthesis whereby we construct a triangle in the imaginal power is totally identical with that which we exercise in apprehending an appearance in order to make an experiential concept thereof – that alone is what connects the representation of the possibility of such a thing to that concept. And thus, since the concepts of them are *in toto* synthetic, the possibility of continuous quanta and indeed even of quanta *simpliciter* first becomes clear never from the concepts themselves but rather only from them as formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience *simpliciter*; and where would one also wish to seek objects that correspond to the concepts if not in experience, through which alone objects are given to us – although, without exactly prefixing experience itself, we can cognise and characterise the possibility of things merely in relation to the formal conditions under which something becomes determined as an object within experience *simpliciter* and therefore fully *apriori*, but still only in relation to experience and within its limits.

The postulate to cognise the *actuality* of things demands *perception* (and therefore sensation of which one is conscious) admittedly not exactly immediately of the object itself whose existence is to be cognised, but nevertheless its coherence with some actual perception according to the analogies of experience: which propound all real connection within an experience *simpliciter*.

In the *mere concept* of a thing, absolutely no character of its existence can be encountered. For even if that concept is so complete that nothing whatsoever is lacking in order to think of a thing with all of its internal determinations, the thing’s existence still has nothing to do with that at all but rather only with the question of whether such a thing is given to us in such a way that perception of it could perhaps precede the concept. For that the concept precedes the perception signifies the concept’s mere possibility, but the perception that provides the material for the concept is the sole character of its actuality. Nevertheless, one can also cognise the thing’s existence prior to perception of the thing and therefore *comparatively apriori* if it merely coheres with some perceptions according to the principles of their empirical connection (viz. the analogies). For then, the thing’s existence coheres with our perceptions within a possible experience: and we can move from our actual perception to the thing in the series of possible perceptions, following the guiding thread of the aforementioned analogies. So we cognise the existence of a magnetic matter that pervades all bodies from a perception of an attracted iron-filing, although an immediate perception of that material is admittedly impossible due to the constitution of our organs. For in fact, we would also encounter an immediate empirical intuition of that matter according to laws of sensibility and the nexus of our perceptions within an experience if our senses were finer, whose grossness does not at all impinge upon the form of possible experience *simpliciter*. Therefore: wherever perception and what attaches to it extend in accordance with empirical laws, our cognition of the existence of things also extends. If we do not begin from experience or if we do not proceed according to laws of appearances’ empirical coherence, then it is futile for us to seek to divine or explore the existence of any thing.

Finally, in respect to the *third* postulate, it is material necessity in existence that is at issue and not merely formal and logical necessity in connection of concepts. Since no existence of objects of the senses can be cognised fully *apriori*, though it can indeed be cognised comparatively-*apriori* relatively to another existence that is already given (though even then one can arrive only at an existence that must be contained somewhere within the nexus of the experience whereof the given perception is a part), the necessity of existence can never be cognised from concepts but rather always only from a connection to what is perceived in accordance with universal laws of experience. Now, there is no existence that could be cognised as necessary under the condition of other given appearances except the existence of the effects from given causes according to laws of causality. Therefore, it is not the existence of things (i.e. substances) but rather the existence of their state whose necessity alone we can cognise and indeed from other states that are given in perception according to empirical laws of causality. From that, it follows that the criterion of necessity lies merely in the law of possible experience that everything that occurs is determined *apriori* through its cause in appearance. Therefore, we cognise only the necessity of the *effects* in nature whose causes are given to us; and the mark of necessity in existence does not extend beyond the field of possible experience: and even within that field, it does not hold for the existence of things *qua* substances because they can never be regarded as empirical effects or as something that occurs and arises. The necessity therefore pertains only to appearances’ relationships according to the dynamic law of causality and the possibility of inferring *apriori* from a given existence (viz. that of a cause) to another existence (viz. that of the effect), which is grounded upon the aforesaid law. Everything that occurs is hypothetically necessary – that is a principle that subjects the alteration within the world to a law, i.e. to a rule of necessary existence without which nature would not even occur at all. Therefore, the principle that nothing occurs through a blind happenstance (*in mundo non datur casus*) is an *apriori* law-of-nature: and so is the principle that no necessity in nature is blind but is rather conditioned and therefore intelligible necessity (*non datur fatum*). Both are laws through which the play of alterations is subjected to a *nature of things* (*qua* appearances) or, what is the same, to the unity of the understanding: in which alone they can belong to an experience, i.e. to the synthetic unity of appearances. Those two principles belong to the dynamic principles. The first is in fact a consequence of the principle of causality (amongst the analogies of experience). The second belongs to the principles of modality, which add to the causal determination the concept of a necessity that stands under a rule of the understanding. The principle of continuity forbade any jump in the series of appearances (i.e. alterations) (*in mundo non datur saltus*), but also any gap or chasm between two appearances (*non datur hiatus*); for one can thus express the principle that nothing can enter experience that would demonstrate a vacuum or even merely permit it as a part of an empirical synthesis. For a void whereof one may think as outside the field of possible experience (i.e. the world) does not belong to the jurisdiction of the mere understanding, which decides only about questions concerning the use of given appearances for empirical cognition; and it is a problem for ideal reason, which goes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and seeks to judge about that which surrounds and delimits that sphere itself, and must therefore be considered in the Transcendental Dialectic. As with all principles of transcendental origin, we could easily represent those four principles (viz. ‘*in mundo non datur hiatus*’; ‘*non datur saltus*’; ‘*non datur casus*’; and ‘*non datur fatum*’) in respect of their order according to the order of the categories and assign each its position; only the already practised reader will do that by himself or easily discover the guiding thread to do so. Yet they are all united merely in permitting nothing in empirical synthesis that could detract from or harm the understanding and the continuous coherence of all appearances, i.e. the unity of its concepts. For it is only within the understanding that the unity of experience becomes possible in which all perceptions must have their position.

Whether the field of possibility is larger than the field that contains everything actual and whether the latter is in turn larger than the multitude of everything that is necessary are fine questions and are admittedly to be resolved synthetically but also fall within reason’s jurisdiction; for they shall say roughly so much as whether all things *qua* appearances belong *in toto* to the complex and the nexus of a single experience of which every given perception is a part that therefore cannot be conjoined with any other appearances or whether my perceptions can belong to more than one possible experience (in their universal coherence). The understanding gives only a rule to experience *simpliciter apriori*, in accordance with the subjective and formal conditions both of sensibility and of apperception that alone render experience possible. Even if other forms of intuition (other than space and time) and other forms of the understanding (other than the discursive form of thought or cognition through concepts) were possible, we still cannot think of them and render them comprehensible in any way; but even if we could do that, they would still not belong to experience: which is the only cognition wherein objects are given to us. Whether perceptions other than those that belong to our total possible experience in general and therefore an entirely different field of matter can occur cannot be decided by the understanding; it deals only with synthesis of what is given. Otherwise, the poverty of our customary inferences whereby we bring forth a great realm of possibility whereof everything actual (i.e. every object of experience) is only a small part is highly conspicuous. Everything actual is possible; from that, the following merely particular proposition naturally follows according to the logical rules of conversion: some possibilia are actual – which seems to signify so much as that much is possible that is not actual. Admittedly, it seems as if one could also directly raise the number of the possibiliaabove that of the *actualia* because something else must accrue to the former in order to constitute the latter. Only I do not know that accrual to the possibilia. For what would be added to them would be impossible. Something can accrue only to my understanding, beyond a harmony with the formal conditions of experience: namely, a connection to a perception. What is connected to a perception is actual, however, even if it is not immediately perceived. But that another series of appearances in thoroughgoing coherence with what is given to me in perception and therefore more like a single, all-encompassing experience is possible cannot be inferred from what is given and can much less be inferred without something being given because nothing whatsoever can be thought without material. What is possible only under conditions that are themselves merely possible is not possible *in every respect*. The question is taken in every respect, however, when one wishes to know whether the possibility of things extends further than experience can reach.

I have made mention of those questions only in order to leave no gap in what belongs to the intellectual concepts according to common opinion. In fact, however, absolute possibility (which is valid in every respect) is not a mere intellectual-concept and cannot be of empirical use in any way; but rather it appertains solely to a reason [*Vernunft*] that goes beyond all possible empirical use of the understanding. Hence, we have had to satisfy ourselves with a merely critical remark but have also left the issue in obscurity for a further, future procedure.

Since I wish to conclude this fourth section and, with it, simultaneously the system of all principles of the pure understanding, I must still specify a ground why I have called the principles of modality ‘postulates’. I do not intend to take that term here in the signification that some recent philosophical authors have given to it contrarily to the sense of the mathematicians, to whom it indeed truly belongs: namely, such that ‘to postulate’ shall mean so much as to pass a proposition off as immediately certain without justification or proof. For if we were to permit that for synthetic propositions (however evident they may be), so that one may impose them for unconditional approval without deduction on the authority of their own pronouncement, then all critique of the understanding is lost; and since there is no lack of brazen pretensions that even common belief (which is, however, not an accreditation) does not refuse, our understanding will be open to every delusion without being able to deny its approval to pronouncements that, even though they are illegitimate, nevertheless demand to be admitted in exactly the same tone of confidence as actual axioms. If therefore a determination accrues to the concept of a thing synthetically *apriori*: then if not a proof, then still at least a deduction of the legitimacy of such a proposition’s assertion must unfailingly be added to it.

The principles of modality are not objectively synthetic, however, because the predicates of possibility, actuality, and necessity do not augment the concept of which they are said in the slightest through adding something else to the representation of the object. Yet since they are nevertheless always synthetic, they are only subjectively synthetic: i.e. they add to the concept of a thing (i.e. *reale*), of which they otherwise say nothing, the cognitive power wherein that concept arises and has its seat in such a way that: if the concept is merely connected to the formal conditions of experience within the understanding, then its object is called ‘possible’; if the concept coheres with perception (i.e. sensation as the matter of the senses) and is determined through it by means of the understanding, then the object is actual; and if the concept is determined through the coherence of perceptions according to concepts, then the object is called ‘necessary’. The principles of modality therefore express nothing about a concept except the action of the cognitive capacity whereby it is generated. Now, the term ‘postulate’ in mathematics means a practical proposition that contains nothing except the synthesis whereby we first give an object to ourselves and generate its concept: e.g. to describe a circle with a given line from a given point on a plane; and such a proposition cannot be proved because the procedure that it demands is precisely that whereby we first generate the concept of such a figure. So we can therefore postulate the principles of modality with exactly the same right because they do not augment their concept of things at all,[[11]](#footnote-11) but rather merely indicate the way in which it is conjoined with the cognitive power.

1.2.2.2.4. On the Ground of the Division of All Objects *Simpliciter* into Phenomena and Noumena

We have now not only travelled through the land of the pure understanding and carefully inspected every part thereof, but have also traversed it and determined the position of every thing within it. That land is an island, however, and is enclosed within unalterable limits by nature itself. It is the land of truth (a charming name) and is surrounded by a vast and stormy ocean – the true seat of semblance – where many a cloudbank and some ice that soon melts away simulate new lands and which, by unceasingly deceiving the seafarer seeking new discoveries with false hopes, embroils him in adventures from which he can never desist but which he can also never bring to an end. Yet before we venture onto that sea in order to explore it in all latitudes and to become certain whether something is to be hoped in it, it will be useful to first cast a glance upon the map of the land that we wish to leave and firstly to ask whether we might not perhaps be content with what it contains within it or even must be content therewith out of necessity if there is otherwise no ground anywhere upon which we could settle and secondly to ask under what title we can possess that land ourselves and keep it safe from all hostile claims. Although these questions have already been sufficiently answered in the course of the analytic, a summary estimation of their solutions can nevertheless strengthen conviction through unifying their moments in one point.

We have seen that everything that the understanding extracts from itself without borrowing it from experience it nevertheless has for no other behoof than merely for experiential use. The principles of the pure understanding – whether they be *apriori* constitutive (like the mathematical principles) or merely regulative (like the dynamic principles) – contain nothing except merely the pure schema for possible experience, as it were. For the latter has its unity only from the synthetic unity that the understanding imparts to the imaginal power’s synthesis in relation to apperception originally and by itself and to which appearances (as data for a possible cognition) must already stand in relation and be consonant with *apriori*. Now, even though those intellectual rules are not only true *apriori* but even the source of all truth (i.e. agreement of our cognition with objects) through the fact that they contain within them the ground of the possibility of experience as the complex of all cognition wherein objects may be given to us: it still does not seem enough to allow merely what is true to be presented, but rather what one desires to know. If we therefore learn nothing more through this critical investigation than what we would well have exercised by ourselves in merely empirical use of the understanding even without such subtle investigation, it seems as if the advantage that one draws from it were not worth the expense and preparation. Now, one can admittedly respond to that by saying that no curiosity is more disadvantageous for the expansion of our cognition than that which always wishes to know the utility in advance before one embarks upon the investigations and also before one could make the slightest concept of that utility, even if it were placed before one’s eyes. Only there is nevertheless an advantage that can be rendered comprehensible and simultaneously important to even the most difficult and reluctant student of such transcendental investigations: namely, that an understanding occupied merely with its empirical use that does not reflect upon the sources of its own cognition can admittedly progress very well but cannot accomplish one task at all, viz. that of determining the limits of its own use and of knowing what may lie inside or outside its total sphere; for that requires precisely the deep investigations that we have instituted. Yet if that understanding cannot discern whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not, then it is never sure of its claims and possessions but may rather reckon only upon manifold abashing rebukes when it incessantly transgresses the limits of its domain (as is unavoidable) and strays into delusion and illusions.

That the understanding can therefore make none other than empirical use but never a transcendental use of all its *apriori* principles and indeed of all its concepts is a proposition that offers a prospect of important consequences if it can be cognised with conviction. The transcendental use of a concept in a principle is this: that it becomes related to things *simpliciter and per se*. Its empirical use, however, is when it becomes related merely to *appearances*: i.e. to objects of a possible *experience*. That only the latter can occur at all is discernible from the following, however. For every concept, one requires firstly the logical form of a concept (i.e. of thought) *simpliciter* and then secondly also the possibility of giving an object for it to which it relates. Without such an object, the concept has no sense and is completely devoid of content: even though it may always contain the logical function to make a concept from some data. Now, the object cannot be given for a concept otherwise than in intuition; and even if a pure intuition is possible *apriori* prior to the object, even it can nevertheless receive its object and consequently objective validity only through the empirical intuition of which it is the mere form. All concepts and, with them, all principles – however *apriori* possible they may be – therefore nevertheless relate to empirical intuitions, i.e. to data for a possible experience. Without that, they have no objective validity whatsoever but are rather a mere sport, be it of the imaginal power or the understanding, with their respective representations. One may only take the concepts of mathematics as an example and indeed firstly in their pure intuitions: space has three dimensions; between two points, there can be only one straight line; etc. Even though all those principles and the representation of the object with which that science occupies itself can be generated within the mind fully *apriori*, they would nevertheless signify absolutely nothing if we could not always propound their significance in light of appearances (i.e. empirical objects). Hence, one also demands to renderan abstracted concept *sensory* (i.e. to present the object corresponding to it in intuition) because without that, the concept would (as one says) remain without *sense*: i.e. without significance. Mathematics fulfils that demand through construction of a shape, which is an appearance present to the senses (though admittedly brought forth *apriori*). In that very science, the concept of quantity seeks its support and sense in number; but number seeks its support and sense in fingers, the beads of an abacus, or the strokes and points that are placed before one’s eyes. The concept always remains generated *apriori* together with the synthetic principles or formulae from such concepts; but their use and relation to giveable objects can in the end be sought nowhere except in experience, whose possibility (in respect to form) they contain *apriori*.

That this is even the case with all categories and the principles spun from them is also manifest, however, from the fact that we cannot even define any of them without immediately descending to conditions of sensibility and therefore to the form of appearances: to which (as their only objects) they must consequently be confined because if one removes that condition, then all significance (i.e. relation to an object) falls away and one cannot render comprehensible to oneself what kind of thing is truly meant under such concepts. In presenting the table of the categories above, we excused ourselves from providing definitions for each of them through the fact that our intention (which pertains only to their synthetic use) did not render them necessary: and one must not expose oneself to criticism with needless investigations from which one can be excused. That was not an excuse but rather a not unimportant prudential-rule to not immediately venture upon defining and not to attempt completeness or precision in the determination of a concept if one can get by with one characteristic or another without requiring a complete enumeration of all the characteristics that constitute the whole concept. It now becomes manifest, however, that the ground of that foresight lies still deeper – namely, that we could not define them even if we wanted to do so;[[12]](#footnote-12) but rather if one removes all conditions of sensibility that distinguish them as concepts of a possible empirical use and takes them for concepts of things *simpliciter* (and consequently as being of transcendental use), then absolutely nothing more is to be done with them than to regard the logical function in judgements as the condition of the possibility of the items themselves yet without being able to indicate in the slightest where they can have their application and their object and therefore how they can have any signification and objective validity in the pure understanding without sensibility. No one can explain the concept of quantity *simpliciter* except perhaps by saying that quantity is the determination of a thing whereby it can be thought how many times unity is posited in it. Only that how-many-times is grounded upon successive repetition and consequently upon time and the synthesis (of *homogenea*) in it. One can explain reality in contrast with negation only if one thinks of a time (as the complex of all being) that is either filled with something or empty. If I remove persistence (which is an existence at all time), then nothing remains to me for the concept of substance except the logical representation of the subject that I purport to realise through representing to myself something that can occur merely as a subject (without being a predicate of anything). Yet not only do I know absolutely no conditions under which that logical priority will belong to any thing, but also absolutely nothing more is to be made thereof and not the slightest consequence is to be drawn therefrom because absolutely no object of that concept’s use becomes determined thereby: and one therefore does not know at all whether that concept signifies anything *tout court*. I would find nothing more from the concept of a cause within the pure category (if I omitted the time in which something follows upon something else according to a rule) than that there is something from which the existence of something else can be inferred; and not only would cause and effect thereby be absolutely incapable of being distinguished from one another: but also, since that capacity-to-infer soon requires conditions of which I know nothing, the concept would have absolutely no determination of how it applies to an object. The purported principle ‘everything contingent has a cause’ admittedly emerges almost gravitationally, as if it had its own dignity *per se*. Only if I ask ‘what do you understand by the term “contingent”?’ and you answer ‘something whose non-being is possible’, then I would like to know whereby you intend to cognise that possibility of non-being if a succession within the series of appearances and, in that succession, an existence that follows upon the non-being (or conversely) and therefore a change are not represented to you. For that the non-being of a thing is not self-contradictory is a lame invocation of a logical condition that is admittedly necessary for the concept but far from sufficient for real possibility. Thus, I can eliminate every existent substance in thought without contradicting myself; but I cannot at all infer therefrom to their objective contingency in their existence, i.e. to the possibility of their non-being *per se*. In respect to the concept of community: it is easy to gauge that since the pure categories of both substance and causality permit no explanation that determines the object, the reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to one another (i.e. *commercium*) likewise admits of no such explanation. No one has yet been able to explain possibility, existence, and necessity otherwise than through manifest tautology, if one sought to extract their definition merely from the pure understanding. For the illusion of distinguishing the logical possibility of a *concept* (wherein the concept does not contradict itself) from the transcendental possibility of *things* (wherein an object corresponds to a concept) can fool and satisfy only tyros.

There is something strange and even absurd in the suggestion that there is a concept to which a signification must yet accrue but which would nevertheless admit of no explanation. Only the categories here have the singular quality that although they can have a determinate signification and relation to an object only by means of the universal *sensory condition*, that condition nevertheless had to be omitted from the pure category because the pure category can contain nothing but the logical function to bring the manifold under a concept. Yet from that function (i.e. the form of the concept alone), absolutely nothing can be cognised and discerned in respect of what object belongs thereunder because precisely the sensory condition under which objects can at all belong under it has been abstracted from. Therefore, in addition to a pure intellectual-concept, the categories require determinations of their application to sensibility *simpliciter* (i.e. a schema); and without them, the categories are not concepts whereby an object would be cognised and distinguished from others but rather merely ways to think of an object for possible intuitions and to give it its significance according to a function of the understanding (under still requisite conditions), i.e. *define* the object – therefore, they themselves cannot be defined. The logical functions of judgements *simpliciter* (viz. unity and plurality; affirmation and denial; subject and predicate) cannot be defined without generating a circularity because the definition would itself have to be a judgement and would therefore have to already contain those functions. Yet the pure categories are nothing other than representations of things *simpliciter* so far as the manifold of their intuition must be thought about through one or another of those logical functions: quantity is the determination that can be thought about only through a judgement that has quantity (i.e. *iudicium commune*); reality is the determination that can be thought about only through an affirmative judgement; substance is the determination that must be the ultimate subject of all other determinations in relation to intuition. What sort of things those things are in respect of which one must avail oneself of one function rather than another remains entirely indeterminate therein, however. Therefore: without the condition of sensory intuition for which they contain the synthesis, the categories have absolutely no relation to any determinate object and therefore cannot define a thing and consequently have no validity of objective concepts *per se*.

From that, it incontrovertibly follows that the pure intellectual-concepts can *never be of transcendental use* but rather can always be only of *empirical* use and that the principles of the pure understanding can become related to objects of the senses only in relation to the universal conditions of a possible experience but can never become related to things *simpliciter* (without regard to the way in which we may intuit them).

The Transcendental Analytic therefore has the following important result: namely, that the understanding can never accomplish more *apriori* than to anticipate the form of a possible experience *simpliciter* and that since what is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, the understanding can never transgress the constraints of sensibility within which alone objects are given to us. The understanding’s principles are merely principles of exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an ontology that pretends to furnish synthetic *apriori* cognitions within a systematic doctrine (e.g. the principle of causality) must make way for the modesty of a mere analytic of the pure understanding.

Thought is the action of relating given intuition to an object. If the mode of that intuition is in no way given, then the object is merely transcendental and the intellectual concept has none other than transcendental use (i.e. the unity of thought about a manifold *simpliciter*). Therefore: through a pure category in which every condition of sensory intuition other than that which is possible for us becomes abstracted from, no object becomes determined but rather merely thought about an object *simpliciter* becomes expressed in diverse modes. Now, to the use of a concept, there also belongs a function of the judging power in which an object becomes subsumed under it and therefore the at least formal condition under which something can be given in intuition. If that condition of the judging power (i.e. schema) is missing, then all subsumption falls away; for nothing is given that could be subsumed under the concept. The merely transcendental use of the categories is therefore in fact no use at all and has no determinate object nor even merely an object determinable in respect to form. From that, it follows that a pure category also does not suffice for a synthetic *apriori* principle and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical but never transcendental use; but beyond the field of possible experience, there can be no synthetic *apriori* principles at all.

It can therefore be advisable to express oneself thus: without formal conditions of sensibility, the pure categories have merely transcendental significance but are of no transcendental use because such a use is *per se* impossible since it lacks all the conditions of a use (in judgements), i.e. the formal conditions of the subsumption of a giveable object under those concepts. Since they (as merely pure categories) shall therefore not be of empirical use and cannot be of transcendental use, they are of no use at all if one abstracts them from all sensibility: i.e. they can be applied to no giveable object whatsoever. Instead, they are merely the pure form of use of the understanding in respect to objects *simpliciter* and of thought: yet without it being possible to think about or determine an object through them alone.

Appearances so far as they are thought of as objects according to the unity of the categories are called *phenomena*. But if I assume things that are merely objects of the understanding and yet can be given as objects of an intuition – though not of sensory intuition (and therefore *coram intuitu intellectuali*) – then such things would be called *noumena* (i.e. *intelligibilia*).

One should think that the concept of appearances that was already constrained by the Transcendental Aesthetic would already by itself deliver the objective reality of noumenaand justify dividing objects into phenomena and noumena and therefore also justify dividing the world into a sensible world and an intellectual world (*mundus sensibilis* *et intelligibilis*) and that it would indeed do so in such a way that the distinction here concerns not merely the logical form of unperspicuous or perspicuous cognition of one and the same thing but rather the diversity in respect of how they can be originally given to our cognition and according to which they are distinguished from one another *per se* in respect of their genera. For even if the senses merely represent something to us as it *appears*, that something must also nevertheless bea thing and an object of a non-sensory intuition (i.e. an intellectual intuition) *per se* – i.e. a cognition must be possible wherein no sensibility is encountered and which alone has absolutely objective reality whereby the same objects are represented to us *as they are*: whereas in empirical use of our understanding, by contrast, things are cognised only *as they appear*. Therefore, besides the empirical use of the categories (which is confined to sensory conditions), there would also be a pure and yet objectively valid use; and we could not assert what we have hitherto professed: namely, that our pure intellectual-cognitions are absolutely nothing more than principles of exposition of appearance that also go no further *apriori* than the formal possibility of experience. For an entirely different field would stand open before us here: viz. a world thought of within the mind (and perhaps even intuited), as it were, which could occupy our pure understanding no less and indeed even far more nobly.

In fact, all of our representations become related to an object through the understanding; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding relates them to a something as the object of sensory intuition: but that something is, to that extent, merely the transcendental object. The transcendental object, however, signifies a something = *x* whereof we know absolutely nothing and whereof we can know nothing *tout court* (due to the current arrangement of our understanding) but which can rather serve only as a correlate of the unity of apperception for the unity of the manifold in sensory intuition, by means of which the understanding unifies that manifold into the concept of an object. That transcendental object absolutely cannot be abstracted from the sensory data because then nothing remains left over whereby it would be thought about. It is therefore not an object of cognition *per se* but rather merely the representation of the appearances under the concept of an object *simpliciter* that is determinable through the manifold of those appearances.

Precisely for that reason, the categories also do not represent a particular object that is given to the understanding alone but rather serve merely to determine the transcendental object (i.e. the concept of something *simpliciter*) through what is given in sensibility in order for appearances to thereby be cognised empirically under concepts of objects.

The cause why, still being unsatisfied through the substratum of sensibility, one has also added noumena to the phenomena about which only the pure understanding can think rests merely upon the following. The sensibility and its field (viz. that of appearances) is itself constrained through the understanding in such a way that it pertains not to things *per se* but rather merely to the way in which things appear to us by means of our subjective constitution. That was the result of the entire Transcendental Aesthetic, and it also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance *simpliciter* that something must correspond to an appearance that is not appearance *per se* because appearance cannot be anything by itself and outside our mode-of-representation; and therefore: if a constant circle is not to arise, then the word ‘appearance’ already indicates a relation to something whose immediate representation is admittedly sensory but which must be something *per se* (i.e. an object independent from sensibility),even without that constitution of our sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition is grounded).

From that arises the concept of a noumenon: which is not at all positive, however, and which signifies not a determinate cognition of a thing but rather merely thought of something *simpliciter*, wherein I abstract from all form of sensory intuition. Yet in order for a noumenon to signify a true object that is to be distinguished from all phenomena, it is not enough that I *free* my thought from all conditions of sensory intuition; I must also additionally have ground to *assume* a mode of intuition other than that sensory intuition under which such an object can be given: for otherwise my thought is nevertheless empty, though admittedly without contradiction. We have admittedly been unable to prove above that sensory intuition is the sole possible intuition *simpliciter* but rather only that it is the sole possible intuition *for us*. We also could not prove that another mode of intuition is possible, however; and even though our thought can abstract from every sensibility, the question still remains of whether it is not then a mere form of a concept and whether an object remains left over at all despite that separation.

The object to which I relate appearance *simpliciter* is the transcendental object, i.e. the totally indeterminate thought of something *simpliciter*. The latter cannot be called the *noumenon*; for I do not know what it is *per se* and have absolutely no concept of it except merely of the object of a sensory intuition *simpliciter*, which is therefore identical for all appearances. I cannot think of it through any categories; for they hold only for empirical intuition, in order for it to be brought under a concept of an object *simpliciter*. Although a pure use of a category is admittedly possible (i.e. without contradiction), it has absolutely no objective validity because it pertains to no intuition that would thereby receive unity of an object; for a category is nevertheless a mere function of thought whereby no object is given to me but rather merely what may be given in intuition is thought about.

If I remove all thought (through categories) from an empirical cognition, then absolutely no cognition of an object remains left over; for absolutely nothing is thought about through mere intuition, and that that affection of sensibility is within me constitutes no relation of such a representation to an object whatsoever. Yet if I omit all intuition, by contrast, then the form of thought (i.e. the way to determine an object for the manifold of a possible intuition) still nonetheless remains. To that extent, therefore, the categories extend further than sensory intuition because they think of objects *simpliciter* without yet looking to the particular mode (of sensibility) in which they may be given. They do not thereby determine a larger sphere of objects, however, because one cannot assume that such objects can be given without presupposing an other-than-sensory mode of intuition as possible: which we would in no way be justified in doing.

I call a concept ‘problematic’ if it contains no contradiction and also coheres with other cognitions as a delimitation of given concepts although its objective reality can in no way be cognised. The concept of a noumenon – i.e. of a thing that shall not at all be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing *per se* (merely through a pure understanding) – is not at all contradictory; for indeed, one cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible mode of intuition. Furthermore, that concept is necessary in order not to extend sensory intuition to things *per se* and therefore in order to constrain the objective validity of sensory cognition (for the rest, which the former does not reach, are called ‘noumena’ precisely in order for one to thereby indicate that those cognitions cannot extend their domain to everything whereof the understanding thinks). In the end, however, the possibility of such noumena cannot be discerned at all; and the extent beyond the sphere of appearances is empty (for us): i.e. we have an understanding that extends further than the appearances *problematically* but no intuition and indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition whereby objects could be given to us outside the field of sensibility and whereby the understanding could be used *assertorically* beyond it. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a *limiting-concept* for constraining sensibility’s pretension and therefore merely of negative use. Nevertheless, that concept is not arbitrarily invented but rather coheres with the constrainment of sensibility yet without it being possible to posit something positive beyond the extent of sensibility.

The division of objects into phenomena and noumena and the division of the world into a sensible world and an intelligible world therefore cannot be permitted at all, even though concepts admittedly permit a division into sensory and intellectual concepts; for one cannot determine an object for the latter, and therefore one also cannot present them as objectively valid. If one abandons the senses, how shall one render it comprehensible that our categories (which would be the only remaining concepts for noumena) still signify something at all: since for their relation to an object, something more than merely the unity of thought – viz. also a possible intuition – must be given to which the categories shall be applied? The concept of a noumenon, taken merely problematically, nevertheless remains not only permissible but also unavoidable as a concept that puts sensibility in constraints. But then, that noumenon is not a particular *intelligible object* for our understanding; but rather an understanding before which it belongs is itself a problem: viz. to cognise its object (of whose possibility we cannot make the slightest representation) not discursively through categories, but rather intuitively in a non-sensory intuition. In that way, our understanding receives a negative expansion: i.e. it not only becomes constrained through sensibility, but rather it constraints sensibility through calling things *per se* (not considered as appearances) ‘noumena’. Yet it also immediately sets constraints upon itself to not cognise them through categories and therefore to think of them only under the name of an unknown something.

Nevertheless, in the writings of the moderns, I find an entirely different use of the terms ‘*mundus sensibilis*’ and ‘*mundus intelligibilis*’ that totally deviates from the sense of the ancients and wherein there is admittedly no difficulty but wherein also nothing but vacuous verbal-chicanery is encountered. According to that use, it has appealed to some to call the complex of appearances the ‘sensible world’ so far as it is intuited and to call it the ‘intelligible world’ so far as its coherence is thought of according to universal intellectual-laws. Theoretical astronomy, which presents the mere observation of the starry heavens, would represent the former; but contemplative astronomy (e.g. explained according to the Copernican cosmic-system or even according to Newton’s laws of gravitation) would, by contrast, represent the latter (i.e. an intelligible world). Yet such a verbal contortion is a mere sophistical evasion in order to avoid an onerous question through diminishing its sense for one’s convenience. Understanding and reason can admittedly be used in respect to appearances, but it is asked whether they also still have some use if the object is not appearance (i.e. noumenon); and one takes the object in that sense if it *per se* is thought of as merely intelligible, i.e. as given to the understanding alone and not to the senses at all. There is therefore the question of whether beyond that empirical use of the understanding (even in the Newtonian representation of the structure of the cosmos) a transcendental use is also possible that addresses the noumenon as an object – a question that we have answered negatively.

If we therefore say then that whereas the senses represent objects to us *as they appear*, the understanding represents them to us *as they are*: then the latter is to be taken not in a transcendental signification but rather in a merely empirical signification – i.e. as the objects of experience must be represented in the thoroughgoing coherence of all appearances and not in respect to what they may be outside their relation to possible experience and consequently to senses *simpliciter* and therefore *qua* objects of the pure understanding. For that will always remain unknown to us, even to the extent that it also remains unknown whether such a transcendental (extraordinary) cognition is possible at all: at least as a cognition that stands under our usual categories. In us, *understanding* and *sensibility* can determine objects *only in conjunction*. If we separate them, then we have intuitions without concepts or concepts without intuitions; but in both cases, we have representations that we cannot relate to a determinate object.

If someone still harbours doubts about renouncing the merely transcendental use of the categories on the basis of all these discussions, then he may make a trial of them in a synthetic assertion. For an analytic assertion takes the understanding no further: and since the understanding is occupied only with what is already thought of within the concept, the understanding leaves it undiscerned whether that concept *per se* has a relation to objects or merely signifies the unity of thought *simpliciter* (which fully abstracts from the way in which an object may be given) – it is enough for it to know what lies within that concept; what the concept itself may pertain to is a matter of indifference for it. He may thus make a trial with a synthetic and purportedly transcendental principle such as: ‘everything that exists, exists as a substance or as a determination attaching to a substance’; ‘everything contingent exists as an effect of another thing (viz. its cause)’; or so forth. Now, I ask: whence shall he take those synthetic propositions, since the concepts shall not hold relatively to possible experience but shall rather hold for things *per se* (i.e. noumena)? Where therein is the *tertium quid* that is always required for a synthetic proposition in order to therein connect concepts to one another that have no logical (i.e. analytical) kinship whatsoever? He will never prove his proposition; and indeed what is more, he will not even be able to justify himself in respect of the possibility of such a pure assertion without having regard to the empirical use of the understanding and thereby fully renouncing the pure and non-sensory judgement. So then, the concept of pure and merely intelligible objects is totally devoid of any principles of their application because one cannot excogitate a way in which they could be given; and the problematic thought that nevertheless leaves a place open for them serves merely like an empty space to constrain the empirical principles yet without containing within it and exhibiting any other object of cognition beyond their sphere.

1.2.2.2.5. Appendix: On the Amphiboly of the Reflectional Concepts through the Confusion of the Understanding’s Empirical Use with Its Transcendental Use

*Reflection* (*reflexio*) does not deal with the objects themselves in order to directly receive concepts from them, but is rather the state of the mind into which we first place ourselves in order to be able to find the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. Reflection is the consciousness of the relationship of given representations to our diverse cognitive-sources through which alone their relationship between one another can be correctly determined. The first question before all further treatment of our representations is this: within which cognitive capacity do they belong together? Is it the understanding or is it the senses, before which they become connected or compared? Some judgements are assumed from custom or linked through inclination; but since no reflection precedes them or at least follows critically thereupon, they are regarded as judgements that have received their origin within the understanding. Not all judgements require an *investigation*, i.e. an advertence to the grounds of their truth; for if they are immediately certain (e.g. ‘between two points, there can be only one straight line’), then no mark of their truth can be indicated for them that is still more proximate than that which they themselves express. Yet all judgements and indeed all comparisons require a *reflection*, i.e. a discernment of the cognitive-power to which the given concepts belong. I call the action whereby I juxtapose the comparison of the representations *simpliciter* with the cognitive power wherein they are engendered and whereby I discern whether they are compared with one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensory intuition ‘transcendental *reflection*’. Yet the relationship in which the concepts can pertain to one another within a mental state is either that of *sameness* and *diversity*, that of *consonance* and *conflict*, that of the *internal* and the *external*, or finally that of the *determinable* and *determination* (matter and form). The correct determination of that relationship rests upon which cognitive power they pertain to one another within, i.e. whether within sensibility or within the understanding. For the difference between the latter makes a great difference in the way in which one shall think of the former.

Before all objective judgements, we compare the concepts in order to arrive at **sameness** (of many representations under one concept) for the behoof of *universal* judgements, at the **diversity** of representations to generate *particular* judgements, at **consonance** (from which *affirmative* judgements can arise), at **conflict** (from which *negative* judgements can arise), or so forth. From that ground, we should (so it seems) call the aforementioned concepts ‘comparational concepts’. Yet since when it is not concepts’ logical form but rather their content that is at issue (i.e. whether the things themselves are the same or diverse, consonant or in conflict, or so forth), the things can have a twofold relationship to our cognitive power (viz. to sensibility and to the understanding) and in that position wherein they belong, the way in which they shall pertain to one another is at issue: transcendental reflection (i.e. the relationship of given representations to one cognitive-power or another) will alone be able to determine their relationship between one another; and whether the things are the same or diverse, consonant or conflicting, or so forth will not be capable of being discerned immediately from the concepts themselves through mere comparison (*comparatio*) but rather only through discerning the mode-of-cognition to which they pertain by means of a transcendental reflection (*reflexio*). One could therefore admittedly say that *logical reflection* is a mere comparison: for in it, the cognitive power to which the given representations belong is totally abstracted from and they are therefore, to that extent, to be treated as homogeneous in respect of their seat within the mind; but *transcendental reflection* (which addresses the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of an objective comparison of the representations between one another and is therefore very highly diverse from the latter because the cognitive power to which they belong is not exactly the same. The aforementioned transcendental-reflection is a duty from which no one can absolve himself if he wishes to judge something about things *apriori*. We shall now take it in hand and will draw no little light therefrom for determining the understanding’s proper occupation.

1. *Sameness* and *diversity*. If an object is presented to us several times but each time with exactly the same internal determinations (*qualitas et quantitas*): then if it is regarded as an object of the pure understanding, that object is always exactly the same object and not *many* but rather only *one* thing (*numerica identitas*); but if that object is appearance, then it is not an issue of comparing concepts at all: but rather even as much as everything may be the same in respect of them, the diversity of that appearance’s locations at the same time is nevertheless a sufficient ground of the *numerical diversity* of the object (of the senses) itself. So in respect to two drops of water, one can fully abstract from all internal diversity (of quality and quantity): and in order for one to hold them to be numerically diverse, it is enough that they are intuited simultaneously in diverse locations. *Leibniz* took appearances to be things *per se* and therefore *intelligibilia*,i.e. objects of the pure understanding (even though, due to the confusedness of their representations, he bestowed the name of ‘phenomena’ upon them): and then his *principle of indiscernibles* (*principium identitatis indiscernibilium*) admittedly could not be disputed; but since they are objects of sensibility and the understanding is not of pure but rather merely of empirical use in respect of them, plurality and numerical diversity will already be indicated through space itself as the condition of all external appearances. For even though one part of space may admittedly be fully similar and equal to another, it is nevertheless external to it and precisely thereby a part diverse from the latter, which accrues to it in order to constitute a larger space; and that must therefore hold for all of the *simultanea* in the various spatial positions, however similar and equal they may otherwise be to one another.

2. *Consonance* and *conflict*. If reality is represented only through the pure understanding (*realitas noumenon*), then no conflict can be thought of between the realities: i.e. such a relationship wherein they, conjoined in a subject, eliminate one another’s consequences and 3 - 3 = 0. In contrast, the *realia* in appearance (*realitas phaenomenon*) can admittedly be in conflict with one another; and, united within the same subject, one *reale* can annihilate *the consequence of another* in whole or in part: such as two motive forces in the same straight line so far as they either pull or push a point in opposite directions, or even a pleasure that holds pain in equilibrium.

3. The *internal* and the *external*. In an object of the pure understanding, only that which has absolutely no relation (in respect of existence) to something diverse from it is internal. In contrast, the internal determinations of a *substantia phaenomenon* in space are nothing but relationships; and it is itself entirely a complex of mere relations. We know a substance in space only through forces that are efficacious within space either in such a way as to impel other substances (i.e. attraction) or prevent them from penetrating into space (i.e. repulsion and impenetrability); we do not know other properties that constitute the concept of the substance that appears in space and which we call ‘matter’. As an object of the pure understanding, by contrast, every substance must have internal determinations and forces that pertain to the internal reality. Only what internal accidents can I think of besides those that my internal sense offers to me, viz. what is either itself *thought* or what is analogous to thought. Hence, after he had taken from them everything that external relation may signify and therefore also *composition* in thought, *Leibniz* turned all substances (because he represented them to himself as noumena) and even the component parts of matter into simple subjects endowed with representational powers: in a word, **monads**.

4. *Matter* and *form*. These are two concepts that are conjoined so inseverably with every use of the understanding that they are laid at the basis of all other reflection. Whereas the first concept signifies the determinable *simpliciter*, the second signifies the latter’s determination (both in a transcendental sense, wherein one abstracts from all difference in what is given and the way in which what is given becomes determined). The logicians previously called what is universal the ‘matter’ but called the specific difference the ‘form’. In every judgement, one can call the given concepts ‘logical matter’ (for the judgement) and call their relationship (by means of the copula) the ‘form’ of the judgement. In every being, its components (i.e. *essentialia*) are the matter; and the way in which they are connected within a thing are the essential form. In respect of things *simpliciter*, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility; but its constrainment (i.e. negation) was regarded as the form whereby one thing distinguishes itself from another according to transcendental concepts. For the understanding demands firstly that something be given (at least in a concept) in order to be able to derermine it in a certain way. Hence, in a concept of the pure understanding, the matter precedes the form; and for that reason, *Leibniz* first assumed things (monads) and internally a representational power thereof in order to thereafter ground their external relationship and the community of their states (i.e. of the representations)thereupon. Consequently: space was possible only through the relationship of the substances, and time was possible only through the connection of the substances’ determinations to one another as grounds and consequences. That would in fact have to be the case, moreover, if the pure understanding could become related immediately to objects and if space and time were determinations of things *per se*. But if they are merely sensory intuitions in which we determine all objects merely as appearances: then the form of intuition (as a subjective quality of sensibility) precedes all matter (i.e. all sensations), and space and time therefore precede all appearances and all experiential data and instead first render the latter possible. The intellectual philosopher could not suffer that the form should precede the things themselves and determine their possibility – an entirely correct censure if he assumed that we intuit the things as they are (albeit with confused representation). Yet since sensory intuition is an entirely particular subjective condition that underlies all perception *apriori* and whose form is original, the form is given alone by itself; and far from it being the case that the matter (or the things themselves that appear) should be fundamental (as one would have to judge according to mere concepts), its possibility instead presupposes a formal intuition (viz. time and space) as given.

1.2.2.2.5.1. Remark on the Amphiboly of the Reflectional Concepts

Allow me to call the position that we impart to a concept either in sensibility or in the pure understanding its *transcendental location*. In such a way, the judgement of that position that accrues to every concept according to the diversity of its use and the direction according to rules to determine that location for all concepts would be a *transcendental topic* – a doctrine that would profoundly protect from inveiglements of the pure understanding and illusions arising therefrom by always discerning which cognitive-power concepts truly belong to. One can call every concept – i.e. every title whereunder many cognitions belong – a *logical location*. *Aristotle’s logical topic* is grounded thereupon: of which schoolteachers and orators could avail themselves in order to check, under certain titles of thought, what was most apt for a certain matter and sophisticate about it with a semblance of profundity or babble verbosely.

In contrast, a transcendental topic contains nothing more than the four aforementioned titles of all comparison and distinction, which distinguish themselves from categories through the fact that through the former, the object is not presented in respect to that which constitutes its concept (e.g. quantity and reality), but rather merely the comparison of representations that precedes the concept of things is presented in all its multiplicity. That comparison first of all requires a reflection (i.e. a determination of the location in which the representations of the things that are compared belong, viz. whether the pure understanding thinks of them or whether sensibility gives them in appearance).

Concepts can be logically compared without one concerning oneself with where their objects belong, i.e. whether they belong before the understanding as noumena or before sensibility as phenomena. Yet if we wish to proceed to the objects with those concepts, then transcendental reflection is needed first of all in respect to which cognitive power they shall be objects for: viz. whether for the pure understanding or for sensibility. Without this reflection, I make a highly unreliable use of those concepts and purported synthetic principles arise that critical reason cannot recognise and which are grounded merely upon a transcendental amphiboly, i.e. a confusion of a pure intellectual object with an appearance.

In the absence of such a transcendental topic and consequently fooled by the amphiboly of the reflectional concepts, the famous *Leibniz* erected an *intellectual system of the world* or rather believed himself to cognise the internal constitution of things because he compared all objects only with the understanding and the abstracted formal concepts of his thought. Our table of the reflectional concepts provides us with the unexpected advantage of displaying the distinguishing feature of his theory in all its parts and simultaneously the guiding ground of that peculiar way-of-thinking, which rested upon nothing but a misunderstanding. He compared all things with one another merely through concepts and found (naturally) no diversities except those through which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another. He did not regard the conditions of sensory intuition (which are accompanied by their own differences) as original; for sensibility was for him merely a confused mode-of-representation and not a particular source of representations. For him, appearance was a representation of a *thing per se*: albeit differing from cognition through the understanding in respect of its logical form because in its usual lack of dissection, appearance draws a certain mixture of ancillary representations into the concept of the thing that the understanding knows to abstract therefrom. In a word: **Leibniz** *intellectualised* appearances just as **Locke** had*sensified* the intellectual concepts *in toto* in accordance with his system of *noogony* (if I am allowed to avail myself of these terms), i.e. presented them as nothing other than empirical but abstracted reflectional-concepts. Instead of seeking two totally diverse sources of representations in the understanding and sensibility that could, however, judge about things objectively validly only *in connection*, each of those great men adhered to one of them: which, in their opinion, related immediately to things *per se* despite the fact that the other source did nothing but confuse or order the former’s representations.

*Leibniz* thus compared the objects of the senses to one another *qua* things *simpliciter* merely within the understanding: *firstly*,so far as they shall be judged to be the same or diverse by the understanding. Since Leibniz therefore had merely their concepts in view and not their position within intuition, in which alone the objects can be given, and left the transcendental location of those concepts (i.e. whether the object is to be counted among appearances or among things *per se*) totally out of consideration, there could be no other result than that he extended his principle of indiscernibles (which holds merely for concepts of things *simpliciter*) also to the objects of the senses (i.e. *mundus phaenomenon*) and believed himself to have thereby provided no small expansion to cognition of nature. Admittedly: if I know a drop of water as a thing *per se* in respect of all its internal determinations, then I cannot regard any drop of water as diverse from another if the entire concept thereof is the same as the latter. But if it is an appearance in space, then it has its location not merely within the understanding (amongst concepts) but rather within external sensory intuition (in space); and then physical locations are entirely a matter of indifference in respect to the internal determinations of things: and a location = *b* can receive a thing that is fully similar and equal to another thing in the location = *a* just as well as if it were highly internally-diverse from the latter. The diversity of locations already by itself renders the plurality and distinction of objects *qua* appearances not only possible but also necessary without further conditions. Therefore, the aforesaid spurious law is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule of comparing things through mere concepts.

*Secondly*: the principle that realities (as mere affirmations) never logically conflict with one another is an entirely true proposition about relationships between concepts but signifies nothing whatsoever in respect to nature nor in respect to any thing *per se* at all (of which we have absolutely no concept). For real conflict always occurs where A - B = 0 – i.e. where a reality conjoined with another reality within one subject eliminates the effect of the other reality: which all hindrances and counteractions in nature unceasingly display, which must nevertheless be called ‘*realitates phaenomena*’ (since they rest upon powers). General mechanics can even specify the empirical condition of that conflict in an *apriori* rule by looking to the opposition of directions: a condition of which the transcendental concept of reality knows absolutely nothing. Although Herr von *Leibniz* did not exactly announce that proposition with the pomp of a new principle, he nevertheless availed himself of it for new assertions; and his successors imported it expressly into their Leibnizian-Wolffian doctrinal-edifices. According to that principle, e.g., all evils are nothing but consequences of the constraints upon creatures (i.e. negations) because negations are all that conflicts with reality (that is also actually the case in the mere concept of a thing *simpliciter*, but not in things *qua* appearances). Moreover, the adherents of that principle find it not only possible but also natural to unify all reality within one being without any worrisome conflict because they know no conflict other than that of contradiction (through which the concept of a thing is itself eliminated) but not that of reciprocal abruption, wherein a real ground eliminates the effect of another; and only in sensibility do we encounter the conditions for such a conflict to be represented to us.

*Thirdly*: the *Leibnizian* monadology has no other ground whatsoever than that that philosopher represented the difference between the internal and the external merely in relationship to the understanding. Substances *simpliciter* must have something *internal* that is therefore free from all external relationships and consequently also from composition. The simple is therefore the foundation of what is internal to things *per se*. But what is internal to their state also cannot consist in location, shape, contact, or movement (determinations that are all external relationships), and we can therefore attribute no internal state to substances other than the state whereby we internally determine our sense itself: namely, the *state of representations*. The monads thus became complete that shall constitute the fundamental material of the entire universe but whose active power consists only in representations, whereby they are in fact efficacious merely within themselves.

Precisely because of that, however, his principle of the possible *community of substances* amongst one another also had to be a *predetermined harmony* and could not be a physical influence. For since everything is occupied only internally (i.e. with its representations), the state of one substance could stand in no efficacious conjunction whatsoever: but rather a third cause that influences all of the substances *in toto* had to make their states correspond to one another – admittedly not through occasional assistance deployed specially in every individual case (*systema assistentiae*) but rather through the unity of the idea of a cause valid for all of the substances in which they must *in toto* receive their existence and persistence and therefore also reciprocal correspondence between one another according to universal laws.

*Fourthly*: his famous *theory* of *time* and *space*, wherein he intellectualised those forms of sensibility, arose merely from the very same deception of transcendental reflection. If I wish to represent to myself external relationships of things through the mere understanding, then that can occur only by means of a concept of their reciprocal action; and if I am to connect a state of exactly the same thing to another state, then that can occur only within the order of grounds and consequences. *Leibniz* thus thought of space as a certain order in the community of substances and thought of time as the dynamic sequence of their states. Yet he ascribed what they both seem to have in them that is peculiar to them and independent from things to the *confusedness* of those concepts, which effects that what is a mere form of dynamic relationships is taken for an intuition in its own right that subsists by itself and precedes the things themselves. Therefore, space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of the things (viz. substances and their states) *per se*. The things, however, were intelligible substances (*substantiae noumena*). Nevertheless, he sought to have those concepts regarded as appearances because he did not grant sensibility its own mode of intuition but rather sought all representation – including even the empirical representation of objects – within the understanding and left the senses with nothing but the contemptible task of confusing and distorting the former’s representations.

Yet even if we could say something *about things per se* synthetically through the pure understanding (which is nonetheless impossible), it would nevertheless be absolutely incapable of becoming related to appearances: which do not represent things *per se*. In the latter case, therefore, I will always have to compare my concepts only under the conditions of sensibility in transcendental reflection; and thus space and time will not be determinations of the things *per se* but rather determinations of the appearances – I do not know what the things may be *per se* and also do not need to know that because indeed no thing can ever be presented to me otherwise than in appearance.

I also proceed thus with the other reflectional-concepts. Matter is *substantia phaenomenon*. I seek that which internally accrues to it in all parts of the space that it occupies and in all effects that it exercises and which admittedly can always be merely appearances of external senses. I therefore admittedly have nothing absolutely internal but rather merely something comparatively internal, which itself in turn consists of external relationships. Only what is absolutely internal to matter (in respect to the pure understanding) is also a mere fancy; for it is not an object for the pure understanding at all, but the transcendental object that may be the ground of that appearance which we call ‘matter’ is a mere something whereof we would not understand what it is even if someone could tell us. For we can understand nothing except what something corresponding to our words carries with it in intuition. If the complaints that *we do not discern what is internal to things at all* shall signify so much as that we do not comprehend through the pure understanding what the things that appear to us may be *per se*, then they are wholly unfair and irrational. For they want one to still be capable of cognising and therefore of intuiting things without senses and consequently want us to have a cognitive capacity that is totally different from the human cognitive-capacity not merely in respect to degree but even in respect to intuition and kind: and they therefore want us to be not humans but rather beings of which we ourselves cannot specify whether they are even possible, much less how they are constituted. Observation and dissection of appearances penetrate into what is internal to nature, and one cannot know how far that will progress with time. Yet despite all such progress, we would still never be capable of answering those transcendental questions that go beyond nature even if the whole of nature were uncovered for us, since it is not even given to us to observe our own mind with an intuition other than that of our internal sense. For within the internal sense lies the secret of the origin of our sensibility. Our sensibility’s relation to an object and what the transcendental ground of that unity is undoubtedly lies too deeply concealed for us – who know even ourselves only through internal sense and therefore as appearance – to be able to use such an inapt tool of our investigation to find something other than always in turn appearances whose non-sensory cause we would nevertheless like to explore.

What renders this critique from the mere actions of reflection exceedingly useful is that it perspicuously demonstrates the nullity of all inferences concerning objects that one compares with one another merely within the understanding and simultaneously confirms what we have principally advocated: namely, that even though appearances are not concomitantly comprehended amongst the objects of the pure understanding as things *per se*, they are nevertheless all that our cognition can have objective reality within (viz. where intuition corresponds to concepts).

When we reflect merely logically, we merely compare our concepts amongst one another within the understanding in respect to whether they contain exactly the same, whether they contradict one another or not, whether something is contained within a concept internally or accrues to it, and which of them is given and which is to be regarded merely as a way to think about given concepts. But if I apply those concepts to an object *simpliciter* (in the transcendental sense) without determining that object further in respect of whether it is an object of sensory- or intellectual intuition, then constraints immediately manifest themselves (not to go beyond that concept) that pervert all empirical use of the concepts and precisely thereby prove that the representation of an object as a thing *simpliciter* is not, say, merely *insufficient* but is rather without sensory determination thereof and *conflicting per se* independently of an empirical condition in such a way that one must therefore either abstract from every object (in logic) or, if one assumes an object, think of it under conditions of sensory intuition; and therefore, *intelligibilia* would require an utterly singular condition that we do not have and would be nothing for us in that condition’s absence: whereas, by contrast, appearances would also be incapable of being objects *per se*. For if I merely think of things *simpliciter*, then the diversity of their external relationships admittedly cannot constitute a diversity of the items themselves but rather presupposes such a diversity; and if the concept of one does not differ from that of the other at all, then I merely posit one and the same thing in diverse relationships. Furthermore, through accrual of one mere affirmation (reality) to another, what is positive is indeed augmented and nothing is withdrawn or eliminated from it; therefore, a *reale* in things *simpliciter* cannot conflict with another such *reale*, etc.

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As we have shown: through a certain misunderstanding, the concepts of reflection have such an influence upon the understanding’s use that they were even in a position to entice one of the most sharpsighted of all philosophers into a purported system of intellectual cognition that undertakes to determine its objects without the aid of the senses. Precisely for that reason, developing the deceptive cause of the amphiboly of those concepts at the incitement of false principles is of great utility for reliably determining and securing the limits of the understanding.

One must admittedly say that what generally accrues to or contradicts a concept also accrues to or contradicts every particular concept contained under that concept (*dictum de omni et nullo*), but it would be absurd to alter that logical principle so that it read ‘what is not contained within a general concept is also not contained within the particular concepts that stand under it’; for the latter are particular concepts precisely because they contain more within them than is thought of in the general concept. Yet *Leibniz’s* entire intellectual system is actually constructed on the latter principle, and it therefore falls simultaneously with the latter along with all ambiguity arising from it in use of the understanding.

The principle of indiscernibles is in fact grounded upon the presupposition that if a certain distinction is not encountered within the concept of a thing *simpliciter*, then nor is it to be encountered within the things themselves; consequently, all things that do not already differ from one another in their concept (in respect of quality or quantity) are completely the same (*numero eadem*). But since some necessary conditions of an intuition have been abstracted from in the mere concept of any thing: what has been abstracted from will, through a strange precipitance, be taken for not being encounterable anywhere; and nothing is conceded to a thing except what is contained within its concept.

The concept of a cubic foot of space is completely the same *per se*, regardless of where and how often I may wish to think of that space. Only two cubic-feet in space are nevertheless distinct (*numero diversa*) merely through their locations, which are conditions of the intuition wherein the object of that concept is given that pertain not to the concept but indeed to sensibility as a whole. In the same way, there is no conflict whatsoever within the concept of a thing if nothing negative has been conjoined with something affirmative; and merely affirmative concepts can effect no elimination whatsoever in conjunction. Only within the sensory intuition wherein reality (e.g. movement) is given, conditions (i.e. opposite directions) are found which were abstracted from in the concept of movement *simpliciter* and which render a conflict possible that is not indeed logical, i.e. a zero = 0 from mere *positiva*; and one could not say that all realities are in consonance amongst one another because no conflict is encountered amongst their concepts.[[13]](#footnote-13) According to mere concepts, what is internal is the substratum of all relational- or external determinations. If I therefore abstract from all conditions of intuition and adhere merely to the concept of a thing *simpliciter*: then I can abstract from all external relationship, and a concept must nevertheless remain of that which signifies no relationship at all but rather merely internal determination. Now, it seems that it follows therefrom that in every thing (i.e. substance), there is something that is absolutely internal and which precedes all external determinations because it first renders them possible. Consequently, if that substratum is something that contains no further external relationships within it and consequently *simple* (for bodily things are still always merely relationships, at least of their parts external to one another) and because we know no absolutely internal determinations other than those through our internal sense: then that substratum is not only simple but also (by analogy with our internal sense) determined through *representations* – i.e. all things would truly be *monads*, i.e. simple beings endowed with representations. That would also all be correct if nothing more than the concept of a thing *simpliciter* belonged to the conditions under which alone objects of external intuition can be given to us and from which the pure concept abstracts. For it then becomes manifest that a persistent appearance in space (i.e. impenetrable extension) can contain merely relationships and nothing absolutely internal whatsoever and nevertheless be the primary substratum of all external perception. Through mere concepts, I admittedly cannot think of something external without something internal precisely because relational concepts nevertheless presuppose things that are given absolutely and are impossible without them. But since something is contained within intuition that does not lie within the mere concept of a thing *simpliciter* at all, and that delivers the substratum that would not be cognised at all through mere concepts (viz. a space that, along with everything it contains, consists of merely formal- or even real relationships: I cannot say that because no thing can become represented *through mere concepts* without something absolutely internal, there is also nothing external in the things themselves contained under those concepts and *their intuition* that is not underlain by something absolutely internal. For if we have abstracted from all conditions of intuition, then admittedly nothing remains to us in the mere concept except *internalia simpliciter* and their relationship between one another through which alone the *externalia* are possible. Yet that necessity, which is grounded solely upon abstraction, does not occur with things so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations that express mere relationships without having something internal at their basis, because they are not things *per se* but rather merely appearances. Moreover, what we know in matter are mere relationships (what we call ‘internal determinations’ of it are only comparatively internal); but there are selfstanding and persistent determinations amongst them whereby a determinate object is given to us. That I have absolutely nothing more to think about if I abstract from those relationships does not eliminate the concept of a thing *qua* appearance nor even the concept of a thing *in abstracto*, although it indeed eliminates all possibility of such a thing that is determinable according to mere concepts (i.e. a noumenon). It is admittedly perplexing to hear that a thing shall consist entirely of relationships, but such a thing is also mere appearance and cannot be thought of through pure categories at all; it itself consists in the mere relationship of something *simpliciter* to the senses. Equally, if one begins with mere concepts, one cannot indeed think of the relationships of things *in abstracto* otherwise than that one is the cause of determinations in the other; for that is our intellectual concept of relationships themselves. Only since we then abstract from all intuition, an entire way in which the elements of a manifold can determine their locations for one another falls away: viz. the form of sensibility (viz. space), which nevertheless precedes all empirical causality.

If by ‘merely intelligible objects’ we understand those things that are thought about through pure categories without any schema of sensibility, then such objects are impossible. For the condition of objective use of all our intellectual concepts is merely the mode of our sensory intuition whereby objects are given to us; and if we abstract from the latter, then the former have no relation to an object whatsoever. Indeed, even if one wished to assume a mode of intuition other than our sensory intuition, our functions of thought would nevertheless be of no significance whatsoever in respect to it. If we understand by that term merely objects of a non-sensory intuition for which our categories admittedly cannot hold and of which we can therefore never have any cognition whatsoever (neither intuition nor concept), then noumena in that merely negative signification must indeed be admitted. For they then say nothing except that our mode of intuition does not relate to all things but rather merely to objects of our senses; consequently, its objective validity is limited and therefore leaves room for another mode of intuition and therefore also for things asobjects thereof. Yet then the concept of a noumenon is problematic: i.e. the representation of a thing of which we can say neither that it is possible nor that it is impossible because we know no mode of intuition whatsoever other than our sensory intuition and no mode of concept other than the categories, but neither of them is appropriate for a supersensory object. We can therefore never positively expand the field of the objects of our thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility and assume, beyond appearances, objects of pure thought (i.e. noumena) because they have no specifiable positive significance. For one must admit of the categories that they alone still do not suffice for cognition of things *per se* and that without the data of sensibility, they would be merely subjective forms of intellectual unity but without object. Admittedly, thought is *per se* not a product of the senses and is also, to that extent, not constrained through them; but it does not, because of that, immediately have its own, pure use without the accession of sensibility because it is then without object. One also cannot call the noumenon such an object; for that signifies precisely the problematic concept of an object for an entirely different intuition and an entirely different understanding from ours, which is therefore itself a problem. The concept of a noumenon is therefore not the concept of an object but rather the problem unavoidably attached to the constrainment of our sensibility of whether there may not be objects entirely unbound from our sensibility’s intuition – a question that can be answered only indeterminately: namely, by saying that because sensory intuition does not relate to all things without distinction, room remains for more and other objects; and they therefore cannot be denied absolutely, but nor can they be asserted as objects for our understanding in the absence of a determinate concept (since no category is apt for that purpose).

The understanding thus limits sensibility without consequently expanding its own field; and in warning sensibility not to pretend to relate to things *per se* but rather merely to appearances, the understanding thinks of an object *per se* but only as a transcendental object that is the cause of appearance (and therefore not itself an appearance) and which cannot be thought of as a quantum, a reality, a substance etc. (because those concepts always require sensory forms in which they determine an object) and whereof it is therefore completely unknown whether it is to be encountered within us or even outside us and whether it is eliminated simultaneously with sensibility or would still remain if we removed sensibility. If we wish to call that object ‘noumenon’ because the representation of it is non-sensory, then we are free to do so. But since none of our intellectual concepts can be applied to it, that representation nevertheless remains empty for us and serves for nothing other than to designate the limits of our sensory cognition and to leave a space remaining that we can fill neither through possible experience nor through the pure understanding.

The critique of that pure understanding therefore does not allow us to create a new field of objects beyond those that can be presented to it as appearances and divagate into intelligible worlds: not even in their concept. The fault that entices one to do that in the most spurious way and which admittedly exculpates, even though it cannot be justified, lies in the fact that the understanding’s use is rendered transcendental, contrarily to its determination, and the objects (i.e. possible intuitions) must comply with concepts but concepts need not comply with possible intuitions (upon which alone their objective validity rests). The cause of that, however, is in turn that apperception and, with it, thought precede all possible determinate ordering of representations. We therefore think of something *simpliciter* and determine it sensorily, on the one hand, yet nonetheless do not distinguish the universal and abstractly-represented object from that way to intuit it. Now, a way to determine that object merely through thought remains open to us that is admittedly a mere logical form without content yet nevertheless seems to be a way in which the object exists *per se* (i.e. noumenon) without looking to intuition, which is confined to our senses.

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Before leaving the Transcendental Analytic, we must still add something that, despite being of no particular importance *per se*, might nevertheless seem requisite for the system’s completeness. The supreme concept from which one tends to begin a transcendental philosophy is commonly the division into the possible and the impossible. But since all division presupposes a divided concept, a higher concept must still be specified; and that is the concept of an object *simpliciter* (taken problematically and without its being discerned whether it is something or nothing). Since the categories are the only concepts that relate to objects *simpliciter*, the discernment of whether an object is something or nothing will proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.

1) To the concepts of all, many, and one, the concept that eliminates everything (i.e. *none*) is opposed; and so, the object of a concept to which absolutely no giveable intuition corresponds = nothing, i.e. a concept without object: such as the noumena, which cannot be counted among the possibilities even though they must not for that reason be presented as impossible (i.e. *ens rationis*) or such as, say, certain new fundamental-powers whereof one thinks admittedly without contradiction but also without an example from experience and which therefore must not be counted among the possibilities.

2) Reality is *something*; negation is *nothing*: viz. a concept of the absence of an object, such as a shadow or the cold (*nihil privativum*).

3) The mere form of intuition without substance is in itself not an object but rather the merely formal condition of an object (*qua* appearance) – such as pure space and pure time (i.e. *ens imaginarium*): which, as forms of intuition, are admittedly something but are not themselves objects that become intuited.

4) The object of a concept that contradicts itself is nothing because the concept is nothing: i.e. an *impossibilium*, such as (e.g.) the rectilinear figure of two sides (i.e. *nihil negativum*).

The table of that division of the concept of *nothing* (for the division of the concept of *something* that runs parallel to the former follows by itself) would therefore be arranged thus:

Nothing as:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1. Empty concept without object** |  |
|  | *ens rationis* |  |
| **2. Empty object of a concept** |  | **3. Empty intuition without object** |
| *nihil privativum* |  | *ens imaginarium* |
|  | **4. Empty object without concept** |  |
|  | *nihil negativum* |  |

One sees that a cogitational thing (no. 1) differs from a nonthing (no. 4) through the fact that whereas the former must not be counted among the possibilities because it is merely invention (albeit non-contradictory), the latter is opposed to possibility because the concept eliminates even itself. Both are empty concepts, however. In contrast, a *nihil privativum* (no. 2) and an *ens imaginarium* (no. 3) are empty data for concepts. If light has not been given to the senses, then nor can one represent darkness to oneself; and if extended beings have not been perceived, then one cannot represent space to oneself. Neither negation nor the mere form of intuition is an object without a *reale*.

1.2.3. The Transcendental Dialectic

1.2.3.1. Introduction

1.2.3.1.1. On Transcendental Semblance

We have called dialectic *simpliciter* a *logic of semblance* above. That does not signify that it is a doctrine of *probability*; for probability is truth but cognised through insufficient grounds, whose cognition is therefore admittedly deficient yet still not consequently fallacious and which therefore must not be separated from logic’s analytical part. Still less may *appearance* and *semblance* be taken to be the same. For truth or semblance are not in the object so far as it is intuited but rather in the judgement about the object so far as it is thought about. One can therefore indeed rightly say that the senses do not err: but not because they always judge rightly, but rather because they do not judge at all. Therefore, both truth and error and consequently also semblance as enticement towards the latter are to be encountered only within a judgement: i.e. only in an object’s relationship to our understanding. There is no error in a cognition that thoroughgoingly harmonises with the understanding’s laws. There is also no error in a sensory representation (because it contains no judgement whatsoever). Yet no force of nature can deviate from its own laws by itself. Therefore, neither the understanding alone by itself (without the influence of another cause) nor the senses by themselves err: the former does not err because when it acts merely according to its own laws, the effect (i.e. a judgement) must necessarily agree with those laws. The formal aspect of all truth, however, consists in agreement with the understanding’s laws. In the senses, there is no judgement whatsoever: neither a true- nor a false judgement. Now, since we have no other cognitive-source besides those two, it follows that error is effected only through the unremarked influence of sensibility upon the understanding: whereby it occurs that subjective grounds of judgement run into the objective grounds and cause them to deviate from their determination[[14]](#footnote-14) – just as a moving body would by itself admittedly always hold a straight line in the same direction: which deforms into a curvilinear motion, however, if another force influences it in another direction simultaneously. In order to distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from the force that mixes with it, it will therefore be necessary to regard an erroneous judgement as the diagonal between two forces that determine the judgement in two diverse directions, which enclose an angle (as it were), and to resolve that composite effect into the simple effects of the understanding and sensibility: which must occur in pure *apriori* judgements through transcendental reflection, whereby (as has already been indicated) each representation is assigned its position within the corresponding cognitive-power and the latter’s influence upon the former also consequently becomes distinguished.

Our task here is not to treat of empirical semblance (e.g. optical semblance), which is found in empirical use of otherwise correct intellectual-rules and through which the judging power becomes enticed through the influence of imagination; but rather we are dealing solely with *transcendental semblance*, which influences principles whose use is not even based upon experience (in which case, we would still at least have a touchstone of their correctness) but which rather leads us ourselves astray entirely beyond the categories’ empirical use, against all warnings of critique, and tantalises us with the illusion of an expansion of the *pure understanding*. We shall call the principles whose application stays entirely within the constraints of possible experience *immanent* principles but will call those that shall fly over those limits *transcendent* principles. I understand by the latter not the *transcendental* use or misuse of the categories, which is a mere fault of a judging power that has not been suitably reined-in through critique and which does not sufficiently attend to the limit of the ground upon which alone the pure understanding is allowed to play, but rather actual principles that demand that we tear down all of those boundary-posts and usurp an entirely new ground that recognises no demarcation whatsoever. Therefore, *transcendental* and *transcendent* are not the same. The principles of the pure understanding, which we presented above, shall be merely of empirical- and not of transcendental use (i.e. use reaching beyond the limit of experience). A principle that removes those constraints and indeed even commands us to transgress them is called *transcendent*. If our critique can succeed in uncovering the semblance of those usurped principles, then those principles of the merely empirical use will be able to be called *immanent* principles of the pure understanding in contrast with the latter.

Logical semblance, which consists in mere imitation of rational form (i.e. the semblance of fallacious inferences), arises merely from a lack of attention to the logical rule. Hence, as soon as that rule is sharpened for the respective case, the semblance vanishes entirely. In contrast, transcendental semblance still does not cease if one has already uncovered it and discerned its correctness perspicuously through transcendental critique (e.g. the semblance in the proposition ‘the cosmos must have a beginning in respect to time’). The cause thereof is that within our reason (considered subjectively as a human cognitive-capacity) lie fundamental-rules and maxims of their use that have entirely the regard of objective principles and whereby it occurs that the subjective necessity of a certain connection between our concepts is, for the benefit of the understanding, taken for an objective necessity of the determination of things *per se*. An *illusion* that is not to be avoided at all: no more than we can avoid that the sea seems higher in the middle than on the shore because we see the former through higher light-rays than the latter or, still more so, no more than even an astronomer cannot prevent the Moon from seeming larger in its ascent even though he is not deceived by that semblance.

Transcendental dialectic will therefore satisfy itself with uncovering the semblance of transcendent judgements and simultaneously preventing them from deceiving us, but it can never effect that the semblance also even vanishes (like logical semblance) and ceases to be a semblance. We are then dealing with a *natural* and unavoidable *illusion* that itself rests upon subjective principles and passes them off as objective principles: whereas in resolving fallacious inferences, logical dialectic deals merely with a fault in following the principles or with an artificial semblance in imitation of them. There is therefore a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason: not one in which, say, a dilettante embroils himself through lack of knowledge or which a sophist has artfully excogitated in order to confuse rational people, but which rather attaches irrepressibly to human reason and which will still not cease to juggle it and unremittingly hurl it into momentary lapses that always need to be remedied.

1.2.3.1.2. On Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Semblance

1.2.3.1.2.A. On Reason *Simpliciter*

All our cognition starts from the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with reason: above which nothing superior is encountered within us to elaborate the material of intuition and bring it under the supreme unity of thought. Since I shall now give an explanation of that highest cognitive-power, I find myself in some perplexity. As with the understanding, there is a merely formal (i.e. logical) use of it wherein reason abstracts from all content of cognition but also a real use wherein it itself contains the origin of certain concepts and principles that it borrows neither from the senses nor from the understanding. Now, the first capacity has admittedly long been explained by logicians as a capacity to infer mediately (in distinction from the immediate inferences, i.e. *consequentiis immediatis*); but the second capacity, which itself generates concepts, has not yet been thereby discerned. Since a division of reason into a logical- and transcendental capacity occurs here, a higher concept of that cognitive source must be sought that encompasses both concepts under it: although by analogy with the intellectual concepts, we can expect that the logical concept will simultaneously deliver the key to the transcendental concept and that the table of the former’s functions will simultaneously deliver the genealogical ladder of the rational concepts.

In the first part of our Transcendental Logic, we explained the understanding as the capacity for rules. Here, we distinguish reason from it through intending to call reason the *capacity for principles*.

The term ‘principle’ [*Prinzip*] is ambiguous and commonly signifies merely a cognition that can be used as a principle though it is admittedly not a principle *per se* and in respect to its origin. Every universal proposition – even if it is derived from experience (through induction) – can serve as the major premise in a rational inference, but it is not itself a principle because of that. The mathematical axioms (e.g. ‘between two points, there can be only one straight line’) are even universal *apriori* cognitions and are therefore rightly called ‘principles’ relatively to the cases that can be subsumed under them. Yet I still cannot for that reason say that I cognise that property of straight lines *simpliciter* and *per se* from principles, but rather only within pure intuition.

Hence, I would call cognition wherein I cognise the particular in the universal through concepts ‘cognition from principles’. So every rational inference is then a form of the derivation of a cognition from a principle. For the major premise always gives a concept that then effects that everything subsumed under its condition is cognised from it according to a principle. Now, since every universal cognition can serve for the major premise in a rational inference and the understanding offers such universal *apriori* propositions, those propositions can then also be called ‘principles’ in regard to their possible use.

If we consider those principles of the pure understanding *per se* in respect of their origin, however, then they are nothing less than cognitions from concepts. For they would also not even be possible *apriori* if we did not invoke pure intuition (in mathematics) or conditions of a possible experience *simpliciter*. That everything that occurs has a cause cannot at all be inferred from the concept of what occurs *simpliciter*; instead, the principle shows how one can first receive a determinate experiential-concept of what occurs.

The understanding cannot therefore provide synthetic cognitions from concepts; and it is truly the latter that I call ‘principles’ absolutely, though all universal propositions *simpliciter* can be called ‘comparative principles’.

It is an old wish that will perhaps someday be fulfilled (though who knows how late) that even despite the endless multiplicity of civil laws, one may nevertheless seek out their principles; for the secret to simplifying legislation can consist in that alone. Yet the laws here are also merely constrainments of our freedom to conditions under which it harmonises with itself thoroughgoingly; consequently, they concern something that is entirely our own work and whereof we can ourselves be the cause through those concepts. But how objects *per se* and the nature of things shall stand under principles and be determined according to mere concepts is, if not something impossible, then nevertheless at least highly absurd in its demand. Whatever may be the case therewith (for we still have the investigation concerning it ahead of us), it is at least manifest therefrom that cognition from principles (*per se*) is something totally different from mere intellectual-cognition, which can also admittedly precede cognitions in the form of a principle but which *per se* (so far as it is synthetic)neither rests upon mere thought nor contains within it something universal according to concepts.

Whereas the understanding may be a capacity for the unity of appearances by means of rules, reason is the capacity for unity according to intellectual rules under principles. Reason therefore never relates primarily to experience nor to any object but rather to the understanding in order to give unity to its manifold cognitions *apriori* and through concepts, which may be called ‘rational unity’ and is of an entirely different kind than the unity implementable by the understanding.

That is the general concept of the rational capacity so far as it has been capable of being rendered comprehensible despite a total lack of examples (which shall first be given only in what follows).

1.2.3.1.2.B. On the Logical Use of Reason

One makes a distinction between what is immediately cognised and what is merely inferred. That there are three angles in a figure delimited through three straight lines is immediately cognised, but that those angles together are equal to two right-angles is merely inferred. Since we constantly need inference and it thereby ultimately becomes entirely customary, we ultimately no longer remark that difference; and, as with the so-called deceptions of the senses, we often take something to be immediately perceived that we have in fact nevertheless merely inferred. With every inference, there is *a proposition* that lies at its basis, *another* proposition that is drawn from it (viz. the conclusion), and finally the inference according to which the truth of the latter is unfailingly connected to the truth of the former. If the inferred judgement already lies within the first in such a way that it cannot be deduced therefrom without the mediation of a third representation, then the inference is called ‘immediate’ (*consequentia immediata*); but I would prefer to call such an inference an ‘intellectual inference’. But if another judgement is needed to effect the consequence besides the cognition taken as a basis, then the inference is called a ‘rational inference’. Within the proposition ‘all humans are mortal’ lie the propositions ‘some humans are mortal’ or ‘some *mortalia* are humans’ or ‘nothing immortal is a human’; and they are therefore immediate corollaries of the first proposition. In contrast, the proposition that all scholars are mortal does not lie within the judgement taken as a basis (for the concept of a scholar does not occur in it at all); and it can be inferred from the latter only by means of an intermediate judgement.

In every rational inference, I first think about a rule (*maior*) through the *understanding*. Secondly, I *subsume* a cognition under that rule’s condition (*minor*) by means of the *judging power*. Finally, I *determine* my cognition through the rule’s predicate (*conclusio*) and therefore *apriori* through *reason*. The relationship that the major premise represents as the rule between a cognition and its condition constitutes the diverse kinds of rational inferences. They are therefore exactly threefold, just like all judgements *simpliciter*, so far as they differ in the way in which they express the cognition’s relationship within the understanding: viz. *categorical*, *hypothetical*, and *disjunctive* rational-inferences.

If, as occurs for the most part, the conclusion has been propounded as a judgement in order to see whether it does not flow from already given judgements through which namely an entirely different object is thought about, then I seek out the assertion of that conclusion within the understanding in respect to whether it is not found within it under certain conditions according to a universal rule. Now, if I find such a condition and the object of the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then the conclusion is inferred from the rule *that also holds for other objects of cognition*. One sees therefrom that in inference, reason seeks to bring the great multiplicity of the understanding’s cognition to the smallest number of principles (i.e. universal conditions) and thereby effect their supreme unity.

1.2.3.1.2.C. On the Pure Use of Reason

Can one isolate reason, and is it then still in its own right a source of concepts and judgements that derive merely from it and whereby it relates to objects; or is it a merely subaltern capacity to give a certain form to given cognitions that is called ‘logical’ and whereby intellectual cognitions are subordinated merely to one another and lower rules are subordinated to other, higher rules (whose condition encompasses the condition of the former within its sphere) so far as that can be accomplished through comparing them? That is the question with which we now occupy ourselves merely precursorily. In fact, multiplicity of rules and unity of principles is a demand of reason in order to bring the understanding into thoroughgoing coherence with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and thereby brings intuition into connection. Yet such a principle does not prescribe a law for the objects and does not contain the ground of the possibility of cognising and determining them as such *simpliciter* but is rather merely a subjective law of housekeeping with our understanding’s inventory to bring the universal use of its concepts to the smallest possible number of them through comparing them, without one demanding such a lucidity from the objects themselves that would promote our understanding’s convenience and expansion and which would be justified in simultaneously giving objective validity to that maxim. In a word, the question is: does reason *per se* (i.e. pure *apriori* reason) contain synthetic principles and rules, and wherein may those principles consist?

Reason’s formal and logical procedure in rational inferences already gives us sufficient guidance concerning this in respect of what ground the transcendental principle thereof will rest upon in synthetic cognition through pure reason.

*Firstly*, a rational inference does not address intuitions in order to bring them under rules (like the understanding with its categories) but rather addresses concepts and judgements. Therefore: if pure reason also addresses objects, it nevertheless has no immediate relation to them and their intuition but rather merely to the understanding and its judgements, which are primarily concerned with the senses and their intuition in order to determine their object for them. Rational unity is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is rather essentially distinct from it (i.e. from intellectual unity). That everything that occurs has a cause is absolutely not a principle cognised and prescribed through reason. That principle renders the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which would have been incapable of demanding such a synthetic unity from mere concepts without that relation to possible experience.

*Secondly*: in its logical use, reason seeks the universal condition of its judgement (i.e. of the conclusion); and a rational inference is itself nothing other than a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (i.e. the major premise). Now, since that rule is in turn exposed to exactly the same trial by reason and the condition of the condition must thereby be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) so long as that is sustainable, one well sees that the peculiar principle of reason *simpliciter* (in its logical use) is: to find the *inconditionatum* for the understanding’s conditioned cognition with which the latter’s unity is completed.

That logical maxim cannot become a principle of *pure reason*, however, except through one’s assuming that if a *conditionatum* is given, then the entire series of intersubordinate conditions (which is therefore itself unconditioned) is also given: i.e. contained within the object and its connection.

Such a principle of pure reason is, however, manifestly *synthetic*; for a *conditionatum* admittedly relates to some condition analytically, but not to an *inconditionatum*. Diverse synthetic propositions must also arise from it whereof the pure understanding knows nothing, as it deals only with objects of a possible experience: whose cognition and synthesis is always conditioned. Yet an *inconditionatum* (if it actually occurs) can be considered particularly in respect to all of the determinations that distinguish it from every *conditionatum* and must thereby yield material for some synthetic *apriori* propositions.

The principles arising from that highest principle of pure reason will, however, be *transcendent* in respect to all appearances: i.e. no empirical use that is adequate to that principle will ever be able to made of it. That principle will therefore totally differ from all principles of the understanding (whose use is fully immanent because they have only the possibility of experience for their theme). Now, our task in the Transcendental Dialectic – which we shall now develop from its sources, which are deeply concealed within human reason – will be to establish: whether the principle that every series of conditions (in synthesis of appearances or even of thought about things *simpliciter*) extends to an *inconditionatum* has its objective correctness or not; what consequences flow therefrom to the empirical use of the understanding or whether there is instead no such objectively valid rational-principle but rather a merely logical prescription to always approach conditions’ completeness in ascending to ever higher conditions and to thereby bring the highest rational-unity that is possible for us into our cognition; whether (as I say) that need of reason has, through a misunderstanding, been taken for a transcendental principle of pure reason that overhastily postulates such an unrestricted completeness of a series of conditions within the objects themselves; but also, in that case, what manner of misinterpretations and obscurations may sneak into rational inferences whose major premise has been taken from pure reason (and which is perhaps more a petition than a postulate) and which climb upwards from experience to its conditions. We will divide the Transcendental Dialectic into two main components, the *first* of which shall treat of the *transcendental concepts* of pure reason and the *second* of which shall treat of transcendent and *dialectical rational-inferences* of pure reason.

1.2.3.2. First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic: On the Concepts of Pure Reason

Whatever may be the case with the possibility of concepts from pure reason, they are nevertheless not merely reflected- but rather inferred concepts. Intellectual concepts are also thought of *apriori* prior to experience and for its behoof, but they contain nothing more than the unity of reflection upon appearances insofar as they shall necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Cognition and determination of an object become possible through them alone. They therefore give material for inference for the first time, and no *apriori* concepts of objects precede them from which they could be inferred. In contrast, their objective reality is grounded merely upon the fact that since they constitute the intellectual form of all experience, their application must always be capable of being shown within experience.

Nevertheless, the denomination of a rational concept already shows precursorily that it will not allow itself to be restricted to experience because it concerns a cognition of which every empirical cognition is merely a part (perhaps the whole of possible experience or of its empirical synthesis): to which admittedly no actual experience is ever fully adequate, although it indeed always pertains thereto. Rational concepts serve for *comprehending* just as intellectual concepts serve for *understanding* (of perceptions). If they contain the *inconditionatum*, then they concern something under which all experience belongs but which is never itself an object of experience: i.e. something to which reason leads in its inferences from experience and in light of which it estimates and measures the grade of its empirical use but which never constitutes an element of empirical synthesis. If such concepts have objective validity in spite of that, then they can be called *conceptus ratiocinati* (i.e. correctly inferred concepts); but where they do not have objective validity, they are at least inveigled through an inferential semblance and may be called *conceptus ratiocinantes* (i.e. sophistical concepts). Yet since that can first be discerned only in the main component concerning the dialectical inferences of pure reason, we cannot yet have regard thereto but will instead precursorily bestow a new name upon the concepts of pure reason and call them ‘transcendental ideas’ (just as we called the pure intellectual-concepts ‘categories’): and we shall now elucidate and justify that denomination.

1.2.3.2.1. First Section: On Ideas *Simpliciter*

Despite the vast wealth of our languages, the thinking mind still often finds himself perplexed in respect to the term that fits his concept exactly and in whose absence, he cannot become rightly intelligible to others nor even to himself. Coining new words is a pretension to legislating in languages that seldom succeeds; and before one proceeds to that dubious means, it is advisable to first look in a dead and scholarly language to see whether that concept is not found therein together with its corresponding term; and even if the old use of that term has become somewhat wavering through its originator’s incautiousness, it is nevertheless better to fix the signification that predominantly belonged to it (even if it should remain doubtful whether one had precisely that signification in mind at that time) than to merely ruin one’s task through rendering oneself unintelligible.

For that reason: if for a certain concept one perhaps found only a single word that fits that concept exactly in a signification that has already been introduced (and if distinguishing that concept from other akin concepts is of great importance), then it is advisable not to use that word profligately or use it synonymously instead of others merely for variety but rather to carefully preserve its peculiar signification for it because it otherwise easily occurs that, since the term does not particularly occupy attention but rather loses itself amidst the mass of other terms with highly divergent significations, the thought that only it could have preserved is also lost.

*Plato* availed himself of the term *idea* in such a way that one well sees that he understood something thereby that was not only never borrowed from the senses but which far surpassed even the concepts of the understanding with which *Aristotle* occupied himself because nothing congruent therewith could ever be encountered in experience. For him, the ideas are prototypes of the things themselves and not merely keys to possible experiences, like the categories. In his opinion, they issue from supreme reason: whence they have been imparted to human reason, which now no longer finds itself in its original state, however, but must rather recall the old and now highly obscured ideas through anamnesis (which is called ‘philosophy’). I do not wish to enter into a literary investigation here in order to discern the sense that that sublime philosopher conjoined with his term. I merely remark that it is by no means unusual, in common discourse as well as in writings, to understand an author even better than he understood himself through comparing the thoughts that he expressed about his object because he did not determine his concept sufficiently and thereby sometimes spoke or even thought contrarily to his own intention.

*Plato* remarked very well that our cognitive power feels a far higher need than merely to spell-out appearances according to synthetic unity in order to be able to read them as experience and that our reason naturally elevates itself to cognitions that go much too far for any object that experience can give to ever be capable of being congruent with them but which nevertheless have their reality and are by no means mere figments of the brain.

*Plato* found his ideas predominantly in everything practical,[[15]](#footnote-15) i.e. everything that rests upon freedom: which, for its part, stands under cognitions that are a peculiar product of reason. Someone who sought to extract the concepts of virtue from experience and turn that which can at most serve merely as an example for imperfect elucidation into a pattern for a cognitive source (as many have actually done) would turn virtue into an ambiguous nonthing mutable according to time and circumstances and unusable as a rule. In contrast, everyone becomes aware that when someone is presented to him as a pattern of virtue, he still always has the true original merely in his own head with which he compares that purported pattern and merely estimates the latter according to it. That pattern is the idea of virtue, however: in respect of which, all possible objects of experience admittedly render service as examples (i.e. demonstrations of the feasibility, to a certain degree, of what the concept of reason enjoins), but not as prototypes. That no human will ever act adequately to what the pure idea of virtue contains by no means demonstrates something chimerical in that thought. For all judgement concerning moral value or valuelessness is nevertheless possible only by means of that idea. Therefore, that idea necessarily underlies every approximation to moral perfection: however far the hindrances in human nature, which are indeterminable in respect of their degree, may keep us distant therefrom.

The *Platonic republic* has become a byword as a purportedly conspicuous example of dreamt perfection that can have its seat only within the brain of an otiose thinker, and *Brucker* finds it risible that that philosopher asserted that a prince would never govern well if he did not partake of the ideas. Only one would do better to pursue that thought further and (where that excellent man leaves us without help) shed light upon it through new endeavours than to cast it aside as useless under the very miserable and deleterious pretext of unfeasibility. A constitution of the *greatest human freedom* according to laws that effect *that everyone’s freedom can subsist together with that of others* (not of the greatest beatitude, for that would already follow by itself) is nevertheless at least a necessary idea that one must take as a basis not merely in the first delineation of a state’s constitution but also in respect to all laws and wherein one must initially abstract from the present hindrances that may perhaps arise not so much unavoidably from human nature as rather from neglecting the genuine ideas in legislation. For nothing can be found that is more deleterious and unworthy of a philosopher than the vulgar invocation of purportedly conflicting experience that yet would not exist at all if those institutions were not encountered at the correct time in accordance with the ideas and in whose stead, rough concepts would have vitiated all good intention precisely because they had been extracted from experience. The more legislation and governance were arranged in agreement with that idea, the more seldom punishments would indeed become; and it is then entirely rational (as *Plato* asserted) that with a perfect ordering of them, no punishments whatsoever would be needed. Now, even though the latter may never come about, the idea is nevertheless entirely correct that sets that maximum up as a prototype in order to bring the legal constitution of humans ever nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For no one can nor shall determine what the highest grade may be at which humanity must stop nor how great the chasm that remains between the idea and its implementation may therefore be, precisely because it is freedom that can surpass any given limit.

Nevertheless, it is not merely in that wherein human reason shows true causality and where ideas become efficient causes (of actions and their objects), viz. in *moralia*, but also in respect of nature itself that *Plato* rightly sees perspicuous demonstrations of their origination from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular order of the cosmos’s structure (and presumably therefore also the entire natural-order) perspicuously show that they are possible only in accordance with ideas: in such a way that admittedly no individual creature under the individual conditions of its existence is congruent with the idea of the most perfect creature of its kind (no more than a human is congruent with the idea of humanity that even he himself carries within his soul as the prototype of his actions) and yet those ideas within the supreme understanding are individual, unalterable, thoroughgoingly determined, and the original causes of the things; and only the whole of their conjunction within the cosmos alone is fully adequate to that idea. If one abstracts the exaggeration from the expression, then that philosopher’s mental impulse to ascend from imitative contemplation of the physicality of the cosmic order to the architectonic connection of that order according to purposes (i.e. according to ideas) is an endeavour that deserves respect and emulation; but in respect to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion – where the ideas first render experience itself (of the good) possible, although they admittedly can never be fully expressed therein – it has an entirely peculiar merit that one does not cognise merely because one judges it through precisely those empirical rules whose validity as principles was to be eliminated precisely through the ideas. For in contemplation of nature, experience delivers the rule to us and is the source of truth; but in respect to moral laws, experience is (unfortunately) the mother of semblance: and it is extremely reprehensible to derive the laws concerning what I *should do* from what *is done* or to want to thereby constrain them.

Instead of all those contemplations, whose appropriate execution in fact constitutes philosophy’s peculiar dignity, we now occupy ourselves with a labour that is not as lustrous but which is also still not without merit, viz. to make the ground for those majestic moral edifices even and firm: in which occur all manner of mole-tunnels of a reason digging for treasures vainly yet with good confidence that render that structure insecure. It is therefore pure reason’s transcendental use, its principles, and its ideas that it now behoves us to know exactly in order to be able to appropriately determine and estimate pure reason’s influence and value. Before I set this precursory introduction aside, however, I beseech those for whom philosophy is close to heart (which is said more than commonly encountered) – if they should find themselves convinced by this and what follows – to safeguard the term *idea* in its original signification so that it does not further drift amidst the other terms with which diverse kinds of representation are customarily designated in careless disorder and so that the science does not lose therein. Yet we do not lack for denominations that are appropriate for every kind of representation without needing to delve into the property of another language. Here is a scale of them. The genus is *representation simpliciter* (*repraesentatio*). Under it stands representation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A *perception* that relates merely to the subject as the modification of his state is *sensation* (*sensatio*); an objective perception is *cognition* (*cognitio*). Cognition is either *intuition* or *concept* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). Whereas the former relates to the object immediately and is individual, the latter relates to the object mediately by means of a characteristic that can be common to multiple things. A concept is either an *empirical*- or a *pure concept*; and a pure concept so far as it has its origin merely within the understanding (not within the pure image of sensibility) is called a *notion*. A concept out of notions that surpass the possibility of experience is an *idea* or a rational concept. Once someone has become accustomed to this distinction, it must be intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an ‘idea’. It is not even to be called a ‘notion’ (i.e. an intellectual concept).

1.2.3.2.2. Second Section: On the Transcendental Ideas

The Transcendental Analytic gave us an example of how the mere logical form of our cognition could contain the origin of pure *apriori* concepts that represent objects prior to all experience or rather indicate the synthetic unity that alone renders an empirical cognition of objects possible. The form of judgements (transformed into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) brought forth categories that guide all use of the understanding in experience. Equally, we can expect that the form of rational inferences – if one applies it to the synthetic unity of intuitions according to the categories’ moderation – will contain the origin of particular *apriori* concepts that we can call ‘rational concepts’ or *transcendental ideas* and which will determine the understanding’s use within the whole of total experience according to principles.

Reason’s function in its inferences consisted in the universality of cognition according to concepts, and a rational inference is itself a judgement that becomes determined *apriori* in the entire extent of its condition. I could also merely extract the proposition ‘Caius is mortal’ from experience through the understanding. Only I seek a concept that contains the condition under which the predicate (i.e. assertion *simpliciter*) of that judgement is given (viz. here the concept of man); and after I have subsumed under that condition taken in its entire extent (all humans are mortal), I determine the cognition of my object accordingly (Caius is mortal).

In the conclusion of a rational inference, we thus restrict a predicate to a certain object after we have previously thought about that predicate in the major premise in its entire extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of an extent in relation to such a condition is called *universality* (*universalitas*). In the synthesis of intuitions, the *allness* (*universitas*) or *totality* of the conditions corresponds to that universality. Therefore, a transcendental rational-concept is none other than that of the *totality of the conditions* for a given *conditionatum*. Now, since the *inconditionatum* alone renders the totality of the conditions possible and, conversely, the totality of the conditions is itself always unconditioned, a pure rational-concept *simpliciter* can be explained through the concept of the *inconditionatum* so far as that concept contains a ground of the synthesis of the *conditionata*.

There will be as many pure rational-concepts as there are kinds of relationship that the understanding represents to itself by means of the categories; and one will therefore have to seek an *inconditionatum* **firstly** of the *categorial* synthesis within a subject, **secondly** of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the elements of a *series*, and **thirdly** of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts within a system.

For there are equally many kinds of rational inference, each of which progresses to an *inconditionatum* via prosyllogisms: one of them progresses to a subject that is not itself another predicate; another progresses to a presupposition that presupposes nothing further; and the third progresses to an aggregate of the elements of a division for which nothing further is requisite in order to complete the division of a concept. Therefore, the pure rational-concepts of a totality in the synthesis of conditions are necessary at least as problems in order to continue the understanding’s unity to an *inconditionatum* (where possible) and are grounded in the nature of human reason: even if those transcendental concepts lack a use *in concreto* that is congruous with them and they therefore have no other utility than to bring the understanding into the orientation wherein its use, because it extends to an extreme, is simultaneously rendered thoroughgoingly consonant with itself.

Nevertheless, since we speak here of a totality of conditions and an *inconditionatum* as the common title of all rational concepts, we again stumble upon a term that we cannot do without and yet which we cannot use assuredly due to an ambiguity attaching to it through long misuse. The word ‘**absolute**’ is one of the few words that has, in its primordial signification, been congruous with a concept that, moreover, absolutely no other word of the very same language fits exactly and whose loss or, what is the same, whose wavering use must therefore also draw behind it the loss of the concept itself and indeed of a concept that, since it greatly occupies reason, cannot be dispensed with without great disadvantage to all transcendental judgements. The word ‘absolute’ is now often used merely in order to indicate that something holds for an item *per se* and therefore *internally*. In that signification, ‘*absolutely* possible’ would signify what is possible *per se* (*interne*): which is in fact *the least* that one can say of an object. In contrast, it is also sometimes used in order to indicate that something is valid in every respect (i.e. unconstrainedly): e.g. absolute government; and in that signification, ‘absolutely possible’ would signify that which is possible in every regard (i.e. *in every respect*): which is in turn *the most* that I can say about the possibility of a thing. Now, admittedly, these significations sometimes converge. So, e.g., what is intrinsically impossible is also impossible in every respect and therefore absolutely. But in most cases, they are infinitely far apart; and I can in no way infer that because something is possible *per se*, it is consequently possible in every respect and therefore absolutely. Indeed, in what follows, I will show that absolute necessity by no means depends upon internal necessity in all cases and therefore must not be regarded as synonymous with it. If something’s contrary is internally impossible, then its contrary is also admittedly impossible in every regard: and it is therefore itself absolutely necessary; but I cannot conversely infer that if something is absolutely necessary, then its contrary is *internally* impossible: i.e. that the *absolute* necessity of things is an *internal* necessity – for in certain cases, that internal necessity is an entirely empty term with which we cannot conjoin the slightest concept: whereas that of the necessity of a thing in every respect (i.e. in respect to everything possible) carries with it entirely particular determinations. Now, since philosophers can never be indifferent to the loss of a concept of great application in speculative secular-wisdom, I hope that they will also not be indifferent to the determination and careful conservation of the term on which the concept hangs.

I will then avail myself of the word ‘absolute’ in that expanded signification and will oppose it to that which holds merely comparatively or in a particular regard; for whereas the latter is restricted to conditions, the former holds without restriction.

A transcendental rational-concept always heads solely towards absolute totality in synthesis of conditions and never ends anywhere other than at something absolutely unconditioned (i.e. something unconditioned in every respect). For pure reason leaves everything to the understanding, which relates primarily to the objects of intuition or rather to their synthesis in the imaginal power. Pure reason reserves absolute totality in use of the intellectual concepts for itself alone and seeks to lead the synthetic unity thought of within a category to something absolutely unconditioned. One can therefore call the latter unity the *rational-unity* of appearances, just as one can call the unity that the category expresses *intellectual-unity*. Reason thus relates only to the understanding’s use and indeed not so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the absolute totality of conditions is not a concept usable within an experience, since no experience is unconditioned), but rather in order to prescribe to it direction towards a certain unity of which the understanding has no concept and which aims at aggregating all actions of the understanding in respect of every object into an *absolute whole*. Therefore, the objective use of the pure rational-concepts is always *transcendent*: whereas that of the pure intellectual-concepts must always be *immanent* according to its nature because it confines itself merely to possible experience.

By the term ‘idea’, I understand a necessary rational-concept for which no congruent object can be given in the senses. Therefore, the rational concepts we are now considering are *transcendental ideas*. They are concepts of pure reason; for they consider all experiential cognition as determined through an absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented but rather imposed through the nature of reason itself and therefore relate necessarily to the understanding’s entire use. They are finally transcendent and surpass the limit of all experience: in which, therefore, no object can ever be presented that would be adequate to a transcendental idea. If one calls something an ‘idea’, one says *very much* in respect to the object (as an object of the pure understanding): but precisely because of that, one says *very little* in respect to the subject (i.e. in respect of its actuality under an empirical condition) because as the concept of a maximum *in concreto*, the idea can never be given congruently. Since the latter is in fact the whole aim in merely speculative use of reason, and approximation to a concept that yet will never be reached in the implementation is just as much as if the concept were missed entirely and absolutely: it is said of such a concept that it is *only* an idea. So one would be able to say ‘the absolute totality of all appearances is *only an idea*’; for since we can never delineate such an idea in an image, that totality remains a *problem* without any resolution. In contrast, since only implementation according to rules is at issue in practical use of the understanding, an idea of practical reason can always be actual though admittedly given only in part – indeed, that idea is the indispensable condition of every practical use of reason. Its implementation is always limited and deficient but under non-determinable limits and therefore always under the influence of the concept of an absolute completeness. Thus, a practical idea is always extremely fruitful and unavoidably necessary in respect to actual actions. In it, pure reason even has causality to actually bring forth what its concept contains; therefore, one cannot (as it were) say disdainfully of wisdom that *it is only an idea*: but rather precisely because it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible purposes, it must serve for a rule for everything practical as an original and at least restrictive condition.

Even though we must say of the transcendental rational-concepts that *they are only ideas*, we will still by no means have to regard them as superfluous and null. For even if no object can already thereby be determined, they can nevertheless serve the understanding fundamentally and unremarkedly for a canon of its widespread and lucid use: whereby it admittedly cognises no object more than it would cognise it by means of its concepts but is nevertheless guided better and further in that cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render a transition from natural- to practical concepts possible and, in such a way, can provide support and coherence with reason’s speculative cognitions to the moral ideas themselves. One must expect information about all this in due course.

In accordance with our intention, however, we set the practical ideas aside here and therefore consider reason only in its speculative use and in that, still more narrowly, in its transcendental use. We must pursue the same path here that we took above in the deduction of the categories, i.e. consider the logical form of rational cognition and see whether reason does not also thereby become a source of concepts to regard objects *per se* as determined synthetically *apriori* in respect of one function of reason or another.

Considered as a capacity for a certain logical form of cognition, reason is the capacity to infer: i.e. to judge mediately (through subsuming the condition of a possible judgement under the condition of a given judgement). The given judgement is the universal rule (i.e. the major premise, *maior*). The subsumption of the condition of another possible judgement under the condition of the rule is the minor premise (*minor*). The actual judgement that expresses the assertion of the rule *in the subsumed case* is the conclusion (*conclusio*). For the rule says something universally under a certain condition. Now, in a presented case, the condition of the rule occurs. Therefore, what holds universally under that condition is also regarded as holding in the presented case (which carries that condition with it). One easily sees that reason can arrive at a cognition through intellectual actions that constitute a series of conditions. If I arrive at the proposition ‘all bodies are alterable’ only through beginning from the remoter cognition ‘everything composite is *alterable*’ (wherein the concept of a body does not yet occur but which nevertheless contains the condition thereof), proceeding from that to a more proximate cognition that stands under the condition of the first cognition (viz. ‘all bodies are composite’), and only then proceeding to a third cognition (viz. ‘consequently, all bodies are alterable’) that now connects the remote cognition (i.e. ‘everything composite is alterable’) to the second cognition, then I have arrived at a cognition (i.e. conclusion) via a series of conditions (i.e. premises). Now, every series whose exponent (of a categorical or hypothetical judgement) is given can be continued; therefore, exactly the same action of reason leads to the *ratiocinatio polysyllogistica*, which is a series of inferences that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (*per prosyllogismos*) or on the side of the *conditionata* (*per episyllogismos*) into indeterminate expanses.

One soon becomes aware, however, that the chain or series of prosyllogisms (i.e. the inferred cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions for a given cognition: in other words, the *ascending series* of rational inferences) must nevertheless relate to the rational capacity differently than the *descending series*, i.e. reason’s progression on the side of the *conditionata* through episyllogisms. For since the cognition (*conclusio*) in the first case is given only as conditioned, one cannot arrive at it except at least under the presupposition that all elements of the series are given on the side of the conditions (i.e. totality in the series of premises) because the respective *apriori* judgement is possible only under their presupposition; in contrast, on the side of the *conditionata* or consequences, only an *emerging*- and not already *wholly* presupposed or *given* series and therefore merely a potential progression is thought about. Hence, if a cognition is regarded as conditioned, then reason is compelled to regard the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed and given in their totality. But if precisely the same cognition is simultaneously regarded as a condition of other cognitions that amongst one another constitute a series of consequences in a descending line, then reason can be entirely indifferent in respect to how far that progression extends *a parte posteriori* and even whether that series’s totality is possible at all because reason does not need such a series for the conclusion that lies before it, since that conclusion is already sufficiently determined and assured through its grounds *a parte priori*. Now, irrespective of whether the series of premises on the side of the conditions has a *first* premise as a highest condition or it does not and is therefore without limits *a parte priori*, it must nevertheless contain totality of the conditions: assuming that we can never come to comprehend them; and the whole series must be unconditionally true if the *conditionatum* that is regarded as a consequence arising therefrom is to be deemed true. That is a demand of reason, which announces its cognition as determined *apriori* and as necessary: either *per se* (and then it requires no grounds) or, if it is derived, as an element of a series of grounds that is itself unconditionally true.

1.2.3.2.3. Third Section: System of the Transcendental Ideas

We are dealing here not with a logical dialectic that abstracts from all content of cognition and which uncovers merely the false semblance in the form of rational-inferences but rather with a transcendental dialectic that shall contain fully-*apriori* the origin of certain cognitions from pure reason and inferred concepts whose object cannot be discovered empirically at all and which therefore lie totally beyond the capacity of the pure understanding. From the natural relation that the transcendental use of our cognition must have to its logical use in inferences as well as in judgements, we have taken that there will be only three kinds of dialectical inference – which relate to the three kinds of inference through which reason can arrive at cognitions from principles – and that in all of them, reason’s task is to ascend from the conditioned synthesis to which the understanding always remains bound to the unconditioned synthesis that the understanding can never attain.

The commonality of all relation that our representations can have is: (1) their relation to a subject and (2) their relation to objects and indeed firstly as appearances or as objects of thought *simpliciter*. If one conjoins this subdivision with the higher division, then all relationship of representations whereof we can make either a concept or an idea is threefold: (1) their relationship to a subject; (2) their relationship to the manifold of the object in appearance; and (3) their relationship to all things *simpliciter*.

Whereas all pure concepts *simpliciter* deal with the synthetic unity of all representations, concepts of pure reason (i.e. transcendental ideas) deal with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions *simpliciter*. Consequently, all transcendental ideas can be brought under *three classes*: the **first** of which contains the absolute (i.e. unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject*; the **second** of which contains the absolute *unity of the series of the conditions of appearance*; and the **third** of which contains the absolute *unity of the condition of all objects of thought simpliciter*.

The thinking subject is the object of *psychology*; the complex of all appearances (i.e. the world) is the object of *cosmology*; and the thing that contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought about (i.e. the being [*Wesen*] of all beings) is the object of *theology*. Therefore, pure reason delivers the idea for a transcendental doctrine-of-the-soul (*psychologia rationalis*), for a transcendental cosmological science (*cosmologia rationalis*), and finally also for a transcendental cognition-of-God (*theologia transscendentalis*). The mere delineation even for one or another of those sciences does not stem from the understanding at all, even if the understanding were conjoined with the supreme logical use of reason (i.e. all thinkable inferences) in order to progress from one object of reason (i.e. appearance) to all others up to the remotest elements of empirical synthesis, but is rather merely a pure and genuine product or problem of pure reason.

What modes of pure rational-concepts stand under those three titles of all transcendental ideas will be completely propounded in the following main-component. They proceed along the thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates directly to objects but rather to the understanding’s concepts of them. Equally, moreover, only in the full execution will it be able to be rendered perspicuous how reason must necessarily arrive at the concept of the absolute unity of the *thinking subject* merely through synthetic use of precisely the same function whereof it avails itself for categorical rational-inferences, how the logical procedure in hypothetical rational-inferences must necessarily draw behind it the idea of something absolutely-unconditioned *within a series* of given conditions, and finally how the mere form of a disjunctive rational-inference must necessarily draw behind it the supreme rational-concept of a *being of all beings* – a thought that on first impression seems to be extremely paradoxical.

No *objective deduction* of those transcendental ideas is truly possible like that which we could deliver for the categories. For in fact, they have no relation to any object that could be given congruently with them precisely because they are only ideas. Nevertheless, we could undertake a subjective derivation of them from the nature of our reason; and such a derivation is also accomplished in the present main-component.

One easily sees that pure reason has for its goal nothing other than the absolute totality of the synthesis *on the side of the conditions* (be it of inherence, dependence, or concurrence) and that it does not deal with absolute completeness *on the side of the conditionata*. For it needs the former only in order to presuppose the entire series of conditions and thereby give them to the understanding *apriori*. But once a condition exists that is given completely (and unconditionally), a rational concept is no longer needed in respect to the continuation of the series; for the understanding performs every step downwards from the condition to the *conditionata* by itself. In such a way, the transcendental ideas serve only for *ascending* to the *inconditionata* (i.e. the principles) in the series of conditions. In respect to the *descent* to the *conditionata*, however, there is admittedly a far-reaching logical use that our reason makes of the understanding’s laws but no transcendental use whatsoever; and if we make an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (i.e. of a *progressus*), e.g. of the whole series of all *future* cosmic-alterations, then that is a cogitational thing (*ens rationis*) that is thought of merely arbitrarily and not presupposed through reason necessarily. For the totality of the *conditionata*’s conditions is admittedly presupposed for the *conditionata*’s possibility, but not the totality of their consequences. Consequently, such a concept is not a transcendental idea: which is indeed all that we are merely dealing with here.

Ultimately, one also becomes aware that a certain coherence and unity shines forth amongst the transcendental ideas themselves and that pure reason brings all its cognitions into a system by means of them. Progressing from cognition of oneself (i.e. of the soul) to cosmic cognition and, by means of cosmic cognition, to the originary being is such a natural progression that it seems similar to reason’s logical progression from premises to a conclusion. Now, whether a kinship of kind between the logical procedure and the transcendental procedure is secretly underlying here is also one of the questions whose answer one must first expect only in the course of these investigations. We have already achieved our purpose precursorily because we have been able to appropriately extract reason’s transcendental concepts – which otherwise usually mingle amongst one another in philosophers’ theories without their even appropriately distinguishing them from intellectual concepts – from that ambiguous predicament and specify their origin and thereby simultaneously their determinate number (beyond which there can be no more at all) and represent them in a systematic nexus, whereby a particular field for pure reason is demarcated and constrained.

#### 1.2.3.3. Second Book of the Transcendental Dialectic: On the Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason

One can say that the object of a mere transcendental idea is something whereof one has no concept even though that idea has been generated entirely necessarily within reason according to its original laws. For in fact, no intellectual concept of an object that shall be adequate to reason’s demand is possible: i.e. an intellectual concept that can be shown within a possible experience and rendered intuitive. One would express oneself better and with less risk of misunderstanding, however, if one said that we can have no knowledge of an object that corresponds to an idea: although we can admittedly have a problematic concept.

The transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure rational-concepts at least rests upon the fact that we can be brought to such ideas through a necessary rational-inference. Therefore, there will be rational inferences that contain no empirical premises and by means of which we infer from something that we know to something else whereof we still have no concept and yet to which we can give objective reality through an unavoidable semblance. Such inferences are therefore to be called ‘*sophistical* inferences’ rather than ‘rational inferences’ in light of their result: although they can well bear the latter name due to their occasion because they have still not been invented, nor have they arisen contingently; but rather they have arisen from the nature of reason. They are sophistications not of humans but rather of pure reason itself from which even the wisest amongst all humans cannot free himself; and although he can perhaps prevent error after much endeavour, he can never get rid of the semblance that vexes and illudes him incessantly.

There are therefore only three kinds of those dialectical rational-inferences, which are as manifold as the ideas to which their conclusions lead. In rational inferences of the **first class**, I infer from the transcendental concept of a subject that contains nothing manifold to the absolute unity of that subject itself: of which, in that way, I have absolutely no concept. I will call that dialectical inference the ‘transcendental *paralogism*’. The **second** class of sophistical inferences is based upon the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions for a given appearance *simpliciter*; and I infer from the fact that I always have a self-contradictory concept of the series’s unconditioned synthetic unity on one side to the correctness of the opposing unity, yet of which I also have no concept. I will call reason’s state in these dialectical inferences the *antinomy* of pure reason. Finally, in the **third** kind of sophistical inferences, I infer from the totality of conditions for thinking about objects *simpliciter* so far as they can be given to me to the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of things *simpliciter*: i.e. from things that I do not know, according to their mere transcendental concept, to a being of all beings that I know still less through a transcendent concept and of whose unconditional necessity I can make no concept for myself. I will call that dialectical rational-inference the *ideal* of pure reason.

#### 1.2.3.3.1. First Main-Component: On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason

A logical paralogism consists in the falsity of a rational inference in respect of its form, whatever its content may be. A transcendental paralogism, however, has a transcendental ground to infer falsely in respect of form. In such a way, such a fallacious inference will have its ground in the nature of human-reason and will carry with it an unavoidable, though admittedly not unresolvable, illusion.

We now come to a concept that was not delineated above in the general list of the transcendental concepts and which must nevertheless be counted among them, without altering that table in the slightest and declaring it deficient. That is the concept or, if one prefers, the judgement ‘I think’. One easily sees, however, that that concept is the vehicle of all concepts *simpliciter* and therefore also of the transcendental concepts and is thus always concomitantly comprehended among the latter and is therefore equally transcendental but can have no particular title because it serves merely to present all thought as belonging to consciousness. Yet even as pure as it is from the empirical (i.e. from sensory impression), it nevertheless serves to distinguish two objects from the nature of our representational power. I *qua* thinking am an object of the internal sense and am called a ‘soul’. Something that is an object of external senses is called a ‘body’. Thus, the term ‘I’ *qua* thinking being already signifies the object of psychology, which can be called ‘rational doctrine-of-the-soul’ if I demand to know nothing further of the soul than what can be inferred independently of all experience (which determines me more closely and *in concreto*) from that concept ‘I’ so far as it occurs in all thought.

*Rational* doctrine-of-the-soul is actually an undertaking of that kind; for if even the slightest *empiricum* from my thought or any particular perception of my internal state were mixed among the cognitive grounds of that science, then it would no longer be rational- but rather *empirical* doctrine-of-the-soul. We therefore already have a purported science before us that has been constructed upon the single proposition ‘I think’ and whose ground or nonground we can investigate entirely aptly here and accordantly with the nature of a transcendental philosophy. One must not object that I still have an internal experience in that proposition that expresses my perception of myself and that the rational doctrine-of-the-soul that is constructed thereupon is therefore never pure but rather is grounded partially upon an empirical principle. For that internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception ‘I think’ that renders even all transcendental concepts possible in which it is said that I think of substance, of cause, etc. For without some particular difference and determination of them being given empirically, internal experience *simpliciter* and its possibility or perception *simpliciter* and its relationship to other perception cannot be regarded as empirical cognition but must rather be regarded as cognition of the empirical *simpliciter* and pertain to an investigation of the possibility of every experience, which is admittedly transcendental. The slightest object of perception (e.g. merely pleasure or displeasure) that accrued to the general representation of self-consciousness would immediately transform rational psychology into an empirical psychology.

‘I think’ is therefore the sole text of rational psychology from which it shall develop its entire wisdom. One easily sees that if that thought is to be related to an object (viz. myself), then it can contain nothing other than transcendental predicates of that object because the slightest empirical predicate would ruin the science’s rational purity and independence from all experience.

We will merely have to follow the guiding thread of the categories here, however. Only since a thing (viz. I, as a thinking being) has first of all been given here, we will admittedly not alter the above order of the categories amongst one another as it is represented in their table but will nevertheless begin here from the category of substance, whereby an object *per se* becomes represented, and thus proceed backwards in their series. The topic of rational doctrine-of-the-soul from which everything else that it may merely contain must be derived is thus as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1.** The soul is *substance* |  |
| **2.** The soul is *simple* in respect of its quality |  | **3.** The soul is numerically identical in respect to the diverse times in which it exists, i.e. *unity* (not plurality) |
|  | **4.** The soul is in relationship to *possible* objects in space[[16]](#footnote-16) |  |

From these elements arise all concepts of pure doctrine-of-the-soul merely through composition without one’s cognising another principle in the slightest. This substance merely *qua* object of the internal sense yields the concept of *immateriality*; *qua* simple substance it yields the concept of *incorruptibility*; its identity as an intellectual substance yields *personhood*; all three of these elements together yield *spirituality*; the substance’s relationship to the objects in space yields a *commercium* with bodies; and it therefore represents the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, i.e. as a soul (*anima*) and as the ground of *animality*: and *animality*, constrained through spirituality, as the ground of *immortality*.

To the foregoing relate four paralogisms of a transcendental doctrine-of-the-soul that is falsely taken for a science of the nature of our thinking being from pure reason. At its basis, we can lay nothing other than the simple representation ‘I’: which, by itself, is totally devoid of content and of which one cannot even say that it is a concept but rather a mere consciousness that accompanies all concepts. Nothing is represented through that ‘I’ or ‘he’ or ‘it’ (i.e. a thing) that thinks beyond a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X that is cognised only through the thoughts, which are its predicates, and of which we can never have the slightest concept *in abstracto* and around which we therefore move in a constant circle because we must always avail ourselves of its representation in order to judge something about it – a discomfort that cannot be separated therefrom because consciousness *per se* is not so much a representation that distinguishes a particular object as a form of such a representation *simpliciter* so far as it shall be called ‘cognition’; for only of that can I say that I think of something thereby.

Initially, however, it must seem strange that the condition under which I think *simpliciter* and which is therefore merely a quality of my subject shall simultaneously hold for everything that thinks and that we can presume to ground an apodictic and universal judgement upon a seemingly empirical proposition: namely, that everything that thinks is so constituted as the pronouncement of self-consciousness within me expresses. The cause thereof lies, however, in the fact that we must necessarily attribute to things *apriori* all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we can think about them. Now, I cannot have the slightest representation of a thinking being through an external experience but rather merely through self-consciousness. Therefore, such objects are nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things, which become represented as thinking beings only thereby. Yet the proposition ‘I think’ is taken only problematically herein: not so far as it may contain a perception of an existence (the *Cartesian* ‘*cogito*; *ergo sum*’), but rather in respect to its mere possibility in order to see which properties may flow from such a simple proposition to its subject (irrespective of whether such a subject exists or not).

If something more than the ‘*cogito*’ underlayour pure rational-cognition of thinking beings *simpliciter* and if we also invoked the aid of the observations about the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self that are extractable therefrom, then an empirical psychology would arise that would be a kind of *physiology* of the internal sense and which could perhaps explain its appearances but could never serve to disclose such properties that do not belong to possible experience at all (such as the property of simplicity) and could not teach us anything *apodictically* about thinking beings *simpliciter* that concerns their nature; and it would therefore not be a *rational* psychology.

Since the proposition ‘I think’ (taken problematically) contains the form of every intellectual judgement *simpliciter* and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is clear that all inferences from it can contain a merely transcendental use of the understanding that expels all admixture of experience and of whose progression we can make no advantageous concept already in advance, according to what we have shown above. We shall therefore pursue that proposition with a critical eye through all predicaments of pure doctrine-of-the-soul.

#### 1.2.3.3.1.1. First Paralogism: On Substantiality

That whose representation is the *absolute subject* of our judgements and which therefore cannot be used as a determination of another thing is a **substance**.

I *qua* thinking being am the *absolute subject* of all my possible judgements, and that representation of my self cannot be used as a predicate of any other thing.

Therefore: *qua* thinking being (i.e. a soul), I am a **substance**.

##### 1.2.3.3.1.1.1. Critique of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology

In the Transcendental Logic’s analytical part, we have shown that pure categories (and, amongst them, also that of substance) have no objective significance whatsoever *per se* where an intuition is not laid at their basis to whose manifold they can be applied as functions of synthetic unity. Without that, they are merely functions of a judgement without content. I can say of every thing *simpliciter* that it is a substance so far as I distinguish it from mere predicates and determinations of things. Now, in all our thought, the egois the subject within which thoughts inhere merely as determinations; and that ego cannot be used as the determination of another thing. Therefore, everyone must necessarily regard himself as substance and regard his thought merely as accidents of his existence and determinations of his state.

What manner of use am I to make of that concept of a substance, however? I can in no way infer therefrom that I *endure* by myself as a thinking being and naturally *neither arise nor pass away*, and yet the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject can be useful to me for that alone: without which, I can very well do without that concept.

It is so far from being the case that one could infer those properties from the mere, pure category of a substance that we must rather take the persistence of a given object from experience as a basis if we wish to apply the empirically usable concept of a *substance* to that object. We have not taken an experience as a basis with our proposition, however, but have rather inferred merely from the concept of the relation that all thought has to the ego as the common subject in which it inheres. Moreover: even if we did base it thereupon, we would be unable to demonstrate such a persistence through a secure observation. For the ego is admittedly in all thoughts, but not the slightest intuition is conjoined with that representation that might distinguish it from other objects of intuition. One can therefore admittedly perceive that that representation always reoccurs in all thought, but not that there is a stable and abiding intuition wherein the thoughts (*qua* mutable) change.

It follows therefrom that the first rational-inference of transcendental psychology imposes only one purported new insight upon us by passing off the constant logical subject of thought as cognition of the real subject of the inherence, of which we do not have and cannot have the slightest knowledge because only consciousness turns all representations into thoughts and wherein all our perceptions must be encountered as belonging to the transcendental subject; and besides that logical signification of the ‘I’, we can have no knowledge of the subject *per se* that underlies that thought and all thoughts as a substratum. Nevertheless, one can very well accept the proposition ‘the soul is a substance’ if one only concedes that that concept of ours can lead us no further in the slightest and cannot teach us any of the usual inferences of sophistical doctrine-of-the-soul such as (e.g.) the soul’s everlasting duration throughout all alterations and even the death of the human and that it therefore designates only a substance in an idea but not in reality.

##### 1.2.3.3.1.2. Second Paralogism: On Simplicity

Every thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things is **simple**.

Now, the soul or the thinking ego is such a thing.

Therefore, etc.

###### 1.2.3.3.1.2.1. Critique of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

This is the achilles of all dialectical inferences of pure doctrine-of-the-soul: not, say, merely a sophistical game that a dogmatist manufactures in order to lend a fleeting semblance to his assertions, but rather an inference that seems to withstand even the acutest examination and the greatest doubt of investigation. Here it is.

Every *composite* substance is an aggregate of many, and the action of a composite or what inheres within it *qua* composite is an aggregate of many actions or accidents that are distributed amongst the multitude of substances. Now, an effect that arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is admittedly possible if that effect is merely external (as, e.g., the movement of a body is the unified movement of all its parts). Only with thoughts, as accidents belonging to a thinking being internally, the situation is different. For suppose that the composite thought – then, every part of that composite would be a part of the thought; but only all parts taken together would first constitute the thought. But that is contradictory. For since representations that are distributed amongst diverse beings (e.g. the individual words of a verse) never constitute a whole thought (e.g. a verse), the thought cannot inhere within a composite as a composite. The thought is therefore possible only in *one* substance that is not an aggregate of many and is therefore absolutely simple.[[17]](#footnote-17)

The so-called *nervus probandi* of this argument lies within the proposition that many representations must be contained within the absolute unity of the thinking subject in order to constitute a thought. But no one can prove that proposition *from concepts*. For indeed, how would he begin in order to accomplish that? The proposition ‘a thought can be only the effect of the absolute unity of the thinking being’ cannot be treated as analytic. For the unity of a thought that consists of many representations is collective and can, in respect of the mere concepts, relate just as well to the collective unity of the substances cooperating therein (as the movement of a body is the composite movement of all its parts) as to the absolute unity of the subject. According to the rule of identity, therefore, the necessity of the presupposition of a simple substance in respect of a composite thought cannot be discerned. But no one who discerns the ground of the possibility of synthetic *apriori* propositions as we have propounded it above will trust himself to justify that the very same proposition shall be cognised synthetically and fully-*apriori* from mere concepts.

It is also impossible, however, to derive that necessary unity of the subject (as the condition of the possibility of every thought) from experience. For experience allows no necessity to be cognised, not to mention that the concept of absolute unity is far beyond its sphere. Whence then do we take that proposition upon which the entire psychological rational-inference is supported?

It is manifest that if one wishes to represent a thinking being to oneself, then one must put oneself in its position and consequently distinguish one’s own subject from the object that one wishes to consider (which is the case in no other kind of investigation) and that we require absolute unity of the subject for a thought only because otherwise it could not be said ‘I think (of the manifold within a representation)’. For even though the whole of the thought could be divided and distributed amongst many subjects, the subjective ego could not be divided and distributed; and we nevertheless presuppose that ego in all thought.

Therefore, here just as in the previous paralogism, the formal principle of apperception ‘I think’ remains the entire ground upon which rational psychology ventures the expansion of its cognitions – a principle that is admittedly not an experience but rather the form of apperception that attaches to every experience and precedes it but which must nevertheless be regarded always only in respect to a possible cognition *simpliciter* as its merely *subjective condition* and which we unjustifiedly turn into the condition of the possibility of a cognition of objects, i.e. a *concept* of a thinking being *simpliciter*, because we cannot represent such a being to ourselves without putting ourselves into the position of every other intelligent being with the formula of our consciousness.

My self’s simplicity is also not actually *inferred* from the proposition ‘I think’, however; but rather that simplicity already lies within each thought itself. The proposition ‘I am simple’ must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as the purported *Cartesian* inference ‘*cogito*, *ergo sum*’ is in fact tautological because the ‘*cogito*’ (i.e. ‘*sum cogitans*’) expresses actuality immediately. ‘I am simple’ signifies nothing more, however, than that the representation ‘I’ does not encompass the slightest multiplicity within it and that it is absolute (albeit merely logical) unity.

Therefore, the highly famous psychological proof is grounded merely upon the indivisible unity of a representation that merely directs the verb in respect to a person. It is manifest, however, that the subject of the inherence is designated merely transcendentally through the ego attached to the thought without remarking the slightest property of that ego nor knowing anything of it or about it at all. That subject signifies a something *simpliciter* (i.e. a transcendental subject) whose representation must admittedly be simple precisely because one determines nothing whatsoever in it, as certainly nothing simpler can be represented than via the concept of a mere something. The simplicity of the representation of a subject is therefore not a cognition of the simplicity of the subject itself, however; for the subject’s properties become totally abstracted from if it is designated merely through the entirely contentless expression ‘I’ (which I can apply to every thinking subject).

So much is certain: that through the ‘I’, I always think about an absolute yet logical unity of the subject (i.e. simplicity) – but not that I thereby cognise the actual simplicity of my subject. Just as the proposition ‘I am a substance’ signified nothing but the pure category, of which I can make no (empirical) use *in concreto*, I am also allowed to say ‘I am a simple substance’: i.e. the representation of that substance never contains a synthesis of a manifold; but that concept or even that proposition teaches us absolutely nothing in respect of my self as an object of experience because the concept of the substance itself is used only as a function of synthesis without underlaid intuition and therefore without object and holds only for the condition of our cognition but not for any giveable object. We shall conduct an enquiry concerning the purported usability of that proposition.

Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of some value only so far as I thereby distinguish that subject from all matter and can consequently exclude it from the infirmity to which matter is always subject. The above proposition is also deployed entirely properly in that use; hence, it is also often expressed thus ‘the soul is nonbodily’. Now, if I can show that even if one concedes all objective validity to that cardinal principle of rational doctrine-of-the-soul (i.e. that everything that thinks is a simple substance) in the pure signification of a mere judgement-of-reason (from pure categories), still not the slightest use can be made of that principle in respect to that substance’s inhomogeneity from or kinship with matter; so that will be just as much as if I had expelled that purported psychological insight into the field of mere ideas, which lack all reality of an objective use.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, we undeniably proved that bodies are mere appearances of our external sense and not things *per se*. In accordance with that, we can rightly say that our thinking subject is nonbodily: i.e. that since it is represented by us as an object of the internal sense, it (insofar as it thinks) cannot be an object of external senses (i.e. an appearance in space). Now, that shall say so much as that thinking beings *as such* can never be presented to us amongst external appearances or that we cannot externally intuit their thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc.; for those all belong before the internal sense. In fact, that argument also seems to be the natural and popular argument that even the commonest understanding seems to have lighted upon since time immemorial and thereby already very early began to consider souls as beings entirely different from bodies.

Even if extension, impenetrability, coherence, movement – in short, everything that external senses can merely deliver to us – are not thoughts, feeling, inclination, nor decision and do not contain such as cannot be objects of external intuition at all: that something which underlies the external appearances that affects our sense in such a way that it receives the representations of space, matter, shape, etc. could nevertheless – considered as a noumenon (or better: considered as a transcendental object) – also well simultaneously be the subject of the thoughts: although through the way in which our external sense is thereby affected, we receive no intuition of representations, will, etc. but rather merely of space and its determinations. Yet that something is neither extended nor impenetrable nor composite because all those predicates impinge only upon sensibility and its intuition so far as we are affected by such objects (which are otherwise unknown to us). Those terms do not at all allow us to cognise what manner of object it is, however, but rather merely that those predicates of external appearances cannot be attributed to it as an object considered *per se* without relation to external senses. Only those predicates of the internal sense, representations, and thought do not contradict it. Thus, even through the conceded simplicity of its nature, the human soul is by no means sufficiently distinguished from matter in respect to the substratum if one considers the human soul merely as appearance (as one should).

Were matter a thing *per se*, then it (as a composite being) would totally and utterly distinguish itself from the soul (as a simple being). But it is merely external appearance, whose substratum is cognised through no giveable predicates whatsoever; therefore, I can well assume of that substratum that it is simple *per se* although in the way in which it affects our senses, it admittedly brings forth intuition of what is extended and therefore composite and that thoughts therefore dwell within the substance to which extension accrues in respect to our external sense that can become represented through that substance’s own internal sense with consciousness. In such a way, precisely what is called ‘bodily’ in one respect would, in another respect, simultaneously be a thinking being whose thoughts we admittedly cannot intuit, although we can indeed intuit their signs in appearance. The expression that only souls (as particular kinds of substance) think would thereby fall away, and it would instead as usual be said that humans think: i.e. that precisely what is extended *qua* external appearance is intrinsically (i.e. *per se*) a subject that is not composite but rather simple and thinks.

Without allowing such hypotheses, however, one can universally remark that if by the term ‘soul’ I understand a thinking being *per se*, then the question of whether the soul is of the same kind as matter (which is not a thing *per se* at all but rather merely a kind of representation within us) is already inapt *per se*; for that a thing *per se* is of a different nature than the determinations that merely constitute its state is, by itself, already understood.

Yet if we compare the thinking ego not with matter but rather with the *intelligibilium* that underlies the external appearance that we call ‘matter’: then since we know absolutely nothing about the latter, we also cannot say that the soul distinguishes itself from that *intelligibilium* intrinsically in any respect.

So therefore, simple consciousness is not knowledge of the simple nature of our subject insofar as that subject shall thereby be distinguished from matter as a composite being.

If that concept is inapt for determining my self’s peculiarity and distinguishing feature in the sole case wherein it is usable (viz. in comparing my self with objects of external experience), however, then one may always profess to know that the thinking ego (i.e. the soul: a name for the transcendental object of the internal sense) is simple. That expression therefore still has absolutely no use that extends to actual objects and consequently cannot expand our cognition in the slightest.

So therefore, the whole of rational psychology falls with its main support; and we can no more hope to expand insights through mere concepts without relation to possible experience here than we can otherwise ever (but still less through the mere subjective form of all our concepts, viz. consciousness): especially since even the fundamental-concept *of a simple nature* is of such a kind that it cannot be encountered within an experience at all; and there is therefore absolutely no way to arrive at it as an objectively valid concept.

#### 1.2.3.3.1.3. Third Paralogism: On Personhood

What is conscious of the numerical identity of itself in diverse times is, to that extent, a *person*:

Now, the soul etc.

Therefore, the soul is a person.

###### 1.2.3.3.1.3.1. Critique of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

If I wish to cognise the numerical identity of an external object through experience, then I will attend to what is persistent within the appearance to which *qua* subject all else relates *qua* determination and remark the former’s identity in the time wherein the latter changes. But I am an object of the internal sense, and all time is merely the form of the internal sense. Consequently, I relate all and each of my successive determinations to the numerically identical self in all time: i.e. within the form of the internal intuition of my self. On that footing, the soul’s personhood would have to be regarded not even as inferred but rather as a fully identical principle of self-consciousness in time; and that is also the cause why that principle holds *apriori*. For it actually says nothing more than ‘in the whole time wherein I am conscious of my self, I am conscious of that time as pertaining to the unity of my self’; and it is the same whether I say ‘that whole time is within me *qua* individual unity’ or ‘I am found with numerical identity in all that time’.

The identity of the person is therefore to be encountered unfailingly within my own consciousness. If I contemplate myself from the viewpoint of another (as an object of his external intuition), however, then that external observer first considers me only *within time*; for in apperception, *time* is in fact represented only within me. He will therefore nonetheless still not infer from the ego that accompanies all representations at all time within my consciousness and indeed with full identity (even if he concedes it) to my self’s objective persistence. For since the time into which the observer posits me is not the time encountered in my sensibility but rather the time encountered in his sensibility, the identity that is necessarily conjoined with my consciousness is not therefore conjoined with his consciousness (i.e. with the external intuition of my subject).

The identity of the consciousness of my self in diverse times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence but does not at all prove the numerical identity of my subject: in which, despite the logical identity of the ego, such a change could nevertheless have occurred that does not allow it to retain its identity, although it admittedly always still imparts the homophonic ‘I’ to it that in every other state – even that of the transmutation of the subject – could still always preserve the thought of the preceding subject and thus also bequeath it to the following subject.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Even if the principle of some old schools that everything is in *flux* and nothing within the world is *persistent* and abiding cannot occur as soon as one assumes substances, it is still not refuted through the unity of self-consciousness. For we ourselves cannot judge from our consciousness whether we are persistent as souls or not because we attribute to our identical self only that whereof we are conscious and so must indeed necessarily judge that we are exactly the same souls in the whole time wherein we are conscious of ourselves. From the standpoint of someone else, however, we nevertheless cannot declare that that holds because, since we encounter no persistent appearance in the soul other than merely the representation ‘I’ that accompanies and connects them all, we can never discern whether that ‘I’ (a mere thought) is not in flux just as much as the other thoughts that thereby become concatenated with one another.

It is nevertheless remarkable that the soul’s personhood and its presupposition (viz. persistence) and therefore the soul’s substantiality must first be proved only now. For if we could presuppose the latter: then although the endurance of the consciousness would still not follow therefrom, the possibility of a lasting consciousness within a subject would nevertheless follow – which is already sufficient for personhood, which does not itself immediately cease through the fact that its effect is perhaps interrupted throughout a time. Yet that persistence is not given to us through anything prior to the numerical identity of our selves (which we infer from the identical apperception) but is rather first inferred only therefrom (and only upon it – if it occurs correctly – would the concept of substance follow that is alone empirically usable). Now, since that identity of the person in no way follows from the identity of the ego in the consciousness of all time wherein I cognise myself, the soul’s substantiality has also been incapable of being grounded thereupon above.

Nevertheless, just like the concepts of substance and the simple, the concept of personhood remains (so far as it is merely transcendental: i.e. unity of the subject that is otherwise unknown to us but in whose determinations there is a thoroughgoing connection through apperception: and to that extent, the latter concept is also needed and sufficient for practical use; but as an expansion of our self-consciousness through pure reason, which simulates an uninterrupted endurance of the subject for us from the mere concept of the identical self, we can never make any more of it because that concept always turns upon itself and brings us no further in respect of even a single question directed towards synthetic cognition. What manner of thing *per se* (i.e. transcendental object) matter is, is totally unknown to us; nevertheless, its persistence *qua* appearance can still be observed so long as it is represented as something external. But since if I wish to observe the mere ego despite the change of all representations, I have no other correlate of my comparisons than again my self with the universal conditions of my consciousness: I can give none other than tautological answers to all questions because I base the properties that accrue to my self *qua* object upon my concept and its unity and presuppose what one demanded to know.

##### 1.2.3.3.1.4. The Fourth Paralogism: On Ideality (of the External Relationship)

That whose existence can be inferred to only as a cause for given perceptions has only a doubtful existence.

Now, all external appearances are of such a kind that their existence is not immediately perceived; but rather they can be inferred to only as the cause of given perceptions.

Therefore, the existence of all objects of external senses is doubtful.

I call that uncertainty the ‘ideality’ of external appearances; and the doctrine of that ideality is called *idealism*: in comparison with which, the assertion of a possible certainty of objects of external senses is called *dualism*.

###### 1.2.3.3.1.4.1. Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

First of all, we shall subject the premises to examination. We can rightly assert that only what is in us ourselves can be immediately perceived and that my own existence can be the object of a mere perception alone. Therefore, the existence of an actual object outside me (if that word is taken in an intellectual signification) is never given directly in perception but can rather only be cogitatively added to the latter (which is a modification of the internal sense) as an external cause of it and therefore inferred. Hence, even *Descartes* rightly constrained all perception in the narrowest signification to the proposition ‘I (as athinking being) am’. For it is clear that since what is external is not within me, I cannot encounter it within my apperception and therefore also cannot encounter it within a perception: which is in fact merely the determination of apperception.

I therefore cannot in fact perceive external things but can rather merely infer to their existence from my internal perception because I regard the latter as the effect for which something external is the proximate cause. But an inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always insecure because the effect could have arisen from more than one cause. Thus, in the relation of perception to its cause, it always remains doubtful whether the latter is internal or external and whether all so-called external perceptions are therefore not a mere play of our internal sense or whether they relate to actual external objects as their cause. At least the existence of the latter is merely inferred and runs the risk of all inferences: whereas, in contrast, the object of the internal sense (viz. I myself with all my representations) is immediately perceived; and its existence incurs no doubt whatsoever.

By an *idealist*, therefore, one must not understand someone who denies the existence of external objects of the senses but rather someone who merely does not concede that it is cognised through immediate perception yet infers therefrom that we can never be fully certain of their actuality through any possible experience.

Before I present our paralogism in respect to its fallacious semblance, I must first remark that one must necessarily distinguish a twofold idealism: namely, transcendental- and empirical idealism. By a *transcendental idealism* of all appearances, I understand the theory according to which we regard them *in toto* as mere representations and not as things *per se* and according to which time and space are merely sensory forms of our intuition but neither determinations given *per se* nor conditions of the objects *qua* things *per se*. To that idealism, a *transcendental realism* is opposed that regards time and space as something given *per se* (independently of our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents external appearances to himself as things *per se* that exist independently of us and our sensibility and which would also therefore be external to us according to pure intellectual-concepts. It is in fact that transcendental realist who thereafter plays the empirical idealist; and after he has falsely presupposed of objects of the senses that if they are to be external, then they would have their existence *per se* even without senses: he finds from that viewpoint that all of our sensory representations are insufficient to render the actuality of those objects certain.

The transcendental idealist can, by contrast, be an empirical realist and therefore (as one calls him) a *dualist*: i.e. concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of the representations within me and therefore the ‘*cogito*, *ergo sum*’. For since he accepts that matter and even its internal possibility merely as appearance, which is nothing if it is separated from our sensibility: it is for him merely a kind of representation (viz. intuition) that is called ‘external’ not as if it *per se* related to *per se external* objects but rather because they relate perceptions to space, in which everything is external to everything else although the space itself is within us.

We have already declared for that transcendental idealism at the beginning. Therefore, with our theory, all doubt falls away in respect to assuming the existence of matter on the testimony of our mere self-consciousness and thereby declaring it to be proved, just like the existence of my self as a thinking being. For I am nevertheless conscious of my representations; therefore: they and I myself, who has those representations, exist. But external objects (i.e. bodies) are merely appearances and therefore also nothing other than a kind of my representations whose objects are something only through those representations but nothing if abstracted from them. Therefore, both external things and I myself exist; and admittedly, both exist on the immediate testimony of my self-consciousness: only with the difference that whereas the representation of my self as the thinking subject become related merely to the internal sense, the representations that designate extended beings also become related to the external sense. I no more need to infer in regard to the actuality of external objects than in respect to the actuality of the object of my internal sense (viz. my thoughts); for they are, in both cases, nothing but representations: whose immediate perception (i.e. consciousness) is simultaneously a sufficient proof of their actuality.

Therefore, the transcendental idealist is an empirical realist and grants matter (*qua* appearance) an actuality that need not be inferred but is rather immediately perceived. In contrast, transcendental realism necessarily falls into perplexity and sees itself compelled to make room for empirical idealism because it regards the objects of external senses as something distinct from the senses themselves and regards mere appearances as selfstanding beings that are found outside us: although then, with our best consciousness of our representation of those things, it is still admittedly far from certain that if the representation exists, then the object corresponding to it also exists. In our system, by contrast, those external things (viz. matter, in all of its shapes and alterations) are nothing but mere appearances (i.e. representations within us) of whose actuality we become immediately conscious.

Since, as far as I know, all psychologists adhering to empirical idealism are transcendental realists, they have admittedly proceeded entirely consistently in granting great importance to empirical idealism as one of the problems from which human reason hardly knows how to extricate itself. For in fact: if one regards external appearances as representations that are effected in us by their objects as things that are found outside us *per se*, then it is not to be seen how one can cognise the existence of those things otherwise than through an inference from the effect to the cause, in which it must always remain doubtful whether the latter is within us or outside us. Now, one can admittedly concede that something that may be outside us in the transcendental sense is the cause of our external intuitions; but that is not the object that we understand under the representations of matter and bodily things; for they are merely appearances: i.e. mere modes-of-representation that are always found only within us and whose actuality rests upon immediate consciousness, just like the consciousness of my own thoughts. The transcendental object is equally unknown in respect to internal intuition as well as in respect to external intuition. The talk is also not of it, however, but rather of the empirical object: which is called an *external* object if it is in *space* and an *internal* object if it becomes represented merely in *temporal relationship*; but space and time are both to be encountered only *within us*.

Since the expression ‘outside us’ carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity because it sometimes signifies something that exists as a *thing per se*, distinct from us, and sometimes what pertains merely to external *appearance*, we shall – in order to place that concept beyond uncertainty in the latter signification, in which the psychology question concerning the reality of our external intuition is taken – distinguish *empirically-external* objects from those that might be so-called in the transcendental sense through directly calling them things *that are to be encountered in space*.

Space and time are admittedly *apriori* representations that dwell within us as forms of our sensory intuition even before an actual object has determined our sense through sensation in order to represent it under those sensory relationships. Only that *materiale* or *reale* (i.e. that something that shall be intuited in space) necessarily presupposes perception and cannot be fabricated and brought forth through any imaginal power independently of perception, which indicates the actuality of something in space. Sensation is therefore that which designates an actuality in space and time after it becomes related to one mode of sensory intuition or another. Once sensation is given (which is called ‘perception’ if it is applied to an object *simpliciter* without determining it), an object can be fabricated in imagination through the sensation’s multiplicity, which has no empirical position in space or time outside imagination. That is undoubtedly certain; whether one takes the sensations pleasure and pain or even sensations of the external senses such as colours, warmth, etc., perception is that whereby the material in order to think about objects of sensory intuition must first be given. That perception (in order for us to stay only with external intuitions on this occasion) therefore represents something actual in space. For firstly, perception is the representation of an actuality: just as space is the representation of a mere possibility of being-together. Secondly, that actuality is represented before the external sense: i.e. within space. Thirdly, space itself is nothing other than mere representation; therefore, in space, only what is represented within it can be regarded as actual:[[19]](#footnote-19) and conversely, what is given (i.e. represented through perception) within it is also actual within it; for were it not actual (i.e. given immediately through empirical intuition) within it, then nor could it even be invented because one cannot think of the *reale* of intuitions at all *apriori*.

All external perception therefore immediately demonstrates something actual in space or is rather the *actuale* itself; and to that extent, empirical realism is beyond doubt: i.e. something actual within space corresponds to our external intuitions. Admittedly, as representations, space itself with all its appearances are only within me; but within that space, the *reale* or the material of all objects of external intuition is nonetheless actual and given independently of all invention: and it is also impossible that something *external to us* (in the transcendental sense) should be given *within that space*, because space itself is nothing externally to our sensibility. Therefore, the most stringent idealist cannot demand that one prove that the object corresponds to our perception externally to us (in the strict signification). For were there such an object, it would nevertheless be incapable of being represented and intuited as external to us because that presupposes space: and as a mere representation, actuality within space is nothing other than the perception itself. The *reale* of external appearances is therefore actual only within the perception and can be actual in no other way.

Cognition of the objects of perceptions can be generated from the perceptions either through a mere play of the imagination or even by means of experience. And there, fallacious representations can admittedly arise to which the objects do not correspond and in respect of which, the deception is sometimes to be attributed to an illusion of imagination (e.g. in a dream) and sometimes to a misstep of the judging power (in the so-called deceptions of the senses). Now, in order to escape the false semblance therein, one proceeds according to the following rule: *what coheres with a perception according to empirical laws is actual*. Only that deception as well as the preservative against it impinge just as much upon idealism as upon dualism, since only the form of experience is at issue therein. To refute empirical idealism as a false doubt concerning the objective reality of our external perceptions, it is already sufficient that external perception immediately demonstrate an actuality in space – a space that, although it is *per se* admittedly only a mere form of representations, nevertheless has objective reality in respect to all external appearances (which are also nothing but mere representations) – and also that without perception, even invention and dreams would be impossible; therefore: our external senses, in respect of the data from which experience can arise, have their actual corresponding objects in space.

Whereas a *dogmatic idealist* would be someone who *denies* the existence of matter, a *sceptical* idealist would be someone who *doubts* it because he holds it to be indemonstrable. The dogmatic idealist can be such only because he believes himself to find contradictions in the possibility of a matter *simpliciter*; and we are not yet dealing with that. The following section on dialectical inferences, which represents reason in its internal dispute in respect to concepts of the possibility of what belongs to the nexus of experience, will also remedy that difficulty. The sceptical idealist, however, who merely challenges the ground of our assertion and declares our persuasion of the existence of matter (which we believe ourselves to ground upon immediate perception) to be insufficient, is a benefactor of human reason insofar as he compels us to open our eyes well in even the smallest steps of common experience and not immediately accept into our possession as well-acquired what we perhaps merely inveigle. The utility that those idealistic objections create here is now clearly conspicuous. They drive us with force to do something in which we did not wish to embroil ourselves in our commonest assertions: namely, to regard all perceptions (irrespective of whether they be called ‘internal’ or ‘external’) merely as a consciousness of what attaches to our sensibility and to regard the external objects of our sensibility not as things *per se* but rather merely as representations of which we can become immediately conscious (as with every other representation) but which are called ‘external’ because they attach to the sense that we call the ‘external sense’, whose intuition is space but which is itself indeed nothing other than an internal mode-of-representation in which certain perceptions connect to one another.

If we accept external objects as things *per se*, then it is absolutely impossible to comprehend how we should arrive at cognition of their actuality externally to us because we support ourselves merely upon the representation, which is within us. For indeed one cannot sense externally to oneself but rather only within oneself; and self-consciousness in its entirety therefore delivers nothing other than merely our own determinations. Thus, sceptical idealism compels us to seize the sole refuge that remains to us – namely, the ideality of all appearances: which we have demonstrated in the Transcendental Aesthetic independently of those consequences, which we could not foresee at that time. Now, if one asks whether dualism alone occurs in doctrine of the soul according to the foregoing, then the answer is ‘indeed!’: but only in the empirical sense – i.e. within the nexus of experience, matter is actually given to the external sense as substance in appearance: just as the thinking ego is likewise given as a substance in appearance before the internal sense; and according to the rules for an experience that that category imports into the nexus of our external- as well as our internal perceptions, appearances must also be interconnected in both cases. Yet if one wished to expand the concept of dualism (as usually occurs) and take it in a transcendental sense, then neither it nor the *pneumatism* opposed to it on one side nor the *materialism* opposed to it on the other would have the slightest ground because one would then lack the determination of one’s concepts and take the diversity in the mode-of-representation of objects that remain unknown to us in respect of what they are *per se* for a diversity of those things themselves. I (represented in time through the internal sense) and objects within space outside me are indeed entirely different appearances specifically, but they are not thereby thought of as diverse things. The *transcendental object* that underlies external appearances and also what underlies internal intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being *per se* but rather a ground (unknown to us) of the appearances that deliver the empirical concept of both the former and the latter.

If we therefore remain true to the above established rule of not pursuing our questions further than only so far as possible experience can deliver their object to us (as the present critique patently compels us to do), then we will not even let it occur to us to conduct an enquiry concerning the objects of our senses in respect of what they may be *per se* (i.e. without any relation to the senses). If the psychologist takes appearances for things *per se*, however, then he may accept into his theory either (as a materialist) matter alone or (as a spiritualist) merely thinking beings (viz. according to the form of our internal sense) or (as a dualist) both, as things existing by themselves; yet he is still always tantalised, through misunderstanding, to sophisticate about the way wherein that which is not indeed a thing *per se* but rather merely the appearance of a thing *simpliciter* may exist *per se*.

**1.2.3.3.1.5. Contemplation on the Sum of Pure Doctrine-of-the-Soul According to These Paralogisms**

If we compare *doctrine of the soul* (as physiology of the internal sense) with *doctrine of bodies* (as a physiology of the objects of external senses): then beyond the fact that much can be cognised empirically in both, we also find that remarkable difference that whereas much can be cognised *apriori* in the latter science from the mere concept of an extended impenetrable being, absolutely nothing can be cognised synthetically *apriori* in the former science from the concept of a thinking being. The cause is as follows. Even though both are appearances, the appearance before the external sense nevertheless has something stable or abiding that delivers a substratum underlying the mutable determinations and therefore a synthetic concept, viz. that of space and an appearance within it: whereas time, which is the sole form of our internal intuition, has nothing abiding and therefore allows only the change of the determinations to be cognised but not the determinable object. For in what we call a ‘soul’, everything is in continuous flux and there is nothing abiding except perhaps (if one thoroughly wants it) the ego that is so simple because that representation has no content and therefore no manifold: for which reason, it even seems to represent or (better expressed) designate a simple object. That ego would have to be an intuition that, since it would be presupposed in thought *simpliciter* (prior to all experience), would (as an *apriori* intuition) deliver synthetic propositions if it should be possible to bring about a pure rational-cognition of the nature of a thinking being *simpliciter*. Only that ego is no more an intuition than a concept of any object but rather the mere form of the consciousness that can accompany representations of both kinds and thereby elevate them into cognitions so far as something else is given in intuition to that end that proffers material for a representation of an object. Therefore, the whole of rational psychology falls as a science surpassing all powers of human reason; and nothing remains to us except to study our soul following the guiding thread of experience and to keep within the constraints of the questions, which go no further than possible internal experience can propound their content.

Yet even though rational psychology has no utility as expansive cognition but is rather composed of mere paralogisms, one still cannot deny it an important negative utility if it shall be regarded as nothing more than a critical treatment of our dialectical inferences and indeed of common and natural reason.

Indeed, to what end do we have need of a doctrine-of-the-soul grounded merely upon pure rational-principles? Without doubt, preeminently in the intention of securing our thinking self against the danger of materialism. But this is accomplished by the rational concept of our thinking self that we have given. For far from its being the case that according to that concept, some fear remains that if one removed matter, then all thought and even the existence of thinking beings would thereby be eliminated: it is instead clearly shown that if I remove the thinking subject, then the entire bodily-world must fall away as it is nothing other than the appearance in our subject’s sensibility and a kind of representations of our subject.

I admittedly cognise that thinking self in respect of its properties no better thereby nor can I comprehend its persistence nor indeed even the independence of its existence from whatever transcendental substratum of external appearances there may be; for the latter is just as unknown to me as the former. Yet since it is nevertheless possible for me to derive cause to hope for a selfstanding existence of my thinking nature that is persistent throughout all possible change elsewhence than from merely speculative grounds, much is already gained through nevertheless being able to repel the dogmatic attacks of a speculative opponent despite freely admitting my own ignorance and through showing him that he can never know more about the nature of my subject in order to deny possibility to my expectations than I can in order to adhere to them.

Upon that transcendental semblance of our psychological concepts, three dialectical questions are then also grounded that constitute the true aim of rational psychology and which cannot be decided except through the above investigations: viz. (1) the question of the possibility of the soul’s community with an organic body, i.e. of the soul’s animality and its state during the life of the human; (2) the question of the beginning of that community, i.e. of the soul in and before the birth of the human; (3) the question of the end of that community, i.e. of the soul in and after the death of the human (the question concerning immortality).

I now assert that all difficulties that one believed oneself to find in connection with those questions and with which, as dogmatic objections, one seeks to give oneself the regard of a deeper insight into the nature of the things than the common understanding can indeed have rest upon a mere illusion wherein one hypostasises that which exists merely in thoughts and assumes it in exactly the same quality as an actual object outside the thinking subject (i.e. extension, which is nothing but appearance) to be a subsistent property of external things, even without our sensibility, and seeks to hold motion to be its effect: which occurs even outside our senses actually *per se*. For the matter whose community with the soul arouses such great doubt is nothing other than a mere form or a certain way of representing an unknown object through the intuition that one calls the ‘external sense’. Therefore, there may well be something outside us to which that appearance that we call ‘matter’ corresponds; but it is not outside us in the same quality as appearance but rather merely as a thought within us, although that thought represents it as situated outside us through the aforementioned sense. ‘Matter’ therefore signifies not a kind of substance so entirely distinct and heterogeneous from the object of the internal sense (i.e. the soul) but rather merely the inhomogeneity of the appearances of objects (that are unknown to us *per se*) whose representations we call ‘external’ in comparison with those that we attribute to the internal sense even though they belong merely to the thinking subject, just like all other thoughts, except that they have in them the deceptive feature that since they represent objects in space, they detach themselves from the soul (as it were) and seem to float outside it: since indeed even the space wherein they are intuited is nothing but a representation whose antitype absolutely cannot be encountered in the same quality outside the soul. Now, the question is no longer of the soul’s community with other substances of a foreign kind outside us but rather merely of the connection of the internal sense’s representations with the modifications of our external sensibility and how the latter may be connected to one another according to constant laws in such a way that they cohere within an experience.

So long as we juxtapose internal and external appearances with one another as mere representations in experience, we find nothing absurd that would render the community of both kinds of sense strange. But as soon as we hypostasise external appearances – i.e. regard them no longer as representations but rather also *as things subsisting by themselves outside us in the same quality in which they are within us* – but relate their actions (which they exhibit as appearances in relationship to one another) to our thinking subject, then we have a character of the efficient causes outside us that will not harmonise with their effects within us because whereas the former relate merely to external senses, the latter relate to the internal sense: which, although they are admittedly united within one subject, are nevertheless extremely inhomogeneous. Then, however, we have no external effects except alterations of location and no forces except merely endeavours that lead to relationships in space as their effects. Within us, however, the effects are thoughts: between which no relationship of location, motion, shape, or spatial-determination occurs at all; and we lose the guiding thread of the causes entirely in the effects that should manifest themselves therefrom in the internal sense. Yet we should consider: that bodies are not objects *per se* that are present to us but rather a mere appearance of who knows what unknown object; that movement is not the effect of that unknown cause but merely the appearance of its influence upon our senses and that both are consequently not something outside us but rather merely representations within us and therefore that the movement of matter does not effect representations within us but rather that movement (and therefore also the matter that thereby renders itself knowable) is mere representation; and finally that the entire self-made difficulty amounts to that of how and through what cause the representations of our sensibility stand in conjunction with one another in such a way that what we call ‘external intuitions’ can be represented as objects outside us according to empirical laws: a question that now, totally and absolutely, does not contain the purported difficulty of explaining the origin of representations of efficient causes of an entirely foreign kind situated outside us because we take the appearances of an unknown cause for the cause outside us, which can engender nothing but confusion. In judgements in which a misinterpretation enrooted through long custom occurs, it is impossible to immediately bring the justification of that comprehensibility that can be demanded in other cases where no such unavoidable illusion confuses the concept. Hence, our liberation of reason from sophistical theories will hardly already have the perspicuity that is needed for full satisfaction.

I believe myself to be able to further that liberation in the following way.

All *objections* can be divided into *dogmatic*, *critical*, and *sceptical* objections. Whereas a dogmatic objection is directed against a *proposition*, a critical objection is directed against the *proof* of a proposition. The former needs an insight into the constitution of the nature of the object in order to be able to assert the contrary of what the proposition professes of that object; it is therefore itself dogmatic and professes to know the constitution in question better than the contrary. The critical objection – because it leaves the proposition untouched in its value or valuelessness and challenges only the proof – needs neither to know the object better at all nor to pretend a better knowledge thereof; it shows only that the assertion is groundless, not that it is incorrect. A sceptical objection sets a proposition and a counterproposition reciprocally against one another as objections of equal importance: each of them reciprocally as a dogma and the other as its objection; and it is therefore seemingly dogmatic on both opposite sides in order to totally annihilate all judgement concerning the object. Both the dogmatic objection and the sceptical objection must therefore profess as much insight into their object as is needed in order to assert something of it affirmatively or negatively. The critical objection alone is of such a kind that, in merely showing that one assumes something for the behoof of one’s assertion that is null and imagined, overturns the theory through withdrawing its presumed foundation from it without otherwise seeking to discern anything about the constitution of the object.

According to the common concepts of our reason in respect of the community wherein our thinking subject stands with the things outside us, we are dogmatic and regard the latter as true objects subsisting independently of us in accordance with a certain transcendental dualism that does not attribute those external appearances to the subject as representations but which rather positions them outside us as objects and totally separates them from the thinking subject. That subreption is the foundation of all theories about the community between soul and body; and it is never asked whether that objective reality of the appearances is then so utterly correct: but rather that reality is presupposed as granted, and merely the way in which it must be explained and conceived is sophisticated about. The usual three systems thought of in respect to that and actually the only possible systems are those of *physical influence*, *predetermined harmony*, and *supernatural assistance*.

The two latter ways of explaining the soul’s community with matter are grounded upon objections to the first, which is the common understanding’s conception: viz. that what appears as matter cannot through its immediate influence be the cause of representations, which are an entirely heterogeneous kind of effect. But then they cannot conjoin the concept of a matter – which is nothing but appearance and therefore already *per se* mere representation that has been effected through some external objects – with what they understand by the object of external senses; for otherwise they would say that representations of external objects (i.e. appearances) cannot be external causes of the representations within our mind, which would be an entirely senseless objection because it would not occur to anyone to take something he has already recognised as mere representation for an external cause. According to our principles, they must therefore direct their theory towards the fact that that which is the true (transcendental) object of our external senses cannot be the cause of those representations (appearances) that we understand under the name ‘matter’. Now, since no one can groundedly profess to know something of the transcendental cause of our representations of external senses, their assertion is totally groundless. Yet if the purported improver of the doctrine of physical influence wished to regard matter as such as a thing *per se* (and not as a mere appearance of an unknown thing) according to the common mode-of-representation of a transcendental dualism and direct his objection towards showing that such an external object that shows no other causality than that of movements *per se* can never be the efficient cause of representations, but rather that a third being must therefore intervene in order to institute, where not interaction, then still at least correspondence and harmony between both: then they would begin their refutation by assuming the πρωτον ψευδος [sc. first lie] of physical influence into their dualism and therefore refute through their objection not so much natural influence as rather their own dualistic presupposition. For all difficulties that impinge upon the thinking nature’s conjunction with matter arise without exception merely from that inveigled dualistic conception that matter as such is not appearance (i.e. mere representation of the mind to which an unknown object corresponds) but rather the object *per se* as it exists externally to us and independently of all sensibility.

Therefore, no dogmatic objection can be made against the commonly-assumed physical influence. For if the opponent assumes that matter and its movement are mere appearances and therefore themselves merely representations, then he can only posit the difficulty therein that the unknown object of our sensibility cannot be the cause of the representations within us: which absolutely nothing justifies him in professing, however, because no one can discern of an unknown object what it can or cannot do. According to our above proofs, however, he must necessarily concede the aforesaid transcendental idealism so far as he does not wish to manifestly hypostasise representations and position them outside himself as true things.

Nevertheless, a grounded *critical* objection can be made against the common doctrine of physical influence. Such a purported community between two kinds of substance (viz. thinking- and extended substances) takes a gross dualism as a basis and turns the latter, which are nothing but mere representations of the thinking subject, into things that subsist by themselves. Therefore, the misunderstood physical influence can be fully vitiated through one’s revealing its probative ground to be null and inveigled.

If one abstracts all that is imagined, the notorious question concerning the community of *cogitantia* and *extensa* would therefore amount merely to the question of *how external intuition* (i.e. intuition of space, i.e. of a filling of it: shape and movement) *is possible in a thinking subject simpliciter*. It is impossible for a human to find an answer to that question, however; and one can never fill that gap in our knowledge but can rather merely designate it through ascribing all external appearances to a transcendental object that is the cause of representations of that kind but which we do not know at all, nor will we ever receive any concept of it. In all problems that may occur within the field of experience, we treat those appearances as objects *per se* without concerning ourselves about the primary ground of their possibility (*qua* appearances). Yet if we go beyond experience’s limit, then the concept of a transcendental object becomes necessary.

The decision of all disputations or objections concerning the state of the thinking nature before that community (viz. life) or after such a community’s elimination (viz. death) is an immediate consequence of the foregoing reminders concerning the community between thinking- and extended beings. The opinion that the thinking subject was capable of thinking before all community with bodies would be expressed thus: before the beginning of the kind of sensibility whereby something appears to us in space, the same transcendental objects that appear as bodies in the present state were capable of being intuited in an entirely different way. The opinion that the soul can still continue to think after the elimination of all its community with the bodily world would be announced in the following form, however: if the mode of sensibility whereby transcendental and for now entirely-unknown objects appear to us as a material world should cease, still not all intuition thereof is consequently eliminated; and it is very well possible that exactly the same unknown objects continue to be cognised by the thinking subject, albeit admittedly no longer in the quality of the bodies.

Now, admittedly, no one can adduce the slightest ground for such an assertion from speculative principles nor indeed even demonstrate the possibility thereof but can rather merely presuppose it; but equally, no one can even make any valid dogmatic objection against it. For whoever he is, he knows just as little about the absolute and internal cause of external and bodily appearances as I or anyone else. He therefore cannot even groundedly profess to know what the actuality of the external appearances in the current state (viz. in life) rests upon nor therefore even that the condition of all external intuition or even the thinking subject itself will cease after that state (i.e. in death).

So then, all dispute concerning the nature of our thinking being and its connection to the bodily world is therefore merely a consequence of the fact that in the elimination of that whereof one knows nothing, one fills the gap with paralogisms of reason wherein one turns one’s thoughts into items and hypostasises them: from which, imagined science arises both in respect to him who asserts affirmatively as well as in respect to him who asserts negatively because each purports either to know something about objects whereof no human has any concept or to turn his own representations into objects and thus revolves in an eternal circle of ambiguities and contradictions. Nothing other than the sobriety of a strict yet just critique can liberate from that dogmatic illusion that tantalises so many through imagined beatitude amongst theories and systems and constrain all our speculative claims merely to the field of possible experience: not through, say, insipid mockery of enquiries that have so often failed or pious sighs concerning the constraints upon our reason but rather by means of a determination of its limits executed according to sure principles that fixes its *nihil ulterius* with the greatest reliability to the Herculean pillars that nature has herself erected in order to continue our reason’s voyage only so far as the steadily continuous coasts of experience reach, which we cannot leave without venturing onto a boundless ocean that, in the end, compels us to abandon all onerous and protracted endeavour as hopeless under ever fallacious prospects.

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We still owe a perspicuous and general discussion of the transcendental and yet natural semblance in the paralogisms of pure reason and also the justification of their systematic orderings, which runs parallel to the table of the categories. We would have been unable to undertake them at the beginning of this section without drifting into danger of obscurity or unfittingly getting ahead of ourselves. We shall now seek to fulfil that obligation.

One can locate all *semblance* in the fact that the *subjective* condition of thought is taken for cognition of the *object*. Furthermore, we have shown in the introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic that pure reason occupies itself merely with the totality of the synthesis of the conditions for a given *conditionatum*. Now, since the dialectical semblance of pure reason cannot be an empirical semblance found in determinate empirical cognitions: it will concern what is common to the conditions of thought, and there will be only three cases of dialectical use of pure reason:

1. Synthesis of the conditions of a thought *simpliciter*.

2. Synthesis of the conditions of empirical thought.

3. Synthesis of the conditions of pure thought.

In all three of these cases, pure reason occupies itself merely with the absolute totality of that synthesis: i.e. with the condition that is itself unconditioned. Upon this division, the threefold transcendental semblance is also grounded that gives occasion for three sections of the dialectic and delivers the idea for equally many spurious sciences from pure reason: viz. transcendental psychology, cosmology, and theology. We deal only with the first here.

Since in thought *simpliciter*, we abstract from all relation of the thought to any object (be it of the senses or of the pure understanding): synthesis of the conditions of a thought *simpliciter* (no. 1) is not objective at all but rather merely a synthesis of the thought with the subject, but which is falsely taken for a synthetic representation of an object.

It follows therefrom, however, that the dialectical inference to the condition of all thought *simpliciter*, which is itself unconditioned, does not suffer from a failing in its content (for it abstracts from all content or objects) but rather fails in its form alone and must be called a ‘paralogism’.

Since furthermore the sole condition that accompanies all thought is the ‘I’ in the universal proposition ‘I think’, reason deals with that condition so far as it is itself unconditioned. Yet it is merely the formal condition (i.e. the logical unity) of every thought, with which I abstract from every object, and is nevertheless represented as an object whereof I think (viz. I myself and my unconditioned unity).

If anyone poses the following question to me: of what quality is a thing that thinks?, then I do not know in the slightest how to answer it because the answer shall be synthetic (for an analytic answer indeed perhaps explains the thought but gives no expanded cognition of that upon which that thought rests in respect of its possibility). Yet for every synthetic resolution, intuition is required: which was totally omitted in the thus general problem. Equally, no one can answer the following question in its generality: what manner of thing must that which is mobile indeed be? For then, impenetrable extension (i.e. matter) is not given. Now, although I admittedly know no answer to that question generally, it nevertheless seems to me that I can give such an answer in an individual cause in the proposition that self-consciousness expresses: namely, ‘I think’. For that ego is the first subject (i.e. substance); it is simple; etc. Yet those must then have to be mere experiential-propositions that could contain no such predicates (which are non-empirical) without a universal rule that expresses the conditions of the possibility of thinking *simpliciter* and *apriori*. In such a way, such a spurious insight concerning the nature of a thinking being – and indeed judging from mere concepts – initially seem suspicious to me: even though I have not yet discovered their failing.

Only further investigation behind the origin of the attribute that I attribute to myself *qua* thinking being *simpliciter* can uncover that failing. They are nothing more than pure categories whereby I never think about a determinate object but rather merely about the unity of the representations in order to determine an object of them. Without an underlying intuition, a category alone cannot provide me with a concept of an object; for only through intuition is the object given that is thereafter thought about accordantly with the category. If I declare a thing to be a substance in appearance, then I must be given predicates of its intuition beforehand in light of which I distinguish what is persistent from what is mutable and distinguish the substratum (i.e. the thing itself) from what merely attaches to it. If I call a thing *simple in an appearance*, then I understand thereby that the intuition of that thing is admittedly a part of the appearance but cannot itself be divided etc. Yet if something is cognised as simple only in a concept and not in appearance, then I actually thereby have no cognition of the object whatsoever but rather merely of my concept that I make for myself of something *simpliciter* that admits of no genuine intuition. I say that I think of something entirely simple only because I actually do not know what else to say beyond merely that it is something.

Now, mere apperception (I) is substance in its concept, simple in its concept, etc.; and so all those psychological theorems have their undisputed correctness. Nevertheless, what one truly wishes to know is still in no way cognised of the soul; for none of those predicates hold for intuition at all, and nor therefore can they have any consequences that would be applied to objects of experience; and they are therefore completely empty. For that concept of substance teaches me neither that the soul endures by itself nor that it is a part of external intuitions that cannot itself be divided any further and which can therefore neither arise nor pass away through any natural alterations: properties that merely render the soul knowable for me in the nexus of experience and could give indication in respect to its origin and future state. Yet if I now say through a mere category ‘the soul is a simple substance’: then it is clear that since the naked intellectual-concept of substance contains nothing further than that a thing shall be represented as a subject *per se* without in turn being a predicate of another, nothing of persistence follows therefrom and the attribute of simplicity certainly cannot add that persistence and one is therefore not thereby instructed in the slightest about what the soul can encounter in cosmic alterations. If one said to us ‘the soul is a *simple part of matter*’, then we would be able to derive its persistence and (together with its simple nature) its indestructibility from what experience teaches us about it. The concept of the ego in the psychological principle (viz. ‘I think’) does not say a word to us about that, however.

From that, however, stems the fact that the being that thinks within us purports to cognise itself through pure categories and indeed through those categories that express absolute unity under every title. Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories: which, for its part, can represent nothing other than the synthesis of the intuitional manifold so far as that manifold has unity in apperception. Therefore, self-consciousness *simpliciter* is the representation of that which is the condition of all unity and yet itself unconditioned. One can therefore say of the thinking ego (i.e. soul) that thinks of itself as a substance, simple, numerically identical in all time, and the correlate of all existence from which all other existence must be inferred that it cognises *not so much itself through the categories* as rather the *categories* and, through them, all objects in the absolute unity of apperception and therefore *through itself*. Now, it is admittedly very patent that I cannot cognise that which I must presuppose in order to cognise an object at all as itself an object and that the determinative self (i.e. thought) differs from the determinable self (i.e. the thinking subject) as cognition differs from the object. Nevertheless, nothing is more natural and seductive than the semblance of taking the unity in the synthesis of thought for a perceived unity in the subject of those thoughts. One could call that semblance the ‘subreption of hypostasised consciousness’ (*apperceptionis substantiatae*).

If one wishes to logically entitle the paralogism in the dialectical rational-inferences of rational doctrine-of-the-soul so far as they nevertheless have correct premises, then it can be regarded as a *sophisma figure dictionis* in which the major premise makes a merely transcendental use of a category in respect to its conditions but the minor premise and conclusion make an empirical use of precisely that category in respect to the soul that has been subsumed under that condition. So, e.g., the concept of substance in the paralogism of simplicity is a pure intellectual concept that is merely of transcendental use (i.e. no use whatsoever) without conditions of sensory intuition. In the minor premise, however, the very same concept is applied to the object of all internal experience yet without establishing the condition of its application *in concreto* (viz. the persistence thereof) in advance and taking it as a basis; and therefore an empirical, albeit here impermissible, use has been made thereof.

Finally, in order to show the systematic coherence of all those dialectical assertions in a sophistical doctrine-of-the-soul within a nexus of pure reason and therefore their completeness, one may remark that apperception is carried through all classes of the categories but only to those intellectual concepts that, in each of them, underlie the unity in a possible perception: consequently subsistence, reality, unity (not plurality), and existence – except that reason here represents them all as conditions of the possibility of a thinking being that are themselves unconditioned. Therefore, the soul cognises in itself:

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|  | **1.** *The unconditioned unity* of its **relationship**, i.e. itself not as inhering but rather as **subsisting**. |  |
| **2.** *The unconditioned unity* of its **quality**, i.e. not as a real whole but rather **simple**.[[20]](#footnote-20) |  | **3.** *The unconditioned unity* in its **plurality** in time, i.e. not numerically diverse in diverse times but rather as **one** and exactly **the same subject**. |
|  | **4.** *The unconditioned unity* of its **existence** in space, i.e. not as the consciousness of multiple things outside it but rather **only of the existence of itself** but of other things merely as its representations. |  |

Reason is the capacity for principles. The assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul but rather predicates that, if they occur, shall determine the object *per se* independently of experience and therefore through mere reason. They would therefore have to be grounded equitably upon principles and general concepts of thinking natures *simpliciter*. Instead, it is found that the simple representation ‘I am’ governs them *in toto*: which, precisely because it expresses the pure formula of all my experience (indeterminately), announces itself like a universal proposition that holds for all thinking beings and – since it is nevertheless individual in every regard – carries with it the semblance of an absolute unity of the conditions of thought *simpliciter* and thereby expands further than possible experience could reach.

#### 1.2.3.3.2. Second Main-Component: The Antinomy of Pure Reason

In the Introduction to this part, we have shown that all transcendental semblance of pure reason rests upon dialectical inferences whose schema logic delivers in the three formal kinds of rational-inference *simpliciter*: just as, say, the categories encounter their logical schema in the four functions of all judgements. The first kind of those sophistical inferences concerns the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all representations *simpliciter* (of the subject or the soul) in correspondence with the categorical rational-inferences, whose major premise (*qua* principle) expresses a predicate’s relation to a subject. The second kind of dialectical argument will therefore – by analogy with *hypothetical* rational-inferences – make the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in appearance into its content, just as the third kind (which will be presented in the following main-component) has the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects *simpliciter* for its theme.

It is remarkable, however, that a transcendental paralogism effects a merely one-sided semblance in respect of the idea of the subject of our thought and that not the slightest semblance from rational-concepts shall be found for the assertion of the contrary. The advantage is entirely on the side of pneumatism, even though pneumatism cannot deny the hereditary failing of dissipating into mere vapour in the fire-assay of critique despite all of its favourable semblance.

The result is entirely different if we apply reason to the objective synthesis of appearances, where reason admittedly thinks to validate its principle of unconditioned unity with much semblance but soon embroils itself in contradictions such that it is compelled to abstain from its demand in a cosmological regard.

A new phenomenon of human reason manifests itself here: viz. an entirely natural antithetic upon which no one needs to ponder and lay artful snares but rather into which reason drifts by itself and indeed unavoidably and is admittedly thereby preserved from the slumber of an imagined conviction that brings forth a one-sided semblance but is simultaneously brought into temptation to either deliver itself over to a sceptical hopelessness or assume a dogmatic defiance and set itself upon certain assertions without giving ear and doing justice to the grounds of the contrary. Both are the death of a healthy philosophy, although the former could also perhaps be called the *euthanasia* of pure reason.

Before we display the scenes of the schism and perturbations that incite that conflict of pure reason, we shall first provide certain expositions that can elucidate and justify the method of which we avail ourselves in treating our object. I call all transcendental ideas ‘cosmic concepts’ so far as they concern absolute totality in synthesis of appearances, partly due to precisely that unconditioned totality upon which the concept of the cosmic whole (which is itself merely an idea) also rests and partly because they pertain merely to synthesis of appearances and therefore empirical synthesis: whereas, in contrast, absolute totality in synthesis of the conditions of all possible things *simpliciter* will engender an ideal of pure reason, which is totally distinct from a cosmic concept even though it stands in relation thereto. Therefore, just as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the ground for a dialectical psychology, so will the antinomy of pure reason display the transcendental principles of a purported pure (rational) cosmology not in order to find them valid and appropriate them but rather (as the denomination of a ‘conflict of reason’ indicates) in order to present them in their blinding yet false semblance.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.1. First Section: System of the Cosmological Ideas

In order to now be able to enumerate those ideas with systematic precision according to a principle, we must *firstly* remark that it is only the understanding from which pure and transcendental concepts can arise and that reason in fact generates no concepts whatsoever but rather at most renders intellectual concepts free from the unavoidable constraints of a possible experience and thus seeks to expand them beyond the limits of the empirical yet nevertheless in connection with it. That occurs through its demanding absolute totality for a given *conditionatum* on the side of the conditions (under which the understanding subjects all appearances to synthetic unity) and thereby turning a category into a transcendental idea in order to give absolute completeness to empirical synthesis through its continuation up to the *inconditionatum* (which is never encountered in experience but rather only in an idea). Reason demands that according to the principle that if a *conditionatum* is given, then the whole sum of conditions and consequently something that is absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the *conditionatum* was possible) are also given. Therefore, the transcendental ideas will firstly in fact be nothing other than categories expanded to an *inconditionatum*; and the former will be capable of being brought into a table ordered according to the titles of the latter. Yet *secondly*, moreover, not all categories will indeed be apt for that but rather only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series and indeed of the intersubordinate (not coordinate) conditions for a *conditionatum*. Absolute totality is demanded by reason only so far as it pertains to the ascending series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum* and therefore not when the talk is of the descending line of consequences nor even of the aggregate of coordinate conditions for those consequences. For conditions are already presupposed in respect of the given *conditionatum* and are also to be regarded as given with the latter instead of its being the case that since consequences do not render their conditions possible but rather presuppose them, one can be unconcerned in progressing to the consequences (or in ascending from the given condition to the *conditionatum*) whether the series terminates or not: and, in general, the question concerning their totality is not a presupposition of reason at all.

So one necessarily thinks of a time that has fully passed up to the given moment as also given (even if not determinable by us). But regarding the future time – since it is not the condition of arriving at the present: it is, in order to comprehend the present, entirely a matter of indifference how we wish to deal with the future time: whether one wishes to let it terminate somewhere or run *in infinitum*. If there were a series *m*, *n*, *o* wherein *n* is given as conditioned in respect of *m* but is simultaneously given as a condition of *o* and the series goes upwards from the *conditionatum* *n* to *m* (*l*, *k*, *i*, etc.) and also downwards from the condition *n* to the *conditionatum* o (*p*, *q*, *r*, etc.): then I must presuppose the first series in order to regard *n* as given; and *n* is possible according to reason (i.e. the totality of conditions) only by means of that series, but its possibility does not rest upon the following series *o*, *p*, *q*, *r*: which can therefore be regarded not as given but rather only as *dabilis* [sc. giveable].

I shall call a synthesis of a series on the side of the conditions (i.e. from the condition that is the most proximate to the given appearance and so on to the remoter conditions) a *regressive* synthesis, but I shall call a synthesis that progresses from the most proximate consequence to the remoter consequences on the side of the *conditionata* a *progressive* synthesis. The former proceeds *in antecedentia*, the latter *in consequentia*. The cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the totality of a regressive synthesis and proceed *in antecedentia*, not *in consequentia*. If the latter occurs, then it is an arbitrary- and not necessary problem of pure reason because for the complete comprehensibility of what is given in appearance, we indeed need the grounds but do not need the consequences.

In order to arrange the table of the ideas according to the table of the categories, we first take the two original quanta of all our intuition: namely, time and space. Time is a series *per se* (and the formal condition of all series); and therefore: within it, in respect to a given present, the *antecedentia* as conditions (i.e. what is past) are to be distinguished *apriori* from the *consequentia* (i.e. what is future). Consequently, the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum* pertains only to all past time. According to reason’s idea: the whole past time, as a condition of the given moment, is necessarily thought of as given. Regarding space – within it *per se*, there is no difference between a *progressus* and a *regressus* because it constitutes an aggregate but not a series: since its parts are simultaneous *in toto*. In respect to the past time, I could regard the present temporal-point only as conditioned but never as a condition of it because that moment first arises only through the past time (or rather through the passing of the preceding time). But since the parts of space are not subordinate to one another but rather coordinate with one another, one part is not the condition of another’s possibility: and unlike time, it does not constitute a series *per se*. Only the synthesis of the manifold parts of space whereby we apprehend it is nevertheless successive and therefore occurs within time and contains a series. And since within that series of aggregated spaces (e.g. the feet in a rod) from a given space onwards, the spaces further added to it are always the condition of the limit of the previous spaces: the *measurement* of a space is also to be regarded as a synthesis of a series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum* except that the side of the conditions does not *per se* differ from the side on which the *conditionatum* lies; and consequently, a *regressus* and a *progressus* in space seem to be the same. Yet since one part of space is not given through the others but rather merely delimited, we must to that extent regard each delimited space also as conditioned: which presupposes another space as the condition of its limit and so forth. In respect to delimitation, therefore, progression in space is also a *regressus*: and the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of the conditions also impinges upon space; and I can enquire just as well after the absolute totality of the appearance in space as after the appearance in the past time. But whether an answer thereto is also at all possible will be able to be determined subsequently.

Secondly: the reality in space (i.e. matter) is a *conditionatum* whose internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of the parts are the remote conditions in such a way that a regressive synthesis occurs here whose absolute totality reason demands, which cannot occur except through a completed division whereby the reality of the matter vanishes either into nothing or indeed into that which is no longer matter (viz. the simple). Consequently, a series of conditions and a progression to the *inconditionatum* is also possible here.

Thirdly, regarding the categories of the real relationship between appearances: the category of substance with its accidents is incompatible with a transcendental idea, i.e. reason has no ground to proceed to conditions regressively in respect to it. For accidents are (so far as they inhere within a single substance) coordinate with one another and do not constitute a series. In respect to the substance, however, they are in fact not subordinate to it but rather the way in which the substance itself exists. What might still seem to be an idea of transcendental reason in respect to this would be the concept of *substantiale*. Only since that signifies nothing other than the concept of an object *simpliciter* that exists so far as one therein thinks merely of the transcendental subject without any predicates but here the talk is only of the *inconditionatum* in a series of appearances, it is clear that the *substantiale* could not constitute an element within that series. Exactly the same also holds for substances in community, which are mere aggregates and have no exponents of a series because they are not subordinate to one another as conditions of their possibility: which one could well say of spaces, whose limit was determined never *per se* but rather always through another space. There therefore remains only the category of causality left over, which offers a series of the causes for a given effect in which one can ascend from the latter as the *conditionatum* to the former as conditions and answer the question of reason.

Fourthly: the concepts of the possible, actual, and necessary lead to no series except only so far as what is *contingent* in existence must always be regarded as conditioned and, according to the understanding’s rule, points to a condition under which it is necessary to refer that condition to a higher condition until reason encounters unconditional necessity only in that series’s totality.

There are thus no more than four cosmological ideas: according to the four titles of the categories, if one highlights those that necessarily carry with them a series in synthesis of a manifold.

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|  | **1.** The absolute completeness of the composition of the given whole of all appearances |  |
| **2.** The absolute completeness of the division of a given whole in appearance |  | **3.** The absolute completeness of the arising of an appearance *simpliciter* |
|  | **4.** The absolute completeness of the dependence of the existence of what is alterable in appearance |  |

In connection with this, it is first to be remarked that the idea of absolute totality concerns nothing except exposition of appearances and therefore not the pure intellectual-concept of a whole of the things *simpliciter*. Appearances are therefore considered here as given, and reason demands the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility so far as they constitute a series and therefore an absolutely complete synthesis (i.e. a synthesis complete in every regard) whereby appearance can be expounded according to intellectual laws.

Secondly, it is truly only the *inconditionatum* that reason seeks in that serially and indeed regressively continued synthesis of the conditions: as it were, the completeness in the series of the premises, which together presuppose no other further premise. That *inconditionatum* is always contained within the series’s absolute totality, if one represents it to oneself in imagination. Only that absolutely completed synthesis is in turn merely an idea; for one cannot (at least in advance) know whether such a synthesis is even possible with appearances. If one represents everything to oneself through mere pure intellectual-concepts without conditions of sensory intuition, then one can say directly that for a given *conditionatum*, the whole series of intersubordinate conditions is also given; for the former is given through the latter alone. Only with appearances, a particular constrainment of the way wherein conditions are given is to be encountered: namely, through successive synthesis of the intuitional manifold that shall be complete in the *regressus*. Now, whether that completeness is sensorily possible is still a problem. Only the idea of that completeness nevertheless lies within reason, regardless of the possibility or impossibility of connecting empirical concepts to it adequately. Therefore: since the *inconditionatum* is necessarily contained within the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in appearance (following the guidance of the categories, which represent them as a series of conditions for a given *conditionatum*), one may even leave it undiscerned whether and how that totality is to be brought about: reason thus takes the path here of setting out from the idea of the totality even though it in fact has the *inconditionatum* (be it of the whole series or of a part of it) for its final goal.

One can think of that *inconditionatum* either as subsisting merely in the whole series, in which therefore all elements are conditioned without exception and only the whole of them would be absolutely unconditioned (and then the *regressus* is called ‘infinite’): or what is absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series to which its other elements are subordinate although that part itself stands under no other condition.[[21]](#footnote-21) In the first case, the series is without limits (i.e. without beginning) *a parte priori* – i.e. infinite – and nevertheless wholly given; but the *regressus* within it is never completed and can be called only ‘potentially infinite’. In the second case, there is a first element of the series that can be called the ‘cosmic beginning’ in respect to past time, the ‘cosmic limit’ in respect to space, the ‘simple’ in respect to the parts of a whole given within its limits, ‘absolute spontaneity’ (i.e. ‘freedom’) in respect to causes, and ‘absolute natural-necessity’ in respect to the existence of alterable things.

We have two terms, viz. ‘world’ and ‘nature’, that sometimes run into one another. The first signifies the mathematical whole of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis in respect to the macro as well as the micro, i.e. in its progression through composition as well as through division. The very same world is called ‘nature’[[22]](#footnote-22), however, so far as it is considered as a dynamic whole and one looks not to aggregation within space or time in order to bring them about as quanta but rather to unity in the existence of the appearances. Now, the condition of what occurs is called the ‘cause’; and whereas the unconditioned causality of a cause in appearance is called ‘freedom’, the conditioned causality of a cause in appearance is called ‘natural cause’. What is conditioned in existence *simpliciter* is called ‘contingent’, and what is unconditioned in existence *simpliciter* is called ‘necessary’. Unconditional necessity of appearances can be called ‘natural necessity’.

I have called the ideas with which we are now occupied ‘cosmological ideas’ partly because by the term ‘world’ the complex of all appearances is understood and our ideas are also directed only to what is unconditioned amongst the appearances and also partly because the word ‘world’ in the transcendental sense signifies the absolute totality of the complex of existing things and we direct our aim only to the completeness of synthesis (though in fact solely in *regressus* to the conditions). In consideration of the fact that, moreover, those ideas are *in toto* transcendental and although they admittedly do not transgress the object (viz. appearances) in respect to kind but rather deal merely with the sensible world (not with *noumena*), they nevertheless pursue the synthesis to a degree that surpasses all possible experience: one can, in my opinion, aptly call them *in toto* ‘cosmic concepts’. In respect to the difference between a mathematical *inconditionatum* and a dynamic *inconditionatum* that a *regressus* targets, I would nevertheless call the first two ‘cosmic concepts’ in a narrower signification (viz. that of the world in respect of the macro and the micro) and call the other two ‘transcendent *natural-concepts*’. Although that distinction is not yet of particular importance for the time being, it can become more important as we progress.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.2. Antithetic of Pure Reason

If every complex of dogmatic doctrines is a thetic, then I understand by an ‘antithetic’ not dogmatic assertions of the contrary but rather a conflict of seemingly dogmatic cognitions (*thesin cum antithesi*): without one’s attributing a predominant claim to approval to one over another. An antithetic is therefore not occupied with one-sided assertions at all but rather contemplates universal cognitions of reason only in respect to their conflict between one another and the causes of that conflict. A transcendental antithetic is an investigation concerning the antinomy of pure reason, its causes, and its result. If we deploy our reason not merely for using the understanding’s principles upon objects of experience but rather venture to extend the former beyond the latter’s limit, then *sophistical* theorems arise that may neither hope for confirmation nor fear refutation in experience and each of which is not only without contradiction *per se* but even encounters conditions of its necessity within the nature of reason: only that, unfortunately, the contrary has equally valid and necessary grounds of assertion on its side.

The questions that naturally offer themselves in connection with such a dialectic of pure reason are therefore: (1) in respect of which propositions pure reason is unfailingly subject to an antinomy; (2) upon what causes that antinomy rests; (3) whether and in what way a path to certainty nevertheless remains open to reason under that contradiction.

A dialectical theorem of pure reason must thus have in it the following feature that distinguishes it from all sophistical propositions: namely, that it does not concern an arbitrary question that one raises only in a certain arbitrary intention but rather a question that every human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress and secondly that it together with its counterproposition do not merely carry with them an artificial semblance that immediately vanishes when one comprehends it but rather a natural and unavoidable semblance that always still deceives (although it does not betray) even if one is no longer fooled by it and which can therefore admittedly be rendered innocuous but never eradicated.

Such a dialectical doctrine will relate not to the intellectual unity in experiential concepts but rather to the rational unity in mere ideas: whose conditions, since they shall firstly (*qua* synthesis according to rules) be congruent with the understanding and yet simultaneously (*qua* absolute unity of such a synthesis) congruent with reason, will be too great for the understanding if they are adequate to rational unity and too small for reason if they are accordant with the understanding – from which, then, a conflict must arise that cannot be avoided: however one wishes to begin it.

Those sophistical assertions therefore disclose a dialectical battleground where each party that is allowed to launch an attack holds the upper hand and the party that is compelled to conduct itself merely-defensively certainly succumbs. Hence, lusty knights are also sure to carry the laurels therefrom – irrespective of whether they espouse the good cause or the bad – if they merely ensure that they have the privilege of launching the last attack and are not obliged to sustain a new assault from their opponent. One can easily imagine that that tumbling ground has been trodden often enough since time immemorial and that many victories have been won by both sides although the last victory, which decided the issue, has always been provided for in such a way that the champion of the good cause alone held the ground through his opponent’s being forbidden from taking up arms thereafter. As impartial referees, we must entirely set aside whether it is the good- or the bad cause for which the disputants fight and let them resolve their issue only amongst themselves. Perhaps after they have more exhausted than harmed one another, they will discern the nullity of their dispute by themselves and part as good friends.

That method of observing a dispute of assertions or rather inciting it oneself not in order to ultimately decide the advantage of one party or another but rather in order to investigate whether the dispute’s object is not perhaps a mere illusion at which each party vainly clutches and in respect of which he can gain nothing even if he were not resisted at all can, I say, be called the *sceptical method*. It is totally distinct from scepticism – a principle of an artificial and scientific ignorance that undermines the foundations of all cognition in order to, where possible, leave none of its reliability and sureness remaining at all. For the sceptical method aims at certainty through seeking to uncover the point of misunderstanding in such a dispute that is honestly-intended and conducted with understanding on both sides in order, as wise legislators do, to draw instruction from the perplexity of judges in legal actions before them regarding what is deficient and imprecisely determined in their laws. The antinomy that manifests itself in the application of the laws is, with our constrained wisdom, the best examinatory trial of the nomothetic in order to render reason – which does not easily become aware of its missteps in abstract speculation – attentive to the moments in determination of its principles.

That sceptical method, however, essentially belongs to transcendental philosophy alone and can perhaps be dispensed with in every other field of investigations, only not in this field. In mathematics, its use would be absurd because one cannot conceal and render invisible any false assertions, since the proofs must always progress along the thread of pure intuition and indeed through ever evident synthesis. In experimental philosophy, a doubt of deferment can well be useful: only still at least no misunderstanding is possible that could not easily be remedied; and the last means of deciding the controversy must nevertheless lie within experience, irrespective of whether it is found early or late. Even morality can give its principles in their totality *in concreto* together with the practical consequences, at least in possible experiences, and thereby avoid the misunderstanding of abstraction. In contrast, transcendental assertions that pretend insights expanding beyond the field of all possible experiences are neither in such a case that their abstract synthesis could be given in any *apriori* intuition nor so constituted that misunderstanding could be uncovered by means of any experience. Transcendental reason therefore admits no other touchstone than a trial of unifying its assertions amongst themselves and therefore antecedently their free and unhindered competition between one another; and we shall now institute such competition.[[23]](#footnote-23)

###### 1.2.3.3.2.2.1. First Conflict

**Thesis**

The world has a beginning in time and is also enclosed within limits in respect to space.

**Proof**

For if one assumes that the world has no beginning in respect to time: then at any given temporal-point, an eternity has passed and an infinite series of successive states of the things within the world has passed. Now, a series’s infinitude consists precisely in the fact that it can never be completed through successive synthesis. Therefore, an infinite past cosmic-series is impossible; and consequently, a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of the world’s existence: which was to be proved firstly.

In respect to the second point, one can again assume the contrary: then the world will be an infinite given whole of simultaneously existent things. Now, we can think of the magnitude of a quantum that is not given inside certain limits of every intuition[[24]](#footnote-24) in no other way than merely through synthesis of the parts and can think of such a quantum’s totality only through completed synthesis or through repeated addition of unity to itself.[[25]](#footnote-25) Thus, in order to think of the world (which fills all spaces) as a whole, successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world would have to be regarded as completed, i.e. an infinite time would (in enumerating all coexistent things) have to be regarded as having passed: which is impossible. Thus, an infinite aggregate of actual things can neither be regarded as a given whole nor therefore as given simultaneously. Consequently, no world is infinite in respect to extension in space: which was the second point.

**Antithesis**

The world has no beginning and no limits in space but rather is infinite in respect to space as well as time.

**Proof**

For suppose the world has a beginning. Since the beginning is an existence that a time precedes wherein the thing is not, a time must have preceded wherein the world was not (i.e. an empty time). But in an empty time, no arising of any thing is possible because no part of such a time before another has any distinguishing condition of existence before that of non-being (irrespective of whether one assumes that it arises by itself or through another cause). Therefore, some series of the things can admittedly begin within the world; but the world itself can have no beginning and is therefore infinite in respect to past time.

Regarding the second point: if one first of all assumes the contrary (viz. that the world is finite and limited in respect to space), then the world is situated within an empty space that is unlimited. A relationship not only of the things within space but also of the things to space would therefore be encountered. Now, since the world is an absolute whole outside which no object of intuition and therefore no correlate of the world is encountered to which the world stands in relationship, the world’s relationship to empty space would be a relationship of it to no object. But such a relationship and also consequently the delimitation of the world through empty space are nothing; therefore, the world is not limited at all in respect to space: i.e. it is infinite in respect to extension.[[26]](#footnote-26)

**1.2.3.3.2.2.1.1. Remarks on the First Antinomy**

**On the Thesis**

In connection with these conflicting arguments, I have not sought to (e.g.) conduct an advocate’s proof (as one says) that avails itself of the opponent’s incautiousness and gladly accepts his invocation of a misunderstood law in order to construct its own illegitimate claims upon the opponent’s refutation. Each of these proofs is drawn from its object’s nature, and the advantage that the dogmatists’ faulty inferences could give us has been set aside.

I would also have been able to seemingly prove the thesis by prefixing a faulty concept of the infinitude of a given quantum following the custom of the dogmatists. A quantum is infinite beyond which no greater quantum (i.e. beyond the multitude of a given unity contained therein) is possible. Now, no multitude is the greatest because one or more unities could still always be added thereto. Therefore, an infinite given quantum and consequently also an infinite world (i.e. infinite in respect to the past series as well as extension) are impossible: the world is therefore limited bilaterally. I would have been able to conduct my proof thus: only that concept does not agree with what one understands by an ‘infinite whole’. How great it is, is not thereby represented; and consequently, its concept is also not the concept of a maximum: but rather only its relationship to an arbitrarily assumable unity is thought of in respect to which it is greater than all number. Now, the *infinitum* would be greater or smaller according to whether the unity is assumed to be greater or smaller; only since the *infinitum*’s infinitude consists merely in its relationship to that given unity, it would always remain the same even though the quantum’s absolute magnitude would not thereby be cognised at all: which is also not being spoken of here.

The true (transcendental) concept of infinitude is that successive synthesis of the unity in traversing a quantum can never be completed.[[27]](#footnote-27) It follows entirely surely therefrom that an eternity of successive states up to a given temporal-point (viz. the present temporal-point) cannot have passed; therefore, the world must have a beginning.

In regard to the second part of the thesis: the difficulty of an infinite and nevertheless past series admittedly falls away; for the manifold of a world infinite in respect to extension is given simultaneously. Only in order to think about such a multitude’s totality: since we cannot invoke limits that constitute that totality by themselves in intuition, we must give account of our concept: which in such a case cannot proceed from the whole to the determinate multitude of the parts but must rather demonstrate the possibility of a whole through successive synthesis of its parts. Now, since that synthesis would have to constitute a series that is never to be completed, one can think of a totality neither before it nor therefore through it. For in that case, the concept of the totality itself is a representation of a completed synthesis of the parts; and that completion and therefore also the concept thereof are impossible.

**On the Antithesis**

The proof for the infinitude of the given cosmic-series and of the cosmic complex rests merely upon the fact that in the opposite case, an empty time and also an empty space would have to constitute the cosmic limit. Now, it is not unknown to me that evasions against that consequence are sought through one’s professing that a limit of the world in respect to time and space might be very well possible without one’s exactly needing to assume an absolute time prior to the world’s beginning or an absolute space outstretched outside the actual world, which are impossible. I am entirely well satisfied with the last part of that opinion of the philosophers from the Leibnizian school. Space is merely the form of external intuition but not an actual object that can be intuited externally and not a correlate of the appearances but rather the form of the appearances themselves. Therefore, space absolutely cannot (by itself alone) occur as something determinative in the existence of the things because it is not an object at all but rather merely the form of possible objects. Things (*qua* appearances) therefore indeed determine space: i.e. render it the case that amongst all possible predicates of it (i.e. quantity and relationship), some predicates or others pertain to actuality; but space (as something that subsists by itself) cannot conversely determine the actuality of the things in respect to quantity nor shape because it is nothing actual *per se*. Although a space (be it full or empty)[[28]](#footnote-28) can therefore well be delimited through appearances, appearances cannot be delimited through an empty space external to them. Precisely that also holds for time. Now, even if all that is conceded, it is nevertheless indisputable that one must thoroughly assume those two nonthings (viz. the empty space external to and the empty time prior to the world) if one assumes a cosmic limit: be it in respect to space or time.

For regarding the evasion through which one seeks to avoid the consequence according to which we say that if the world has limits (in respect to time and space), then the infinite void must determine the existence of actual things in respect to their quantity: it secretly consists only in one’s thinking of an intelligible world (though who knows what intelligible world) instead of a sensible world, one’s thinking of an existence that presupposes no other condition within the world instead of the primary beginning (i.e. an existence that a time of non-being precedes), and one’s thinking of constraints of the cosmic whole instead of the limit of extension and thereby avoiding time and space. Yet the talk here is only of the *mundus phaenomenon* and its quantity, in respect of which one can in no way abstract from the aforementioned conditions of sensibility without eliminating that phenomenon’s essence. If the sensible world is limited, then it necessarily lies within the infinite void. If one shall omit the latter and therefore space *simpliciter* as an *apriori* condition of the possibility of appearances, then the whole sensible-world falls away. Only in our problem, the latter alone is given. The *mundus intelligibilis* is nothing but the general concept of a world *simpliciter* in which one abstracts from all conditions of intuiting the latter and consequently in respect to which, no synthetic proposition whatsoever is possible: neither affirmative nor negative.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.2.2. Second Conflict

**Thesis**

Every composite substance within the world consists of simple parts, and absolutely nothing exists except what is simple or what is composed of it.

**Proof**

For assume that the composite substances did not consist of simple parts – were all composition eliminated in thought, then no composite part would remain left over nor (since there are no simple parts) any simple part and therefore nothing whatsoever: and consequently no substance has been given. Either therefore all composition can (*per impossibile*) be eliminated in thought or something subsisting without any composition (i.e. a simple) must remain left over following its elimination. In the first case, however, the composite would not in turn consist of substances (because with them, composition is merely a contingent relation of substances without which they, as beings persisting by themselves, must subsist). Now, since that case contradicts the presupposition, only the second remains left over: namely, that what is substantially composite within the world consists of simple parts.

It follows immediately therefrom that the things of the world are *in toto* simple beings, that composition is merely an external state of them, and that even if we never posit the elementary substances outside that state of conjunction and isolate them, reason must nevertheless think of them as the primary subjects of all composition and therefore, prior to that composition, as simple beings.

**Antithesis**

No composite thing within the world consists of simple parts, and there is nothing simple within it at all.

**Proof**

Suppose a composite thing (*qua* substance) consisted of simple parts. Since all external relationship and therefore also all composition of substances is possible only within space, the space that a composite occupies must consist of equally many parts as the composite that occupies it. Now, the space consists not of simple parts but rather of spaces. Therefore, every part of the composite must occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of everything composite are simple. Therefore, the simple occupies a space. Now, since every *reale* that occupies a space comprehends a manifold within it whose elements are situated externally to one another and is therefore composite and indeed as a real composite not of accidents (for they cannot be external to one another without substance) and therefore of substances, the simple would be a substantial composite: which is self-contradictory.

The antithesis’s second proposition (viz. that absolutely nothing simple exists within the world) shall here signify only so much as that the existence of something absolutely simple can be demonstrated from no experience nor perception (neither external nor internal), and the absolutely simple is therefore a mere idea whose objective reality can never be demonstrated in any possible experience and which is therefore without any application and object in exposition of appearances. For we shall assume an object of experience were found for that transcendental idea: empirical intuition of any object would have to be cognised as an empirical intuition that contains absolutely no manifold whose elements are outside one another and conjoined into a unity. Now, since no inference is valid from non-consciousness of a manifold to the total impossibility of such a consciousness in any intuition of the same object although the latter is thoroughly needed for absolute simplicity, it follows that the latter cannot be inferred from any perception: whatever it may be. Since something can never be given as an absolutely simple object in any possible experience but the sensible world must be regarded as the complex of all possible experiences, nothing simple is given within the sensible world at all.

That second proposition of the antithesis goes much further than the first, which merely banishes the simple from the intuition of the composite whereas the second removes it from the whole of nature. Hence, the second proposition has also not been able to be proved from the concept of a given object of external intuition (i.e. the composite) but rather from its relationship to a possible experience *simpliciter*.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.2.2.1. Remarks on the Second Antinomy

**On the Thesis**

If I speak of a whole that necessarily consists of simple parts, then I understand by that only a substantial whole as the genuine *compositum*: i.e. that contingent unity of the manifold that, given abstractedly (at least in thought), is placed into a reciprocal conjunction and thereby constitutes a unity. One should in fact call space not a *compositum* but rather a *totum* because its parts are possible only within the whole and not the whole through the parts. Space could perhaps be called a *compositum ideale* but not a *compositum reale*. Yet that is merely subtlety. Since space is not a composite of substances (and not even of real accidents): if I eliminate all composition within it, then nothing – not even a point – must remain; for a point is possible only as the limit of a space (and therefore of a composite). Therefore, space and time do not consist of simple parts. What belongs only to the state of a substance – even if it has a quantity (e.g. alteration) – also does not consist of simples: i.e. a certain degree of alteration does not arise through an accrual of many simple alterations. Our inference from the composite to the simple holds only for *per se* subsistent things. Accidents of a state, however, do not subsist by themselves. One can therefore easily ruin the proof for the necessity of the simple as the component part of all substantial composites and thereby easily ruin one’s cause altogether if one extends that proof too far and seeks to validate it for every composite without distinction, as has actually already occurred more than once.

Moreover, I speak of the simple here only so far as it is given necessarily within the composite in that the latter can therein be resolved into its component parts. The genuine signification of the word ‘monad’ (according to Leibniz’s use) should indeed pertain only to a simple that is given immediately as a simple substance (e.g. in self-consciousness) and not as an element of the composite, which one could better call an ‘atom’. And since I shall demonstrate simple substances only in respect to the composite as its elements, I could call the second antinomy’s antithesis ‘transcendental *atomistic*’. But since that word has already long been used to designate a particular way of explaining bodily appearances (i.e. molecules) and therefore presupposes empirical concepts, it may be called the ‘dialectical principle of monadology’.

**On the Antithesis**

Against this principle of an infinite division of matter, whose probative ground is merely mathematical, objections are brought forth by the *monadists* that already render themselves suspicious through the fact that they do not wish to accept the clearest mathematical proofs as insights into the constitution of space so far as space is in fact the formal condition of the possibility of all matter but rather regard them merely as inferences from abstract or arbitrary concepts that could not become related to actual things. Even as if it were also merely possible to think of another mode of intuition than that which is given in the original intuition of space and the determinations of space did not simultaneously pertain to everything that is possible only through the fact that it fills that space. If one gives ear to them: then beyond the mathematical point, which is simple but not a part of a space but rather merely its limit, one must also think of physical points that are also admittedly simple but which, as parts of space, have the distinction of filling space through their mere aggregation. Now, without repeating here the common and clear refutations of that absurdity that one encounters in multitude, as it is totally fruitless to seek to sophisticate mathematics’s evidence away through merely discursive concepts: I remark only that if philosophy chicanes with mathematics here, that occurs because it forgets that only appearances and their condition are at issue in this question. It is not enough here, however, to find the concept of the simple for the pure intellectual-concept of the composite; but rather one must find the intuition of the simple for the intuition of the composite (i.e. of matter): and that is wholly impossible according to laws of sensibility and therefore also with objects of the senses. Therefore, it may always hold for a whole of substances that is thought of merely through the pure understanding that prior to all composition thereof, we must have the simple; but that does not hold for the *totum substantiale phaenomenon*: which, *qua* empirical intuition in space, carries with it the necessary property that no part thereof is simple because no part of space is simple. Nevertheless, the monadists have always been fine enough to seek to avoid that difficulty through not presupposing space as a condition of the possibility of the objects of external intuition (viz. bodies) but rather presupposing the latter and the dynamic relationship of substances *simpliciter* as the condition of the possibility of space. Now, we have a concept of bodies only as appearances; but as such, they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of the possibility of all external appearance: and the evasion is therefore vain and has also been sufficiently excluded above in the Transcendental Aesthetic. If they were things *per se*, then the monadists’ proof would admittedly hold.

The second dialectical assertion has in it the particularity that it does not have a dogmatic assertion against it, which amongst all sophistical assertions is the only one that undertakes to patently prove in light of an object of experience the actuality of what we attributed merely to transcendental ideas above: viz. the absolute simplicity of substance, i.e. that the object of the internal sense (viz. the ego that thinks therein) is an absolutely simple substance. Without entering upon that now (since it has been thoroughly considered above), I remark merely that if something is thought of merely as an object without one’s adding any synthetic determination of one’s addition thereto (as occurs through the entirely naked representation ‘I’), then nothing manifold and no composition could admittedly be perceived in such a representation. Since, moreover, the predicates whereby I think about that object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, also nothing can occur therein that would demonstrate a manifold external to one another and therefore real composition. Therefore, only self-consciousness brings with it that because the subject that thinks is simultaneously its own object, it cannot divide itself (even though the determinations inhering within it can); for in respect of one’s self, every object is absolute unity. Nevertheless, if that subject is considered externally as an object of intuition, then it would indeed yet show composition within the appearance *per se*. It must always be thus considered, however, if one wishes to know whether a manifold are external to one another within it or not.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.2.3. Third Conflict

**Thesis**

Causality according to laws of nature is not the sole causality from which the world’s appearances can be derived *in toto*. It is also necessary to assume a causality through freedom to explain them.

**Proof**

If one assumes there were no causality except according to laws of nature, then everything that occurs presupposes a prior state upon which it follows unfailingly according to a rule. Yet the prior state must itself be something that has occurred (i.e. something that has arisen in time, wherein it previously was not) because if it had always been, then its consequent would also not have arisen for the first time but would rather have always been. Therefore, the causality of the cause through which something occurs is itself something that occurs that in turn presupposes a prior state and its causality: which likewise presupposes a still older state, however, etc. If everything therefore occurs according to mere laws of nature, then there is always only a subaltern- but never a primary beginning: and therefore, there is absolutely no completeness of the series on the side of the causes that originate from one another. Yet the law of nature consists precisely in the fact that nothing occurs without sufficiently *apriori* determinate cause. Therefore, the principle that all causality is possible only according to natural laws contradicts itself in its unconstrained universality; and therefore, that causality cannot be assumed as the sole causality.

In accordance with that, a causality must be assumed through which something occurs without its cause being determined through another preceding cause according to necessary laws: i.e. an *absolute spontaneity* of causes to, by themselves, begin a series of appearances that runs according to laws of nature and therefore transcendental freedom, without which the serial sequence of appearances on the side of the causes is never complete (even in the course of nature).

**Antithesis**

There is no freedom, but rather everything within the world occurs merely according to laws of nature.

**Proof**

Suppose there were a freedom in the transcendental sense as a particular kind of causality according to which the world’s occurrences can result, i.e. a capacity to absolutely begin a state and therefore also a series of its consequences: then not only will a series arise through that spontaneity, but rather the determination of that spontaneity itself for bringing forth the series (i.e. the causality) will begin absolutely in such a way that nothing precedes whereby that occurrent action is determined according to constant laws. Yet every beginning of action presupposes a state of the cause that is not yet acting, and a dynamically primary beginning of the action presuppose a state that has absolutely no causal coherence with the preceding state of the very same cause, i.e. in no way results therefrom. Therefore, transcendental freedom is opposed to the causal law and is such a conjunction of the successive states of efficient causes according to which no unity of experience is possible and which is also therefore encountered in no experience and is consequently an empty cogitational-thing.

We therefore have nothing but nature in which we must seek the coherence and order of cosmic occurrences. Freedom (i.e. independence) from the laws of nature is admittedly a liberation from compulsion but also from the guiding thread of all rules. For one cannot say that instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom enter into the causality of the world’s course because if freedom were determined according to laws, then it would not be freedom but would rather itself be nothing other than nature. Therefore, nature and transcendental freedom differ like lawfulness and lawlessness: the former of which admittedly burdens the understanding with the difficulty of seeking the occurrences’ origination ever higher within the series of the causes because the causality in them is always conditioned but promises thoroughgoing and lawful unity of experience for compensation, whereas the illusion of freedom admittedly promises the enquiring understanding repose within the chain of causes by leading it to an unconditioned causality that starts to act by itself but which, since it is itself blind, cuts off the guiding thread of rules along which alone a thoroughgoingly coherent experience is possible.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.2.3.1. Remark on the Third Antinomy

**On the Thesis**

Although the transcendental idea of freedom admittedly far from constitutes the entire content of the psychological concept of that name, which is in great part empirical, but rather merely that of the absolute spontaneity of action as the true ground of freedom’s imputability, it is nevertheless the true stumbling-block for philosophy: which finds insurmountable difficulties in admitting such a kind of unconditioned causality. Therefore, what has placed speculative reason in such great perplexity in the question concerning the freedom of the will since time immemorial is in fact only *transcendental* and concerns merely whether a capacity must be assumed to begin a series of successive things or states by oneself. How such a capacity is possible is not equally necessary to be able to answer because, just as with causality according to natural laws, we must satisfy ourselves with cognising *apriori* that such a causality must be presupposed: even though we in no way comprehend the possibility of how through a certain existence, the existence of something else becomes posited and must in that case adhere solely to experience. Now, admittedly, we have in fact demonstrated that necessity of a primary beginning of a series of appearances from freedom only insofar as is requisite for the comprehensibility of an origin of the world, although one can take all subsequent states for a sequence according to mere natural-laws. Yet once the capacity to begin a series within time entirely by oneself is thereby demonstrated (though admittedly not comprehended), we are also thenceforth allowed to let diverse series begin by themselves in respect to causality in the world’s course and to attribute to the world’s substances a capacity to act from freedom. In connection with this, however, one should not let oneself be detained through a misunderstanding: viz. that since a successive series within the world can have only a comparatively primary beginning because a state of the world’s things always nevertheless precedes, perhaps no absolutely primary beginning of the series during the world’s course is possible. For we are here speaking of an absolutely primary beginning not in respect to time but rather in respect to causality. If I am now fully free (for example) and stand up from my chair without the necessarily determinative influence of the natural causes: then in that occurrence together with its natural consequences *in infinitum*, a new series begins absolutely even though in respect to time, that occurrence is merely the continuation of a preceding series. For that decision and deed does not lie within the sequence of merely natural-effects at all; and it is not a mere continuation thereof, but rather the determinative natural-causes entirely cease above it in respect of that event, which admittedly follows upon them but does not result therefrom and which must be called an ‘absolutely primary beginning’ of a series of appearances, admittedly not in respect to time yet nevertheless in respect to causality.

The confirmation of reason’s need to invoke a primary beginning from freedom within the series of natural-causes is very clearly illuminated through the fact that (with the exception of the Epicurean school) all philosophers of antiquity saw themselves compelled to assume a prime mover to explain cosmic movements, i.e. a freely-acting cause that began that series of states first of all and by itself. For they did not undertake to render a primary beginning comprehensible from mere nature.

**On the Antithesis**

In contrast with the doctrine of freedom, the defender of nature’s omnipotence (i.e. transcendental physiocracy) would assert his proposition against the former’s sophistical inferences in the following manner. If you assume no mathematical primary in respect to time within the world, then nor do you need to seek a dynamic primary in respect to causality. Who has commanded you to think of an absolutely first state of the world and therefore of an absolute beginning of the gradually passing series of appearances and to set limits upon an uncircumscribed nature in order that you may have a resting-point for your imagination? Since the substances within the world have always been (or at least the unity of experience renders such a presupposition necessary), there is no difficulty in also assuming that the change of their states (i.e. a series of their alterations) has always been: and consequently, no primary beginning (neither mathematical nor dynamic) need be sought. The possibility of such an infinite origination without a first element in respect to which everything else is merely subsequent cannot be rendered comprehensible in respect of its possibility. Yet if you wish to discard that natural riddle, then you will see yourself compelled to reject many synthetic fundamental-qualities (i.e. fundamental powers) that you can just as little comprehend: and even the possibility of an alteration *simpliciter* must be offensive to you. For if you did not find that it is actual through experience, then you would never be able to excogitate *apriori* how such an interminable sequence of being and non-being is possible.

Nevertheless, even if a transcendental capacity of freedom is perhaps admitted in order to begin the world’s alterations, that capacity must still at least be only outside the world (although it always remains an audacious pretension to also assume an object outside the complex of all possible intuitions that cannot be given in any possible perception). Only to attribute such a capacity to the substances within the world itself can never be allowed because then the coherence of necessarily interdeterminative appearances according to universal laws that one calls ‘nature’ and, with it, the mark of empirical truth that distinguishes experience from a dream would for the greatest part vanish. For alongside such a lawless capacity of freedom, nature can hardly be thought of any longer because the latter’s laws become interminably modified through the former’s influences: and the play of appearances that would be regular and uniform according to mere nature thereby becomes confused and rendered incoherent.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.2.4. Fourth Conflict

**Thesis**

Something belongs to the world that is an absolutely necessary being: either as a part of the world or as its cause.

**Proof**

As the whole of all appearances, the sensible world also contains a series of alterations. For without such a series, even the representation of the time series – as a condition of the possibility of the sensible world – would not be given to us.[[29]](#footnote-29) Yet every alteration stands under its condition, which precedes in respect to time and under which it is necessary. Now, in respect of its existence, every *conditionatum* that is given presupposes a complete series of conditions up to what is absolutely unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Therefore, something absolutely necessary must exist if an alteration exists as its consequence. That *necessitum*, however, itself belongs to the sensible world. For suppose it were outside the sensible world: then the series of cosmic alterations would derive its beginning from it yet without that necessary cause itself belonging to the sensible world. Now, that is impossible. For since the beginning of a time-series can become determined only through that which precedes in respect to time, the highest condition of the beginning of a series of alterations must exist in the time wherein that series still was not (for a beginning is an existence that a time precedes wherein the thing that begins still was not). Therefore, the causality of the necessary cause of all alterations and consequently also the cause itself belong to time and consequently to appearance (in which alone time, as its form, is possible); and consequently, they cannot be thought about in abstraction from the sensible world, which is the complex of all appearances. Therefore, something absolutely necessary is contained within the world itself (be it the whole cosmic-series itself or a part thereof).

**Antithesis**

No absolutely necessary being exists at all: neither within the world nor outside it as its cause.

**Proof**

Suppose that the world itself or something within it were a necessary being: then within the series of its alterations, there would either be a beginning that were unconditionally necessary and consequently without cause (which conflicts with the dynamic law of the determination of all appearances in time) or the series itself would be without any beginning and, despite being contingent and conditioned in all of its parts, would nevertheless be absolutely-necessary and unconditioned in the whole: which is self-contradictory because the existence of a multitude cannot be necessary if no single part thereof possesses a *per se* necessary existence.

In contrast, suppose there were an absolutely necessary cause of the world outside it: then as the highest element within the series of the causes of the cosmic alterations, it would first begin the latter’s existence and their series.[[30]](#footnote-30) But then it would also have to begin to act, and its causality would belong to time and precisely therefore to the complex of all appearances (i.e. the world); and consequently, it itself (i.e. the cause) would not be outside the world: which contradicts the presupposition. Therefore, there is no absolutely necessary being within the world nor outside it (yet in causal conjunction with it).

###### 1.2.3.3.2.2.4.1. Remark on the Fourth Antinomy

**On the Thesis**

In order to prove the existence of a necessary being, I am obliged here to use none other than a cosmological argument: which ascends from the *conditionata* within appearance to the *inconditionatum* within a concept through one’s regarding the latter as the necessary condition of the series’s absolute totality. To attempt a proof from the mere idea of a highest of all beings *simpliciter* pertains to another principle of reason, and such a proof will therefore have to occur separately.

The pure cosmological proof cannot demonstrate the existence of a necessary being except through simultaneously leaving it undiscerned whether such a being is the world itself or a thing distinct from it. For in order to discover the latter, principles are required that are no longer cosmological and which progress not within the series of the appearances but rather within concepts of contingent beings *simpliciter* (so far as they are considered merely as objects of the understanding) and a principle to connect such concepts to a necessary being through mere concepts: all of which belongs before a transcendent philosophy, for which here is not yet the place.

Yet once one begins the proof cosmologically through taking the series of appearances and the *regressus* within it according to empirical laws of causality as a basis, one cannot thereafter leap therefrom and cross over to something that does not belong to the series as an element at all.

For something must be regarded as a condition in exactly the same signification in which the *conditionatum*’s relation to its condition within the series was taken, which should lead to that supreme condition in continuous progression. Now, if that relationship is sensory and pertains to the understanding’s possible empirical use, then the highest condition or cause can end the *regressus* only according to laws of sensibility and therefore only as belonging to the time-series: and the necessary being must be regarded as the highest element of the cosmic series.

Nevertheless, one has appropriated the freedom to perform such a leap (μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος). For one inferred from the alterations within the world to the world’s empirical contingency (i.e. its dependence upon empirically determinative causes) and received an ascending series of empirical conditions, which was also entirely just. But since one could find no primary beginning and no highest element therein, one suddenly abandoned the empirical concept of contingency and took the pure category: which then engendered a merely intelligible series whose completeness rested upon the existence of an absolutely necessary cause that then, since it was bound to no sensory conditions, was also freed from the temporal-condition to begin its causality itself. That procedure is entirely illegitimate, however, as one can infer from the following.

In the pure sense of the category, something is contingent if its contradictory contrary is possible. Now, one cannot at all infer from empirical contingency to that intelligible contingency. Something is altered if its contrary (of its state) is actual at another time and therefore also possible; therefore, the latter is not the contradictory contrary of the previous state, for which it is required that in the same time when the previous state was, its contrary could have been in its stead: which cannot at all be inferred from the alteration. A body that was in motion = A comes to rest = non-A. Now, from the fact that a state opposed to state A follows upon it, it cannot at all be inferred that A’s contradictory contrary is possible and therefore that A is contingent; for that would require that in the same time when the movement was, rest could have been instead of it. Now, we know nothing beyond the fact that rest was actual in the following time and therefore also possible. Yet movement at a time and rest at another time are not contradictorily opposed to one another. Therefore, the succession of opposed determinations (i.e. alteration) in no way demonstrates contingency according to concepts of the pure understanding and also therefore cannot lead to the existence of a necessary being according to pure intellectual-concepts. Alteration demonstrates only empirical contingency: i.e. that the new state absolutely could not have occurred by itself without a cause that belongs to the previous time, according to the law of causality. Even if that cause is assumed as absolutely necessary, it must nevertheless be encountered within time and belong to the series of appearances.

**On the Antithesis**

If one thinks that one encounters difficulties opposing the existence of an absolutely-necessary highest cause in ascending within the series of all appearances, then they must also not be grounded upon mere concepts of the necessary existence of a thing *simpliciter* and must therefore be non-ontological but must rather arise from causal conjunction with a series of appearances in order to assume a condition for that series that is itself unconditioned and must consequently be cosmological and inferred according to empirical laws. For it will become manifest that ascent within the series of all causes (within the sensible cosmos) could never end at an empirically unconditioned condition and that the cosmological argument hatches from the contingency of the world’s states according to their alterations contrarily to the assumption of a first cause that initially starts the series absolutely.

Nevertheless, an extraordinary contrast manifests itself in this antinomy: namely, that from exactly the same probative-grounds from which an originary being’s existence was inferred in the thesis, its non-being is inferred in the antithesis and indeed with the same incisiveness. Only whereas there it was said that there is a necessary being because the whole past time encompasses within itself the series of all conditions and therewith therefore also the *inconditionatum* (i.e. *necessitum*), it is now said that there is no necessary being precisely because the whole past time encompasses within itself the series of all conditions (which are in turn consequently conditioned *in toto*). The cause thereof is as follows. The first argument looks only to the absolute totality of the series of the conditions, each of which determines another within time, and thereby receives something unconditioned and necessary. In contrast, the second takes into consideration the contingency of everything that is determined within the time-series (because prior to each, a time precedes wherein the condition itself must in turn be determined as conditioned): whereby, then, everything unconditioned and all absolute necessity totally fall away. Nevertheless, the mode of inference in both is entirely congruous with common human-reason, which frequently drifts into the fault of disuniting with itself because it considers its object from two diverse standpoints. Herr *von Mairan* describes the dispute of two famous astronomers that arose from a similar difficulty concerning a choice of standpoints in respect of a phenomenon remarkable enough for someone to compose a special treatise regarding it. Whereas one of them inferred that the Moon rotates upon its axis because it constantly turns the same side towards the Earth, the other inferred that the Moon does not rotate upon its axis precisely because it constantly turns the same side towards the Earth. Both inferences were correct according to the standpoint from which one wished to observe the Moon’s motion.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.3. On Reason’s Interest in These Conflicts

We now have the entire dialectical spectacle of the cosmological ideas: which do not at all allow a congruent object to be given for them within any possible experience and indeed not even that reason could think of them consonantly with universal experiential-laws but which are nonetheless not arbitrarily excogitated but rather to which reason is necessarily led in the continuous progression of empirical synthesis if it wishes to liberate what can become determined always merely contingently from every condition and comprehend it in its unconditioned totality. These sophistical assertions are four attempts to resolve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason, of which there can be only exactly so many – no more and no fewer – because there are no more series of synthetic presuppositions that delimit empirical synthesis *apriori*.

We have represented the lustrous pretensions of a reason that expands its domain over all limits of experience only in dry formulae that contain merely the ground of their legal claims and, as befits a transcendental philosophy, have stripped them of everything empirical: even though the rational assertions’s total splendour can shine forth only in conjunction with it. In that application, however, and the progressive expansion of reason’s use through its starting from the field of experiences and gradually ascending to those sublime ideas, philosophy shows a dignity that, if it could only assert its pretensions, would leave the value of all other human science far beneath it because it promises the foundation for our greatest expectations and prospects into the ultimate purposes in which all of reason’s endeavours must ultimately unite. The questions of: whether the world has a beginning and any limit of its extension in space; whether somewhere, and perhaps within my thinking self, there is an indivisible and indestructible unity or nothing other than the divisible and the transient, whether I am free in my actions or, like other beings, guided along the thread of nature and fate; and finally whether there is a highest cosmic-cause or the natural things and their order constitute the ultimate object with which we must abide in all our contemplations – those are questions for whose resolution the mathematician would gladly sacrifice his whole science; for it can indeed provide him with no satisfaction in respect of humanity’s supreme and most important purposes. Even the true dignity of mathematics (that pride of human reason) rests upon the fact that since it gives reason the guidance to comprehend nature in its order and regularity in the macro as well as in the micro and also in the wondrous unity of the forces that move it, far beyond all expectation of a philosophy constructing upon common experience: it thereby gives itself occasion and encouragement for use of reason expanded beyond all experience and also provides the cosmic-wisdom occupied therewith with the most excellent materials to underpin its investigation through congruous intuitions so far as that investigation’s constitution allows it.

Unfortunately for speculation (though perhaps fortunately for man’s practical determination), reason sees itself caught in a crowd of grounds and countergrounds amidst its greatest expectations in such a way that since, due to its honour as well as also even its security, it is unfeasible for it to withdraw and observe that controversy indifferently as a mere playfight and it is still less feasible for it to demand absolute peace because the object of the dispute is of great interest, nothing more remains to it than to reflect upon the origin of that disunity of reason with itself in regard to whether, say, a mere misunderstanding is not to blame therein after whose exposition, both sides’ proud claims perhaps fall away: but in their stead, an enduringly tranquil regime of reason over understanding and the senses would take its beginning.

For now, we shall still further postpone that profound exposition and first consider on which side we would ourselves indeed most like to compete if we were perhaps compelled to select a party. Since in this case, we consult not the logical touchstone of truth but rather merely our interest: such an investigation will, even though it discerns nothing in respect of the disputed right of both parties, nevertheless have the utility of rendering it comprehensible why the participants in that dispute have preferred to compete on one side rather than on the other without exactly a preeminent insight into the object having been the cause therein and also of explaining still other ancillary-things: e.g. the zealous ardour of one party and the cold assertion of the other and why they gladly bellow joyful approval for one party and are irreconcileably prejudiced against the other in advance.

Nevertheless, in connection with this precursory judgement, there is something that determines the viewpoint from which alone it can be conducted with appropriate profundity; and that is a comparison of the principles from which both parties set out. Amongst the assertions of the antithesis, one remarks a perfect uniformity of the way-of-thinking and complete unity of the maxims: viz. a principle of pure empiricism, not only in explaining the appearances within the world but also in resolving the transcendental ideas of the universe itself. In contrast, the assertions of the thesis are underlain not only by an empirical mode-of-explanation inside the series of all appearances but also by intellectual beginnings; and to that extent, the maxim is not simple. In light of its essential distinguishing-characteristic, however, I shall call that maxim the *dogmatism* of pure reason.

On the side of dogmatism in determination of the cosmological rational-ideas or the thesis, therefore, the following manifest themselves:

*Firstly*, a certain *practical interest* whereof everyone well-meaning partakes if he understands his true advantage. That the world has a beginning, that my thinking self is of a simple and consequently incorruptible nature, that my thinking self is simultaneously free in its voluntary actions and elevated above natural-compulsion, and finally that the whole order of the things that constitute the world originate from an originary being from which everything borrows its unity and purposeful connection are so many cornerstones of morality and religion. The antithesis robs us of all those supports or at least seems to rob us of them.

*Secondly*, a speculative interest of reason also expresses itself on that side. For if one assumes and uses the transcendental ideas in such a way, then one can fully comprehend the entire chain of conditions *apriori* and conceive the *conditionata*’s derivation through beginning from the *inconditionatum*: which the antithesis does not accomplish, which recommends itself very badly through its inability to give any answer to the question regarding the conditions of its synthesis, which cannot always leave further enquiry remaining without end. According to it: one must ascend from a given beginning to a still higher beginning; every part leads to a still smaller part; every occurrence always has yet another occurrence above itself as a cause; and the conditions of existence *simpliciter* are always in turn supported upon others, without ever receiving unconditional stability and support in a selfstanding thing as an originary being.

*Thirdly*, this side also has the merit of *popularity*: which certainly does not constitute the smallest part of its recommendation. The common understanding finds not the slightest difficulty in the ideas of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis because without them, it is more accustomed to proceeding downwards to the consequences than to ascending to the grounds and has within the concepts of something absolutely primary (over whose possibility it does not ponder) a convenience and simultaneously a fixed point to which it can connect the guideline for its steps: whereas, by contrast, in restlessly ascending from *conditionatum* to condition – always with one foot in the air – it can find no pleasure whatsoever.

On the side of empiricism in determination of the cosmological ideas, or the antithesis, there is firstly found no such practical interest from pure principles of reason as morality and religion carry with them. Instead, mere empiricism seems to deprive both of all power and influence. If there is no originary-being distinct from the world; if the world is without a beginning and therefore also without an author; and if our will is not free and the soul is of equal divisibility and corruptibility with matter: then even the moral ideas and principles lose all validity and fall with the transcendental ideas that constituted their theoretical support.

In contrast, however, empiricism offers advantages for reason’s speculative interest that are highly alluring and which far exceed those that the dogmatic teacher of the rational ideas may promise. According to the former, the understanding is always on its peculiar ground: viz. the field of mere possible experiences, whose laws it can trace; and by means of them, it can expand its sure and comprehensible cognition without end. Here, it can and shall present the object – both *per se* as well as in its relationships – to intuition or indeed in concepts whose image can be propounded clearly and perspicuously in similar given intuitions. Not only does it not need to leave that chain of the natural-order in order to attach itself to ideas whose objects it does not know because they (as cogitational things) can never be given; but it is also not even allowed to abandon its task and, under the pretext that it will now be brought to an end, cross over into the domain of an idealising reason and to transcendent concepts where it no longer needs to observe and enquire accordantly with the natural laws but rather merely to think and fabricate in the assurance that it cannot be refuted through facts of nature precisely because it is not bound to their testimony but may instead pass them by or even subordinate them themselves to a higher authority, viz. that of pure reason.

The empiricist will therefore never allow any natural epoch to be assumed before the absolutely-first such epoch; nor will he allow any limit of his prospect into nature’s extent to be regarded as the extreme limit; nor will he allow one to cross over from the objects of nature, which he can resolve through observation and mathematics and determine synthetically in intuition (viz. *extensa*) to those that neither sense nor imaginal-power can ever present *in concreto* (viz. simples); nor will he admit that even within nature, one takes a capacity to act independently of laws of nature (viz. freedom) as a basis and thereby diminishes the understanding’s task to tracing the arising of appearances along the guiding-thread of necessary rules; nor finally will he concede that one may seek something’s cause outside nature (i.e. an originary being) because we know nothing beyond nature, since it is nature alone that offers objects to us and which can instruct us about their laws.

Admittedly, if the empirical philosopher has no other intention with his antithesis than to subdue the curiosity and presumptuousness of a reason that misapprehends its true determination, aggrandises itself with *insight* and *knowledge* where insight and knowledge in fact cease, and wishes to present that which can hold only in respect of the practical interest as furthering the speculative interest in order (where it is conducive to its convenience) to tear away the thread of physical investigations and, under a pretence of expanding cognition, link it to transcendental ideas through which one in fact cognises only that *one knows nothing* – if, I say, the empiricist satisfied himself therewith, then his principle would be a maxim of moderation in claims, of modesty in assertions, and simultaneously of the greatest possible expansion of our understanding through the teacher that is in fact superordinate to us: namely, experience. For in such a case, intellectual *presuppositions* and *belief* would not be taken from us for the behoof of our practical concern; only one could not let them appear under the title and pomp of science and rational-insight because genuinely speculative *knowledge* can impinge upon absolutely no other object than that of experience: and if one transgresses experience’s limit, then synthesis that attempts new cognitions that are independent from experience has no substratum of intuition upon which it might be exercised.

Thus, however, if empiricism itself becomes dogmatic in respect of the ideas (as occurs for the most part) and brazenly denies that which is beyond the sphere of its intuitive cognitions, then it itself falls into the fault of immodesty: which is so much more blameworthy here because an irreparable disadvantage is thereby inflicted upon reason’s practical interest.

That is the contrast between Epicureanism[[31]](#footnote-31) and Platonism.

Each of them says more than it knows: yet in such a way that the first encourages and furthers knowledge, albeit to the detriment of the practical; and the second admittedly delivers excellent principles for the practical but precisely thereby allows reason to attach itself to idealistic explanations of natural appearances and, moreover, neglect physical investigation in respect of everything wherein a speculative knowledge alone is granted to us.

Finally, in respect of the third moment that can be looked to in connection with the precursory choice between two disputing parties, it is exceedingly strange that empiricism is totally contrary to all popularity even though one would believe that the common understanding would desirously adopt a project that promises to satisfy it through nothing but experiential cognitions and their rational coherence instead of transcendental dogmatism compelling it to ascend to concepts that far surpass the insight and rational capacity even of the minds most practised in thought.

Yet precisely that is the empiricist’s motivational ground. For he then finds himself in a state in which even the greatest scholar can pretend to nothing beyond him. If he understands little or nothing thereof, then nor indeed can anyone boast of understanding much more thereof; and even if he cannot speak about it in as scholastically-correct a manner as others, he can nevertheless sophisticate about it infinitely more because he is wandering amongst mere ideas, about which one is most eloquent precisely because one knows nothing thereof: instead of his having to remain completely silent concerning investigation of nature and admit his ignorance. Convenience and idleness are therefore already a strong recommendation of those principles. Moreover, even if it is very difficult for a philosopher to assume something as a principle without being able to give account of it to himself and still less introduce concepts whose objective reality cannot be discerned, nothing is more customary for the common understanding. It wants to have something with which it can confidently begin. The difficulty in comprehending such a presupposition itself does not unsettle him because it never enters his mind (and he does not know what ‘comprehension’ means), and he takes what is familiar to him through frequent use to be known. Ultimately, however, all speculative interest vanishes for him in favour of the practical; and he imagines himself to comprehend and know what his worries or hopes impel him to assume or believe. So empiricism of a transcendental-idealising reason is totally robbed of all popularity and, however much such a reason may contain that is detrimental to the highest practical principles, it is still not at all to be feared that it will ever transgress the limits of the school and acquire even merely somewhat considerable authority and some favour with the great multitude.

Human nature is, according to its nature, architectonic: i.e. it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system and hence permits only such principles that at least do not render a prospective cognition incapable of standing together with others within a system. The propositions of the antithesis, however, are of such a kind that they render completion of an edifice of cognitions totally impossible. According to them: beyond a state of the world, there is always a still older state; in every part, there are always still other parts that are in turn divisible; before every occurrence, there is another that was in turn otherwise generated; and in existence *simpliciter*, everything is always merely conditioned without recognising any unconditioned and first existence. Since therefore the antithesis nowhere admits a primary nor a beginning that could serve absolutely for a basis of construction, a complete edifice of cognition is totally impossible with such presuppositions. Therefore, reason’s architectonic interest (which demands not empirical- but rather pure rational-unity *apriori*) carries with it a natural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis.

Yet if a human could release himself from all interest and contemplate reason’s assertions indifferently towards all consequences, merely according to the content of their grounds: then such a human – supposing that he knew no way to escape from the crowd except by confessing one or another of the disputed doctrines – would be in an incessantly wavering state. Today, it would convincingly occur to him that the human will is free; tomorrow, when he took the indissoluble natural-chain into consideration, he would hold that freedom is nothing but self-deception and that everything is merely *nature*. But when it came to deed and action, that game of merely speculative reason would vanish like silhouettes of a dream; and he would choose his principles merely according to practical interest. Yet since it is nevertheless proper for a reflective and enquiring being to dedicate certain times merely to examination of his own reason but remove all partiality therein and thus impart his remarks to others for judgement publicly, no one can be resented for and still less forbidden from letting the propositions and counterpropositions appear so as to be able to defend themselves before jurors of their own standing (viz. the standing of frail humans), daunted through no threat.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.4. On the Transcendental Problems of Pure Reason insofar as They Absolutely Must Be Capable of Being Resolved

To wish to resolve all problems and answer all questions would be an unashamed self-aggrandisement and such an excessive self-conceit that one would thereby immediately have to forsake all confidence. Nevertheless, there are sciences whose nature brings with it that every question occurring therein must be answerable absolutely from what one knows because the answer must derive from the same sources from which the question derives and where it is in no way allowable to pretend unavoidable ignorance, but where the resolution can rather be demanded. One must be able to know what is *right* or *wrong* in all possible cases according to a rule because it concerns our obligation, and we cannot even have an obligation towards what we cannot know. In explanation of the appearances of nature, much must nevertheless remain uncertain to us and some questions must nevertheless remain unresolvable for us because what we know of nature is far from sufficient in all cases for what we shall explain. It is now asked whether any question in transcendental philosophy that concerns an object presented to reason is unanswerable through precisely that pure reason and whether one can rightfully withdraw from answering it decisively through counting it, *qua* absolutely uncertain (out of all that we can cognise), with that whereof we admittedly have enough of a concept to raise a question but totally lack the means or the capacity to ever answer it.

I now assert that amongst all speculative cognition, transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that absolutely no question that concerns an object given to pure reason is unresolvable for the very same human reason and that no pretence of an unavoidable ignorance and of the problem’s unfathomable depth could absolve one from the obligation to answer it profoundly and completely because exactly the same concept that puts us in a position to ask it must also thoroughly render us fit to answer that question, since the object is not encountered outside the concept at all (as with right and wrong).

In transcendental philosophy, however, there are no questions, except merely the cosmological questions, in respect of which one can rightfully demand a sufficient answer that concerns the constitution of the object, without a philosopher being allowed to withdraw from them through pretending impenetrable obscurity; and those questions can concern only cosmological ideas. For the object must be given empirically, and the question pertains only to its congruity with an idea. If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown – e.g. whether the something whose appearance (within ourselves) is thought (i.e. the soul) is a *per se* simple being; whether there is a cause of all things *in toto* that is absolutely necessary; etc. – then we shall seek an object for our idea of which we can admit that it is unknown to us yet still not impossible because of that.[[32]](#footnote-32) The cosmological ideas alone have in them the peculiarity that they can presuppose their object and the empirical synthesis requisite for its concept as given; and the question that arises from them concerns only the progression of that synthesis so far as it shall contain absolute totality: and the latter is no longer something empirical because it cannot be given in an experience. Now, since the talk here is merely of a thing as an object of a possible experience and not as an item *per se*, the answer to the transcendent cosmological question can lie nowhere outside the idea because it does not concern an object *per se*; and in respect of possible experience, one enquires not about what can be given *in concreto* within an experience but rather about what lies within the idea, which empirical synthesis shall merely approximate – therefore, the question must be capable of being resolved from the idea alone; for the idea is a mere creation of reason, which therefore cannot reject the responsibility and shift it onto the unknown object.

It is not as extraordinary as it initially seems that a science could merely demand and expect certain resolutions in respect of all questions belonging to its complex (i.e. *quaestiones domesticae*) even though they have perhaps not yet been found at that time. Beyond transcendental philosophy, there are two further pure rational-sciences – one with merely speculative content and the other with practical content: namely, pure *mathematics* and pure *morality*. Has one ever indeed heard that due to a necessary ignorance of the conditions, as it were, it has been professed to be uncertain what relationship the diameter has to a circle utterly exactly in rational- or irrational numbers? Since that relationship cannot be given congruently through the former at all but has not yet been found through the latter, one judges that at least the impossibility of such a resolution could be cognised with certainty: and Lambert gave a proof thereof. In the universal principles of morals, nothing uncertain can be found because the principles are either entirely and absolutely null and devoid of sense or must flow merely from our rational concepts. In contrast, there is an infinity of surmises in natural theory in respect of which certainty can never be expected because natural appearances are objects that can be given to us independently of our concepts and the key to which therefore does not lie within us and our pure thought but rather outside us and, precisely because of that, cannot be found in many cases and consequently can expect no sure solution. I do not reckon the questions of the Transcendental Analytic concerning the deduction of our pure cognition herewith because we are now treating only of the certainty of judgements in respect to the objects and not in respect to the origin of our concepts themselves.

We will therefore be unable to avoid the obligation to provide an at least critical resolution of the propounded questions-of-reason through raising complaints about the narrow constraints of our reason and confessing with the semblance of a humble self-cognition that it is beyond our reason to discern: whether the world is from eternity or has a beginning; whether cosmic space is filled with beings *in infinitum* or enclosed inside certain limits; whether something within the world is simple or whether everything must be divided *in infinitum*; whether there is a generation and production from freedom or whether everything hangs upon the chain of the natural order; and finally whether there is any totally unconditioned and *per se* necessary being or whether everything is conditioned in respect of its existence and therefore externally-dependent and *per se* contingent. For all of those questions concern an object that can be given nowhere other than within our thoughts, viz. the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of the appearances. If we cannot say and discern anything certain about that from our own concepts, we are not permitted to shift the blame onto the item that conceals itself from us: for no such item can be given to us at all (because it is nowhere encountered outside our idea); but rather we must seek the cause within our idea itself, which is a problem that admits of no resolution and whereof we can nevertheless stubbornly assume that an actual object corresponds to it. A perspicuous presentation of the dialectic that lies within our concept itself would soon bring us to the full certainty of what we have to judge in respect of such a question.

To your pretext of uncertainty in respect of these problems, one can first oppose the following question: which you must at least answer perspicuously – whence do the ideas come to you whose resolution embroils you in such difficulty here? Are they perhaps appearances whose explanation you need and whereof you, according to those ideas, have to seek only the principles or the rule of their exposition? Assume nature were totally uncovered for you and that nothing were concealed from your senses and your consciousness of all that is laid before your intuition: you would nevertheless be unable to cognise the object of your ideas *in concreto* through any single experience (for beyond that complete intuition, a completed synthesis and consciousness of its absolute totality is required, which is possible through no empirical cognition whatsoever); consequently, your question can in no way be necessarily imposed for explaining a presented appearance and therefore, as it were, through the object itself. For the object can never be presented to you because it cannot be given through a possible experience. With all possible perceptions, you always remain trapped under conditions (be it within space or time) and encounter nothing unconditioned in order to discern whether that *inconditionatum* is to be posited in an absolute beginning of synthesis or an absolute totality of the series without any beginning. Yet the all, in an empirical signification, is always merely comparative. The absolute all of quantity (i.e. the universe), of division, of origination, and of the condition of existence *simpliciter* with all questions of whether it is to be brought about through finite synthesis or synthesis continuing *in infinitum* impinges upon no possible experience. You would (e.g.) be unable to explain the appearances of a body better in the slightest nor even merely otherwise, irrespective of whether you assume that it consists of simple- or always thoroughgoingly of composite parts; for neither a simple appearance nor, equally, an infinite composition can ever be presented to you. The appearances demand only to be explained, so far as their explanatory conditions are given within perception; but everything that may ever be given, taken together in an absolute whole, is not itself a perception. It is in fact that all, however, whose explanation is demanded in the transcendental problems-of-reason.

Since the resolution of these problems can never be presented within experience, you cannot say that it is uncertain what is to be attributed to the object in respect of it. For your object is merely within your brain and cannot be given outside it at all; therefore, you have to concern yourself merely with becoming one with yourself and preventing the amphiboly that turns your idea into a purported representation of something empirically given and therefore also into an object that is to be cognised according to experiential laws. The dogmatic resolution is therefore not, say, uncertain but rather impossible. But the critical resolution, which can be fully certain, considers the question not objectively at all but rather in respect to the fundament of cognition upon which it is grounded.

**1**.2.3.3.2.5. Sceptical Representation of the Cosmological Questions through All Four Transcendental Ideas

We would gladly recede from the demand to see our questions answered dogmatically if we already comprehended in advance that however the answer might turn out, it would still merely augment our ignorance and hurl us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity into a still greater obscurity, and perhaps even into contradictions. If our question is posed merely for affirmation or denial, then it is prudent to let the answer’s surmised grounds remain in question for the nonce and to first of all consider what one would gain if the answer turned out in favour of one side and what one would gain if it turned out in favour of the opposing side. Now, if it happens that mere senselessness (i.e. nonsense) results in both cases, then we have a grounded invitation to critically investigate our question itself and to see whether it does not itself rest upon a groundless presupposition and play with an idea that betrays its falsity better in its application and through its consequences than in its abstracted representation. That is the great utility of the sceptical way of treating the questions that pure reason poses to pure reason and whereby one can be relieved of a great dogmatic imbroglio with little expense in order to place a sober critique in its stead that, as a true catharcticon, will felicitously expel the illusion together with its cohort: pedantry.

So if I could discern from a cosmological idea in advance that whichever side of the *inconditionatum* of the regressive synthesis of the appearances it might favour, it would still be either too great or too small for any intellectual concept: then I would comprehend that since the former nevertheless deals only with an object of experience that shall be congruous with a possible intellectual-concept, it must be entirely empty and without significance because the object does not fit it: however I may seek to accommodate the object to it. And that is actually the case with all cosmic concepts: which, precisely because of that, also embroil reason in an unavoidable antinomy so long as it adheres to them. For assume:

*Firstly* that *the world* *has no beginning* – it is then too great for your concept; for your concept, which consists in a successive regress, can never attain the entire past eternity. Suppose you have a beginning: then the world is in turn too small for your intellectual concept in the necessary empirical *regressus*. For since the beginning still always presupposes a time that precedes, it is still not unconditioned: and the law of empirical use of the understanding still imposes the task of enquiring after a higher temporal-condition upon you; and the world is therefore manifestly too small for that law.

It is exactly the same with the double answer to the question concerning the world’s magnitude in respect to space. For if it is infinite and unlimited, then it is too great for every possible empirical concept. If it is finite and limited, then you still rightly ask what determines that limit. Empty space is not a correlate of things subsisting by itself and cannot be a condition at which you could stop, and still much less can it be an empirical condition that constitutes a part of a possible experience (for who can have an experience of something absolutely empty?). For the absolute totality of empirical synthesis, however, it is always required that the *inconditionatum* be an experiential concept. Therefore, a limited world is too small for your concept.

*Secondly*, if every appearance in space (i.e. matter) consists of infinitely many parts, then the *regressus* of division is always too great for your concept; and if the division of space shall cease at an element of that division (viz. a simple), then the *regressus* is too small for the idea of the *inconditionatum*. For that element still always leaves a *regressus* remainingto more parts contained within it.

*Thirdly*, if you assume that in everything that occurs within the world, there is nothing other than results according to laws of nature: then the causality of the cause is always in turn something that occurs and necessitates your *regressus* to a still higher cause and therefore lengthening the series of conditions *a parte priori* without cessation. Mere efficient nature is therefore too great for all your concepts in synthesis of cosmic-occurrences. If, now and then, you choose occurrences effected by yourself and therefore generation from freedom: then the ‘why’ pursues you according to an unavoidable natural-law and compels you to go beyond that point according to the causal-law of experience, and you find that such totality of connection is too small for your necessary empirical concept.

*Fourthly*. If you assume an absolutely necessary being (be it the world itself or something within the world or the world’s cause), then you posit it in a time infinitely distant from any given temporal-point: because it would otherwise be dependent upon another, older existence. Then, however, that existence is inaccessible for your empirical concept and too great for you to ever be capable of reaching it via any continued *regressus*.

Yet if, in your opinion, everything that belongs to the world (be it as a *conditionatum* or as a condition) is contingent: then any given existence is too small for your concept. For any given existence compels you to always look for another existence upon which it is dependent.

We have said in all of those cases that the cosmic idea is either too great for the empirical *regressus* and therefore for every possible intellectual-concept or even too small for it. Why have we not expressed ourselves conversely and said that whereas the empirical concept is always too small for the idea in the first case, it is always too large in the second case and consequently attached the blame to the empirical *regressus* (as it were) instead of accusing the cosmological idea of deviating from its purpose (viz. possible experience) in being too great or too small? The ground was as follows. Possible experience is that which alone can give reality to our concepts; without that, every concept is merely an idea without truth and relation to an object. Hence, the possible empirical concept was the standard in light of which the idea had to be judged in respect of whether it is a mere idea and cogitational-thing or encounters its object within the world. For one says that something is too great or too small relatively to something else only if it is assumed for the latter’s sake and must be arranged according to it. The following question also belonged to the playthings of the ancient dialectical schools – if a ball does not pass through a hole, what shall one say: is the ball too large or the hole too small? In that case, it is a matter of indifference how you wish to express yourself; for you do not know which of the two exists for the other’s sake. In contrast, you will not say that a man is too tall for his garment but rather that the garment is too short for the man. We are therefore at least brought to the grounded suspicion that the cosmological ideas and, with them, all sophistical assertions posited amongst one another in dispute are perhaps underlain by an empty and merely imagined concept of the way in which the object of those ideas is given to us; and that suspicion can already lead us to the right track to discover the illusion that has led us astray for so long.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.6. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to Resolving the Cosmological Dialectic

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, we sufficiently proved that everything that is intuited within space or time, and therefore all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but appearances (i.e. mere representations) that have no *per se* grounded existence outside our thoughts as they are represented, i.e. as extended beings or series of alterations. I call that doctrine *transcendental idealism*. The realist, in a transcendental signification, makes *per se* subsistent things from those modifications of our sensibility and consequently turns mere representations into items *per se*.

One would do us an injustice if one sought to impute to us the already long greatly maligned empirical-idealism: which, because it assumes space’s own actuality, denies the existence of the extended beings within it (or at least finds it doubtful) and admits no sufficiently demonstrable difference between dream and truth in that respect. It finds no difficulty in respect to the appearances of the internal sense within time *qua* actual things and indeed even asserts that only that internal experience alone sufficiently demonstrates the actual existence of its object (*per se*), (with all of that temporal determination).

In contrast, our transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition, exactly as they are intuited within space, are also actual and that within time, all alterations are actual just as the internal sense represents them. For since space is indeed a form of the intuition that we call ‘external intuition’ and without objects within it, there would be no empirical representation whatsoever: we can and must assume extended beings as actual therein, and it is also exactly the same with time. Yet that space itself along with that time and, together with both, all appearances are nevertheless not things *per se* but rather nothing but representations and cannot exist outside our mind at all; and even the internal and sensory intuition of our mind (*qua* object of consciousness), whose determination becomes represented through the succession of diverse states in time, is also not the genuine self as it exists *per se* or the transcendental subject but rather merely an appearance that has been given to the sensibility of that being, which is unknown to us. The existence of that internal appearance as a thus *per se* existent thing cannot be admitted because its condition is time, which cannot be a determination of any thing *per se*. Within space and time, however, the empirical truth of the appearances is adequately assured and sufficiently differentiated from kinship with dreams if both cohere correctly and thoroughgoingly within an experience according to empirical laws.

Thus, the objects of experience are never given *per se* but rather only within experience and do not exist outside it at all. That there could be inhabitants of the Moon – even if no human has ever perceived them – must admittedly be conceded, but it signifies only so much as that we could encounter them in the possible progression of experience; for everything is actual that stands within a context with a perception according to laws of empirical progression. They are therefore actual when they stand in an empirical nexus with my actual consciousness, even though they are not consequently actual *per se* (i.e. outside that progression of experience).

Nothing is actually given to us except perception and its empirical progression to other possible perceptions. For *per se*, appearances are (as mere representations) actual only within perception: which is in fact nothing other than the actuality of an empirical representation, i.e. appearance. To call an appearance an ‘actual thing’ prior to perception signifies either that we must encounter such a perception in the progression of experience, or it has no signification whatsoever. For it could admittedly be said that the appearance exists *per se* – without relation to our senses and possible experience – if the talk were of a thing *per se*. But the talk is merely of an appearance within space and time, both of which are determinations not of the things *per se* but rather merely of our sensibility; therefore, what is within them (i.e. appearances) are not something *per se* but rather mere representations that would be encountered nowhere at all if they were not given within us (i.e. within perception).

The sensory intuitional-capacity is in fact only a receptivity to be affected in a certain way with representations whose relationship to one another is a pure intuition of space and time (mere forms of our sensibility) and which are called ‘objects’ so far as they are connected and determinable in that relationship (i.e. within space and time) according to laws of the unity of experience. The non-sensory cause of those representations is wholly unknown to us, and we consequently cannot intuit it as an object; for such an object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time (which are mere conditions of sensory representation): without which conditions, we would be unable to think about any intuition whatsoever. Nevertheless, we can call the merely intelligible cause of appearances *simpliciter* the ‘transcendental object’ merely in order for us to have something that corresponds to sensibility as a receptivity. We can ascribe all extent and coherence of our possible perceptions to that transcendental object and say that it is given *per se* prior to all experience. Yet appearances are, in accordance with it, given not *per se* but rather only within that experience because they are mere representations that, as perceptions, signify an actual object only if that perception coheres with all others according to the rules of experiential unity. So one can say that the actual things of the past time are given in the transcendental object of experience; but they are objects for me and actual within the past time only so far as I represent to myself that a regressive series of possible perceptions (be it along the guiding-thread of history or in the footsteps of causes and effects), according to empirical laws (i.e., in a word: the world’s course), leads to a past time-series *qua* condition of the present time that then nevertheless becomes represented as actual only within the nexus of a possible experience and not *per se*, in such a way that all past occurrences prior to my existence since time immemorial signify nothing other than the possibility of lengthening the chain of experience from the present perception upwards to the conditions that determine that perception in respect to time.

So if I represent to myself all existent objects of the senses in all time and all spaces *in toto*: then I do not posit the former into the latter, but rather that representation is nothing but a thought of a possible experience in its absolute completeness. Those objects (which are nothing but mere representations) are given within that experience alone.

That one says that they exist prior to all my experience, however, signifies merely that they are to be encountered only within the part of experience to which I must first progress starting from perception. The cause of the empirical conditions of that progression and consequently which elements or even how far I could encounter such elements in the *regressus* is transcendental and therefore necessarily unknown to me. Yet it is not that cause that is at issue, moreover, but rather merely the rule of the progression of the experience within which the objects (viz. appearances) are given to me. Moreover, it is entirely the same at the outset whether I say ‘in empirical progression in space, I can encounter stars that are a hundred times more distant than the most distant stars that I see’ or whether I say ‘there are perhaps stars to be encountered within cosmic space even if no human has ever perceived them nor will perceive them; for even if they were given *simpliciter* as things *per se* without relation to possible experience, then they are nevertheless nothing prior to me and therefore are not objects except so far as they are contained within the series of the empirical *regressus*. Only in another signification – if precisely those appearances shall be used for the cosmological idea of an absolute whole and if therefore only a question that goes beyond the limits of possible experience is at issue – then distinguishing the way in which one takes the objects of the senses is of importance in order to avoid a fallacious illusion that must inevitably arise from misinterpreting our own experiential concepts.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.7. Critical Decision of Reason’s Cosmological Dispute with Itself

The whole antinomy of pure reason rests upon the following dialectical argument: if a *conditionatum* is given, then the whole series of all its conditions is also given; now, objects of the senses are given to us as conditioned; consequently, etc. Through that rational inference, whose major premise seems so natural and patent, and according to the diversity of the conditions (in the synthesis of appearances) so far as they constitute a series, just as many cosmological ideas are introduced that postulate the absolute totality of those series and which precisely thereby bring reason unavoidably into conflict with itself. Yet before we uncover the fallacious aspect of that sophistical argument, we must put ourselves in a position to do so through correcting and determining certain concepts occurring therein.

First of all, the following principle is clear and undoubtedly certain: viz. that if a *conditionatum* is given, then a *regressus* within the series of all conditions for it is *imposed* upon us; for the concept of a *conditionatum* already brings with it that something thereby becomes related to a condition and, if that condition is in turn conditioned, to a remoter condition and thus through all elements of the series. That principle is therefore analytic and rises above all fear of a transcendental critique. The following is a logical postulate of reason: to pursue through the understanding and to continue as far as possible the connection of a concept to its conditions that already attaches to the concept itself.

Furthermore, if a *conditionatum* as well as its condition are things *per se*, then if the former has been given: then not only is a *regressus* to the latter imposed, but the latter is thereby already actually *given* concomitantly; and because that holds for all elements of the series, the complete series of the conditions and therefore also the *inconditionatum* are thereby given simultaneously: or rather it is presupposed that the *conditionatum* that was possible only through that series is given. The synthesis of the *conditionatum* with its condition here is a synthesis of the mere understanding, which represents the things as they are without adverting to whether and how we can attain knowledge of them. In contrast: if I am dealing with appearances – which, as mere representations, are not given at all if I do not arrive at knowledge of them (i.e. arrive at them themselves, for they are nothing but empirical knowings) – then I cannot say in precisely that signification that if a *conditionatum* is given, then all of the conditions for it (as appearances) are also given and can therefore in no way infer to the absolute totality of the series thereof. For appearances themselves are, in apprehension, nothing but an empirical synthesis (within space and time) and therefore given only in that synthesis. Now, it does not at all follow that if a *conditionatum* (in appearance) is given, then the synthesis that constitutes its empirical condition is also thereby concomitantly given and presupposed; but rather the latter first occurs only in a *regressus* and never without it. Yet one can well say in such a case that a *regressus* to the conditions (i.e. a continued empirical synthesis on that side) is demanded or imposed and that the conditions that are given through that *regressus* cannot be absent.

It is manifest therefrom that the major-premise of the cosmological rational-inference will take the *conditionatum* in the transcendental signification of a pure category but will take the minor premise in the empirical signification of an intellectual concept applied to mere appearances and that consequently, the dialectical fallacy that one calls *sophisma figurae dictionis* is encountered therein. That fallacy is not artificial, however, but rather an entirely natural deception of common reason. For through it, we posit the conditions and their series in advance (in the major premise) indiscriminately, as it were, if something is given as conditioned because that is nothing other than the logical requirement to assume complete premises for a given conclusion: and there, no temporal order is to be encountered in the connection of the *conditionatum* to its condition; they are presupposed *per se* as given simultaneously. Furthermore, it is just as natural (in the minor premise) to regard appearances as both things *per se* and objects given to the mere understanding as occurred in the major premise, since I abstracted from all conditions of intuition under which alone objects can be given. Yet we had overlooked a remarkable difference between the concepts. The synthesis of the *conditionatum* with its condition and the whole series of the latter (in the major premise) carries with it no constrainment through time whatsoever and no concept of succession. In contrast, the empirical synthesis and the series of the conditions (that are subsumed in the minor premise) are necessarily successive and given only after one another in time; consequently, I could no more presuppose the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series thereby represented in the latter case than I could in the former because whereas all elements of the series are given *per se* (without a temporal condition) in the former case, they are possible in the latter case only through a successive *regressus* that is given only through the fact that one actually executes it.

Following the confutation of such a misstep of the argument commonly taken as a basis (of the cosmological assertions), both disputing parties can rightly be dismissed as parties that ground their demand upon no profound title. Their controversy is not yet ended, however, insofar as they were to be persuaded that they, or one of them, were incorrect in the issue itself that they assert (in the conclusion): even if they were unable to construct it upon fit probative-grounds. Yet nothing seems clearer than that of two people, one of whom asserts that the world has a beginning and the other of whom asserts that the world has no beginning but is rather from eternity, one must nevertheless be right. If that is so, however, then it is because the clarity on both sides is equal: although it is impossible to ever find out which side is right and the dispute endures afterwards as before, even if the parties have been directed to desist at the tribunal of reason. Therefore, no means remains left over to end the dispute profoundly and to the satisfaction of both parties except that since they can indeed refute one another so beautifully, they ultimately become persuaded that they are disputing over nothing and that a certain transcendental semblance has depicted an actuality for them where none is to be encountered. We shall now pursue that path of setting aside a dispute that cannot be adjudicated.

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The *Eleatic Zeno*, a subtle dialectician, is already severely rebuked by Plato as a willful sophist because he, on the one hand, sought to prove a proposition through specious arguments and, on the other hand, soon thereafter in turn sought to overturn the same proposition through other, equally-strong specious arguments in order to show his art. He asserted that God (who was, for him, purportedly nothing other than the cosmos) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor at rest, and neither similar nor dissimilar to other things. It seemed to those who judged him in respect thereto that he had sought to totally deny two propositions that contradict one another, which is absurd. Only I do not find that that charge can rightfully be laid upon him. I will soon inspect the first of those propositions more closely. In respect to the other: if Zeno understood the universe by the word ‘God’, then he admittedly had to say that it is neither persistently present in its location (i.e. at rest) nor alters its location (i.e. moves) because only all locations are within the universe, whereas the universe itself is therefore in no location. If the universe encompasses within itself everything that exists: then it is also, to that extent, neither similar nor dissimilar to another thing because there is no other thing outside it with which it could be compared. If two opposed judgements presuppose an inadmissible condition: then despite their conflict (which is nevertheless no genuine contradiction), they both fall away because the condition falls away under which alone each of those propositions should hold.

If someone said ‘every body either smells good, or it does not smell good’, then there is a *tertium quid*: namely, that the body does not smell (i.e. emit an odour) at all; and so both conflicting propositions can be false. If I say ‘either the body is sweetsmelling, or it is not sweetsmelling’ (‘*vel suaveolens vel non suaveolens*’): then both judgements are contradictorily opposed to one another, and only the first is false; but its contradictory contrary (viz. some bodies are not sweetsmelling) also encompasses within it the bodies that do not smell at all. In the previous opposition (*per disparata*), the contingent condition of the concept of a body (viz. smell) still remained in respect to the conflicting judgement and therefore was not concomitantly eliminated through it: and consequently, the latter was not the contradictory contrary of the former.

So if I say ‘the cosmos is either infinite in respect to space, or it is not infinite (*non est infinitus*)’: then if the first proposition is false, its contradictory contrary (viz. ‘the cosmos is not infinite’) must be true. I would thereby only eliminate an infinite cosmos without positing another (viz. a finite cosmos); but if it were said ‘the cosmos is either infinite or finite (i.e. non-infinite)’, then both could be false. For I then regard the cosmos as determined *per se* in respect of its magnitude because I do not merely eliminate infinity in the counterproposition and, with it, perhaps its entire abstracted existence but rather add a determination to the cosmos as a *per se* actual thing that can just as well be false: i.e. if the cosmos were not to be given as a *thing* *per se* at all and nor therefore in respect to its quantity – neither as infinite nor as finite. Allow me to call such an opposition a ‘dialectical’ opposition and that of contradiction ‘analytic’ opposition. Therefore: of two dialectically-opposed judgements, both can be false because one does not merely contradict the other but rather says something more than is requisite for contradiction.

If one regards the two propositions ‘the cosmos is infinite in respect to magnitude’ and ‘the cosmos is finite in respect to its magnitude’ as contradictorily opposed to one another, then one assumes that the cosmos (i.e. the entire series of all appearances) is a thing *per se*. For it remains even if I eliminate the infinite or finite *regressus* in the series of its appearances. But if I remove that presupposition or that transcendental semblance and deny that the cosmos is a thing *per se*, then the contradictory conflict of the two assertions transforms into a merely dialectical conflict: and because the cosmos does not exist at all *per se* (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a *per se infinite* nor as a *per se finite* whole. The cosmos is to be encountered only in the empirical *regressus* of the series of the appearances and is not to be encountered at all by itself. Therefore: if that series is always conditioned, then it is never wholly given; and the cosmos is therefore not an unconditioned whole and therefore also does not exist as such a whole – neither with infinite nor with finite magnitude.

What has been said here of the first cosmological idea (viz. of the absolute totality of quanta in appearance) also holds for all others. The series of conditions is to be encountered only in the regressive synthesis itself but not *per se* within appearance as a discrete thing given prior to all *regressus*. Consequently, I will also have to say that the multitude of the parts within a given appearance is *per se* neither finite nor infinite because appearance is nothing existent *per se* and the parts are first given only through the *regressus* of decompositional synthesis and in it, which *regressus* is never given absolutely wholly: neither as finite nor as infinite. Precisely that holds for the series of the intersuperordinate causes or the series of conditioned- up to unconditionally-necessary existence: which can never be regarded as finite nor as infinite *per se* in its totality because as a series of subordinate representations, it consists only in dynamic *regressus* but cannot exist at all prior to it and *per se* as a series of things subsisting by itself.

The antinomy of pure reason is thus remedied in respect of its cosmological ideas through its being shown that it is merely dialectical and a conflict of a semblance that derives from the fact that one applied the idea of absolute totality that is valid only as a condition of the things *per se* to appearances: which exist only in representation and, if they constitute a series, in successive *regressus* but otherwise not at all. Yet one can also conversely draw a true utility from that antinomy that is admittedly not dogmatic but which is nevertheless critical and doctrinal: viz. to thereby prove the transcendental ideality of all appearances indirectly, if the direct proof in the Transcendental Aesthetic were perhaps not enough for someone. The proof would consist in the following dilemma. If the world is a *per se* existent whole, then it is either finite or infinite; now, both the first and the second are false (according to the above adduced proofs of the antithesis, on the one hand, and the thesis on the other). Therefore, it is also false that the cosmos (i.e. the complex of all appearances) is a *per se* existent whole. From which, then, it follows that appearances *simpliciter* are nothing outside our representations: which we wanted to say precisely through their transcendental ideality.

That remark is of importance. One sees therefrom that the above proofs of the fourfold antinomy were not illusions but rather were profound under the presupposition that appearances or a sensible cosmos that comprehends them within itself *in toto* were things *per se*. The conflict of the propositions drawn therefrom uncovers that a falsity lies within the presupposition, however, and thereby leads us to uncover the true constitution of the things *qua* objects of the senses. The Transcendental Dialectic therefore in no way promotes scepticism at all but indeed promotes the sceptical method, which can exhibit an example of its great utility in light of it if one lets reason’s arguments appear against one another in their greatest freedom: which, even though they will not ultimately deliver what one sought, will always nevertheless deliver something useful that can serve for our judgements’ correction.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.8. Eighth Section: Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in Respect of the Cosmological Ideas

Since no maximum of the series of conditions within a sensible cosmos *qua* thing *per se* is given through the cosmological principle of totality but can rather merely be imposed in *regressus*, the aforesaid principle of pure reason nevertheless retains its good validity in its thus corrected signification admittedly not as an *axiom* to think of the totality within the object as actual but rather as a problem for the understanding and therefore for the subject in order, according to the completeness in the idea, to institute and continue the *regressus* in the series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum*. For within sensibility (i.e. within space and time), every condition at which we can arrive in exposition of given appearances is in turn conditioned because the latter are not objects *per se* in which something absolutely unconditioned could occur but rather merely empirical representations that must always find within intuition their condition that determines them in respect to space or time. The principle of reason is therefore in fact only a rule that demands a *regressus* in the series of the conditions of given appearances that is never allowed to stop at something absolutely unconditioned. That principle is therefore not a principle of the possibility of experience and of empirical cognitions of the objects of the senses and nor consequently is it a principle of the understanding – for every experience is enclosed within its limits (according to the given intuition) – and nor therefore is it a *constitutive principle* of reason to expand the concept of the sensible cosmos beyond all possible experience but rather a principle of the greatest possible continuation and expansion of experience according to which no empirical limit must be regarded as an absolute limit and therefore a principle of reason that, as a *rule*, postulates what shall occur from us in the *regressus* and *does not anticipate* what is given *in the object per se* prior to all *regressus*. Hence, I call it a ‘regulative principle of reason’ because, by contrast, the principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions – as given in the object (i.e. the appearances) *per se* – would be a constitutive cosmological principle whose nullity I have sought to indicate precisely through that distinction and have thereby sought to prevent one from attributing objective reality to an idea that serves merely for a rule, as otherwise inevitably occurs (through transcendental subreption).

In order to now appropriately determine the sense of that rule of pure reason, it is to be remarked first of all that that rule cannot say *what the object is* but rather *how the empirical regressus is to be instituted* in order to arrive at the complete concept of the object. For if the former occurred, then that rule would be a constitutive principle: the like of which is never possible from pure reason. One can therefore in no way have the intention of saying that the series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum* is finite or infinite *per se*; for thereby, a mere idea of absolute totality that is created merely within the idea itself would think of an object that cannot be given within an experience because an objective reality independent from empirical synthesis would be imparted to a series of appearances. The idea of reason will therefore merely prescribe a rule to regressive synthesis within the series of conditions according to which it progresses from the *conditionata* to the *inconditionatum* by means of all intersubordinate conditions, even though the *inconditionatum* is never attained. For something absolutely unconditioned is not encountered within experience at all.

To that end, the synthesis of a series so far as it is never complete is firstly to be determined exactly. In that intention, one customarily avails oneself of two terms that shall therein distinguish something: yet without one’s being able to specify the ground of that distinction correctly. Mathematicians speak merely of a *progressus in infinitum*. Instead of that, researchers of concepts (i.e. philosophers) wish to accept only the term ‘*progressus in indefinitum*’. Without dwelling upon examination of the doubt that has recommended such a distinction to them and the good or fruitless use of that distinction, I shall seek to determine those concepts exactly in relation to my intention.

One can rightly say of a straight line that it can be lengthened *in infinitum*; and there, the distinction between infinite- and indeterminably-long progression (*progressus in indefinitum*) would be a vacuous subtlety. For even though if one says ‘extend a line’, it admittedly sounds more correct if one adds ‘*in indefinitum*’ rather than ‘*in infinitum*’ because whereas the first signifies no more than ‘lengthen it as far as you wish’, the second signifies ‘you shall never cease to lengthen it’ (which is not exactly the intention therein): the first expression is nevertheless entirely correct if the talk is only of *capacity*; for you could always enlarge it *in infinitum*. And it also thus in all cases wherein one speaks only of *progressus*,i.e. progression from *condition* to *conditionatum*; that possible progression goes *in infinitum* within the series of appearances. You could progress without end from one parental pair in a descending line of generation, and you could also very well think that the line actually progresses thus within the cosmos. For there, reason never needs the series’s absolute totality because it does not presuppose the series as a condition and as given (*datum*) but rather merely as something conditioned that is only giveable (*dabile*) and which is added to without end.

It is entirely different with the problem of how far the *regressus* extendsthat ascends from the given *conditionatum* to the conditions within a series – in respect of whether I can say that it is a *regression in infinitum* or merely a regression that extends *indeterminably* far (i.e. *in indefinitum*) and whether I can therefore ascend upwards *in infinitum* from the humans currently-alive within the series of their ancestors or whether it can be said only that even as far as I have gone back, an empirical ground is never encountered for holding the series to be limited somewhere: in such a way that I am justified in seeking out and simultaneously obliged to seek out still further ancestors of each of the progenitors, even though I am neither justified in presupposing nor obliged to presuppose them.

I thus say: if a whole has been given in empirical intuition, then the *regressus* within the series of its internal conditions goes *in infinitum*; but if only an element of the series is given from which the *regressus* shall only progress to absolute totality, then only a regression into an indeterminate expanse (i.e. *in indefinitum*) occurs. So it must be said of the division of a matter (of a body) that is given between its limits that it goes *in infinitum*. For that matter is given wholly and consequently with all of its possible parts within empirical intuition. Now, since the condition of that whole is its part, and the condition of that part is the part of the part etc.; and an unconditioned (i.e. indivisible) element of that series of conditionsis never encountered in that decompositional *regressus*: not only is there nowhere an empirical ground for ceasing in the division, but also the further elements of the division that is to be continued are themselves given empirically prior to that continuing division – i.e. the division goes *in infinitum*. In contrast: the series of the ancestors for a given human is given in its absolute totality in no possible experience, but the *regressus* nevertheless goes from each element of that generation to a higher element in such a way that no empirical limit is encounterable that would present an element as absolutely unconditioned. Yet since, moreover, the elements that could yield the condition for that nevertheless do not already lie within the empirical intuition of the whole prior to the *regressus*, the *regressus* goes not *in infinitum* (i.e. of the division of what is given) but rather into an indeterminable expanse of the search for more elements for the given elements that are in turn always given only conditionally.

In neither of the two cases (i.e. neither in *regressus in infinitum* nor in *regressus in indefinitum*) is the series of the conditions regarded as given infinitely in the object. They are not things that are given *per se* but rather only appearances that, as conditions of one another, are given only in the *regressus* itself. Therefore, the question is no longer how great that series of the conditions is *per se* (i.e. whether it is finite or infinite) – for the series is nothing *per se* – but rather how we shall institute the empirical *regressus* and how far we shall continue it. And there is then a nomenclatory difference in respect to the rule of that progression. If the whole has been given empirically, then it is *possible* to regress *in infinitum* within the series of its internal conditions. But if the whole is not given but shall rather first be given only through empirical *regressus*, then I can say only that it is *possible* to progress *in infinitum* to still higher conditions of the series. In the first case, I could say: more elements always exist and are empirically given than I reach through the (decompositional) *regressus*; but in the second case: I can still always go further in the *regressus* because no element is empirically given as absolutely unconditioned and therefore still always permits a higher element as possible and consequently permits enquiry after it as necessary. In the first case, it was necessary to encounter more elements of the series; but in the second case, it is always necessary to enquire after more elements of the series because no experience delimits absolutely. For you either have no perception that delimits your empirical *regressus* absolutely, and then you must not hold your *regress* to be completed; or if you have such a perception that delimits your series, then that perception cannot be a part of the series that you have covered (because that which *delimits* must differ from that which is thereby *delimited*): and you must therefore also further continue your *regressus* for that condition and so forth.

The following section will set these remarks in their appropriate light through their application.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.9. Ninth Section: On the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason in Respect of All Cosmological Ideas

Since, as we have shown multiple times, there is no more a transcendental use of the pure understanding than of rational concepts because the absolute totality of the series of the conditions within the sensible cosmos is founded merely upon a transcendental use of reason that demands that unconditioned completeness from that which it presupposes as a thing *per se*, whereas the sensible world does not contain such completeness: the talk can never any longer be of the absolute magnitude of the series within the sensible cosmos – whether they may be limited or *per se* unlimited – but rather only of how far we shall regress in empirical *regressus* in tracing experience back to its conditions so as, in accordance with reason’s rule, not to stop at any answer to reason’s questions other than the answer that is congruous with the object.

It is therefore only the *validity of the rational-principle* as a rule of the continuation and magnitude of a possible experience that alone remains to us after its invalidity as a constitutive principle of appearances *per se* has been sufficiently demonstrated. Moreover: if we can display that indubitably, then reason’s dispute with itself is fully ended because not only has it been eliminated through critical dissolution of the semblance that disunites reason from itself but also, in its stead, the sense in which reason harmonises with itself becomes disclosed and an otherwise *dialectical* principle becomes transformed into a *doctrinal* principle. In fact: if that principle can be proven in respect of its subjective significance for determining the greatest-possible use of the understanding in experience congruently with its objects, then it is just as much as if it determined the objects *per*-*se apriori* like an axiom (which are impossible from pure reason); for even such an axiom could have no greater influence upon expansion and correction of our cognition in respect to the objects of experience than its proving itself to be active in the most widespread experiential-use of our understanding.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.9.1. Resolution of the Cosmological Idea of the *Totality of the Composition* of the Appearances of a Cosmic Whole

Both here as well as with the other cosmological questions, the ground of reason’s regulative principle is the principle that in empirical *regressus*, no *experience of an absolute limit* – and therefore no experience of a condition as a condition that is empirically absolutely unconditioned – could be encountered. The ground thereof, however, is that such an experience would have to contain within itself a delimitation of the appearances through nothing or the void that continued *regressus* could encounter by means of a perception, which is impossible.

That principle – which signifies precisely so much as that in empirical *regressus*, I can arrive always only at a condition that must in turn itself be regarded as empirically conditioned – contains the rule *in terminis* that however far I may have come in the ascending series, I must always enquire after a higher element of the series: irrespective of whether it becomes known to me through experience or not.

For the resolution of the first cosmological problem, nothing more is needed than to discern whether that never delimited ascent in *regressus* to the unconditioned magnitude of the cosmic whole (in respect to time and space) could be called a *regression in infinitum* or only a *regressus continued indeterminably* (i.e. *in indefinitum*). The mere general representation of the series of all past cosmic-states and also of the things that are simultaneous within cosmic space is itself nothing other than a possible empirical *regressus* whereof I think, albeit still indeterminately, and through which alone the concept of such a series of conditions can arise for the given perception.[[33]](#footnote-33) Now, I have the cosmic whole always only in concept but in no way (as a whole) in intuition. Therefore, I cannot infer from its magnitude to the magnitude of the *regressus* and determine the latter according to the former; but rather I must first make myself a concept of the cosmos’s magnitude only through the magnitude of the empirical *regressus*. I never know anything more about the *regressus*, however, than that I must always progress empirically from each given element of the series of conditions to a higher (i.e. remoter) element. Therefore, the magnitude of the whole of the appearances is not at all determined absolutely; and consequently, one also cannot say that that *regressus* goes *in infinitum* because that would anticipate the elements that the *regressus* has not yet reached and represent their multitude as so great that no empirical synthesis can reach it and would consequently determine the cosmos’s magnitude prior to the *regressus* (even if only negatively), which is impossible. For the cosmos’s magnitude is given to me through no intuition (in its totality), and nor therefore is its magnitude given prior to the *regressus* at all. So we can say absolutely nothing about the cosmos’s magnitude *per se* – not even that a *regressus in infinitum* occurs within it – but must rather merely seek the concept of its magnitude according to the rule that empirical *regressus* within it determines. That rule, however, says nothing more than that even as far as we may have come in the series of the empirical conditions, we are nowhere to assume an absolute limit but must rather subordinate every appearance (*qua* conditioned) to another appearance (as its condition) and must therefore further progress to the latter, which is *regressus in indefinitum*: which, because it determines no magnitude in the object, is to be distinguished perspicuously enough from *regressus in indefinitum*.

So I cannot say that the world is infinite in respect to past time or in respect to space. For such a concept of magnitude as that of a given infinity is empirical and therefore also absolutely impossible in respect to the world as an object of the senses. Moreover, I will also not say that the *regressus* from a given perception onwards to all that delimits that perception in space as well as in past time within a series goes *in infinitum*: for that presupposes the cosmos’s infinite magnitude; but nor will I say that it is finite, for an absolute limit is likewise empirically impossible. So I will be unable to say anything about the whole object of experience (viz. the sensible cosmos) but rather only about the rule according to which experience shall be instituted and continued congruently with its object.

The first and negative answer to the cosmological question concerning the cosmos’s magnitude is therefore that the cosmos has no first beginning in respect to time and no extreme limit in respect to space.

For in the opposite case, the cosmos would be delimited neither through empty time, on one hand, nor through empty space, on the other. Now since, as appearance, the cosmos can be neither of those *per se* because appearance is not a thing *per se*: a perception of delimitation through absolutely empty time or empty space would have to be possible through which those cosmic ends would be given within a possible experience. But as completely devoid of content, such an experience is impossible. Therefore, an absolute cosmic-limit is empirically- and consequently also absolutely impossible.[[34]](#footnote-34)

From that, then, the affirmative answer follows that as a determination of the cosmos’s magnitude, the *regressus* within the series of cosmic-appearances goes *in indefinitum*: which says precisely so much as that the sensible cosmos has no absolute magnitude, but rather empirical *regressus* (through which alone it can be given on the side of its conditions) has its rule – viz. to always progress from each element of the series (as a *conditionatum*) to a still remoter element (be it through one’s own experience, following the guiding thread of history, or along the chain of effects and their causes) and to nowhere excuse oneself from expanding the possible empirical use of one’s understanding: which is, then, also reason’s true and sole task in respect of its principles.

A determinate empirical *regressus* that would progress in a certain kind of appearances without ceasing is not thereby prescribed (e.g. that one would always have to ascend upwards from a living human in a series of ancestors without expecting a first pair or in the series of heavenly-bodies without permitting an extreme sun), but rather only progression from appearances to appearances is demanded even if they should yield no actual perception (if, for our consciousness, it is too weak in respect to degree to become experience) because despite that, they nevertheless belong to possible experience.

Every beginning is in time and every limit of an *extensum* is in space. But space and time are only within the sensible cosmos. Consequently, appearances are in the cosmos only conditionally: but the cosmos itself is delimited in neither a conditional- nor an unconditional way.

Precisely because of that and since neither the cosmos nor even the series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum* (*qua* cosmic series) can ever be wholly given, the concept of the cosmos’s magnitude is given only through *regressus* and never prior to it in a collective intuition. That *regressus*, however, always consists only in *determining* magnitude and therefore gives no *determinate* concept nor even a concept of a magnitude that would be infinite in respect to a certain measure and therefore goes not *in infinitum* (into a given expanse, as it were) but rather into an indeterminate expanse so as to give a magnitude (of experience) that first becomes actual only through that *regressus*.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.9.2. Resolution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Given Whole within Intuition

If I divide a whole that is given within intuition, then I go from a *conditionatum* to the conditions of its possibility. The division of the parts (*subdivisio* or *decompositio*) is a *regressus* within the series of those conditions. That series’s absolute totality would be given only if the *regressus* could arrive at *simple* parts. Yet if all parts in a continuously progressive decomposition are always in turn divisible, then the division (i.e. the *regressus*) goes from the *conditionatum* to its conditions *in infinitum* because the conditions (i.e. the parts) are contained within the *conditionatum* itself and, since the latter is wholly given within an intuition enclosed between its limits, are also concomitantly given *in toto*. The *regressus* must not therefore be called merely a ‘*regressus in indefinitum*’, as the previous cosmological idea alone allowed: wherein I was to progress from the *conditionatum* to its conditions, which were not thereby concomitantly given but rather which first accrued only in the empirical *regressus*. Despite that, it is still in no way allowable to say of such a whole that is divisible *in infinitum* that *it consists of infinitely many parts*. For even though all parts are contained within the intuition of the whole, *the whole division* is nevertheless *not* containedtherein: which consists only in progressive decomposition or in the *regressus* itself that first renders the series actual. Now, since that *regressus* is infinite, all elements (i.e. parts) at which it arrives are *admittedly* contained within the given whole as *aggregates* but not the whole *series* of the division, which is successively infinite and never whole and which can consequently represent neither an infinite multitude nor a summation of such a multitude in a whole.

That general reminder can firstly very easily be applied to space. Every space intuited within its limits is such a whole whose parts are always in turn spaces and is consequently divisible *in infinitum*.

From that, the second application also follows entirely naturally: namely, to an external appearance enclosed within its limits (i.e. a body). That body’s divisibility is grounded upon the divisibility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the body as an extended whole. The body is therefore divisible *in infinitum* yet without consequently consisting of infinitely many parts.

It admittedly seems that since a body must be represented as a substance within space, the body will be differentiated from the law of the divisibility of space through the fact that although one can indeed perhaps concede that decomposition within space can never remove all composition because then even all space – which otherwise has nothing selfstanding – would cease (which is impossible), the fact that absolutely nothing would remain if all composition of the matter were eliminated in thought does not seem to be reconcileable with the concept of a substance that should truly be the subject of all composition and which would have to remain left over in its elements even if the connection of those elements in space whereby they constitute a body were eliminated. Only with what is called ‘substance’ in appearance, the situation is not as one would think it to be for a thing *per se* through a pure intellectual-concept. The former is not an absolute subject but rather a persistent image of sensibility and nothing but intuition in which nothing unconditioned is encountered at all.

Yet even though that rule of progression *in infinitum* undoubtedly occurs with the subdivision of an appearance as a mere filling of space, it nevertheless cannot hold if we also seek to extend it to the multitude of the parts that are already abstracted in a certain way within the given whole whereby those parts constitute a *quantum discretum*. The assumption that within every articulated (organised) whole, every part is in turn articulated and that in such a way one always encounters new artificial-parts in division of the parts *in infinitum* and (in a word) the whole is articulated *in infinitum* cannot be thought of at all, although it can indeed admittedly be thought that the parts of the matter could always be articulated in their decomposition *in infinitum*. For the infinitude of the division of a given appearance in space is grounded solely upon the fact that through the appearance, merely its divisibility (i.e. an absolutely indeterminate multitude of parts) is given but the parts themselves become given and determined only through the subdivision and, in short, that the whole is not already divided *per se*. Consequently, the division can determine a multitude within the whole that goes as far as one wishes to progress in divisional *regression*. In contrast: with an organic body articulated *in infinitum*, the whole is already represented as divided precisely through that concept; and a *per se* determinate yet infinite multitude of the parts is encountered within it prior to all divisional *regressus*, whereby one contradicts oneself because that infinite development becomes regarded as a never to be completed series (i.e. infinite) and yet nevertheless as completed in a summation. Infinite division characterises an appearance only as *quantum continuum* and is inseverable from filling of space because the ground of the infinite divisibility lies precisely within space. Yet as soon as something comes to be assumed as a *quantum discretum*, the multitude of the unities therein is determined and is consequently also always equal to a number. Therefore, only experience can discern how far the organisation may go in an articulated body; and even if experience does not arrive at an inorganic part with certainty, such parts must nevertheless lie at least within possible experience. Yet how far transcendental division of an appearance *simpliciter* may extend is not a matter of experience at all but rather a principle of reason to never take empirical *regressus* to be absolutely completedin decomposition of an *extensum* according to the nature of that appearance.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.9.3. Concluding Remark on the Resolution of the Mathematico-Transcendental Ideas and Reminder for the Resolution of the Dynamico-Transcendental Ideas

In representing the antinomy of pure reason through all transcendental ideas within a table – wherein we indicated the ground of that conflict and the sole means of resolving it, which consisted in declaring both opposed assertions to be false – we have everywhere represented the conditions as pertaining to their *conditionata* according to relationships of space and time, which is the customary presupposition of the common human-understanding upon which then that conflict also entirely rested. In that regard, moreover, all dialectical representations of totality within the series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum* are of the same kind through-and-through. There was always a series in which the condition and the *conditionata* were, as elements thereof, connected and thereby homogeneous: wherein, then, the *regressus* would never have to be thought of as completed or, if that should occur, a *per se* conditioned element had to be falsely thought of as a first element and consequently assumed as unconditioned. So if admittedly not always the object (i.e. the *conditionatum*), then nevertheless the series of the conditions for it were considered merely in respect to their magnitude; and the difficulty that could be resolved not through a comparison but rather only through totally severing the knot consisted in the fact that reason made the object either *too long* or *too short* for the understanding in such a way that the understanding could never match reason’s idea.

We have therein overlooked an essential difference, however, that prevails amongst the objects (i.e. the intellectual concepts) that reason endeavours to elevate into ideas: viz. that according to our above table of the categories, two of them signify *mathematical* synthesis of appearances whereas the other two signify a *dynamic* synthesis of appearances. That could also very well occur hitherto because just as we always remained only under conditions *within appearance* in the general representation of all transcendental ideas, we also likewise have no *object* in the two mathematico-transcendental ideas other than the object within appearance. Yet since we shall now progress to *dynamic* concepts of the understanding so far as they shall fit reason’s idea, that distinction becomes important and opens an entirely new prospect to us in respect of the disputative action wherein reason is embroiled; and whereas that action could previously only be dismissed as constructed upon bilaterally false presuppositions: it can now, since perhaps such a presupposition occurs within the dynamic antinomy that can subsist together with reason’s pretension, be *settled* to both parties’ satisfaction from that viewpoint and because a judge supplements a deficiency in legal grounds that one had misapprehended on both sides.

The series of the conditions are admittedly homogeneous insofar as one looks merely to their *extension* in respect to whether they are congruous with the idea or whether they are too great or too small for it. Only the intellectual concept that underlies those ideas contains either merely a *synthesis of homogenea* (which is presupposed in respect of every quantum both in its composition as well as in its division) or even of *inhomogenea*, which can at least be permitted in dynamic synthesis both of causal conjunction as well as that of the necessary with the contingent.

From that arises the fact that in mathematical connection of series of appearances, no condition other than a *sensory* condition can enter (i.e. a condition that is itself a part of the series): whereas, in contrast, a dynamic series of sensory conditions still nevertheless permits an inhomogeneous condition that is not a part of the series but which – as *merely intelligible* – instead lies outside the series, whereby reason is then satisfied and the *inconditionatum* becomes prefixed to the appearances without thereby confusing and terminating the latter’s series (which is always conditioned), contrarily to the understanding’s principles.

Through the fact that a condition of the appearances external to their series (i.e. a condition that is not itself appearance) is permitted, something occurs that totally differs from the result of the mathematical antinomy. For whereas the mathematical antinomy effected that both dialectical counterassertions had to be declared false, the thoroughgoingly-conditioned *conditionata* of the dynamic series (which are inseverable from them as appearances) connected to the admittedly empirically-unconditioned but also *non-sensory* condition can satisfy both the *understanding*, on one hand, and *reason* on the other[[35]](#footnote-35) and because whereas the dialectical arguments fall away that sought unconditioned totality within mere appearances in one way or another, reason’s propositions can *both be true* in their thus-corrected signification: which cannot occur with the cosmological ideas that concern merely mathematically-unconditioned unity because with them, no condition of the series of the appearances is encountered except that which is also itself appearance and which, as such, concomitantly constitutes an element of the series.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.9.4. Resolution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Derivation of the Cosmic Occurrences from Their Causes

One can think of only two causalities in respect of what occurs: either according to *nature* or from *freedom*. The first is the connection of a state to a previous state within the sensible cosmos upon which the former follows according to a rule. Since the *causality* of appearances rests upon temporal conditions, and the previous state would not have brought forth an effect that first arises only within time if it had always been: the causality of the cause of what occurs or arises has also *arisen* and itself needs a cause according to the understanding’s principle.

In contrast: by ‘freedom’ in the cosmological sense, I understand the capacity to begin a state *by oneself*: whose causality therefore does not, according to the natural law, in turn stand under another cause that determines it in respect to time. In that signification, freedom is a pure transcendental idea that firstly contains nothing borrowed from experience and secondly whose object also cannot be given determinately within experience because it is a universal law even of the possibility of all experience that everything that occurs must have a cause and that consequently the causality of the cause – which *itself* must have *occurred* or arisen – must in turn also have a cause: whereby then the whole field of experience, however far it may extend, becomes transformed into a complex of mere nature. Yet since no absolute totality of the conditions in causal relationships is to be received therefrom, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can start to act by itself without another cause needing to be prefixed to determine it in turn according to the law of causal connection for action.

It is exceedingly remarkable that upon that *transcendental* idea of *freedom*, the practical concept of freedom is grounded and that the former constitutes the genuine moment of the difficulties within the latter that have surrounded the question regarding its possibility since time immemorial. *Freedom* in the *practical sense* is the dependence of volition upon *necessitation* through impulses of sensibility. For whereas a volition is *sensory* so far as it is *pathologically* *affected* (through motive causes of sensibility), it is called *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*) if it can be *pathologically necessitated*. Human volition is admittedly an *arbitrium sensitivum*, though not *brutum* but rather *liberum*: because sensibility does not render its action necessary, but rather a capacity dwells within the human to determine himself by himself independently of necessitation through sensory impulses.

One easily sees that if all causality within the sensible cosmos were merely nature, then every occurrence would be determined through another occurrence within time according to necessary laws; and therefore, since the appearances would have to render every action necessary as their natural result, the elimination of transcendental freedom would simultaneously eradicate all practical freedom. For the latter presupposes that even though something has not occurred, it nevertheless *should* have occurred and that its cause within appearance was therefore not so determinative that a causality did not lie within our volition to bring something forth independently of those natural causes and even against their power and influence that is not determined in respect to the temporal-order according to empirical laws and therefore to begin a series of occurrences *entirely by oneself*.

There therefore occurs here what is encountered generally in the conflict of a reason that ventures beyond the limits of possible experience: namely, that the problem is in fact not *physiological* but rather *transcendental*. Consequently, although the question of the possibility of freedom admittedly impinges upon psychology, it together with its resolution must occupy only transcendental-philosophy because it rests upon dialectical arguments of merely pure reason. In order to now place transcendental philosophy, which cannot refuse to provide a satisfactory answer to that question, in a position to answer it: I must first of all seek to determine its procedure in respect of that problem more closely through an observation.

If appearances were things *per se*, and if space and time were consequently forms of the existence of things *per se*: then the conditions along with the *conditionata* would always belong to one and the same series as elements; and from that, the antinomy that is common to all transcendental ideas would also arise in the present case: viz. that this series would inevitably have to turn out to be either too great or too small for the understanding. Yet the dynamic rational-concepts with which we are occupied in this section and the following section have the particularity that since they deal not with an object considered as a quantum but rather only with its *existence*, one can also abstract from the magnitude of the series of the conditions: and with them, it is merely an issue of the dynamic relationship of condition to *conditionatum* in such a way that in the question regarding nature and freedom, we already encounter the difficulty of whether freedom is even merely possible at all and, if it is possible, whether it can subsist together with the universality of the natural-law of causality: and therefore, whether it is a rightly disjunctive principle that every effect within the world must arise *either* from nature or from freedom or whether *both* cannot occur simultaneously in diverse respects with one and the same occurrence. The correctness of that principle of the thoroughgoing coherence of all occurrences of the sensible cosmos according to immutable natural-laws already stands fast as a principle of the Transcendental Analytic and suffers no interruption. There is therefore only the question of whether, despite that, freedom can also occur in respect of exactly the same effect that is determined according to nature or whether freedom is fully excluded through that inviolable rule. And here, the admittedly common yet fallacious presupposition of the *absolute reality* of appearances immediately manifests its detrimental influence to confuse reason. For if appearances are things *per se*, then freedom is not to be saved. Then, nature is the complete and *per se* sufficiently determinative cause of every occurrence; and that occurrence’s condition is always contained within the series of the appearances: which, together with their effect, are necessary under the natural law. If, by contrast, appearances are regarded as nothing more than they in fact are – viz. not things *per se* but rather mere representations that cohere according to empirical laws – then they must still themselves have grounds that are not appearances. Such an intelligible cause is not determined through appearances in respect of its causality, however, although their effects admittedly appear and can thus become determined through other appearances. It together with its causality is therefore outside the series: whereas its effects can, by contrast, be encountered within the series of the empirical conditions. An effect can therefore be regarded as free in respect to its intelligible cause and yet simultaneously be regarded in respect to the appearances as a result of them according to nature’s necessity – a distinction that must appear extremely subtle and obscure when it is presented generally and entirely abstractly but which will become elucidated in its application. Here I have sought merely to make the remark that since the thoroughgoing coherence of all appearances within a context of nature is an inexorable law, that law would necessarily have to overturn all freedom if one sought to stubbornly adhere to the reality of appearances. Therefore, even those who follow the common opinion therein have never been able to succeed in reconciling nature and freedom with one another.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.9.4.1. Possibility of Causality through Freedom in Unity with the Universal Law of Natural-Necessity

In an object of the senses, I call that which is not itself appearance *intelligible*. If what must be regarded as appearance in the sensible cosmos also *per se* has a capacity that is not an object of sensory intuition but whereby it can nevertheless be the cause of appearances, then one can consider that being’s *causality* on two sides: viz. as *intelligible* in respect to its *action* as a thing *per se* and as *sensible* in respect to its action’s *effects* as an appearance within the sensible cosmos. From the capacity of such a subject, we would thus make for ourselves an empirical- and also an intellectual concept of the subject’s causality that can occur together in respect of one and the same effect. Such a double-sided way of thinking about the capacity of an object of the senses contradicts none of the concepts that we have to make for ourselves of appearances and of a possible experience. For since, because the latter are not things *per se*, a transcendental object must underlie them that determines them as mere representations: nothing prevents that we should attribute to that transcendental object, beyond the property whereby it appears, also a *causality* that is not appearance even though its *effect* is nevertheless encountered within appearance. Yet every efficient cause must have a **character**, i.e. a law of its causality without which it would not be a cause at all. And we would then have in a subject of the sensible cosmos firstly an *empirical character* whereby its actions *qua* appearances stand in coherence with other appearances through-and-through according to constant natural-laws and could come to be derived from them (which are their conditions) and would therefore constitute elements of a single series of the natural-order in conjunction with them. Secondly, one would also have to grant an *intelligible character* to that subject whereby it is admittedly the cause of the aforesaid actions *qua* appearances but which does not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility and which is not itself appearance. One could also call the first character the character of such a thing ‘within appearance’ and call the second character the character of ‘the thing *per se*’.

That acting subject would stand under no temporal-conditions in respect to its intelligible character, for time is only the condition of appearances but not of things *per se*. In it, no *action* would *arise* nor *pass away*;and consequently it would also not be subject to the law of all temporal-determination (i.e. the law of everything alterable): namely, that everything **that occurs** encounters its cause *within the appearances* (of the previous state). In a word, so far as its causality is intellectual, its causality would not at all stand within the series of empirical conditions that render the occurrence necessary in the sensible cosmos. Admittedly, that intelligible character could never be immediately known because we can perceive nothing except so far as it appears; but the intelligible character would nevertheless have to be *thought* of accordantly with the empirical character, just as we must in general lay a transcendental object at the basis of the appearances in thought although we admittedly know nothing about that object in respect to what it is *per se*.

According to its empirical character, that subject *qua* appearance would therefore be subject to causal conjunction according to all laws of determination; and to that extent, it would be nothing other than a part of the sensible cosmos whose effects inevitably pass-away from nature: just like every other appearance. Just as external appearances influence it and its empirical character (i.e. the law of its causality) would be cognised through experience, so would all of its actions have to be explainable according to natural laws: and all requisites for their perfect and necessary determination would have to be encountered within a possible experience.

Yet according to its intelligible character (although we can admittedly have nothing other than merely the general concept thereof), the same subject must nevertheless be absolved from all influence of sensibility and determination through appearances; and since nothing *occurs* within it so far as it is *noumenon*, and no alteration that demands dynamic temporal-determination and therefore no connection to appearances *qua* causes is encountered within it: that active being would in its actions be independent and free from all natural necessity, which is encountered merely within the sensible cosmos. One would say of it entirely correctly that it begins its effects within the sensible cosmos *by itself* without the action beginning *within it* itself; and that would hold without the effects within the sensible cosmos consequently having to begin by themselves because they are always predetermined within it through empirical conditions in the previous time, though still only by means of the empirical character (which is merely the intelligible character’s appearance), and are possible only as a continuation of the series of the natural causes. So then, freedom and nature – each in its complete signification – would be encountered simultaneously and without any conflict in respect of exactly the same actions according to whether one juxtaposes them with their intelligible or sensible cause.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.9.4.2. Elucidation of the Cosmological Idea of a Freedom in Conjunction with Universal Natural-Necessity

I have seen fit to first delineate the silhouette of our transcendental problem’s resolution in order that one may thereby better survey reason’s course in resolving it. We shall now expound the moments of reason’s decision, which is what is truly at issue, and consider each moment particularly. The natural-law that everything that occurs has a cause and that the causality of that cause (i.e. the *action*) – since it precedes in time and cannot itself always have been, in consideration of an effect that has therein *arisen*, but must rather have *occurred* – must also have its cause amongst appearances whereby it becomes determined and that, consequently, all occurrences are empirically determined within a natural order – that law, through which appearances can first constitute a *nature* and yield objects of an experience, is an intellectual law from which it is under no pretext allowable to deviate or except any appearance therefrom because one would otherwise posit it outside all possible experience but would thereby differentiate it from all objects of possible experience and turn it into a mere cogitational-thing and a figment of the brain.

Yet even though there looks to be merely a chain of causes therein that permits no *absolute totality* whatsoever in *regressus* to their conditions, that doubt still does not at all detain us; for it has already been resolved in the universal judgement of the antinomy of reason when it proceeds to the *inconditionatum* in the series of the appearances. If we wished to yield to the deception of transcendental realism here, then neither nature nor freedom would remain. Here there is only the question of whether if one recognises merely natural-necessity within the whole series of all occurrences, it is still nevertheless possible to regard exactly the same occurrence that is, on the one hand, mere natural-effect as an effect from freedom, on the other, or whether a direct contradiction is encountered between those two kinds of causality.

Amongst the causes within appearance, there can surely be nothing that could begin a series absolutely and by itself. Every action *qua* appearance, so far as it brings forth an occurrence, is itself an occurrence or event that presupposes another state wherein the cause is encountered; and so, everything that occurs is merely a continuation of the series: and no beginning that would occur by itself is possible within that series. Therefore, all actions of the natural-causes within the time-sequence are in turn themselves effects that likewise presuppose their causes within the time-series. An *original* action whereby something occurs that previously was not is not to be expected from the causal-connection of the appearances.

Yet is it then also necessary that if the effects are appearances, then the causality of their cause – which (viz. the cause) is also itself appearance – must be merely empirical? And is it not instead possible that even though for every effect within appearance a connection to its cause is admittedly required according to laws of empirical causality, that empirical causality itself could – without interrupting its coherence with the natural-causes in the slightest – nevertheless be an effect of a non-empirical but rather intelligible causality, i.e. of an (in respect of appearances) original action of a cause that is therefore to that extent not appearance but rather intelligible in respect of that capacity: even though it must also entirely, as an element of the natural-chain, be concomitantly attributed to the sensible cosmos.

We need the principle of the causality of appearances amongst one another in order to be able to seek and specify natural-conditions of natural-occurrences, i.e. causes within appearance. If that is conceded and weakened through no exception: then the understanding – which, in its empirical use, sees nothing other than nature and is also justified in doing so – has everything that it can demand, and physical explanations pursue their unhindered course. Now, not the slightest abruption is caused to it (even supposing that it were also merely invented) if one assumes that amongst the natural causes, there are also some that have a capacity that is intelligible only because its determination for action never rests upon empirical conditions but rather upon mere grounds of the understanding: yet in such a way that the *action within the appearance* of that cause is accordant with all laws of empirical causality. For in that way, the acting subject as *causa phaenomenon* would always be enchained with nature in inseverable dependence of all its actions; and only the *phaenomenon* of that subject (with all its causality within appearance) would contain certain conditions that would have to be regarded as merely intelligible if one wishes to ascend from the empirical object to the transcendental object. For if we only follow the natural-rule in that which may be the cause amongst the appearances, then we can be unworried about what in the transcendental subject (which is empirically unknown to us) may be thought of as a ground of those appearances and of their coherence. That intelligible ground does not impinge upon empirical questions at all but rather concerns perhaps merely thought within the pure understanding; and even though the effects of that thought and action of the pure understanding are encountered within the appearances, the latter must nevertheless be capable of being perfectly explained through one’s pursuing the merely empirical character thereof as the highest explanatory-ground and entirely passing by the intelligible character (which is the former’s transcendental cause) as unknown except so far as it is specified only through the empirical character, which is its sensory sign. Each human is one of the appearances of the sensory-world and, to that extent, also one of the natural-causes: whose causality must stand under empirical laws. As such, he must also thus have an empirical character: just like all other natural-things. We remark that empirical character through powers and capacities that manifest it in its effects. In respect of inanimate or merely animally-animate nature, we find no ground to think of any capacity otherwise than as merely sensorily conditioned. Only man, who otherwise knows the whole of nature merely through senses, also cognises himself through mere apperception and indeed in actions and internal determinations that he cannot count among the impressions of the senses and is admittedly himself one-part phenomenon but also, in respect of another part (viz. in regard to certain capacities), a merely intelligible object because that object’s action cannot at all be attributed to sensibility’s receptivity. We call those capacities ‘understanding’ and ‘reason’; the latter especially is distinguished entirely genuinely and preeminently from all empirically-conditioned powers because it considers its objects merely in light of ideas and determines the understanding according to them, which then makes an empirical use of its (admittedly also pure) concepts.

That this reason has causality – or at least that we represent causality in it – is clear from the *imperatives* that we impose upon the exercising powers as rules in everything practical. The ‘should’ expresses a kind of necessity and connection to grounds that does not otherwise occur in the whole of nature. In respect of nature, the understanding can cognise only *what exists* or has been or will be. It is impossible that something therein *should be otherwise* than it in fact is in all those temporal-circumstances; and if one has merely the course of nature in view, then the ‘should’ indeed has absolutely no significance whatsoever. We cannot at all ask what should occur in nature, no more than we can ask which properties a circle should have: but rather what occurs therein or which properties the latter has.

That ‘should’ expresses a possible action whose ground is nothing but a mere concept: whereas, by contrast, the ground of a mere natural-action must always be an appearance. Now, the action must admittedly be possible under natural-conditions if the ‘should’ is directed towards it; but those natural-conditions concern not the determination of the volition itself but rather merely its effect and result within appearance. However many natural-grounds may impel me towards *willing* and however many sensory incentives there may be, they cannot bring forth the ‘*should*’ but rather only a far from necessary but rather always conditioned will – to which, the ‘should’ that reason expresses opposes measure and aim: and indeed forbiddance and authority. Irrespective of whether it is an object of mere sensibility (e.g. something pleasant) or even of pure reason (e.g. something good), reason does not yield to a ground that is empirically given and does not follow the order of the things as they presented themselves within appearance but rather makes for itself, with full spontaneity, an order of its own according to ideas into which it fits the empirical conditions and according to which it even declares actions to be necessary that *have not yet occurred* and which perhaps will not occur, though it nevertheless presupposes of all of them that reason can have causality in relation to them; for without that, it would not expect effects within experience from its ideas.

Let us now stop here and at least assume it as possible that reason actually has causality in respect to appearances – then, even as much as it is reason, it must nevertheless show an empirical character by itself: because every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain appearances follow as effects, and every rule requires a uniformity of the effects that grounds the concept of the cause (as a capacity): which, so far as it must be manifest from mere appearances, we can call one’s ‘empirical character’ – which is constant, even though the effects appear in alterable forms according to the diversity of the accompanying and partly restrictive conditions.

So then, every human has an empirical character of his volition: which is nothing other than a certain causality of his reason so far as it shows a rule in its effects within appearance according to which one must derive reason’s grounds and actions in respect of their kind and degrees and can judge the subjective principles of his volition. Because that empirical character must itself be drawn from the appearances *qua* effect and from their rule, which experience delivers, all actions of a human within appearance are determined from his empirical character and the other cooperating causes according to the order of nature; and if we could explore all appearances of his volition unto their ground, then there would be no single human action that we could not predict with certainty and cognise as necessary from its preceding conditions. In respect of that empirical character, therefore, there is no freedom; and yet we could contemplate a human in respect of his empirical character alone if we merely **observe** and, as occurs in anthropology, seek to explore the motive causes of his actions physiologically.

Yet if we consider exactly the same actions in relation to reason – and indeed not speculative reason, in order to *explain* them in respect to their origin, but rather solely so far as reason is itself the cause *to generate* them: in a word, if we juxtapose the actions with the latter in a *practical* regard – then we find a rule and order entirely different from the natural order. For then, perhaps everything that indeed *has occurred* according to nature’s course and which inevitably had to occur according to its empirical grounds *should not have occurred*. Sometimes, however, we find or at least believe ourselves to find that reason’s ideas have actually demonstrated causality in respect to actions of humans *qua* appearances and that those actions have occurred not because they were determined through empirical causes, nay, but rather because they were determined through grounds of reason.

Now, supposing one could say that reason has causality in respect to appearance: could reason’s action then indeed be called ‘free’, since it is utterly exactly determined and necessary in reason’s empirical character (i.e. its sensory mode)? That empirical character is in turn determined in the intelligible character (i.e. its cogitational mode). We do not know the cogitational mode, however, but rather characterise it through appearances: which in fact allow only the sensory mode (i.e. empirical character) to be immediately cognised.[[36]](#footnote-36) Nevertheless, so far as the action is to be attributed to the cogitational mode (as the action’s cause), it does not at all *result* therefrom according to empirical laws (i.e. in such a way that the conditions of pure reason precede it) but rather only in such a way that pure reason’s effects within appearance of the internal sense *precede* it. As a merely intelligible capacity, pure reason is the temporal form and is also therefore not subject to the temporal-form’s conditions. Reason’s causality in the intelligible character *does not arise*: nor does it, say, start to bring forth an effect at a certain time. For otherwise, it would itself be subject to the natural-law of appearances so far as that law determines causal-series in respect to time; and the causality would then be nature and not freedom. Therefore, we can say that if reason can have causality in respect to appearances, then it is a capacity *through* which the sensory condition of an empirical series of effects initially begins. For the condition that lies within reason is non-sensory and therefore does not itself begin. So then, what we lacked in all empirical series occurs: namely, that the *condition* of a series of successive occurrences could itself be empirically unconditioned. For here, the condition is *outside* the series of the appearances (i.e. amongst *intelligibilia*) and is consequently subject to no sensory condition and no temporal-determination through a transient cause.

Nevertheless, the very same cause also belongs to the series of the appearances in another respect. Each human is himself appearance. His volition has an empirical character that is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There are no conditions that determine humans according to that character that would not be contained within the series of natural-effects and obey their law: according to which, absolutely no empirically-unconditioned causality of what occurs within time is encountered. Consequently, no given action can begin absolutely by itself (because it can be perceived only *qua* appearance). Yet one cannot say of reason that another state precedes the state wherein it determines a volition wherein the latter state itself becomes determined. For since reason itself is not an appearance and is subject to absolutely no conditions of sensibility, no time-sequence occurs within it in respect of its causality: and therefore, the dynamic law of nature that determines the time-sequence according to rules cannot be applied to reason.

Reason is therefore the persistent condition of all voluntary actions under which a human appears. Each of those actions is determined in advance in the human’s empirical character before it occurs. In respect of the intelligible character whereof that empirical character is merely the sensory schema, neither a *before* nor an *after* occurs: and every action, regardless of the temporal relationship wherein it stands to other appearances, is the immediate effect of pure reason’s intelligible character: which therefore acts freely without being dynamically determined within the chain of natural-causes through external or internal grounds that are nevertheless precedent in respect to time; and one can not only regard pure reason’s freedom negatively as independence from empirical conditions (for the rational capacity would thereby cease to be a cause of the appearances) but also characterise it positively as a capacity to begin a series of occurrences by oneself such that nothing begins within pure reason itself, but rather pure reason – as an unconditioned condition of every voluntary action – admits no conditions above itself that are precedent in respect to time: even though pure reason’s effect nevertheless begins within the series of the appearances but can never constitute an absolutely first beginning therein.

In order to elucidate reason’s regulative principle through an example from that principle’s empirical use – not in order to confirm it (for such proofs are unfit for transcendental assertions) – then one may take a voluntary action: e.g. a bad lie through which a human has brought a certain confusion into society and which one first investigates in regard to its motive causes, from which it arose, and thereupon judges how they can be imputed to him together with their consequences. In the first intention, one goes through his empirical character unto its sources: which one seeks out in his poor upbringing, bad company, and also partly in the badness of a nature insensitive to shame, but which one partly blames on light-mindedness and unreflectiveness – wherein, then, one does not leave the inciting occasional-causes unheeded. In all this, one proceeds as one proceeds generally in investigating the series of the determinative causes for a given natural-effect. Now, even if one believes the action to be thereby determined, one nevertheless blames the perpetrator and indeed not in respect of his unfortunate nature nor in respect of the circumstances influencing him and indeed not even in respect of the way-of-life he had previously led; for one presupposes that one could totally set-aside how that way-of-life has been and completely set-aside the past series of conditions as if they had not occurred, but regard that deed itself as totally unconditioned in respect of the prior state as though the perpetrator therewith starts a series of consequences entirely by himself. That blame is grounded upon a law of reason according to which one regards reason as a cause that was able to determine and should have determined the human’s behaviour otherwise, despite all of the aforementioned empirical conditions. And admittedly one regards reason’s causality not merely as, say, competition but rather *per se* as complete: even if the sensory impetuses were not at all for it but rather indeed altogether against it; the action is attributed to his intelligible character; he is totally at fault at the moment at which he lies; and therefore, despite all empirical conditions of the deed, reason was fully free: and the deed is to be attributed entirely to its omission.

One easily discerns from that imputative judgement that one therein has in mind that reason is not at all affected through all that sensibility, that it does not alter (even if its appearances alter, i.e. the way wherein it manifests itself in its effects), that no state precedes in it that determines the following state, and that it therefore does not at all belong to the series of the sensory conditions that render the appearances necessary according to natural-laws. It (i.e. reason) is present and the same in all actions of the human in all temporal circumstances; but it is not in time and does not, say, drift into a new state wherein it previously was not – it is *determinative* but *not determinable* in respect thereof. Consequently, one cannot ask ‘why has reason not determined *itself* otherwise?’ but rather only ‘why has it not determined the *appearances* otherwise through its causality?’. But no answer is possible thereto. For another intelligible character would have yielded another empirical character; and if we say that despite the entire way-of-life that he had led hitherto, the perpetrator could nevertheless have omitted the lie: then that signifies only that the lie stands immediately under reason’s power and that reason is subject to no conditions of appearance and of time’s course in its causality and that the difference of time could also admittedly make a principal difference in the appearances relative to one another, but – since they are neither items nor therefore causes *per se* – it could make no difference in the action in relation to reason.

With the judgement of free actions in regard to their causality, therefore, we can arrive only at the intelligible cause but cannot go *beyond it*; we can cognise that it could be free (i.e. determined independently of sensibility) and, in such a way, be the sensorily-unconditioned condition of the appearances. But why the intelligible character yields precisely those appearances and that empirical character under the respective circumstances so far exceeds all capacity of our reason to answer it and indeed all authority of our reason even merely to ask it that it is as though one asked why the transcendental object of our external sensory intuition gives only intuition *in space* and not some other intuition. Only the problem that we had to resolve does not oblige us to answer that at all, for the question was only whether freedom conflicts with natural necessity in one and the same action; and we have sufficiently answered that: since we showed that, since a relation to an entirely different kind of conditions is possible with the former than with the latter, the law of the latter does not affect the former at all and that both can therefore occur independently of one another and undisturbed by one another.

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One must well remark that we have not thereby sought to demonstrate freedom’s *actuality* as one of the capacities that contain the cause of the appearances of our sensible cosmos. For besides the fact that that would not at all have been a transcendental contemplation that deals merely with concepts, it also could not succeed: because we can never infer from experience to something that must not be thought of according to experiential laws at all. Furthermore, we have also not even sought to prove freedom’s *possibility*; for that would also not have succeeded because we can cognise neither the possibility of a real ground nor the possibility of a causality from mere *apriori*-concepts *tout court*. Freedom is here treated only as a transcendental idea whereby reason thinks to absolutely start the series of conditions within appearance through something sensorily-unconditioned but therein embroils itself in an antinomy with its own laws, which it prescribes for the understanding’s empirical use. That this antinomy rests upon a mere semblance and that nature at least *does* *not conflict* with causality from freedom was all that we could accomplish and was also all that was solely at issue.

###### 1.2.3.3.2.9.5. Resolution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Appearances in Respect of Their Existence *Simpliciter*

In the previous section, we considered the sensible cosmos’s alterations in their dynamic series: wherein each alteration stands under another, which is its cause. That series of states now serves merely to guide us in order for us to arrive at an existence that could be the supreme condition of everything alterable, viz. the *necessary being*. It is not unconditioned causality that is at issue here, but rather the unconditioned existence of the substance itself. Therefore, the series that we have before us is truly only that of concepts and not of intuitions insofar as one intuition is the condition of another.

One easily sees, however, that since everything within the complex of the appearances is alterable and consequently conditioned in existence, there could not at all be an unconditioned element within the series of dependent existence whose existence were absolutely necessary and that therefore, if appearances were things *per se* and, precisely because of that, their condition always belonged to one and the same series of intuitions with the *conditionata*: then a necessary being could never occur as a condition of the existence of the sensible cosmos’s appearances.

The dynamic *regressus*, however, has in it the following peculiarity that also distinguishes it from the mathematical *regressus* – viz. that since the latter in fact deals only with the composition of parts into a whole or the division of a whole into its parts, the conditions of the latter series must always be regarded as parts thereof and therefore as homogeneous and consequently as appearances: whereas since in the former *regressus* it is not the possibility of an unconditioned whole from given parts or of an unconditioned part of a given whole that is at issue but rather the derivation of a state from its cause or of the contingent existence of the substance itself from the necessary substance, the condition need not necessarily constitute an empirical series with the *conditionata*.

Therefore, one way of escaping from the specious antinomy that lies before us still remains open to us – viz. that all pairs of conflicting propositions can be true simultaneously in diverse respects in such a way that all things of the sensible cosmos are thoroughly contingent and therefore also always have only empirically-conditioned existence and, nevertheless, a non-empirical condition of the whole series (i.e. an unconditionally necessary being) also occurs. For as an intelligible condition, that being would not at all belong to the series as an element thereof (not even as the highest element); and nor would it render any element of the series empirically-unconditioned, but rather it would leave the whole sensory-world in its existence: which is empirically-conditioned throughout all of its elements. This way of laying an unconditioned existence at the basis of the appearances would therefore differ from the empirically-unconditioned causality (of freedom) in the previous article in the respect that whereas with freedom, the thing itself (*qua* cause, i.e. *substantia phaenomenon*) nevertheless belonged to the series of the conditions and only its *causality* was thought of as intelligible: here, the necessary being must be thought of as entirely external to the sensible cosmos’s series (as *ens extramundanum*) and as merely intelligible – through which alone it can be prevented from not itself being subject to the law of the contingency and dependence of all appearances.

Reason’s *regulative principle* in respect of our current problem is therefore that everything in the sensible cosmos has empirically-unconditioned existence and that within it, there is no unconditional necessity in respect of any property at all: so there is no element of the series of conditions whose empirical condition one cannot always expect and must not always seek (so far as one can) within a possible experience; and so nothing justifies us in deriving an existence from a condition outside the empirical series or even holding it to be absolutely independent and selfstanding insofar as it is within the series itself: although, nevertheless, we must not thereby call into question that the whole series could be grounded in some intelligible being (which is consequently free of all empirical conditions and rather contains the ground of the possibility of all those appearances).

Yet with that, there is by no means an intention of proving the unconditionally necessary existence of a being or even merely of thereupon grounding the possibility of a merely intelligible condition of the existence of the sensible cosmos’s appearances but rather only – just as we constrain reason so that it does not leave the thread of empirical conditions and stray into *transcendent* explanatory-grounds that admit of no presentation *in concreto* – to thus also, on the other hand, constrain the law of the understanding’s merely empirical use so that it does not decide regarding the possibility of things *simpliciter* and consequently does not *declare* what is intelligible *to be impossible*, even though it is not to be used by us to explain appearances. It is therefore shown thereby only that the thoroughgoing contingency of all natural-things and all their (empirical) conditions could very well subsist together with the arbitrary presupposition of a necessary, albeit merely intelligible, condition and that therefore no true contradiction is to be encountered between those assertions and that consequently they can be *bilaterally true*. Even if such an absolutely necessary intelligible-being may be impossible *per se*, that still can in no way be inferred from the universal contingency and dependence of everything that belongs to the sensible cosmos nor from the principle that one shall not stop at any single element of the sensible cosmos so far as it is contingent and invoke a cause external to the world. Reason pursues its course in its empirical use and its particular course in its transcendental use.

The sensible cosmos contains nothing other than appearances, but they are mere representations that are always in turn sensorily-conditioned; and since we never have things *per se* for our objects here, it is no wonder that we are never justified in performing a leap beyond the nexus of sensibility just as if the appearances were things *per se* that existed outside their transcendental ground and which one could leave in order to seek the cause of their existence outside them: which would indeed ultimately have to occur with contingent *things* but not with mere *representations* of things whose contingency is itself merely phenomenon and can lead to no regress except one that determines phenomena (i.e. an empirical regress). Yet thinking of an intelligible ground of the appearances (i.e. of the sensible cosmos) and thinking of that ground as liberated from the latter’s contingency is opposed neither to the unconstrained empirical regress within the series of the appearances nor to that series’s thoroughgoing contingency. But that is also all that we had to accomplish to resolve the specious antinomy and which could be done only in that way. For if each condition for each *conditionatum* (in respect to existence) is sensory and, precisely because of that, belongs to the series: then it is itself in turn conditioned (as the fourth antinomy’s antithesis exhibited). There therefore either had to remain a conflict with reason, which demanded an *inconditionatum*: or that *inconditionatum* had to be posited outside the series amongst *intelligibilia*, whose necessity neither requires nor permits an empirical condition and is therefore unconditionally necessary relatively to appearances.

Reason’s empirical use (in respect to the conditions of existence within the sensible cosmos) is not affected through the admission of a merely intelligible being but rather goes, according to the principle of thoroughgoing contingency, from empirical conditions to higher conditions that are always equally empirical. Equally, however, that regulative principle also does not exclude the assumption of an intelligible cause that is not in the series, if reason’s pure use (in respect to purposes) is at issue. For that cause there signifies only the ground of the possibility of the sensory series *simpliciter* that is merely transcendental for us and unknown to us: whose existence, which is independent from all conditions of the latter and unconditionally necessary in respect to it, is not at all opposed to the former’s unlimited contingency and nor therefore to the neverending *regressus* within the series of the empirical conditions.

##### 1.2.3.3.2.10. Concluding Remark on the Whole Antinomy of Pure Reason

So long as with our rational concepts, we have as our object merely the totality of the conditions within the sensible cosmos and what can occur in respect to them in service of reason, then our ideas are admittedly transcendental yet nevertheless *cosmological*. But as soon as we posit the *inconditionatum* (which is indeed truly at issue) in what is entirely outside the sensible cosmos and consequently outside all possible experience, then the ideas become *transcendent*; they serve not merely to complete reason’s empirical use (which always remains an idea that is never to be implemented but is nevertheless to be followed), but rather they totally separate themselves therefrom and render themselves objects whose material is not taken from experience and whose objective reality also rests not upon completion of the empirical series but rather upon pure *apriori* concepts. Such transcendent ideas have a merely intelligible object whose admission as a transcendental object of which one knows nothing more is admittedly allowed: although in respect of thinking of that object as a thing determinable through its distinctive and internal predicates, we have on our side neither grounds of that object’s possibility (as independent from all experiential concepts) nor the slightest justification to assume such an object, which is consequently a mere cogitational thing. Nevertheless, amongst all cosmological ideas, the idea that incites the fourth antinomy compels us to venture that step. For the existence of appearances, which is entirely and absolutely ungrounded *per se* but rather constantly conditioned, invites us to look for something distinct from all appearances and therefore an intelligible object at which that contingency stops. Yet since once we have taken permission to assume an actuality subsisting by itself outside the field of total sensibility, appearances are to be regarded only as contingent modes-of-representation of intelligible objects (i.e. of such beings that are themselves intelligences): nothing remains to us except the analogy according to which we utilise the experiential concepts in order to nevertheless make for ourselves some concept of intelligible things of which we do not have the slightest knowledge *per se*. Because we are not acquainted with *contingentia* otherwise than through experience, but here the talk is of things that shall not be objects of experience at all: we will have to derive knowledge of them from what is necessary *per se*, i.e. from pure concepts of things *simpliciter*. The first step that we perform outside the sensible cosmos therefore compels us to begin our new knowledge from investigation of the absolutely-necessary being and to derive the concepts of all things so far as they are merely intelligible from the concepts of that being; and we shall conduct that enquiry in the following main component.

##### 1.2.3.3.3. Third Main Component: The Ideal of Pure Reason

###### 1.2.3.3.3.1. First Section: On Ideals *Simpliciter*

We have seen above that through pure *intellectual-concepts* without any conditions of sensibility, no objects whatsoever can be represented because the conditions of their objective reality are absent and nothing but the mere form of thought is encountered within them. Nevertheless, they can be presented *in concreto* if one applies them to appearances; for within them, they in fact have the material for an experiential concept: which is nothing other than an intellectual concept *in concreto*. *Ideas* are still more distant from objective reality than *categories*, however; for no appearance can be found in which they could be represented *in concreto*. They contain a certain completeness for which no possible empirical cognition suffices; and reason therein has only a systematic unity in view to which it seeks to approximate the empirically possible unity without ever fully attaining it.

Yet what I call an *ideal* – by which I understand an idea not merely *in concreto* but rather *in individuo*, i.e. as an individual thing determinable or even determinate through the idea alone – seems to be still more distant from objective reality than an idea.

Humanity in its whole perfection contains not only the expansion of all essential properties belonging to that nature, which constitute our concept of it, up to complete congruence with their purposes (which would be our idea of perfect humanity): but also everything outside that concept that belongs to the idea’s thoroughgoing determination. For of all opposed predicates, only a single predicate can fit with the idea of the most perfect human. What is an ideal to us was for **Plato** an *idea of the divine understanding*, an individual object in that understanding’s pure intuition, the most perfect individual from each kind of possible being, and the originary ground of all ectypes within appearance.

Without fanfaronading to such an extent, we must concede that human reason contains not only ideas but also ideals: which are admittedly not creative like the *Platonic* ideals yet nevertheless have *practical force* (as regulative principles) and underlie the possibility of the perfection of certain *actions*. Moral concepts are not entirely pure rational-concepts because something empirical (pleasure or displeasure) underlies them. Nevertheless, they can very well serve for an example of pure rational-concepts in respect to the principle whereby reason sets constraints upon *per se* lawless freedom (and thus if one attends merely to their form). Virtue and, with it, human wisdom in its total purity are ideas. But the wise-man (of the Stoics) is an ideal, i.e. a human who exists merely in thought but who is fully congruent with the idea of wisdom. Just as an idea gives the *rule*, so does the ideal in such a case serve as the *prototype* of thoroughgoing determination of an ectype; and we have no other standard for our actions than the behaviour of that divine human within us: wherewith we compare, judge, and thereby better ourselves – even though we can never attain it. Even if one might not wish to grant objective reality (i.e. existence) to those ideals: they are nevertheless not to be regarded as figments of the brain because of that but rather yield an indispensable standard of reason, which needs the concept of what is entirely complete in its kind in order to estimate and measure the grade and the deficiencies of what is incomplete. Yet to wish to realise an ideal in an example (i.e. in appearance) – like, say, the wise-man in a novel – is unfeasible and, moreover, has in it something absurd and little edifying because the natural constraints that continuously disrupt the completeness within an idea render all illusion impossible in such a venture and thereby render the good that lies within the idea itself suspicious and similar to a mere invention.

That is the situation with an ideal of reason, which must always rest upon determinate concepts and serve as a rule and prototype: be it for following or for judging. The situation is entirely different with those creations of the imaginal power that no one can explain to himself and whereof no one can give himself an intelligible concept – *monograms*, as it were, that are merely individual features, though they are admittedly not determinate according to a specifiable rule and which more constitute a delineation floating amidst diverse experiences, as it were, than a determinate image: the like of which, painters and physiognomists profess to have within their heads and which shall be an unimpartable silhouette of their products or even judgements. They can, albeit merely ungenuinely, be called ‘ideals of sensibility’ because they shall be the unattainable pattern of possible empirical intuitions and nevertheless yield no rule that admits of explanation and examination.

In contrast, reason’s goal with its ideal is thoroughgoing determination according to *apriori* rules; hence, it thinks of an object that shall be thoroughgoingly determinable according to principles, even though the sufficient conditions for that are absent from experience and the concept itself is therefore transcendent.

**1.2.3.3.3.2. Second Section: On Transcendental Ideals (*Prototypa transcendentalia*)**

Every concept is indeterminate in respect of what is not contained within that concept itself and stands under the principle of *determinability*, viz. that only one of *every two* predicates that are contradictorily-opposed to one another can accrue to it: which rests upon the principle of contradiction and is therefore a merely logical principle that abstracts from all content of cognition and has nothing but cognition’s logical form in view.

In respect to its possibility, however, every *thing* still stands under the principle of *thoroughgoing* determination – according to which: of *all possible* predicates of *things* so far as they are compared with their contraries, one must accrue to it. That principle does not rest merely upon the principle of contradiction; for beyond the relationship of two predicates that contradict one another, it considers every thing also in relationship to *total possibility* as the complex of all predicates of things *simpliciter*; and because it presupposes total possibility as an *apriori* condition, it represents every thing as it derives its own possibility from the share that it has in that total possibility.[[37]](#footnote-37) The principle of thoroughgoing determination therefore concerns content and not merely logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates that shall make the complete concept of a thing and not merely of the analytic representation through one of two opposed predicates and contains a transcendental presupposition: viz. that of the matter for *all possibility*, which shall contain *apriori* the data for the *particular* possibility of each thing.

The principle ‘every existent is thoroughgoingly determined’ signifies that not only one of each pair of interopposed *given* predicates but also one of each pair of all *possible* predicates always accrues to it. Through that principle, not only are predicates compared with one another logically: but the thing itself is also compared transcendentally with the complex of all possible predicates. That principle shall thus say so much as that in order to cognise a thing completely, one must cognise everything possible and thereby determine it: be it affirmatively or negatively. Thoroughgoing determination is consequently a concept that we can never present *in concreto* in its totality; and it is therefore grounded upon an idea that has its seat merely within reason, which prescribes to the understanding the rule of its complete use.

Although that idea of the *complex of all possibility*, so far as that complex *qua* condition underlies the thoroughgoing determination of each thing, is itself still indeterminate and we thereby think of nothing more than a complex of all possible predicates *simpliciter*: we nevertheless find on closer examination that that idea *qua* originary-concept expels a multitude of predicates that, *qua* derived, are already given through other predicates or which cannot stand beside one another and that they purify themselves into a thoroughgoingly *apriori* determinate concept and thereby become the concept of an individual object that is thoroughgoingly determinate through the mere idea and which must therefore be called an *ideal* of pure reason.

If we consider all possible predicates not merely logically but rather transcendentally (i.e. according to their content that can be thought of within them *apriori*): then we find that whereas a being [*Sein*] becomes represented through some of them, a mere non-being becomes represented through others. Logical denial, which is indicated merely through the word ‘not’, never in fact attaches to a concept but rather only to one concept’s relationship to another in judgement and can therefore be far from sufficient to characterise a concept in respect of its content. The term ‘immortal’ cannot at all allow it to be cognised that a mere non-being [*Nichtsein*] is thereby represented in the object but rather leaves all content untouched. In contrast, a transcendental denial signifies non-being *per se*: to which transcendental affirmation is opposed, which is a something whose concept *per se* already expresses a being and is hence called ‘reality’ (i.e. itemhood) because through it alone and as far as it reaches, objects are something (i.e. things): whereas the opposing negation, by contrast, signifies a mere deficiency; and where it alone is thought of, the elimination of all things is represented.

No one can think determinately of a denial without having the opposite affirmation underlie it. Someone who is born blind cannot make for himself the slightest representation of darkness because he has none of light; a savage does not know poverty because he does not know wealth.[[38]](#footnote-38) An ignoramus has no concept of his ignorance because he has none of science, etc. All concepts of negations are therefore derived, moreover; and the realities contain the data and the matter, so to speak, or the transcendental content for the possibility and thoroughgoing determination of all things.

If a transcendental substratum is therefore taken as a basis of the thoroughgoing determination within our reason that, as it were, contains the entire inventory of material whence all possible predicates of things can be taken, then that substratum is nothing other than the idea of an all of reality (*omnitudo realitatis*). All true denials are then nothing but *constraints*, which they could not be called if what is unconstrained (viz. the all) were not underlying.

Through that omnipossession of reality, however, the concept of a *thing per se* is represented as thoroughgoingly determined; and the concept of an *ens realissimum* is the concept of an individual being because of all possible opposed predicates, one (viz. the predicate that belongs to being absolutely) is encountered within its determination. Therefore, there is a transcendental *ideal* that underlies the thoroughgoing determination that is necessarily encountered with everything that exists and which constitutes the highest and complete material condition of its possibility to which all thought of objects *simpliciter* must be traced back in respect to its content. It is, however, also the sole genuine ideal of which human reason admits because only in that single case does a *per se* general concept of a thing become thoroughgoingly determined through itself and cognised as the representation of an individual.

The logical determination of a concept through reason rests upon a disjunctive rational-inference in which the major premise contains a logical division (i.e. the division of the sphere of a general concept), the minor premise constrains that sphere to one part, and the conclusion determines the concept through that part. The general concept of a reality *simpliciter* cannot be divided *apriori* because without experience, one knows no determinate species of reality that would be contained under that genus. Therefore, the transcendental major-premise of the thoroughgoing determination of all things is nothing other than the representation of the complex of all reality: i.e. not merely a concept that comprehends all predicates *under itself* in respect to their transcendental content but which rather encompasses them *within itself* in respect to that content; and the thoroughgoing determination of every thing rests upon the constrainment of that *all* of reality through the fact that some of it is attributed to the thing whereas the rest is excluded, which accords with the ‘either – or’ of the disjunctive major-premise and the determination of the object through one of the elements of that division within the minor premise. Thus, the use of reason through which reason takes the transcendental ideal as a basis of its determination of all possible things is analogous to the use according to which it proceeds in disjunctive rational-inferences: which was the principle that I above laid at the basis of the systematic division of all transcendental ideas according to which they are generated in parallel with and correspondently to the three kinds of rational-inferences.

It is self-explanatory that for that intention (viz. merely to represent to itself the necessary thoroughgoing determination of all things), reason presupposes not the existence of such a being that is accordant with the ideal but rather merely the idea of such a being in order to derive conditioned totality (i.e. the totality of what is constrained) from an unconditioned totality of the thoroughgoing determination. For reason, therefore, the ideal is the prototype (*prototypon*) of all things: which *in toto* – as deficient copies (*ectypa*) – take the material for their possibility from that ideal and in more-or-less approximating to it, always nevertheless fall infinitely far short of attaining it.

So then, all possibility of things (i.e. of the synthesis of the manifold in respect to its content) is regarded as derived; and only the possibility of that which encloses all reality within itself is regarded as original. For all denials (which are nevertheless the only predicates whereby everything else can be distinguished from the most real being) are mere constrainments of a greater reality and ultimately of the supreme reality, and they therefore presuppose the latter and are merely derived from it in respect to content. All multiplicity of things is only a likewise manifold way of constraining the concept of the supreme reality (which is its common substratum), just as all figures are possible only as diverse ways of constraining infinite space. Hence, the object of reason’s ideal (which is found merely within reason) is also called the *originary being* (*ens originarium*), the *supreme being* (*ens summum*) so far as it has no being above it, and the *being* [*Wesen*] *of all beings* (*ens entium*) so far as everything (*qua* conditioned) stands under it. All this, however, signifies not the objective relationship of an actual object to other things but rather of an *idea* to *concepts* and leaves us in full ignorance in respect of the existence of a being of such exceptional priority.

Since one also cannot say that an originary being consists of many derived beings, because every derived being presupposes the former and therefore cannot constitute it: the ideal of the originary being will also have to be thought of as simple.

The derivation of all other possibility from that originary being is therefore, precisely speaking, also incapable of being regarded as a *constrainment* of that being’s supreme reality and, as it were, as a *division* of that reality. For then, the originary being would be regarded as a mere aggregate of derived beings: which is impossible, according to the foregoing, even if we initially represented it thus in the initial rough silhouette. Instead, the supreme reality would underlie the possibility of all things as a *ground* and as nothing more than a *complex*; and the former’s multiplicity would rest not upon the constrainment of the originary-being itself but rather upon its complete consequence: to which our whole sensibility together with all reality within appearance would then also belong, which cannot belong to the idea of the supreme being as an ingredient.

If we pursue our aforementioned idea further by hypostasising it, then we will be able to determine the originary being through the mere concept of the supreme reality as a being that is single, simple, allsufficient, eternal, etc. – in a word: we will be able to determine it in its unconditioned completeness through all predicaments. The concept of such a being is that of *God*, thought of in a transcendental sense; and thus, pure reason’s ideal is the object of a transcendental *theology*: as I have also said above.

Nevertheless, that use of the transcendental idea would indeed already transgress the limits of that idea’s determination and admissibility. For reason merely lays that idea, as the *concept* of all reality, at the basis of the thoroughgoing determination of things *simpliciter* without demanding that all that reality be objectively given and itself constitute a thing. The latter is a mere invention through which we summate and realise the manifold of our idea within an ideal as a particular being, for which we have no authority: not even to directly assume the possibility of such a hypothesis. Thus, all inferences that flow from such an ideal do not impinge upon the thoroughgoing determination of things *simpliciter*, for whose behoof alone the idea was needed, and do not have the slightest influence thereupon.

It is not enough to describe our reason’s procedure and dialectic; one must also seek to discover its sources in order to be able to explain that semblance itself, like a phenomenon of the understanding; for the ideal whereof we speak is grounded upon a natural- and not merely arbitrary idea. Hence, I ask: how does reason come to regard all possibility of things as derived from a single underlying possibility (viz. that of the supreme reality) and then presuppose that possibility as contained within a particular originary-being?

The answer offers itself by itself from the discussions in the Transcendental Analytic. The possibility of the objects of the senses is a relationship of them to our thought, wherein something (viz. the empirical form) can be thought about *apriori* but wherein that which constitutes the matter – namely, the reality within appearance (which corresponds to the sensation) – must be given: without which, it could not even be thought about at all and its possibility consequently could not be represented. Now, an object of the senses can become thoroughgoingly determined only if it is compared with all predicates of appearance and represented affirmatively or negatively through the latter. Yet since that which therein constitutes the thing itself (within appearance), viz. the *reale*, must be given – without which, it could not even be thought about at all – but that wherein the *reale* of all appearances is given is the single all-encompassing experience, the matter for the possibility of all objects of the senses – as given within a complex – must be presupposed; and all possibility of empirical objects, their difference from one another, and their thoroughgoing determination can rest upon the constrainment of that complex alone. Now, no objects other than those of the senses can in fact be given to us; and they can be given nowhere other than within the context of a possible experience – consequently, nothing is an object *for us* if it does not presuppose the complex of all empirical reality as a condition of its possibility. According to a natural illusion, we regard that as a principle that must hold for all things *simpliciter*: even though that principle in fact holds only for those things that can be given as objects of our senses. Consequently, through omitting that restriction, we will take the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things *qua* appearances for a transcendental principle of the possibility of things *simpliciter*.

Yet that we thereafter hypostasise that idea of the complex of all reality stems from our dialectically transforming the *distributive* unity of the experiential use of the understanding into the *collective* unity of an experiential whole and our thinking of an individual thing through that whole of appearance that contains all empirical reality within itself: which then, by means of the transcendental subreption whereof we have already thought, becomes confused with the concept of a thing that stands at the pinnacle of the possibility of all things, for whose thoroughgoing determination that thing supplies the real conditions.[[39]](#footnote-39)

##### 1.2.3.3.3.3. Third Section: On Speculative Reason’s Probative-Grounds for Inferring to the Existence of a Supreme Being

Despite that compelling need of reason to presuppose something that can completely underlie the understanding for the thoroughgoing determination of its concepts, reason nevertheless remarks the ideality and mere fabricatedness of such a presupposition far too easily for it to be persuaded through it alone to immediately assume a mere self-creation of its thought to be an actual being if reason were not otherwise compelled to seek its repose somewhere in the *regressus* from the *conditionatum* that is given to the *inconditionatum* that is admittedly still not given *per se* and according to its mere concept as actual but which alone can complete the series of the conditions that are traced to their grounds. That is the natural course that every human reason (even the commonest) takes, although not every human reason persists in it. Human reason begins not from concepts but rather from common experience and therefore takes something existent as a basis. That basis sinks, however, if it does not rest upon the immoveable rock of that which is absolutely necessary. Yet that rock itself floats without support if there is still empty space outside it and beneath it and it does not itself fill everything and thereby leave no more room for the ‘why?’, i.e. if it is not infinite in respect to its reality.

If something exists (whatever it may be), then it must also be admitted that something exists *necessarily*. For what is contingent exists only under the condition of something else, which is its cause; and the inference from that holds further: up to a cause that is not contingent and which exists necessarily, precisely for that reason. That is the argument upon which reason grounds its progression to the originary being.

Reason now looks for the concept of a being that fits with such a priority of existence as unconditional necessity: not so much in order to then infer *apriori* from the concept of that being to its existence (for if it trusted itself to do that, then it would enquire only amongst mere concepts and would have no need to take a given existence as a basis), but rather merely in order to find that concept amongst all concepts of possible things that has nothing in it that conflicts with absolute necessity. For in accordance with the first inference, reason takes it to have already been discerned that something must indeed exist absolutely-necessarily. If reason can now remove everything that is incompatible with that necessity, except for one being: then the latter is the absolutely necessary being – irrespective of whether one can grasp its necessity or not, i.e. derive its necessity from its concept alone.

That being whose concept contains within it the ‘because’ for every ‘why’, which is defective in none of its components nor in any regard, and which always suffices as a condition seems – precisely because of that – to be the being that fits with absolute necessity because, in itself possessing all of the conditions for all possibilia, does not itself need a condition and indeed does not even admit of a condition and consequently – at least in one component – satisfies the concept of unconditional necessity, wherein no other concept can imitate it: which, because it is deficient and in need of supplementation, displays within itself no such mark of independence from all further conditions. It is true that it still cannot be securely inferred therefrom that what does not contain within itself the supreme condition that is complete in every regard must therefore itself be conditioned in respect of its existence; but then it does not yet have within it the sole mark of unconditional existence whereof reason admits in order to cognise a being as unconditioned through a concept *apriori*.

Amongst all concepts of possible things, therefore, the concept of a being with supreme reality would fit best with the concept of an unconditionally necessary being; and even if it is not fully adequate to the latter, we still have no choice but rather see ourselves compelled to adhere to it because we must not cast the existence of a necessary being to the wind: yet if we concede that existence, we still can find nothing in the whole field of possibility that could make a more grounded claim to such a priority in existence.

The natural course of human reason is constituted as follows. First, human reason convinces itself of the existence of *a* necessary being. In that being, it cognises an unconditional existence. Now, it seeks the concept of something independent from every condition and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition for everything else: i.e. in that which contains all reality. But the all without constraints is absolute unity and carries with it the concept of a single being (viz. the supreme being), and human reason thus infers that the supreme being – as the originary-ground of all things – exists absolutely necessarily.

That concept cannot be denied a certain profundity when the talk is of *decisions*: i.e. once the existence of a necessary being is conceded and one agrees that one must adopt a party in respect to wherein one shall posit that being; for then, one cannot choose more fittingly – or rather one has no choice but is rather compelled to lend one’s voice to the absolute unity of the complete reality as the originary-source of possibility. Yet if nothing drives us to decide and we prefer to set that whole issue aside until we are compelled to approve through the full weight of probative-grounds, i.e. if it is merely an issue of *judging* how much we know about that problem and what we merely flatter ourselves to know: then the above inference is far from appearing in a highly advantageous form and needs goodwill to supplement the deficiency of its claims to legitimacy.

For if we grant everything as it lies before us here – viz. firstly that a correct inference can occur from some given existence (perhaps even merely my own) to the existence of an unconditionally necessary being and secondly that I must regard a being as absolutely unconditioned that contains all reality and therefore also every condition and consequently that the concept of the thing that fits with absolute necessity is thereby found – it still cannot at all be inferred therefrom that the concept of an unconstrained being that does not have supreme reality therefore contradicts absolute necessity. For even if I do not encounter the *inconditionatum* that the all of the conditions already carries with it within that being’s concept, it still cannot at all be inferred therefrom that that being’s existence must precisely therefore be conditioned – just as I cannot say in a hypothetical rational-inference that where a certain condition is not (viz. here, completeness in respect to concepts), the *conditionatum* also is not. It will rather remain open to us to likewise accept all other constrained beings as unconditionally necessary, even if we cannot infer their necessity from the general concept that we have of them. In that way, however, that argument would not have provided us with even the slightest concept of the properties of a necessary being and would have accomplished absolutely nothing at all.

Nevertheless, that argument retains a certain importance and an authority that still cannot immediately be taken from it due to that objective insufficiency. For suppose there are obligations that are wholly correct in reason’s idea but which would be without any reality in application to us ourselves (i.e. without impetuses) were a supreme being not presupposed that could bestow effect and weight upon the practical laws – we would then also have an obligation to follow the concepts: which, even if they might not be objectively sufficient, are nevertheless preponderant according to the measure of our reason and in comparison with which we can nevertheless cognise nothing that is better and more persuasive. The duty to choose would there bring speculation’s indecisiveness out of equilibrium through a practical addition; and reason would indeed, by itself: as the most scrutinising judge, find no justification if it had not followed those grounds of its judgement above which we yet at least know none better.

Even if that argument is transcendental because it rests upon the intrinsic insufficiency of what is contingent, it is still so simple and natural that it is congruous with the commonest human-sense as soon as that sense is merely guided thereto. One sees things alter, arise, and pass away; they – or at least their state – must therefore have a cause. But precisely that can in turn be asked of every cause that may ever be given within experience. Now, where shall we locate the *highest* causality more equitably than where the *supreme* causality also is: i.e. in that being that originally contains within itself the sufficiency for every possible effect, whose concept also comes about very easily through the sole feature of an all-encompassing perfection. We then hold that supreme cause to be absolutely necessary because we find it absolutely necessary to ascend to it and find no ground to go still further beyond it. Hence, with all peoples, we see some sparks of monotheism shimmer through their blindest polytheism: to which they have been led not by reflection and deep speculation but rather merely by a natural course of the common understanding that has, little-by-little, become intelligible.

###### 1.2.3.3.3.3.1. Only Three Kinds of Proof of the Existence of God Are Possible from Speculative Reason

All paths that one may pursue in this intention begin either from the determinate experience and the particular constitution of our sensory-world that is thereby cognised and ascend from it according to laws of causality to the supreme cause outside the world; or they take merely indeterminate experience (i.e. some existence) as a basis empirically; or, finally, they abstract from all experience and infer entirely *apriori* from mere concepts to the existence of a supreme cause. The first proof is the *physicotheological* proof; the second is the *cosmological* proof; the third is the *ontological* proof. There are no more of them, and nor can there be any more.

I will demonstrate that reason can no more accomplish something on one path (i.e. the empirical path) than on the other (i.e. the transcendental path) and that it vainly spreads its wings in order to go beyond the sensible cosmos through the mere power of speculation. Yet the order in which those kinds of proof must be propounded for examination will be precisely the converse of that taken by a reason that expands itself little-by-little and in which we also initially placed them. For it will become manifest that even though experience gives the first occasion for this endeavour, merely a *transcendental concept* leads reason in it and demarcates the goal that reason has set itself in all such enquiries. I will therefore begin by examining the transcendental proof and thereafter see what the addition of the empirical proof can do to augment its probative force.

###### 1.2.3.3.3.4. Fourth Section: On the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God

One easily sees from the foregoing that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a pure rational-concept (i.e. a mere idea) whose objective reality is still far from proved through the fact that reason needs it and which also gives direction only towards a certain, though admittedly unattainable, completeness and in fact serves more to delimit the understanding than to expand it to new objects. Now, the strange and absurd fact occurs here that although the inference from a given existence *simpliciter* to an absolutely necessary existence seems to be compelling and correct, all conditions of the understanding to make ourselves a concept of such a necessity are totally against us.

In every time, one has spoken of the *absolutely necessary* being and has endeavoured not so much to understand whether and how one can even merely think about a thing of that kind as rather to prove its existence. Admittedly, a nominal explanation of that concept is entirely easy: namely, that it is something whose non-being is impossible; but one thereby becomes none the wiser in respect to the conditions that render it impossible to regard a thing’s non-being as absolutely unthinkable and which are in fact what one wishes to know, viz. whether or not we think of something through that concept at all. For to discard all conditions that the understanding always needs in order to regard something as necessary by means of the word ‘unconditioned’ still by no means renders it intelligible to me whether I also then think of something or perhaps nothing whatsoever through a concept of something that is unconditionally necessary.

Moreover, one has additionally believed oneself to explain that concept, which was ventured haphazardly and has ultimately become entirely familiar, through a multitude of examples in such a way that all further enquiries concerning its intelligibility appeared entirely unnecessary. Every proposition of geometry, e.g. that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary; and so one spoke of an object that lies entirely outside the sphere of our understanding as though one very well understood what one wished to say with the concept of it.

All purported examples are, without exception, derived only from *judgements* but not from *things* and their existence. The unconditional necessity of judgements is not, however, an absolute necessity of the subject-matter. For the absolute necessity of a judgement is merely a conditional necessity of the subject-matter or of the predicate within the judgement. The previous proposition said not that three angles are absolutely necessary but rather that under the condition that a triangle exists (i.e. is given), three angles (within it) also necessarily exist. Nevertheless, that logical necessity has demonstrated such a great power of its illusion that because one had made oneself an *apriori* concept of a thing that was so disposed that, in one’s opinion, one conceived existence concomitantly within its extent, one believed oneself to be able to infer securely therefrom that since existence necessarily accrues to the object of that concept – i.e. under the condition that I posit that thing as given (i.e. existent), its existence is also necessarily posited (according to the rule of identity) – that being is therefore itself absolutely necessary because its existence is concomitantly thought of within an arbitrarily-assumed concept and under the condition that I posit that concept’s object.

If I eliminate the predicate within an identical judgement and retain the subject, then a contradiction arises: and I hence say that the predicate necessarily accrues to that subject. Yet if I eliminate the subject together with the predicate, then no contradiction arises; for *there is no longer anything* that could be contradicted. To posit a triangle and nevertheless eliminate its three angles is contradictory, but to eliminate the triangle together with its three angles is not a contradiction. It is exactly the same with the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If you eliminate that being’s existence, then you eliminate the thing itself with all of its predicates – whence then shall the contradiction derive? Externally, there is nothing that would be contradicted; for the thing shall not be externally necessary. Internally, there is also nothing that would be contradicted; for through eliminating the thing itself, you have simultaneously eliminated everything internal. God is omnipotent; that is a necessary judgement. Omnipotence cannot be eliminated if you posit a divinity (i.e. an infinite being) with whose concept God is identical. Yet if you say ‘God is not’, then neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates is given; for they are all eliminated together with the subject, and not the slightest contradiction manifests itself within that thought.

You have therefore seen that if I eliminate a judgement’s predicate together with its subject, then an internal contradiction can never arise: whatever the predicate may be. Now, no other evasion remains to you except to say that there are subjects that cannot be eliminated at all and which must therefore remain. But that would say just as much as that there are absolutely-necessary subjects – a presupposition whose correctness I have just doubted and whose possibility you wish to show to me. For I cannot make myself the slightest concept of a thing that would leave a contradiction if it were eliminated with all its predicates; and without contradiction, I have no mark of impossibility through mere pure *apriori* concepts.

Against all of those universal inferences (that no human can refuse), you challenge me through a case that you propound as a proof through the deed – namely, that there is nevertheless one and indeed only this *one* concept wherein the non-being or elimination of its object is contradictory *per se*: and that is the concept of the most real being. It has, you say, all reality: and you are justified in assuming such a being as possible (which I grant for now, even though a non-contradictory concept is still far from demonstrating the possibility of its object).[[40]](#footnote-40) Now, within all reality, existence is also conceived concomitantly: therefore, existence lies within the concept of a possibilium. If that thing is eliminated, then that thing’s internal possibility is eliminated: which is contradictory.

I answer: you have already committed a contradiction if you already import the concept of a thing’s existence (be it under some disguised name) into the concept of that thing of which you wished to think merely in regard to its possibility. If one grants you that, then you have seemingly won the game but have in fact said nothing; for you have committed a mere tautology. I ask you: is the proposition ‘such-and-such a thing (which I grant you as possible, whatever it may be) exists’ an analytic- or a synthetic proposition? If it is the former, then you add nothing to your thought of the thing through the thing’s existence; but then either the thought that is within you would have to be the thing itself, or you have presupposed an existence as belonging to the possibility and have then purportedlyinferred existence from internal possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word ‘reality’, which differs phonetically from ‘existence’ in the concept of the predicate, is of no import. For even if you call all positing ‘reality’ (irrespective of what you posit), then you have already posited the thing with all its predicates in the concept of the subject and have therein assumed it to be actual: and in the predicate, you have merely repeated that. In contrast: if you admit that every existential proposition is synthetic (as every rational person must), how will you then assert that the predicate of ‘existence’ cannot be eliminated without contradiction? For that distinction peculiarly accrues only to analytic propositions, whose character rests precisely thereupon.

I would admittedly hope to annihilate that ponderous argumentation without any detour through an exact determination of the concept of existence if I had not found that the illusion in confusing a logical predicate with a real predicate (i.e. the determination of a thing) almost defies all instruction. Anything one likes can serve for a *logical predicate*: a subject can even be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a *determination* is a predicate that accrues beyond the concept of the subject and which augments that concept. Therefore, it must not already be contained within it.

*Being* is obviously not a real predicate, i.e. a concept of something that could accrue to the concept of a thing. It is merely the position of a thing or of certain determinations *per se*. In its logical use, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition ‘God is omnipotent’ contains two concepts that have their objects, viz. *God* and *omnipotence*; the word ‘is’ is not an additional predicate but rather merely that which posits the predicate *relatively* to the subject. If I now take the subject (viz. God) together with all his predicates (to which omnipotence also belongs) and say ‘God is’ or ‘there is a God’, then I posit no new predicate for the concept of God but rather only the subject *per se* with all its predicates and indeed the *object* in relation to my *concept*. Both must contain exactly the same; and therefore, nothing further can accrue to the concept that expresses merely the possibility as a consequence of my thinking of its object as absolutely given (through the phrase ‘he is’). And so, what is actual contains nothing more than what is merely possible. A hundred actual talers contain not the slightest bit more than a hundred possible talers. For since the latter merely signify the concept whereas the former signify the object and its position *per se*: in the event that the latter contained more than the former, my concept would not express the whole object and nor therefore would it be the congruous concept of it. Yet in my wherewithal, there is more with a hundred actual talers than with the mere concept thereof (i.e. their possibility). For with actuality, the object is not merely contained analytically within my concept but rather accrues synthetically to my concept (which is a determination of my state): without the aforesaid hundred talers themselves being augmented in the slightest through that being [*Sein*] outside my concept.

If I therefore think about a thing through whichever and however many predicates I like (even in thoroughgoing determination), nothing whatsoever accrues to the thing through my also adding that the thing *is*. For otherwise, not exactly the same but rather more would exist than I had thought of within the concept; and I could not say that precisely the object of my concept exists. Even if I think of every reality in a thing except one, the missing reality does not accrue through my saying that such a deficient thing exists; but rather the thing exists afflicted precisely with the same deficiency as I have thought of – otherwise, something other than what I had thought of would exist. If I now think of a being as the supreme reality (without deficiency), then the question still always remains of whether it exists or not. For even though nothing is missing from my concept of the possible real content of a thing *simpliciter*, something is nevertheless still missing from the relationship to my whole state of thought: namely, that the cognition of that object is also possible *aposteriori*. And here, the cause of the difficulty prevailing therein also becomes manifest. If the talk were of an object of the senses, then I would be unable to confuse the existence of the thing with the mere concept of the thing. For whereas through the concept, the object is thought of only as consonant with the universal conditions of a possible empirical cognition *simpliciter*: through existence, it is thought of as contained within the context of total experience. For whereas the concept of the object is not augmented in the slightest through the connection to the content of total experience, our thought receives another possible perception through it. In contrast: if we wish to think of existence through the pure category alone, then it is no wonder that we cannot specify a mark to distinguish it from mere possibility.

Our concept of an object may therefore contain whatever and however much one likes, we must nevertheless go beyond it in order to impart existence to that object. With objects of the senses, that occurs through coherence with some of my perceptions according to empirical laws; but for objects of pure thought, there is absolutely no means of cognising their existence because it would have to be cognised entirely *apriori*: but our consciousness of all existence (be it immediately through perception or through inferences that connect something to perception) belongs entirely and absolutely to the unity of experience; and although an existence outside that field admittedly cannot be declared absolutely to be impossible, it is nevertheless a presupposition that we cannot justify through anything.

The concept of a supreme being is a highly useful idea in some regards; but precisely because it is merely an idea, it is wholly impossible for us to expand our cognition in respect of what exists by means of it alone. It is not even capable of instructing us in respect to the possibility of something else. Admittedly, the analytic mark of possibility that consists in the fact that mere positions (i.e. realities) generate no contradiction cannot be denied to it; but since the connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis about whose possibility one cannot judge *apriori* because the realities are not specifically given: and even if that did occur, no judgement whatsoever occurs therein because the mark of the possibility of synthetic cognitions must always be sought only within experience – to which, however, the object of an idea cannot belong – the famous Leibniz has by no means accomplished what he flattered himself to have accomplished: namely, to discern *apriori* the possibility of such a sublime ideal being.

All endeavour and labour in respect of the highly famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a supreme being from concepts is therefore lost; and a human could no more become richer in insights from mere ideas than a merchant could become richer in wherewithal if, in order to improve his standing, he sought to append several noughts to his cash balance.

##### 1.2.3.3.3.5. Fifth Section: On the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God

It was something entirely unnatural and a mere renewal of scholastic wit to seek to extract from an idea that was developed entirely arbitrarily the existence of the object itself that corresponds to it. In fact, one would never have attempted it in that way if the need of our reason to assume something necessary for existence *simpliciter* (at which one can stop in ascending) had not preceded and if reason had not been compelled – since that necessity must be unconditional and *apriori* certain – to seek a concept that would, where possible, satisfy such a demand and allow an existence to be cognised fully *apriori*. One believed oneself to find that concept in the idea of a being that is the most real being; and so, that idea was used only for more determinate knowledge of that of whose existence one was already otherwise convinced or persuaded: namely, the necessary being. Nevertheless, one concealed that natural course of reason; and instead of ending at that concept, one attempted to begin from it in order to derive the necessity of existence from it that it was nevertheless determined only to supplement. From that arose the unsuccessful ontological proof that carried with it nothing that would satisfy the natural and healthy understanding or scholastically-correct examination.

The *cosmological proof*, whichwe shall now investigate, retains the connection of absolute necessity to the supreme reality; but instead of inferring from the supreme reality to necessity in existence, like the previous proof, it rather infers from the antecedently-given unconditional necessity of a being to its unlimited reality and, to that extent, brings everything at least into the orbit of an at least natural mode of inference (though I do not know whether it is rational or sophistical) that carries with it the most persuasion not only for the common- but also for the speculative understanding – and so then, it also visibly draws the initial groundlines for all proofs of natural theology that one has always pursued and will pursue further: however much foliage and however many flourishes one may wish to decorate and hide it with. We shall now display this proof, which Leibniz also called the ‘proof *a contingentia mundi*’, and subject it to examination.

This proof reads as follows: if something exists, then an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now, at least I myself exist: therefore, an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premise contains an experience; the major premise contains the inference from an experience *simpliciter* to the existence of something necessary.[[41]](#footnote-41) Therefore, the proof in fact begins from experience: and therefore, it is neither conducted entirely *apriori* nor ontological; and because the object of all possible experience is called the ‘cosmos’, the proof is also called the *cosmological* proof. Since it also abstracts from every particular property of the objects of experience whereby that cosmos may distinguish itself from every possible cosmos, it is also distinguished in its denomination from every physicotheological proof that uses observations of the particular constitution of this sensible cosmos of ours as probative grounds.

Now, the proof further infers that the necessary being can be determined in only a single way, i.e. through only one of all possible opposed predicates; consequently, that being must be *thoroughgoingly* determined through its concept. Now, only one single concept of a thing is possible that determines that thing thoroughgoingly *apriori*: namely, that of the *ens realissimum*. Therefore, the concept of the most real being is the sole concept whereby a necessary being can be thought of: i.e. a supreme being exists necessarily.

In that cosmological argument, so many sophistical principles come together that speculative reason seems to have summoned all of its dialectical art here in order to bring about the greatest-possible transcendental semblance. We shall nevertheless set aside its examination for a while in order to render only one of its tricks manifest with which it propounds an old argument in a disguised form as a new argument and invokes the corroboration of two witnesses: viz. one witness from pure reason and another of an empirical credential – although there is indeed only the first witness, who merely alters his clothing and voice in order to be taken for a second witness. In order to lay its ground securely, this proof founds itself upon experience and thereby gives itself the regard as if it were distinct from the ontological proof: which places its whole trust in mere pure *apriori* concepts. The cosmological proof avails itself of that experience, however, merely in order to perform a single step: namely, to the existence of a necessary being *simpliciter*. The empirical probative-ground cannot teach us which properties that being has; but rather reason entirely takes its departure from that probative-ground and enquires behind mere concepts regarding which properties an absolutely necessary being must have in general, i.e. which thing amongst all possible things contains within itself the requisite conditions (*requisita*) for an absolute necessity. Now, it believes itself to encounter those requisites solely within the concept of a being that is the most real being and then infers that that is the absolutely necessary being. It is clear, however, that one therein presupposes that the concept of a being with supreme reality fully satisfies the concept of absolute necessity in existence: i.e. that one can infer from the former to the latter – a proposition that the ontological argument asserted, which one therefore assumes and takes as a basis in the cosmological proof even though one had wanted to avoid it. For absolute necessity is an existence from mere concepts. If I now say that the concept of the *ens realissimum* is such a concept and indeed the sole concept that fits with necessary existence and which is adequate for it, then I must also grant that necessary existence can be inferred from it. It is therefore in fact only the ontological proof from mere concepts that contains all of the probative force within the so-called cosmological proof; and the purported experience is entirely otiose and perhaps serves merely in order to lead us to the concept of absolute necessity but not in order to demonstrate absolute necessity in any determinate thing. For as soon as we have that as our intention, we must immediately leave all experience and seek amongst pure concepts which of them indeed contains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. Yet if merely the possibility of such a being is discerned in such a way, then its existence is also demonstrated; for it means so much as that amongst all possibilia, there is one possibilium that carries absolute necessity with it: i.e. that being exists absolutely-necessarily.

All illusions in the inference reveal themselves most easily if one displays them in a scholastically-correct way. Here is such a presentation.

If the principle ‘every absolutely necessary being is also the most real being’ is correct (which is the *nervus probandi* of the cosmological proof): then it must, like all affirmative judgements, be capable of being converted at least *per accidens* – thus: some most-real beings are also absolutely necessary beings. No *ens realissimum* is distinct from any other in any component, however; and what holds for *some* beings under that concept also therefore holds for *all*. Consequently, I will also be able to convert absolutely (in this case): i.e. every most-real being is a necessary being. Now, since that principle is determined *apriori* merely from its concepts, the mere concept of the most real being must also carry with it the absolute necessity of that being: which precisely the ontological proof asserted and the cosmological proof did not wish to recognise, although it admittedly underlay its inferences (albeit in a hidden manner).

So then, the second path that speculative reason takes in order to prove the existence of the supreme being is not only just as fallacious as the first path but also has in it the blameworthy feature that it commits an *ignoratio elenchi* by promising to lead us along a new trail but – after a short detour – brings us back again to the old trail that we had left because of it.

A short time ago, I said that a whole nest of dialectical pretensions lies concealed within this cosmological argument that transcendental critique can easily discover and destroy. I shall now merely present it and leave it to the already practised reader to further investigate the fallacious principles and eliminate them.

There is found therein firstly, e.g., (1) the transcendental principle to infer from the contingent to a cause: which is of significance only within the sensible cosmos but does not even have a sense outside it. For the merely intellectual concept of the contingent can bring forth no synthetic principle whatsoever (such as that of causality), and the principle of causality has absolutely no significance and no mark for its use except only within the sensible cosmos; but here, it should serve precisely in order to go beyond the sensible cosmos. (2) The inference to infer from the impossibility of an infinite series of intersuperordinate given causes within the sensible cosmos to a first cause, for which the principles of reason’s use within experience cannot themselves justify us, can much less extend that principle beyond the sensible cosmos (whither that chain absolutely cannot be lengthened). (3) Reason’s false self-satisfaction in respect to that series’s completion through one’s ultimately removing all conditions without which no concept of a necessity can indeed occur and, since one can then conceive nothing further, one’s assuming that to be a completion of one’s concept. (4) The confusion of the logical possibility of a concept of all unified reality (without internal contradiction) with the transcendental possibility of such a concept, which needs a principle of the feasibility of such a synthesis: which can, however, apply only to the field of possible experiences, etc.

The cosmological proof’s artifice aims merely to avoid the *apriori* proof of the existence of a necessary being through mere concepts, which would have to be conducted ontologically but in respect of which we feel ourselves to be entirely incapable. In that intention, we infer from an actual existence (of an experience *simpliciter*) that has been taken as a basis to an absolutely necessary condition of that existence (as well as that can be done). We then have no need to explain that condition’s possibility. For if it is proved that the condition exists, then the question concerning its possibility is wholly unnecessary. If we now wish to determine that necessary being more closely in respect of its constitution, then we do not seek that which is sufficient to comprehend the necessity of its existence from its concept. For if we could do that, then we would have no need of an empirical presupposition – nay: we seek only the negative condition (*conditio sine qua non*) without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now, that would well be feasible in every other kind of inference from a given consequence to its ground; but it unfortunately occurs here that the condition that one demands for absolute necessity can be encountered in only a single being, which would consequently have to contain within its concept everything that is requisite for absolute necessity and which therefore renders an *apriori* inference to absolute necessity possible – i.e. I would also have to be able to infer conversely that whichever thing that concept (of supreme reality) accrues to is absolutely necessary; and if I cannot thus infer (which I must admit if I wish to avoid the ontological proof), then I am also unsuccessful on my new path and again find myself where I set out. The concept of the supreme being indeed satisfies all questions *apriori* that can be raised concerning the internal determinations of a thing and is therefore also an ideal without equal because the general concept simultaneously distinguishes it as an individual amongst all possible things. Yet that concept does not at all satisfy the question concerning its own existence, which was all that was truly at issue; and one could not answer the enquiry of someone who assumed the existence of a necessary being and who wished to know only which thing amongst all things must be regarded as that being by saying ‘this is the necessary being here’.

It may well be allowable to *assume* the existence of a being with supreme sufficiency as a cause for all possible effects in order to facilitate reason’s attainment of the unity of all explanatory-grounds, which it seeks. Only to presume so much that one even says ‘such a being exists necessarily’ is no longer the modest utterance of an allowed hypothesis but rather a brazen pretension to an apodictic certainty; for cognition of what one professes to cognise as absolutely necessary must also carry absolute necessity with it.

The whole problem of the transcendental ideal comes down to either finding a concept for absolute necessity or finding the absolute necessity of a thing for the concept of that thing. If one can do one of those, then one must also be able to do the other; for reason cognises as absolutely necessary only what is necessary from its concept. But both totally surpass all extreme endeavours to *satisfy* our understanding in respect of that point but also all attempts to console it in respect of that incapacity.

The unconditional necessity that we need so indispensably as the ultimate sustainer of all things is the true abyss for human reason. Even eternity – even as shuddersomely sublimely as a *Haller* may depict it – does not make its vertiginous impression upon the mind for long; for it only *measures* the duration of the things but does not *sustain* it. One cannot rid oneself of, yet nor can one tolerate, the thought that a being that we even represent to ourselves as the supreme being amongst all possible beings says to itself, as it were, ‘I am from eternity to eternity; outside me, there is nothing without that which is something merely through my will; *but whence then am I*?’. Everything sinks beneath us here; and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest float without stability merely before speculative reason, which it costs nothing to let one of those as well as the other vanish without the slightest hindrance.

Many forces of nature, which manifest their existence through certain effects, remain inexplorable for us; for we cannot trace them far enough through observation. The transcendental object underlying the appearances and, with it, the ground why our sensibility has those rather than other highest conditions are and remain inexplorable for us: although the item itself is admittedly given, only not comprehended. An ideal of pure reason cannot be called *inexplorable*, however, because it does not have to exhibit any certification of its reality beyond reason’s need to complete all synthetic unity by means of it. Since it is therefore not even given as a thinkable object, nor is it inexplorable as such an object. Instead, as a mere idea, it must find its seat and resolution in the nature of reason and must therefore be capable of being explored; for reason consists precisely in the fact that we can give account of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions: be it from objective grounds or, if they are a mere semblance, from subjective grounds.

**1.2.3.3.3.6. Discovery and Explanation of the Dialectical Semblance in All Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of a Necessary Being**

Both of the proofs conducted hitherto were transcendental, i.e. attempted independently of empirical principles. For even though the cosmological proof takes an experience *simpliciter* as a basis, it is nevertheless conducted not from any particular quality thereof but rather from pure rational-principles in relation to an existence given through empirical consciousness *simpliciter* and abandons even that guidance in order to support itself upon mere pure concepts. Now, what is the cause of the dialectical yet natural semblance in those transcendental proofs that connects the concepts of necessity and supreme reality and which realises and hypostasises that which can nevertheless be only idea? What is the cause of the unavoidability of assuming something as *per se* necessary amongst the existent things and yet simultaneously recoiling before the existence of such a being as an abyss; and how does one begin so that reason has an understanding in respect of itself concerning that and attains tranquil insight from the wavering state of a shy approval that is always in turn retracted?

It is something exceedingly remarkable that if one presupposes that something exists, one cannot avoid the inference that something also exists necessarily. The cosmological argument rested upon that entirely natural (though admittedly still not consequently secure) inference. In contrast: whichever concept of a thing I may wish to assume, I find that its existence can never be represented by me as absolutely necessary and that, whatever then exists, nothing prevents me from thinking of its non-being; and therefore, I must admittedly assume something necessary for what exists *simpliciter* but can think of no single thing itself as necessary *per se*. That is: I can never *complete* regression to the conditions of existence without assuming a necessary being, although I can never *begin* from it.

If I must think of something necessary for existent things *simpliciter* but am not authorised to think of a thing *per se* as necessary, then it follows unavoidably therefrom that necessity and contingency must not impinge upon and concern things themselves because otherwise a contradiction would occur. Therefore, neither of the following two principles is objective; but rather they can perhaps be merely subjective principles of reason – viz. on the one hand, for everything that is given as existent, to seek something that is necessary: i.e. to never stop anywhere except at an explanation completed *apriori*; but on the other hand, also to never hope for that completion: i.e. to assume nothing empirical as unconditioned and thereby excuse oneself from further derivation. In such a signification, both principles can very well subsist alongside one another as merely heuristic and *regulative* principles that provide for nothing other than reason’s formal interest. For one says that you shall philosophise about nature as if there were a necessary first ground for everything that pertains to existence merely in order to bring systematic unity into your cognition through your pursuing such an idea, viz. an imagined highest ground; but the other principle warns you to assume no single determination pertaining to the existence of the things to be such a highest ground (i.e. to be absolutely necessary) but rather to still always keep the path open to further derivation and therefore always still treat it as conditioned. Yet if everything that is perceived by us in things must necessarily be considered as conditioned, then also no thing (that may be given empirically) can be regarded as absolutely necessary.

It follows therefrom, however, that you must assume that which is absolutely necessary *outside* the world: because it shall serve only for a principle of the greatest-possible unity of all appearances as their highest ground, and you can never arrive at it within the world because the second rule commands you to always regard all empirical causes of the unity as derived.

The philosophers of antiquity regarded all form of nature as contingent but, in accordance with the judgement of common reason, regarded matter as original and necessary. Yet had they considered matter not relatively as a substratum of the appearances but rather *per se* in respect of its existence, then the idea of absolute necessity would have immediately vanished. For there is nothing that binds reason to that existence absolutely, but rather it can always eliminate it in thought without contradiction; but the absolute necessity also lay within thought alone. A certain regulative principle therefore had to be underlying in respect of that persuasion. In fact, extension and impenetrability (which together constitute the concept of matter) is the highest empirical principle of the unity of appearances and has in it, so far as it is empirically unconditioned, a property of a regulative principle. Nevertheless, since every determination of matter that constitutes the *reale* thereof and therefore also impenetrability is an effect (i.e. action) that must have its cause and is consequently always derived, matter still does not fit with the idea of a necessary being as a principle of all derived unity. For since each of matter’s real properties (*qua* derived) is only conditionally necessary and can therefore be eliminated *per se*, but therewith matter’s entire existence would be eliminated – though if that did not occur, then we would have reached the supreme ground of the unity empirically: which is forbidden through the second regulative principle – it follows that matter and, in general, what belongs to the world cannot fit with the idea of a necessary originary-being as a mere principle of the greatest empirical unity but that it must rather be posited outside the world: since we can then always confidently derive the world’s appearances and their existence from others as though there were no necessary being and can nevertheless unceasingly strive for the completeness of the derivation as though such a being were presupposed as a highest ground.

According to those contemplations, the ideal of the supreme being is nothing other than a *regulative principle* of reason to regard all conjunction within the world as though it derived from an allsufficient necessary cause in order to thereupon ground the rule of a systematic unity that is necessary according to universal laws in explanation thereof and is not an assertion of a *per se* necessary existence. It is simultaneously unavoidable, however, to represent the aforesaid formal principle as constitutive by means of a transcendental subreption and to think of the aforesaid unity hypostatically. For just as space – because it renders all shapes originally possible, which are merely diverse constrainments of it – is, even though it is merely a principle of sensibility, nevertheless (precisely because of that) taken for an absolutely necessary something that subsists by itself and an object that is given *per se*, *apriori*, it also occurs entirely naturally that since nature’s systematic unity can in no way be propounded as a principle of empirical use of our reason except so far as we take the idea of the most real being (as the highest cause) as a basis, that idea is thereby represented as an actual object; and that object is in turn represented as necessary because it is the highest condition: and consequently, a *regulative* principlebecomes transformed into a *constitutive* principle – a substitution that manifests itself through the fact that if I now consider that highest being (which was absolutely, i.e. unconditionally, necessary relatively to the world) as a thing by itself, then that necessity admits of no concept and must therefore have been encounterable within my reason only as a formal condition of thought but not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence.

##### 1.2.3.3.3.7. Sixth Section: On the Impossibility of the Physicotheological Proof

If then neither the concept of things *simpliciter* nor the experience of an *existence simpliciter* can accomplish what is demanded, there still remains a means of enquiring whether a *determinate experience* – viz. that of the things of the present world, their constitution, and their order – can yield a probative ground that can surely help us to attain the conviction of the existence of a supreme being. We would call such a proof the *physicotheological* proof. Should that proof also be impossible, then absolutely no sufficient proof is possible from merely speculative reason for the existence of a being that would correspond to our transcendental idea.

In light of all of the above remarks, one will soon discern that the answer to this enquiry can be expected very easily and concisely. For how can experience ever be given that should be adequate to an idea? The peculiarity of an idea consists precisely in the fact that an experience can never be congruent with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary allsufficient originary-being is so superabundantly immense and so highly exalted above everything empirical, which is always conditioned, that one can partly never muster enough material within experience in order to fill such a concept and partly always blunders around amongst *conditionata* and will constantly seek vainly after the *inconditionatum*: whereof no law of any empirical synthesis gives us an example nor the slightest guidance towards it.

If the supreme being stood within that chain of conditions, then it would itself be an element of the series and – just like the lower elements to which it is prefixed – would require still further investigation concerning its still higher ground. If, by contrast, one wishes to separate it from that chain and not comprehend it concomitantly within the series of natural causes, then what bridge can reason then indeed construct in order to reach it? For all laws of a transition from effects to causes, and indeed all synthesis and expansion of our cognition *simpliciter*, pertain to nothing other than possible experience and therefore merely to objects of the sensible cosmos and can have a significance only in regard thereto.

The present world discloses to us such an immeasurable arena of multiplicity, order, purposiveness, and beauty – irrespective of whether one pursues these in space’s infinitude or in its unlimited division – that even in light of the knowledge that our weak understanding has been able to acquire thereof: all language loses its weight in respect of so many and such unsurveyably immense wonders, all numbers lose their power to measure, and even our thoughts lose all limitation in such a way that our judgement of the whole must dissolve into a speechless, yet so much the more eloquent, astonishment. We everywhere see a chain of effects and causes, and of purposes and their means, regularity in arising or passing away; and since nothing has entered the state wherein it finds itself by itself, it points ever further to another thing as its cause: which renders exactly the same further enquiry necessary to the extent that, in such a manner, the entire all must sink into the abyss of nothing if one did not assume something that holds it and, as the cause of its origin, simultaneously secures its endurance. How great shall one conceive that supreme cause (in respect of all things of the world)? We do not know the world in respect of its whole content, and still less do we know how to estimate its magnitude by comparison with everything that is possible. Yet once we need an extreme and highest being in regard to causality, what prevents us from simultaneously setting it *above all other possibilia* in respect to its degree of perfection? We can accomplish that easily (though admittedly only through the faint outline of an abstract concept) if we represent all possible perfection unified within it as a single substance – a concept that is felicitous for our reason’s demand in sparing principles, subject to no contradictions *per se*, and even conducive to expanding reason’s use amidst experience through the guidance that such an idea gives towards order and purposiveness, but is nowhere contrary to an experience in a decisive way.

This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the proof most congruous with common human-reason. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it itself has its existence from such study and thereby always receives new force. It carries purposes and intentions whither our observation would not have discovered them by itself and expands our natural cognitions through the guiding thread of a particular unity whose principle is external to nature. That knowledge in turn reacts upon its cause (viz. the engendering idea), however, and augments belief in a supreme author into an irresistible conviction.

It would therefore be not only desolate but also entirely futile to seek to detract something from this proof’s esteem. Reason, which is unremittingly elevated through such powerful (albeit merely empirical) probative-grounds that always grow at its hands, cannot be so depressed through any doubt of subtle abstract speculation that it should not be torn from any ponderous indecisiveness – just as if from a dream – through one glance that it casts upon the wonder of nature and the majesty of the cosmos’s structure in order to elevate itself from quantum to quantum up to the all-highest quantum and from *conditionatum* to condition up to the highest and unconditioned author.

Yet even if we have nothing to object to the rationality and utility of that procedure but rather have to recommend and encourage it, we still cannot consequently endorse the claims that this kind of proof might make to apodictic certainty and to an approval needful of no goodwill nor foreign underpinning whatsoever; and it can in no way damage the good cause to tone down the dogmatic language of a contumelious sophist to the tone of moderation and modesty of a belief that suffices for consolation even if it does not exactly demand unconditional submission. I accordingly assert that the physicotheological proof can never demonstrate the existence of a supreme being alone but rather must always leave it to the ontological proof (which it serves only for introduction) to supplement that deficiency; therefore, the ontological proof always contains the *sole possible probative-ground* (so far as a speculative proof even occurs at all) that no human reason can pass by.

The main moments of the aforementioned physicotheological proof are the following. 1. Within the world, perspicuous signs are found everywhere of an order according to determinate intention carried out with great wisdom and in a whole of indescribable multiplicity in respect of its content as well as unlimited magnitude in respect of its extent. 2. That purposive order is entirely foreign to the things of the world and attaches to them only contingently: i.e. the nature of diverse things could not harmonise by themselves for determinate final-intentions through so many uniting means had they not been chosen and arranged entirely expressly for them through an ordering rational principle according to underlying ideas. 3. There therefore exists a sublime and wise cause (or multiple such causes) that must be the cause of the world not merely through *fruitfulness* as a blindly-acting, omnipotent nature but rather through *freedom* as an intelligence. 4. The unity of that cause can be inferred with certainty from the unity of the reciprocal relation of the world’s parts as elements of an artificial structure in that to which our observation extends, but furthermore with probability according to all principles of analogy.

Without chicaning with natural reason here about its inference wherein, from the analogy of some natural-products with what human art brings forth – when it does violence to nature and compels it not to proceed according to its purposes but rather to mould itself to ours – it infers from the similarity of such natural-products to houses, ships, or clocks that precisely such a causality (viz. understanding and will) will be underlying in respect of nature: when natural reason derives the internal possibility of freely-acting nature (which first renders all art and perhaps even reason possible) from another, albeit superhuman art – a mode of inference that perhaps might not withstand the acutest transcendental critique – one must nevertheless concede that once we shall name a cause, we cannot proceed more securely here than by analogy with such purposive generations, which are the only generations whose causes and mode-of-action are fully familiar to us. Reason would be unable to justify it to itself if it sought to pass over from the causality that it knows to obscure and indemonstrable explanatory-grounds that it does not know.

According to that inference, the purposiveness and harmoniousness of so many natural-institutions would have to demonstrate merely contingency of form but not of matter (i.e. the substance within the world) because for the latter, it would still be required that it could be proved that the things of the world would be *per se* unfit for such order and consonance according to universal laws if they were not themselves – *in respect of their substance* – the product of a supreme wisdom: for which, however, probative grounds would be required that are entirely different from those of the analogy with human art. The proof could therefore at most demonstrate a *cosmic architect* who would be always highly constrained through the fitness of the material that he elaborates, but not a *cosmic creator* to whose idea everything is subject: which is far from sufficient for the great intention that one has in view, viz. to prove an allsufficient originary-being. If we wished to prove the contingency of matter itself, then we would have to take our flight to a transcendental argument: which was precisely supposed to be avoided here, however.

The inference therefore passes from the order and purposiveness that are to be observed so thoroughgoingly within the world, as a thoroughly contingent arrangement, to the existence of a cause *proportionate to it*. The concept of that cause must, however, allow us to cognise something entirely *determinate* about it; and it can therefore be none other than that of a being that possesses all power, wisdom, etc. – in a word: all perfection – as an allsufficient being. For the predicates of ‘*very great*’, ‘astonishing’, ‘of immeasurable power and splendour’ give no determinate concept whatsoever and do not in fact say what the thing is *per se* but are rather merely relational-representations of the magnitude of the object, which the observer (of the world) compares with himself and his comprehensional power and which turn out equally extollatory whether one enlarges the object or makes the observing subject smaller in relationship to it. Where the magnitude (i.e. perfection) of a thing *simpliciter* is at issue, there is no determinate concept except that which comprehends the entire possible perfection: and only the all (*omnitudo*) of reality is determined thoroughgoingly within the concept.

I shall not hope that someone should undertake to discern the relationship of the cosmos’s magnitude observed by him (in respect to extent as well as content) to omnipotence, the relationship of the cosmic order to supreme wisdom, the relationship of the cosmos’s unity to the absolute unity of the author, etc. Therefore, physicotheology can give no determinate concept of the highest cause of the world and therefore cannot be sufficient for a principle of theology that shall in turn constitute the foundation of religion.

The step to the absolute totality is entirely and absolutely impossible via the empirical path. Yet one nevertheless makes it in the physicotheological proof. Of what means does one indeed therefore avail oneself in order to cross such a wide chasm?

After one has reached admiration of the magnitude of the cosmic author’s wisdom, power, etc. and can go no further, one at once abandons this argument conducted through empirical probative-grounds and passes to the world’s contingency, which was inferred from its order and purposiveness right at the outset. From that contingency alone, one now passes – merely through transcendental concepts – to the existence of something absolutely necessary and from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the thoroughgoingly determinate or determinative concept thereof: namely, the concept of an all-encompassing reality. Therefore, the physicotheological proof remained stuck in its undertaking, switched suddenly to the cosmological proof in that perplexity; and since the cosmological proof is merely a hidden ontological proof, the physicotheological proof thus executes its intention actually merely through pure reason: even though it denied all kinship with pure reason right at the beginning and had exposed everything to lucid proofs from experience.

Physicotheologians therefore have no cause whatsoever to act so aloofly against the transcendental kind of proof and to look down upon it with the self-conceit of clairvoyant connoisseurs-of-nature as upon the cobwebs of obscure ponderers. For if they would only examine themselves, then they would find that after they have progressed for a good stretch on the ground of nature and experience and always nevertheless see themselves just as far from the object that seems to be ahead of their reason, they suddenly abandon that ground and pass over into the realm of mere possibilities where they hope to approach on the wings of the ideas what had receded from all their empirical inquisition. After thinking they have finally secured firm footing through such a powerful leap, they expand the now determinate concept (that they have come to possess without knowing how) over the whole field of creation and, through experience, elucidate the ideal that was merely a product of pure reason (albeit meagre enough and far beneath the dignity of its object) yet without wishing to concede that they have reached that knowledge or presupposition via a trail other than that of experience.

The physicotheological proof is thus underlain by the cosmological proof, which is underlain by the ontological proof, of the existence of a single originary-being as a supreme being; and since no further path is open to speculative reason beyond those three, the ontological proof from mere pure rational-concepts is the sole possible proof if a proof of a proposition that is exalted so far above all empirical use of the understanding is even possible at all.

##### 1.2.3.3.3.8. Seventh Section: Critique of All Theology from Speculative Principles of Reason

If by ‘theology’ I understand cognition of the originary being, then it is either that of mere reason (*theologia rationalis*) or from revelation (*revelata*). The former thinks of its object either merely through pure reason by means of mere transcendental concepts (*ens originarium*, *realissimum*, *ens entium*) and is called **transcendental** theology or through a concept that it borrows from nature (i.e. from the nature of our soul) as the supreme intelligence and would have to be called **natural** theology. Whereas he who admits a transcendental theology alone will be called a *deist*, he who thus also assumes a natural theology will be called a *theist*. The first concedes that although we can perhaps cognise the existence of an originary being through mere reason, our concept of it is merely transcendental: i.e. only a concept of a being that has all reality but which one cannot determine more closely. The second asserts that reason is in a position to determine the object more closely by analogy with nature: viz. as a being that, through understanding and freedom, contains the originary ground of all other things within itself. Whereas the deist therefore represents to himself merely a *cosmic cause* under that name ‘originary ground’ (whether it is such a cause through the necessity of its nature or through freedom remains undecided), the theist represents a *cosmic author* to himself under that name.

Transcendental theology is either that which thinks to derive the originary being’s existence from an experience *simpliciter* (without determining anything more closely about the world to which it belongs) and is called *cosmotheology* or believes itself to cognise the originary being’s existence through mere concepts without aid from the slightest experience and is called *ontotheology*.

*Natural theology* infers to the properties and existence of a cosmic author from the constitution, order, and unity that is encountered within this world: in which two causalities and their rule must be assumed, viz. nature and freedom. Hence, it ascends from this world to the supreme intelligence: either as the principle of all natural order and perfection or as the principle of all moral order and perfection. In the first case, it is called *physicotheology*; in the latter, it is called *moral theology*.[[42]](#footnote-42)

Since one is accustomed to understanding under the concept of *God* not, say, merely a blindly-acting eternal nature as the root of all things but rather a supreme being that shall be the author of all things through understanding and freedom, and also that concept alone interests us: one could (according to strictness) deny all belief in God to the *deist* and leave him merely with the assertion of an originary-being or highest cause. Nevertheless, since no one may be accused of wanting to deny something altogether because he does not trust himself to assert it, it is milder and fairer to say that whereas the *deist* believes in a *God*, the *theist* believes in a *living God* (*summa intelligentia*). We shall now seek out the possible sources of all those enquiries of reason.

I satisfy myself here with explaining theoretical cognition as a cognition whereby I cognise what *exists* and with explaining practical cognition as a cognition whereby I represent to myself what *should exist*. According to the latter, reason’s theoretical use is its use through which I cognise *apriori* (as necessary) that something is; but reason’s practical use is its use through which I cognise *apriori* what should occur. Now, if it is undoubtedly certain either that something is or that it should occur, although it is nevertheless merely conditioned: then a certain determinate condition for it can indeed be absolutely necessary, or that condition can be presupposed only as arbitrary and contingent. In the first case, the condition is postulated (*per thesin*); in the second case, it is supposed (*per hypothesin*). Since there are practical laws that are absolutely necessary (viz. the moral laws): then if they necessarily presuppose an existence as the condition of the possibility of their *obligatory force*, then that existence must be *postulated* because the *conditionatum* from which the inference proceeds to that determinate condition is itself cognised *apriori* as absolutely necessary. We will subsequently show of the moral laws that they do not merely presuppose the existence of a supreme being but also – since they are absolutely necessary in another regard – rightfully postulate it, though admittedly only practically. We now set that mode of inference aside.

Since when the talk is merely of what exists (not of what should be), the *conditionatum* that is given to us in experience is also always thought of as contingent: the condition pertaining to it cannot be cognised therefrom as absolutely necessary but rather serves merely as a relatively necessary or rather *needed* (despite being arbitrary *per se* and *apriori*) presupposition for rational-cognition of the *conditionatum*. If the absolute necessity of a thing is to be cognised in theoretical cognition, then that can occur only from concepts *apriori* but never as a cause in relation to an existence that is given through experience.

A theoretical cognition is *speculative* if it concerns an object or such concepts of an object at which one cannot arrive in any experience. It is opposed to *natural cognition*, which concerns no objects or predicates thereof except those that can be given within a possible experience.

The principle to infer from something that occurs (i.e. something empirically contingent) as an effect to a cause is a principle of natural cognition, though not of speculative natural-cognition. For if one abstracts from it as a principle that contains the condition of possible experience *simpliciter* and seeks to express it about the contingent *simpliciter* by omitting everything empirical, then not the slightest justification of such a synthetic principle remains in order for one to discern therefrom how I can pass from something that exists to something entirely diverse therefrom; indeed: in such merely speculative use, both the concept of a cause as well as the concept of the contingent lose all signification whose objective reality can be rendered comprehensible *in concreto*.

If one now infers from the existence of the things in the world to their cause, then that appertains not to reason’s *natural* use but rather to its *speculative* use because the former relates not the things themselves (i.e. substances) but rather merely what *occurs* (i.e. its *state*) *qua* empirically contingent to some cause – the cognition that substance itself (i.e. matter) is contingent in respect of existence would have to be a merely speculative rational-cognition. Yet even if the talk were of the cosmos’s form, the manner of its conjunction, and its change but I would nevertheless wish to infer therefrom to a cause that that is entirely distinct from the world, then that would again be a judgement of merely speculative reason because there the object is absolutely not an object of a possible experience. Yet then the principle of causality, which holds only inside the field of experiences and is without use and indeed even without significance outside it, would be totally divorced from its determination.

I now assert that all enquiries of a merely speculative use of reason in regard to theology are entirely fruitless and are null and void in respect of their internal constitution but that the principles of reason’s natural use lead to absolutely no theology whatsoever and that consequently, if one does not take moral laws as a basis or use them for a guiding thread, then there can be no theology from reason at all. For all synthetic principles of the understanding are of immanent use; but for cognition of a supreme being, a transcendent use of them is required: for which, our understanding is not equipped at all. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the originary being, then that being must also belong to the chain of the objects of experience; but then, like all appearances, it would in turn itself be conditioned. Yet even if one allowed the leap beyond the limit of experience by means of the dynamic law of the relation of effects to their causes, what concept can that procedure provide to us? By no means a concept of a supreme being, since experience never proffers the greatest of all possible effects (which shall provide testimony of its cause) to us. If we shall be allowed to fill that deficiency with a mere idea of supreme perfection and original necessity merely in order to leave no void in our reason, then that can admittedly be granted from goodwill but not from the right of an irresistible proof. The physicotheological proof could well therefore perhaps lend weight to other proofs (if such proofs are to be had) by connecting speculation to intuition; but by itself, it more prepares the understanding for theological cognition and gives it a straight and natural direction towards that end rather than its being capable of completing the task *alone*.

One therefore sees well therefrom that transcendental questions allow only transcendental answers, i.e. from mere *apriori* concepts without the slightest empirical admixture. The question here is manifestly synthetic and demands an expansion of our cognition beyond all limits of experience: viz. to the existence of a being that shall correspond to our mere idea, which no experience can ever match. According to our above proofs, all synthetic *apriori* cognition is possible only through the fact that it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience; and all principles are therefore merely of immanent validity, i.e. they relate merely to objects of empirical cognition or appearances. Therefore, nothing is accomplished by means of a transcendental procedure in regard to the theology of a merely speculative reason.

Yet if one preferred to call all of the above proofs of the Analytic into doubt rather than let oneself be robbed of the persuasion of the weight of the probative grounds that have been used for so long, one still cannot refuse to satisfy the challenge when I demand that one should at least justify oneself in respect of how and by means of which experience one can then trust oneself to fly beyond all possible experience through the power of mere ideas. I would request that I be spared new proofs or improved labour on old proofs. For although one admittedly did not have many to choose from because all merely speculative proofs ultimately lead to a single proof (viz. the ontological proof); and therefore, I need not exactly fear being especially burdened through the fruitfulness of the dogmatic champion of that non-sensory reason: even though, moreover, I also – without consequently deeming myself highly disputatious – do not wish to reject the challenge of uncovering the erroneous inference in every enquiry of this kind and thereby vitiating its pretension, the hope for better fortune in those who are once accustomed to dogmatic persuasions will never be fully eliminated; and hence, I adhere to the sole fair demand that one justify oneself universally and from the nature of the human understanding along with all other cognitive-sources in respect of how one shall begin to expand one’s cognition entirely and absolutely *apriori* and extend it whither no possible experience and therefore no means suffices to secure the objective reality of a concept that we ourselves have excogitated. However the understanding may have arrived at that concept, the object’s existence still cannot be found analytically within it because cognition of the object’s *existence* consists precisely in the fact that the object is posited *per se*, *externally to all thoughts*. It is, however, entirely impossible to go outside a concept by oneself and, without following the empirical connection (whereby only appearances are given, however), arrive at a discovery of new objects and superabundant beings.

Yet even though reason in its merely speculative use is far from sufficient for such a great intention (viz. to arrive at the existence of a highest being), it nevertheless has very great utility therein to *correct* cognition of such a being in the event that such cognition could be extracted elsewhence, to render it consonant with itself and every intelligible intention, and to purify it of all that might be contrary to the concept of an originary being and all admixture of empirical constrainments.

So despite all of its insufficiency, transcendental theology nevertheless remains of important negative use and is a constant censure of our reason if it deals merely with pure ideas, which permit none other than a transcendental standard. For if someone – in another, perhaps practical regard – asserted, without objection, the validity of the *presupposition* of a supreme and allsufficient being *qua* highest intelligence, then it would be of the greatest importance to determine that concept exactly on its transcendental side (as the concept of a necessary and most real being) and to remove what is contrary to supreme reality and what belongs to mere appearance (anthropomorphism in the broader sense) and to simultaneously clear away all opposed assertions: be they *atheistic*, *deistic*, or *anthropomorphistic* – which is very easy in such a critical treatment because the same grounds through which human-reason’s incapacity in respect to asserting the existence of such a being is displayed also necessarily suffice for proving the unfitness of every counterassertion. For whence shall someone derive, through pure speculation of reason, the insight that there is no supreme being as an originary ground of everything or that none of the properties accrue to it that we represent to ourselves, in respect of their consequences, as analogous to the dynamic realities of a thinking being or that they, in the latter case, would also have to be subject to all constrainments that sensibility unavoidably imposes upon the intelligences that we know through experience.

The supreme being therefore remains a mere yet nevertheless *faultless ideal* – a concept that closes and crowns the whole of human cognition but whose objective reality admittedly cannot be proved in this way but also cannot be refuted; and if there should be a moral theology that can supplement that deficiency, then the hitherto merely problematic transcendental theology demonstrates its indispensability through determination of its concept and unceasing censure of a reason that has been deceived often enough through sensibility and which is not always consonant with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside the world (not as a cosmic soul), eternity without conditions of time, omnipresence without conditions of space, omnipotence, etc. are mere transcendental predicates; and therefore, the purified concept of them of which every theology has such great need can be drawn merely from transcendental theology.

#### 1.2.3.4. Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic: On the Regulative Use of Pure Reason’s Ideas

The outcome of all dialectical enquiries of pure reason not only confirms what we already proved in the Transcendental Analytic, viz. that all of our inferences that seek to lead us beyond the field of possible experience are fallacious and groundless; but it simultaneously teaches us the following particularity – namely, that human reason therein has a natural tendency to transgress that limit to the extent that transcendental ideas are just as natural for it as the categories are for the understanding: though with the difference that just as the latter lead to truth (i.e. our concepts’ agreement with the object), the former effect a mere yet irresistible semblance whose deception one can barely keep at bay even through the acutest critique.

Everything that is grounded in the nature of our powers must be purposive and consonant with their correct use if we can only prevent a certain misunderstanding and find the true direction of those powers. Therefore, the transcendental ideas will, in accordance with all surmise, have their good and consequently *immanent* use: even though, if their significance is misapprehended and they are taken for concepts of actual things, they can be transcendent in their application and precisely therefore fallacious. For not an idea *per se* but rather merely its use can be either *transvolational* (i.e. transcendent) or *domestic* (i.e. immanent) according to whether one directs it either directly to an object that purportedly corresponds to it or merely to the intellect’s use *simpliciter* in regard to the objects with which it deals, and all faults of subreption are always to be ascribed to a deficiency of the judging power but never to the understanding nor to reason.

Reason never relates directly to an object but rather merely to the understanding and, by means of it, to its own empirical use. It therefore *creates* no concepts (of objects) but rather merely *orders* them and gives them the unity that they can have in their greatest-possible expansion, i.e. in relation to the totality of the series: to which the understanding *does not look at all*; but rather it looks only to the connection *whereby series* of conditions according to conceptscan everywhere *come about*. Reason therefore in fact has only the understanding and its purposive arrangement for its object; and just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object through concepts: reason, for its part, unifies the manifold of the concepts through ideas by setting a certain collective unity as the aim of the understanding’s actions, which are otherwise occupied only with distributive unity.

I thus assert that the transcendental ideas are never of constitutive use in such a way that concepts of certain objects would thereby be given; and in the event that one understands them thus, they are merely sophistical (i.e. dialectical) concepts. In contrast, however, they have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, viz. to direct the understanding towards a certain goal: in prospect of which, the directional lines of all its rules converge at a point that, although it is admittedly only an idea (*focus imaginarius*): i.e. a point from which the intellectual concepts actually do not set out because it lies entirely beyond the limits of possible experience, nevertheless serves to provide them with the greatest unity alongside the greatest expansion. Now, admittedly, the deception arises therefrom as if those directional lines had sprouted from an object itself that lay outside the field of empirically possible cognition (just as the objects behind a mirror are seen); only that illusion (which one can prevent from tricking one) is nevertheless indispensably necessary if, beyond the objects that are before our eyes, we also wish to simultaneously see those that lie far therefrom behind us: i.e. if in our present case, we wished to direct the understanding beyond every given experience (which are a part of the total possible experience) and therefore also towards its greatest-possible- and extreme expansion.

If we survey our intellectual cognitions in their whole extent, then we find that what reason disposes over entirely peculiarly and seeks to bring about is cognition’s *systematicity*: i.e. its coherence from a principle. That rational unity always presupposes an idea: viz. that of the form of a whole of cognition, which precedes determinate cognition of the parts and contains the conditions to determine each part’s position for it and its relationship to the other parts *apriori*. This idea thus postulates complete unity of all intellectual cognition, whereby that cognition becomes not merely a contingent aggregate but rather a system cohering according to necessary laws. One cannot in fact say that that idea is a concept of the object but rather of the thoroughgoing unity of those concepts so far as that unity serves the understanding as a rule. Such rational concepts are not extracted from nature, but rather we question nature in respect to those ideas and hold our cognition to be deficient so long as it is not adequate to them. One concedes that *pure earth*, *pure water*, *pure air*, etc. can hardly be found. Nevertheless, one has need of the concepts thereof (which therefore, in respect of their full purity, have their origin only within reason) in order to appropriately determine the share that each of those natural causes has in appearance; and so one reduces all matters to earth (mere load, as it were), to salts and flammable beings (as force), and finally to water and air as vehicles (machines, as it were, by means of which the aforementioned work) in order to explain the chemical effects of matters amongst one another according to the idea of a mechanism. For although one does not actually express oneself thus, such an influence of reason upon the divisions of natural researchers is nevertheless very easy to discover.

If reason is a capacity to derive the particular from the universal, then either the *universale* is *per se certain* and given and then requires only *judging power* for subsumption and the particular thereby becomes determined necessarily – I shall call that reason’s ‘apodictic use’ – or the *universale* is assumed *problematically* and is a mere idea whereas the particular is certain, but the universality of the rule for that consequence is still a problem: multiple particular cases which are *in toto* certain are tested in respect of whether they flow therefrom; and in that case, when it has the appearance that all specifiable particular cases follows therefrom, the universality of the rule is inferred to from from that case: but thereafter, all cases that are also not given *per se* are inferred to. I shall call that reason’s ‘hypothetical use’.

Hypothetical use of reason from ideas that have been taken as a basis (as problematic concepts) is not in fact *constitutive*: i.e. so constituted that (if one wishes to judge according to all strictness) the truth of the universal rule that has been assumed as a hypothesis follows; for just as one wishes to know all possible consequences that, by following from the same assumed principle, prove its universality; but rather reason’s hypothetical use is merely regulative in order to thereby bring unity into all particular cognitions (so far that is possible) and thereby bringthe rule *closer* to universality.

Reason’s hypothetical use therefore pertains to the systematic unity of all intellectual cognitions, but that unity is the *touchstone of the truth* of rules. Conversely, the systematic unity (*qua* mere idea) is merely *projected* unity that one must regard *per se* not as given but rather only as a problem: which serves, however, to find a principle for the manifold and the understanding’s particular use and also serves to thereby guide that use to the cases that are not given and render it coherent.

One sees therefrom, however, only that the systematic- or rational unity of manifold intellectual-cognition is a *logical* principle to help the understanding along through ideas where it does attain rules on its own and simultaneously to provide consonance under a principle (i.e. systematicity) to the diversity of its rules and thereby provide coherence so far as that can be done. Yet if the constitution of the objects or the nature of the understanding that cognises them as such is determined for systematic unity *per se* and if one can postulate that systematic unity *apriori* in a certain measure even without regard to such an interest of reason and can therefore say that all possible intellectual-cognitions (including those that are empirical) have rational unity and stand under common principles from which they can be derived, despite their diversity: then that would be a *transcendental* principle of reason that would render the systematic unity not merely subjectively- and logically possible as a method, but rather objectively necessary.

We shall elucidate that through a case of reason’s use. Amongst the diverse kinds of unity according to concepts of the understanding, the causality of a substance (which is called ‘power’) also belongs. On first impression, the diverse appearances of exactly the same substance show so much inhomogeneity that one must therefore initially assume almost as many powers of that substance as there are effects that manifest themselves – such as in the human mind: sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, distinguishing power, pleasure, desire, etc. Initially, a logical maxim demands reducing that ostensible diversity as much as possible through comparing the hidden identity and checking whether imagination conjoined with consciousness, memory, wit, distinguishing power, and perhaps even understanding and reason are the same. The idea of a *fundamental power* – about which logic discerns absolutely nothing, however, in respect of whether there is such a power – is at least the problem of a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers. The logical principle-of-reason requires that that unity be brought about so far as is possible; and the more appearances of one power and another are found to be identical amongst themselves, the more probable it is that they are nothing but diverse manifestations of one and the same power: which (comparatively) can be called their *fundamental power*.

The comparative fundamental-powers must in turn be compared with one another in order for one to bring them closer to a single radical (i.e. absolute) fundamental-power through discovering their consonance. That rational unity is merely hypothetical, however. One asserts not that such a unity must in fact be encountered but rather that one must seek it for reason’s sake (viz. to erect certain principles for the many rules that experience may deliver) and, in such a way, bring systematic unity into cognition (where that can be done).

It is manifest, however, that if one attends to reason’s transcendental use, then that idea of a fundamental power *simpliciter* is determined not merely as a problem for reason’s hypothetical use but rather pretends objective reality: whereby the systematic unity of the many powers of a substance are postulated and an apodictic principle-of-reason is erected. For without having to attempt to discover the consonance of the many powers – and indeed even when we have failed to do so after all attempts to discover it – we nevertheless presuppose that such a consonance will be encounterable: not solely in respect to the unity of the substance (as in the previous cases); but rather, where so many (that are, however, homogeneous to a certain degree) are encountered – like in matter *simpliciter* – reason presupposes the systematic unity of manifold powers because particular natural-laws stand under more universal natural-laws, and sparing of principles becomes not merely an economical principle of reason but rather an internal law of nature.

In fact, it is also indiscernible how a logical principle of the rational-unity of rules can occur if a transcendental unity were not presupposed through which such a systematic unity, as attaching to the objects themselves, becomes assumed *apriori* as necessary. For with what authority can reason in its logical use demand to treat the multiplicity of the forces that nature allows us to cognise as a merely hidden unity and to derive them from some fundamental power (whatever it is) when it is free to admit that it is equally possible that all powers are inhomogeneous and inaccordant with the systematic unity of the derivation of nature? For then, reason would proceed directly contrarily to its determination in setting an idea as its goal that would entirely contradict the natural arrangement. One cannot even say that prior to nature’s contingent constitution, reason has derived that unity according to principles of reason. For the law of reason to seek that unity is necessary because without that unity, we would have no reason whatsoever; but without reason, we would have no coherent use of our understanding: and in its absence, we would have no sufficient mark of empirical truth – and therefore, in regard to such a mark, we must thoroughly presuppose nature’s systematic unity as objectively valid and necessary.

We also find that transcendental presupposition hidden in a wondrous way within the principles of the philosophers, although they have not always cognised such a presupposition therein nor admitted it to themselves.

That all multiplicities of individual things do not exclude the identity of the *species*; that the various species must be treated only as diverse determinations of few *genera*, but those *genera* must be treated only as diverse determinations of still higher *families* etc., and that therefore a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts must be sought so far as they can be derived from higher and more general concepts is a scholastic rule or logical principle without which, no use of reason would occur because we can infer from the general to the particular only so far as general properties of the things, under which the particular properties stand, can be taken as a basis.

Yet philosophers also presuppose that such a consonance is encountered within nature in the familiar scholastic-rule that one must not needlessly multiply beginnings (i.e. principles) (*entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda*). It is thereby said that the nature of the things themselves offers material for rational unity and that the ostensibly infinite diversity must not prevent us from surmising unity of fundamental-properties behind it, from which the multiplicity can be derived only through much determination. One has so eagerly pursued that unity at all times – even if though it is a mere idea – that one rather found cause to moderate desires for it instead of encouraging them. Although it was already important that the chemists could reduce all salts to two main genera (viz. acid and alkaline), they attempt to regard even that difference merely as a variety or as diverse manifestation of one and the same fundamental material. One has also sought to bring the various kinds of earth (i.e. the material of stones and even of metals) down to three and ultimately to two; only they still could not be satisfied therewith and could not rid themselves of the thought that behind those varieties, there must nevertheless be a single genus and indeed even surmise a common principle for those varieties and the salts. One might perhaps believe that that is a merely economical handle for reason in order to spare itself endeavour as much as possible and, if it succeeds, gives probability to the presupposed explanatory-grounds precisely through that unity. Only such a self-seeking intention is to be distinguished very easily from the idea according to which everyone presupposes that that rational unity is congruous with nature itself and that reason does not beg here but rather commands: even without being able to determine the limits of that unity.

Were there such a great diversity amongst the appearances that offer themselves to us – I shall not say in respect to form (for they may be similar therein) but rather in respect to content, i.e. the multiplicity of existent beings – that even the acutest human understanding of all could not find the slightest similarity through comparing one appearance with another (a case that can well be thought of), then the logical law of genera would absolutely not occur at all; and there would even be no concept of genus nor any general concept and indeed even understanding could not occur, which was all that was merely at issue. The logical principle of genera therefore presupposes a transcendental principle if it is to be applied to nature (whereby I here understand only objects that are given to us). According to that principle, homogeneity will necessarily be presupposed within the manifold of a possible experience (even if we cannot determine its degree *apriori*) because without it, no empirical concepts and therefore no experience would be possible.

In opposition to the logical principle of genera, which postulates identity, stands another principle (viz. that of *the species*): which needs multiplicity and diversities of things despite their agreement under the same genus; and it makes a prescription for the understanding to be no less attentive to the latter than to the former. This principle (of sharpsensedness or of the distinguishing capacity) greatly constrains the light-mindedness of the former (i.e. of wit); and reason here shows two interests that conflict with one another – on the one hand, the interest of *extent* (i.e. universality) in respect of genera and, on the other hand, an interest of *content* (i.e. determinateness) in regard to the multiplicity of the species because the understanding admittedly thinks of much *under* its concepts in the first case but thinks of that much more *within them* in the second case. That also manifests itself in natural researchers’ highly diverse ways of thinking: some of whom (who are predominantly speculative) are inimical to inhomogeneity, as it were, and always look to the unity of the genus, whereas others (predominantly empirical minds) unceasingly seek to split nature into so much multiplicity that one would almost have to abandon hope of judging their appearances according to universal principles.

The latter way of thinking is also manifestly underlain by a logical principle that has the systematic completeness of all cognitions for its aim: if I, starting from the genus, descend to the manifold that may be contained thereunder and, in such a way, seek to provide expansion to the system – like in the first case, where I sought to provide simplicity in ascending to the genus. For from the sphere of a concept that designates a genus, one can no more discern how far division will go than one can discern how far division of the space that matter can occupy will go. Hence, every *genus* has diverse *species*; but the latter require diverse *subspecies*: and since no such subspecies occurs that is not always in turn a sphere (extent as *conceptus communis*), reason in its total expansion demands that no species be regarded as the lowest *per se* because, since it is still always a concept that contains within it only what is common to diverse things, the concept could not be thoroughgoingly determinate and also could not be related primarily to an individual and consequently must always contain other concepts (i.e. subspecies) under itself. This law of specification could be expressed thus: *entium varietates non temere esse minuendas*.

One easily sees, however, that even that logical law would be without sense and application if a transcendental *law of specification* did not underlie it that admittedly does not demand an actual *infinitude* in respect of diversities from the things that can be our objects; for the logical principle, which asserts merely the *indeterminacy* of the logical sphere in respect to a possible division, gives no occasion for that; but it nevertheless imposes upon the understanding the task of seeking subspecies under every species that is presented to us and smaller diversities for every diversity. For if there were no *lower* concepts, then there would also be no *higher* concepts. Now, the understanding cognises everything only through concepts and consequently, so far as the understanding extends in the division, never through mere intuition but rather always in turn through *lower* concepts. Cognition of appearances in their thoroughgoing determination (which is possible only through understanding) demands a specification of the understanding’s concepts that continues unceasingly and a progression to ever abiding diversities that were abstracted from in the concept of the species and still more so in the concept of the genus.

Even that law of specification cannot be borrowed from experience, for experience cannot give disclosures that go so far. Empirical specification soon stops in distinguishing the manifold if it has not been guided through the already antecedent transcendental law of specification (*qua* principle of reason) to seek distinction and to always still surmise it even if it is not manifest to the senses. That absorbent earths are of diverse species (e.g. chalk- and muriatic earths) needs a preeemptive rule of reason for its discovery that makes it the understanding’s problem to seek the diversity by presupposing nature to be so wealthy that it is to be surmised. For we no more have understanding only under presupposition of the diversities in nature than under the condition that their objects have in homogeneity in them because precisely the multiplicity of what can be aggregated under a concept constitutes the use of that concept and the occupation of the understanding.

Reason therefore prepares the understanding’s field for it (1) through a principle of the manifold’s *homogeneity* under higher genera; (2) through a principle of the *variety* of *homogenea* under lower species; and in order to complete the systematic unity, reason adds (3) also a law of the *affinity* of all concepts, which demands a continuous transition from every species to every other through hierarchical increase of diversity. We can call them the principles of the *homogeneity*, *specification*, and *continuity* of forms. The latter arises through the fact that one unifies the first two after one has completed the systematic nexus in the idea both in ascent to higher genera as well as in descent to lower species; for then, all multiplicites are akin amongst one another because they originate *in toto* from a single highest genus through all degrees of expanded determination.

One can render the systematic unity amongst the three logical principles sensory in the following way. One can regard every concept as a point that, as the standpoint of an observer, has its horizon: i.e. a multitude of things that can be represented and, as it were, intuited from it. Inside that horizon, a multitude of points must be capable of being specified *in infinitum*: each of which in turn has its narrower field-of-view – i.e. every species contains subspecies according to the principle of specification; and the logical horizon consists only of smaller horizons (i.e. subspecies) but not of points, which have no extent (i.e. individuals). But for diverse horizons (i.e. genera) that are determined from equally many concepts, a common horizon can be drawn in thought from which one surveys them *in toto* as from a centrepoint, which is the higher genus, until finally the supreme genus is the universal and true horizon that becomes determined from the standpoint of the supreme concept and encompasses all multiplicity as well as all genera, species, and subspecies under itself.

I am led to that supreme standpoint by the law of homogeneity and am led to all lower standpoints and to their greatest variety by the law of specification. Yet since, in such a manner, there is nothing void in the whole extent of all possible concepts and nothing can be encountered outside that extent, from the universal field of view and its thoroughgoing division arises the principle ‘*non datur vacuum formarum*’: i.e. there are no diverse original and first genera that are isolated and separated from one another (through an empty intermediate-space), as it were; but rather all manifold genera are merely divisions of a single highest and universal genus – and from that principle arises its immediate consequence: *datur continuum formarum*, i.e. all diversities of species limit one another and allow no transition to one another through a leap but rather only through all smaller degrees of difference whereby one can traverse from one to another; in a word: there are no species or subspecies that are proximate to one another (in reason’s concept), but rather still always intermediate species are possible whose difference from the first and second species is smaller than the latter’s difference from one another.

The first law therefore prevents divagation into the multiplicity of diverse original genera and recommends homogeneity; the second law, by contrast, constrains that inclination towards consonance and demands distinction of the subspecies before one turns to the individuals with one’s general concepts. The third law unites those two laws by nevertheless prescribing homogeneity in spite of supreme multiplicity through hierarchical transition from one species to another, which indicates a kind of kinship of the diverse branches insofar as they have *in toto* sprouted from one stem.

Nevertheless, that logical law of *continui specierum* (*formarum logicarum*) presupposes a transcendental law (*lex continui in natura*) without which use of the understanding would only be led astray through the former prescription because it would perhaps take a path directly opposed to nature. That law must therefore rest upon pure transcendental- and not empirical grounds. For in the latter case, it would come later than the systems; but it has in fact first brought forth natural-cognition’s systematicity. Behind those laws, moreover, no intentions are concealed to (e.g.) conduct a test with them *qua* mere experiments: although that nexus, where it occurs, admittedly yields a powerful ground for holding the hypothetically excogitated unity to be grounded; and they therefore have their utility even in that intention, but rather one perspicuously discerns from them that they judge parsimony in respect of fundamental causes, the multiplicity of their effects, and a kinship of nature’s elements *per se* that stems therefrom to be rational and congruous with nature; and those principles therefore carry their recommendation directly with themselves and not merely as methodological handles.

One easily sees, however, that that continuity of forms is a mere idea for which a congruous object cannot at all be exhibited in experience: *not only* because the species in nature are actually divided and must therefore *per se* constitute a *quantum discretum* and if the hierarchical progression in the kinship of those species were continuous, then that progression would also have to contain a true infinity of intermediate elements that would lie between two given species (which is impossible), *but also* because we can make no determinate empirical use of that law whatsoever because not the slightest mark of affinity is thereby indicated according to which and how far we shall seek the incremental sequence of their diversity but rather nothing more than a general indication that we have to seek it.

If we position the principles that have now been adduced in respect of their order so as to place them according to their *experiential use*, then the principles of systematic *unity* would perhaps stand thus: *multiplicity*, *kinship*, and *unity* – each of them, however, taken as an idea in the supreme degree of its completeness. Reason presupposes the understanding’s cognitions, which are primarily applied to experience, and seeks its unity according to ideas that go much further than experience can reach. The kinship of the manifold – despite its diversity under a principle of unity – concerns not merely things but rather far more still the mere properties and forces of things. Hence, when (e.g.) the course of the planets is given as circular through a (still not fully corrected) experience, and we find diversities – just as we surmise them in that which can modify the circle according to a constant law through all infinite intermediate-degrees to one of those deviant revolutions: i.e. the movements of the planets, which are not circles, will perhaps come more-or-less close to its properties and collapse into ellipses. Comets exhibit a still greater diversity in their tracks because they (so far as observation extends) do not even revert into circles; only we conjecture a parabolic course that is nevertheless akin to the ellipse and which, if the latter’s long axis is stretched very far, cannot be distinguished from it in any of our observations. We thus come, following the guidance of those principles, to unity of the genera of those tracks in their shape but thereby furthermore to unity of the cause of all laws of their motion (i.e. gravitation), whence we thereafter extend our conquests and also seek to explain all varieties and spurious deviations from those rules from the same principle yet can ultimately add no more than experience can ever confirm: viz. to think (according to those rules of kinship) even of hyperbolic comet-tracks in which those bodies entirely and absolutely leave our solar system and, in going from sun to sun, unify the remoter parts of a cosmic system that is unlimited for us and which coheres through one and the same motive force.

What is remarkable with those principles, and what also solely occupies us, is that they seem to be transcendental; and even though they are mere ideas for reason’s empirical use to follow – albeit ideas that that use can follow only asymptotically (i.e. merely approximately), as it were, without ever reaching them – they nevertheless (as synthetic propositions) have *apriori*, objective yet indeterminate validity and serve for a rule of possible experience and can, with good fortune, also actually be used in elaboration of possible experience as heuristic principles yet without one’s being able to bring about a transcendental deduction thereof: which, as was shown above, is always impossible in respect of ideas.

In the Transcendental Analytic, we distinguished amongst the principles of the understanding the *dynamic* principles (as merely regulative principles of *intuition*) from *mathematical* principles, which are constitutive in respect to the latter. Despite that, the aforementioned dynamic laws are admittedly constitutive in respect to *experience* because they render the concepts without which no experience occurs *apriori* possible. In contrast, principles of pure reason cannot even be constitutive in respect to empirical *concepts* because no correspondent schema of sensibility can be given for them: and they can therefore have no object *in concreto*. If I now depart from such an empirical use of them as constitutive principles, how will I nevertheless secure a regulative use and, with that, some objective validity; and what significance can that use have?

Just as sensibility constitutes an object for the understanding, so does the understanding constitute an object for reason. Rendering the unity of all possible actions of the understanding systematic is a task for reason, just as the understanding connects the manifold of appearances through concepts and brings it under empirical laws. But just as without schemata of sensibility, the understanding’s actions are *indeterminate*: so is *rational unity* also likewise *indeterminate per se* in respect to the conditions under which and the degree to which it shall systematically conjoin its concepts. Yet even if no schema can be found in *intuition* for the thoroughgoing systematic unity of all intellectual concepts, an *analogue* of such a schema can and must nevertheless be given that is the idea of the *maximum* of the division and the unification of intellectual cognition in a principle. What is greatest and absolutely complete cannot be thought of determinately because all of the restrictive conditions that give indeterminate multiplicity are omitted. Therefore, an idea of reason is an analogueof a schema of a schema of sensibility but with the difference that applying the intellectual-concepts to the schema of reason is not itself likewise a cognition of the object itself (as with the application of the categories to their sensory schemata) but rather merely a rule or a principle of the systematic unity of all use of the understanding. Now, since every principle that establishes throughgoing unity of the understanding’s *apriori* use for the understanding also holds (though admittedly only indirectly) for the object of experience, the principles of pure reason will also have objective reality in respect to that object: only not in order to *determine* something in them but rather merely in order to indicate the procedure according to which the empirical- and determinate experiential-use of the understanding can thoroughgoingly harmonise through its being brought into coherence with the principle of thoroughgoing unity *as far as is possible* and derived therefrom.

I call all subjective principles that derive not from the constitution of the object but rather from the interest of reason in regard to a certain possible perfection of cognition of that object ‘*maxims*’ of reason. So there are maxims of speculative reason that rest merely upon its speculative interest, although it may admittedly seem that they are objective principles.

If merely regulative principles are considered as constitutive, then they cannot conflict with one another as objective principles; but if one considers them merely as *maxims*, then there is no true conflict but rather merely a diverse interest of reason: which incites a division of ways-of-thinking. In fact, reason has only a single interest; and the dispute between its maxims is merely a diversity and a reciprocal constrainment of the methods of satisfying that interest.

In such a way: in *one* sophist an interest in *multiplicity* (according to the principle of specification) is more powerful whereas in another sophist, an interest in *unity* is more powerful (according to the principle of aggregation). Each of them believes that he has his judgement from insight into the object; and yet it is grounded merely upon a greater or lesser attachment to one of two principles, neither of which rests upon objective grounds but rather merely upon reason’s interest; and they could therefore better be called ‘maxims’ rather than ‘principles’. When I see insightful men in dispute with one another over the characterisation of humans, animals, or plants and indeed even of bodies of the mineral realm wherein some assume (e.g.) particular characters of peoples that are grounded in descent or even decisive and hereditary differences in families, races, etc.; whereas others, in contrast, are set upon asserting that nature has not made entirely and absolutely identical predipositions in that component and that all difference rests merely upon external contingencies – I need only consider the constitution of the object in order to grasp that it lies far too deeply concealed for them to be able to speak from insight into the object’s nature. It is nothing other than the two interests of reason, one of which one party takes to heart and the other of which the other party takes to heart (or even affects doing so) and therefore, the diversity of maxims of natural multiplicity or natural unity that can very well be unified but which, so long as they are taken for objective insights, engender not only dispute but even hindrances that long detain truth until a means is found to unify the disputing interests and satisfy reason in respect to them.

It is exactly the same with asserting or challenging the often-invoked *continuous scale* of creations that Leibniz brought into circulation and which was splendidly underpinned by Bonnet, which is nothing but a corollary of the principle of affinity: which rests upon reason’s interest; for observation and insight into nature’s arrangement could not deliver it as an objective assertion at all. The scions of such a scale as experience can give them stand much too far apart, and our purportedly small differences are commonly such vast chasms in nature itself that absolutely nothing is to be reckoned with such observations (especially with a great multiplicity of things, wherein it must always be easy to find certain similarities and approximations) as intentions of nature. In contrast, the method of finding order within nature according to such a principle and the maxim of regarding such order as grounded (though it is admittedly undetermined where or how far it extends in a nature *simpliciter*) is admittedly a legitimate and splendid regulative principle of reason, but as such it goes much too far for experience or observation to match it yet without determining something but rather merely delineating the path to systematic unity for reason.

#### 1.2.3.4.1. On the Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason

Pure reason’s ideas can never be dialectical *per se*, but rather their mere misuse alone must make a fallacious semblance arise for us from them; for they are imposed upon us through the nature of our reason, and it is impossible that that highest tribunal of all rights and claims of our speculation itself originally contains deceptions and illusions. Presumably, they will also have their good and purposive determination within our reason’s natural disposition. Nevertheless, the rabble amongst the sophists cry, as usual, about absurdity and contradictions and disparage the government into whose innermost plans they cannot penetrate and whose beneficent influences they themselves should also thank for their preservation and even the culture that puts them in a position to blame and condemn.

One can avail oneself of an *apriori* concept with no sureness without having brought about its transcendental deduction. The ideas of pure reason admittedly permit no deduction of the kind that the categories permit; but if they are to have some (even if only indeterminate) objective validity and not represent merely empty cogitational-things (*entia rationis ratiocinantis*), then a deduction of them must be thoroughly possible: even if one supposes that they deviate far from what one can undertake with the categories. That is the completion of pure reason’s critical task, and we shall now appropriate it.

It is a great difference whether something is given to my reason as an *object simpliciter* or only as an *object in an idea*. In the first case, my concepts serve to determine the object; in the second case, there is actually only a schema for which no object is given directly nor even hypothetically but which rather serves merely to represent other objects to ourselves by means of their relation to that idea according to their systematic unity and therefore indirectly. So I say that the concept of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea: i.e. its objective reality shall not consist in the fact that it relates directly to an object (for in such a signification, we would be unable to justify its objective validity), but rather it is merely a schema ordered according to conditions of the greatest rational-unity of the concept of a thing *simpliciter* that serves only to maintain the greatest systematic unity in empirical use of our reason because one describes the object of experience, as it were, from the imagined object of that idea as its ground or cause. Then, it is said (e.g.) that the things of the world must be considered *as though* they had their existence from a supreme intelligence. In such a way, the idea is in fact only a heuristic- and not an ostensive concept and indicates not how an object is constituted but rather how we, under its guidance, shall *seek* the constitution and connection of the objects of experience *simpliciter*. Now, if one can show that even though the three kinds of transcendental idea (viz. *psychological*, *cosmological*, and *theological*) do not become related directly to an object corresponding to them and its *determination*, all rules of reason’s empirical use under the presupposition of such an *object in the idea* nevertheless lead to systematic unity and always expand experiential cognition but can never be contrary thereto: then it is a necessary *maxim* of reason to proceed according to such ideas. And that is the transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason not as *constitutive* principles of the expansion of our cognition to more objects than experience can give but rather as *regulative* principles of the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical cognition *simpliciter*, which is thereby more cultivated and corrected within its own limits than could occur without such ideas through mere use of the understanding’s principles.

I shall render that more perspicuous. We shall connect the aforementioned ideas according to principles: *firstly* (in psychology) connect all appearances, actions, and receptivity of our mind to the guiding thread of internal experience *as though* that mind were a simple substance, with personal identity, existing persistently (at least in life), although its states (to which those of the body belong only as external conditions) continuously change. We must *secondly* (in cosmology) pursue the conditions of both internal- as well as external natural-appearances in an investigation that is never to be completed as though they were infinite *per se* and without a first or highest element: even though we do not, because of that, deny their merely intelligible first grounds outside all appearances; but we may never bring them into the nexus of natural explanations because we do not know them at all. *Thirdly*,and finally, we must (in respect to theology) consider everything that may ever merely belong within the nexus of possible experience *as though* possible experience constituted an absolute unity that is nevertheless through-and-through dependent and always still conditioned inside the sensible cosmos yet simultaneously *as though* the complex of all appearances (i.e. the sensible cosmos itself) has a single highest and allsufficient ground outside its extent: viz. an (as it were) selfstanding, original, and creative reason in relation to which we direct all empirical use of *our* reason in its greatest expansion *as though* the objects themselves derived from that prototype of all reason: i.e. not to derive the internal appearances of the soul from a simple thinking substance but rather to derive them from one another according to the idea of a simple being; not to derive the cosmic order and the cosmos’s systematic unity from a supreme intelligence but rather to derive from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule according to which reason is best to be satisfied in connecting the causes and effects within the world to its own satisfaction.

There is not the slightest hindrance to our also *assuming* those ideas to be objective and hypostatic except solely the cosmological ideas, where reason encounters an antinomy if it seeks to bring such an idea about (the psychological and theological ideas contain nothing of that sort at all). For since there is no contradiction within them, how should someone be able to dispute their objective reality with us: since he knows no more about their possibility in order to deny them than we do in order to affirm them. Nevertheless, in order to assume something, it is not enough that there is no positive hindrance against it; and we cannot be allowed to introduce cogitational beings that surpass all our concepts – even though they do not contradict any of them – as actual and determinate objects on the mere credit of a speculative reason that would like to complete its task. Therefore: they should not be assumed *per se*,but rather only their reality shall be regarded as a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all natural cognition; and therefore, they should be taken as a basis only as analogues of actual things but not as actual things *per se*. We eliminate the conditions from the object of the idea that constrain our intellectual concept: which alone make it possible, however, that we can have a determinate concept of any thing. And now we think of a something whereof we have absolutely no concept in respect of what it is *per se* but whereof we nevertheless think of a relationship to the complex of the appearances that is analogous to that which the appearances have to one another.

If we thus assume such ideal beings: then we do not in fact expand our cognition beyond the objects of possible experience, but rather we expand only the latter’s empirical unity through the systematic unity for which the idea gives us the schema, which consequently holds not as a constitutive principle but rather merely as a regulative principle. For through the fact that we posit a thing corresponding to the idea (i.e. a something or an actual being), it is still not said that we seek to expand our cognition of the things with transcendent concepts; for that being is taken as a basis only within the idea and not *per se* and therefore only in order to express the systematic unity that shall serve us as a guiding cord of reason’s empirical use without discerning something about what the ground of that unity or the internal property of such a being is or upon what it rests *qua* cause.

So the transcendental- and sole determinate concept of God that merely speculative reason gives to us is *deistic* in the most exact sense, i.e. reason does not deliver even the objective validity of such a concept but rather merely the idea of something upon which all empirical reality grounds its supreme and necessary unity and which we cannot think about except by analogy to an actual substance that is the cause of all things according to reason’s laws: so far as we indeed undertake to think of it as a particular object at all and do not prefer – satisfied with the mere idea of reason’s regulative principle – to set aside the completion of all conditions of thought as superabundant for the human understanding: which cannot, however, subsist together with the goal of a perfect systematic unity in our cognition, upon which reason at least sets no constraints.

Hence, it now occurs that if I assume a divine being, I admittedly do not have the slightest concept of the internal possibility of its supreme perfection nor of the necessity of its existence; but I can still satisfy all other questions concerning the contingent and can provide reason with the most perfect satisfaction in respect to the great investigable unity in its empirical use, though not in respect to that presupposition itself: which proves that reason’s speculative interest and not its insight justifies it in setting out from a point that lies so far beyond its sphere in order to consider its objects in a complete whole.

A difference in ways of thinking in respect of one and the same presupposition manifests itself here that is fairly subtle but which is nevertheless of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I can have enough ground to assume something relatively (*suppositio relativa*) yet without being authorised to assume it absolutely (*suppositio absoluta*). That distinction applies if merely a regulative principle is at issue whose *necessity per se* we indeed cognise although we do not cognise the source of that necessity and for which, we assume a highest ground merely in the intention of thinking of the principle’s universality that much more determinately: such as, e.g., if I think of a being as existent that corresponds to a mere- and admittedly transcendental idea. For then I can never assume the existence of that thing *per se* because no concepts whereby I can determinately think of an object suffice for that, and the conditions of the objective validity of my concepts are excluded through the idea itself. The concepts of reality, substance, causality, and even that of necessity in existence have – outside the use wherein they render empirical cognition of an object possible – absolutely no significance that determines an object. They can therefore be used to explain the possibility of things within the sensible cosmos but not the possibility of a *cosmic whole itself* because that explanatory ground would have to be external to the world and therefore not an object of a possible experience. Now, I can nevertheless assume such an incomprehensible being (i.e. the object of a mere idea) relatively to the sensible cosmos although not *per se*. For if the greatest-possible empirical use of my reason were underlain by an idea (of the systematically complete unity of which I will soon speak more determinately) that can never be presented adequately *per se* within experience – even though that idea is unavoidably necessary in order to approximate the empirical unity to the highest possible degreee – I will be not only authorised but also compelled to realise that idea: i.e. to posit an actual object for it, but only as a something *simpliciter* that I cannot know at all *per se* and to which (as a ground of the aforesaid systematic unity) I give such properties as are analogous to the intellectual concepts in their empirical use. By analogy with the realities within the world (e.g. substances, causality, and necessity), I will think of a being that possesses all of those in supreme perfection and, since that idea rests merely upon my reason, I will be able to think of that being as *selfstanding reason* that, through ideas of the greatest harmony and unity, is the cause of the cosmic whole: in such a way that I omit all of the conditions that constrain the idea merely in order – under the protection of such an originary ground – to render systematic unity of the manifold within the cosmic whole possible and, by means of it, render the greatest-possible empirical use of reason possible by regarding all conjunctions *as if* they were ordinances of a supreme reason of which ours is a weak ectype. I then think of that supreme being through mere concepts that in fact have their application only within the sensible cosmos; but since I also have that transcendental presupposition for none other than a relative use (i.e. so that it shall yield the substratum of the greatest-possible experiential unity), I think of a being that I distinguish from the world very well through properties that belong merely to the sensible cosmos. For I in no way demand, and nor am I authorised to demand, to cognise that object of my idea in respect of what it may be *per se*; for I have no concepts for that purpose: and even the concepts of reality, substance, causality, and indeed even of necessity in existence lose all significance and are empty titles for concepts without any content if I venture beyond the field of the senses therewith. I think only about the relation of a being that is entirely unknown to me *per se* to the greatest systematic unity of the cosmic whole merely in order to make it the schema of the regulative principle of the greatest-possible empirical use of my reason.

If we now cast our eyes upon our idea’s transcendental object, then we see that we cannot presuppose its actuality according to concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc. *per se* because those concepts have not the slightest application to something that is entirely different from the sensible cosmos. Therefore, reason’s supposition of a supreme being as a highest cause is thought merely relatively to the behoof of the systematic unity of the sensible cosmos and is a mere something within the idea whereof we have no concept in respect of what it is *per se*. It is also thereby explained why we need the idea of a *per se necessary* originary-being admittedly in relation to what is given existently to the senses but can never have the slightest concept of that being nor of its absolute *necessity*.

We can now perspicuously display the result of the entire Transcendental Dialectic and precisely determine the final purpose of the ideas of pure reason, which become dialectical only through misunderstanding and incautiousness. Pure reason is in fact occupied with nothing other than itself and can also have no other task because it is not the objects that are given to it for the unity of an experiential concept but rather the intellectual cognitions for the unity of a rational concept, i.e. the unity of coherence in a principle. Rational unity is the unity of a system; and that systematic unity serves reason not objectively as a principle in order to expand it over the objects but rather subjectively as a maxim in order to expand it over all possible empirical cognition of the objects. Nevertheless, the systematic coherence that reason can give to empirical use of the understanding not only furthers its expansion but also simultaneously proves its correctness; and the principle of such a systematic unity is also objective but in an indeterminate way (*principium vagum*): not as a constitutive principle in order to determine something in respect of its direct object but rather in order – as a merely regulative principle and maxim – to further and consolidate reason’s empirical use through disclosing and fixing new paths *in infinitum* that the understanding does not know, yet without ever therein being contrary to the laws of the empirical use.

Nevertheless, reason cannot think of that systematic unity without simultaneously giving its idea an object that could not, however, be given through an experience; for experience never gives an example of perfect systematic unity. Now, that rational being (*ens rationis ratiocinatae*) is admittedly a mere idea and will therefore not be assumed absolutely and *per se* as something actual but rather taken as a basis merely problematically (because we cannot reach it through intellectual concepts) in order to regard all connection between the things within the sensible cosmos *as if* they had their ground in that rational being, though merely in the intention of grounding the systematic unity upon it that can be indispensable to reason and conducive to empirical intellectual-cognition in all ways without ever being a hindrance to it.

One immediately misapprehends that idea’s significance if one takes it for an assertion or even a presupposition of an actual item to which one would think to ascribe the ground of the cosmos’s systematic constitution; instead, one leaves the question of what manner of constitution its ground (which recedes from our concepts) has *per se* entirely unanswered and posits only an idea as the viewpoint from which alone one may expand that unity, which is so essential to reason and so healthsome to the understanding – in a word: that transcendental thing is merely the schema of that regulative principle whereby reason extends systematic unity to all experience (so far as it can).

The primary object of such an idea is I myself, considered merely as a thinking nature (i.e. soul). If I wish to seek out the properties with which a thinking being exists *per se*, then I must interrogate experience; and I can apply no category to that object otherwise than insofar as the category’s schema is given within sensory intuition. Yet I never arrive at a systematic unity of all appearances of the internal sense therewith. Instead of the experiential concept (of what the soul actually is), therefore, reason takes the concept of the empirical unity of all thought; and from the fact that it thinks of that unity unconditionally and originally, it makes a rational concept (i.e. an idea) of a simple substance that is immutable *per se* (i.e. personally identical) and which stands in community with other actual things outside it – in a word: a simple selfstanding intelligence. Therein, however, reason has in view nothing but principles of systematic unity in explanation of the soul’s appearances, i.e. to consider: all determinations as within a single subject; all powers as derived from a single fundamental-power (so far as is possible); all change as belonging to the states of one and the same persistent being; and to represent all *appearances* in space as entirely distinct from the actions of *thought*. That simplicity of the substance etc. should be only the schema for that regulative principle and is not presupposed as if it were the actual ground of the soul’s properties. For the latter can also rest upon entirely different grounds that we do not know at all, as we could not truly cognise the soul *per se* even through those assumed predicates if we wished them to hold for it absolutely because it is a mere idea that cannot be represented *in concreto* at all. Nothing but advantage can arise from such a psychological idea if one merely prevents oneself from accepting it as something more than a mere idea, i.e. if one accepts it merely relatively to reason’s systematic use in regard to our soul’s appearances. For then no empirical laws mix with bodily appearances, which are of an entirely different kind, in explanations of what belongs merely before the *internal sense*; for no windy hypotheses of generation, destruction, and palingenesis of souls, etc. are permitted; therefore, contemplation of that object of the internal sense is conducted entirely purely without intermixing of inhomogeneous properties; and, moreover, reason’s investigation is directed towards tracing the explanatory grounds within that subject to a single principle (so far as is possible): all of which is effected through such a schema as though it were an actual being at best and indeed even solely and alone. The psychological idea can also signify nothing other than the schema of a regulative principle. For even if I merely wished to ask whether the soul is not of a mental nature *per se*, that question would have no sense whatsoever. For through such a concept, I remove not merely the bodily nature but also all nature *simpliciter*: i.e. all predicates of a possible experience and therefore all conditions for thinking of an object for such a concept, which alone renders it the case that one says that it has a sense.

The second regulative idea of merely speculative reason is the cosmic-concept *simpliciter*. For nature is in fact only the sole given object in respect of which reason needs regulative principles. That nature is twofold: either thinking- or bodily nature. Only for the latter – in order to think about it in respect to its internal possibility, i.e. to determine the application of the categories to it – we need an idea, i.e. a representation surpassing experience: moreover, no idea is possible in regard to it because we are therein led merely through sensory intuition and not as in the psychological fundamental-concept (I): which contains a certain form of thought, viz. its unity *apriori*. Therefore, nothing remains to us for pure reason except nature *simpliciter* and the completeness of the conditions within it according to a principle. The absolute totality of the series of those conditions in the derivation of their elements is an idea that can admittedly never fully come about in empirical use of reason but which nevertheless serves for a rule of how we should proceed in regard thereto, i.e. in explaining given appearances (in regressing or ascending) as if the series were infinite *per se* (i.e. *in indefinitum*) but where reason itself is considered as a determinative cause (in freedom) and therefore with practical principles: as if we had not an object of the senses but rather an object of the pure understanding before us, where the conditions can no longer be posited within the series of the appearances but rather only externally to it; and the series of states can be regarded *as if* it would begin absolutely (through an intelligible cause), all of which proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles and are far removed from positing an actual totality of such series constitutively, as it were. One can seek the rest in its location under the Antinomy of Pure Reason.

The third idea of pure reason, which contains a merely relative supposition of a being as the single and allsufficient cause of all cosmological series is the rational-concept of *God*. We do not have the slightest ground to assume that idea’s object absolutely (i.e. to *suppose* it *per se*); for what can indeed enable us or even justify us in believing in a being of supreme perfection and as absolutely necessary according to its nature and believing in or asserting it from its mere concept *per se* were it not the world, in relation to which alone that supposition can be necessary; and it is clearly manifest that the idea thereof, just like all speculative ideas, says nothing more than that reason demands to consider all connection of the cosmos according to principles of a systematic unity and therefore *as if* it had arisen *in toto* from a single all-encompassing being as a highest and allsufficient cause. It is clear therefrom that reason can have nothing for its aim therein except its own formal rule in expansion of its empirical use, but never an expansion *beyond all limits of its empirical use*;and consequently, no constitutive principle of its use directed to possible experience lies concealed beneath that idea.

That supreme formal unity that rests upon rational concepts alone is the *purposive* unity of things, and reason’s *speculative* interest renders it necessary to regard all ordering within the world as though it had stemmed from the intention of an all-supreme reason. For such a principle discloses entirely new prospects to our reason in its application to the field of experiences according to teleological laws to connect the things of the world and thereby arrive at their greatest systematic unity. The presupposition of a highest intelligence as the sole cause of the cosmic whole (albeit merely within an idea) can always therefore be useful for reason and indeed never damage it therein. For if in regard to the figure of the Earth (i.e. round yet somewhat flattened),[[43]](#footnote-43) the mountains, seas, etc., we assumed mere wise intentions of an author in advance: then we could make a multitude of discoveries on that path. If we remain only with this presupposition as a merely *regulative* principle, then even error cannot damage us. For perhaps nothing more can follow therefrom than that where we expected a teleological nexus (*nexus finalis*), a merely mechanical or physical (*nexus effectivus*) was encountered: whereby we, in such a case, lack only an additional unity but do not ruin the rational unity in its empirical use. But even this virgule cannot impinge upon the law itself in a general and teleological regard *simpliciter*. For even though a dissector can admittedly be persuaded of an error if he relates a limb of an animal body to a purpose from which one can perspicuously show that it does that it does not result, it is nevertheless entirely impossible to *prove* in any case that a natural arrangement (whatever it may be) has absolutely no purpose whatsoever. Hence, physiology (of doctors) expands its highly constrained empirical knowledge of the purposes of an organic body’s anatomy through a principle that merely pure reason provides so far that one therein assumes entirely brazenly and simultaneously with the consonance of all who understand that everything in the animal has its utility and good intention – a presupposition that, if it should be constitutive, goes much further than previous observation can justify us: from which it is then to be discerned that it is nothing but a regulative principle of reason in order to arrive at the supreme systematic unity by means of the idea of the purposive causality of the highest cosmic cause and *as if* that (*qua* supreme intelligence) were the cause of everything according to the wisest intention.

Yet if we abandon that restriction of the idea to the merely regulative use, then reason is led astray in so many ways because it then leaves the ground of experience that nevertheless contains the mark of its course and ventures beyond it to what is inconceivable and inexplorable, above whose height it necessarily becomes dizzy because from that standpoint it sees itself entirely cut off from all use consonant with experience.

The first fault that arises from one’s using the idea of a supreme being not merely regulatively but rather constitutively (which is contrary to the nature of an idea) is foul reason (*ignava ratio*).[[44]](#footnote-44) One can name every principle thus that effects that one regards one’s natural investigation (wherever it may be) as absolutely completed and reason therefore begins to rest as though it had fully accomplished its task. Therefore, even the psychological idea – if it is used as a constitutive principle for explaining our soul’s appearances and thereafter even to expand our cognition of that subject still beyond all experience (its state after death) – admittedly affords reason great comfort but also entirely ruins and devastates all natural use of reason according to the guidance of experience. Thus, the dogmatic spiritualist explains the unity of the person that subsists unaltered throughout all change of states from the unity of the thinking substance that he believes to perceive immediately; he explains the interest that we take in things that shall first occur only after our death from consciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject, etc. and excuses himself from all natural investigation of the cause of those internal appearances from physical explanatory-grounds because he passes by the immanent cognitive-source of experience, as it were, for the behoof of his convenience through the decree of a transcendent reason but with loss of all insight. That detrimental consequence is even more conspicuous with the dogmatism of our idea of a supreme intelligence and the theological system of nature (i.e. physicotheology) that is falsely grounded thereupon. For since all purposes that show themselves in nature, which are often made for that end only by ourselves, serve to truly afford us comfort in exploring causes: i.e. instead of seeking them in the universal laws of the mechanism of matter, we directly invoke the inexplorable counsel of supreme wisdom and regard a rational endeavour as completed when one excuses oneself from its use but which nowhere finds a guiding thread except where nature’s order and the series of alterations according to its internal and more universal laws deliver one. That fault can be avoided if we do not consider merely some natural components (e.g. the division of the fixed land, that land’s structure, and the constitution and position of the mountains or indeed even merely the organisation in the plant- and animal-realms) from the viewpoint of purposes but rather render that systematic unity of nature in relation to the idea of a supreme intelligence *entirely universal*. For then we take a purposiveness according to universal laws of nature as a basis from which no particular arrangement has been excepted but which has rather been rendered more or less knowable for us and have a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a teleological connection that we could not determine in advance, however; but rather only in expectation thereof have we been permitted to pursue the physicomechanical connection according to universal laws. For only thus can the principle of the purposeful unity always expand reason’s use in respect of experience without abrupting it in any case.

The second fault that arises from misinterpretation of the aforesaid principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason (*perversa ratio*, ὕστερον πρότερον *rationis*). The idea of systematic unity should serve only in order for one to seek it as a regulative principle in conjunction of things according to universal natural-laws and, so far as something thereof can be encountered on the empirical path, in order for one to also believe so much that one has approached the completeness of its use, although one will admittedly never attain it. Instead of that, one reverses the issue and begins by taking as a basis the actuality of a principle of purposive unity *qua* hypostatic, determining the concept of such a supreme intelligence anthropomorphistically because it is entirely inexplorable *per se* and then imposing purposes upon nature forcefully and dictatorially instead of seeking them (as it equitable) on the path of physical investigation in such a way that not only does teleology, which should serve merely to supplement the natural unity according to universal laws, now instead work to eliminate it: but also reason even misses its purpose, viz. to prove the existence of such an intelligent highest cause from nature according to those laws. For if one cannot presuppose supreme purposiveness within nature *apriori* (i.e. as belonging to nature’s essence), then how shall one then be directed to seek it and to approach the supreme perfection of an author as an absolutely necessary and therefore *apriori*-cognisable perfection on nature’s scale? The regulative principle demands that one absolutely presuppose the systematic unity *qua natural unity* that is not merely cognised empirically but rather presupposed *apriori* (albeit still indeterminately) and therefore presuppose it as following from the essence of the things. Yet if I first take a supreme ordering being as a basis, then the natural unity is in fact eliminated. For it is entirely foreign to the nature of the things and contingent and also cannot be cognised from universal laws thereof. Therefore, a vicious circle arises in the proof wherein one presupposes what should in fact have been proved.

To take nature’s systematic unity for a constitutive unity and to hypostatically presuppose as a cause what is merely laid at the basis of reason’s consonant use in an idea means merely to confuse reason. Natural research takes its course entirely alone along the chain of natural causes according to universal laws thereof, admittedly according to the idea of an originary-being but not in order to derive the purposiveness from that being but rather to cognise that being’s existence from the purposiveness that is sought in the essences of the natural things and, where possible, also in the essences of all things *simpliciter* and consequently to cognise it as absolutely necessary. Irrespective of whether the latter succeeds or not, the idea always remains correct and equally also its use if it has been restricted to the conditions of a merely regulative principle.

Complete purposive unity is perfection (absolutely considered). If we consider that perfection not in the essence of the things, which constitute the whole object of experience (i.e. of all our objectively valid cognition) and therefore find it in universal and necessary natural-laws, then how shall we infer therefrom to the idea of a supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of an originary-being that is the origin of all causality? The greatest systematic (and consequently also purposive) unity is the school and even the foundation of the possibility of the greatest use of human reason. The idea thereof is therefore inseverably conjoined with our reason’s essence. The very same idea is therefore legislative for us, and so it is very natural to assume a reason corresponding to and legislative for it (*intellectus archetypus*) from which all systematic unity of nature (as the object of our reaason) is to be derived.

On occasion of the antinomy of pure reason, we have said that all questions that pure reason raises must be answerable absolutely and that the apology citing our reason’s constraints that is just as unavoidable as it is equitable in many natural questions cannot be permitted here because the questions here are propounded to us not regarding the nature of the things but rather solely through the nature of reason and merely concerning its internal arrangement. We can now confirm that *prima facie* audacious assertion in regard to the two questions wherein pure reason has its greatest interest and thereby bring our contemplation on pure reason’s dialectic to total completion.

If one then asks oneself (in regard to a transcendental theology)[[45]](#footnote-45) *firstly* whether there is something distinct from the world that contains the ground of the cosmos’s order and its coherence according to universal laws, then the answer is ‘*without doubt*’. For the world is a sum of appearances; there must therefore be some transcendental ground of it (i.e. a ground thinkable merely for the pure understanding). If *secondly* the question is whether that being is substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, etc.: then I answer *that* *that question has no signification whatsoever*. For all categories through which I attempt to make myself a concept of such an object are of none other than empirical use and have no sense whatsoever if they are not applied to objects of possible experience, i.e. to the sensible cosmos. Outside that field, they are merely titles for concepts that one can admit but whereby one also cannot understand anything. If *thirdly* and finally the question is whether we are not at least permitted to think of that being that is distinct from the world by *analogy* with the objects of experience: then the answer is ‘admittedly’, but only as an object within the idea and not within reality: i.e. only so far as it is a substratum (unknown to us) of the systematic unity, order, and purposeiveness of the cosmic arrangement, which reason must turn into a regulative principle of its investigation. Furthermore, we can unabashedly and blamelessly allow certain anthropomorphisms within that idea that can further the aforementioned regulative principle. For it is always only an idea that by no means becomes directly related to a being distinct from the world but rather to the regulative principle of the world’s systematic unity, though only by means of a schema thereof: namely, a highest intelligence that is the world’s author according to wise intentions. What that originary ground of the cosmic unity is *per se* is not supposed to have thereby been thought, but rather how we should use it – or rather its idea – relatively to reason’s systematic use in regard to the things within the cosmos.

In such a way, however, *can* we nevertheless (if one continues to enquire) assume a single wise and omnipotent cosmic-author? *Without any doubt*; and not only that, but rather we *must* presuppose such a cosmic author. But do we then expand our cognition beyond the field of possible experience? *By no means*. For we have merely presupposed a something whereof we have absolutely no concept in respect of what it is *per se* (i.e. a merely transcendental object); but, in relation to the systematic and purposive order of the cosmos’s structure that we must presuppose when we study nature, we have thought of that being (which is unknown to us) *only by analogy* with an intelligence (an empirical concept): i.e. in regard to the purposes and the perfection that are grounded upon that being, which is endowed precisely with those properties that – according to the conditions of our reason – can contain the ground of such a systematic unity. That idea is therefore entirely grounded *relatively to cosmic use* of our reason. Yet if we sought to impart objective validity to that idea, then we would forget that the aforesaid being is merely a being of which we think within the idea; and because we would then begin from a ground that was not determinable at all through cosmic contemplation, we would have thereby removed ourselves from a position from which we could apply that principle to reason’s empirical use.

Yet (one will further ask) in such a way, can I still make use of the concept and presupposition of a supreme being in rational cosmological contemplation? Indeed: and that idea of reason was in fact even taken as a basis for that purpose.

Only may I now regard quasi-purposive ordinances as intentions by deriving them from the divine will, though admittedly by means of particular dispositions within the world that are ordered thereto? Indeed: you can also do that, but in such a way that you must be indifferent to whether someone says that the divine wisdom has thus ordered everything to its highest purposes or that the idea of the supreme wisdom is a regulative in investigation of nature and a principle of the systematic and purposive unity thereof according to universal natural-laws, even where we do not become aware of that unity: i.e. it must be completely the same to you, where you perceive that unity, to say ‘God has wisely willed it thus’ or ‘nature has ordered it thus wisely’. For the greatest systematic and purposive unity that your reason demanded to place at the basis of all natural research as a regulative principle was precisely what would justify you in taking the idea of a supreme intelligence as a basis as a schema of the regulative principle, and you have as much confirmation of the legitimacy of your idea as you have encountered purposiveness within the world according to that principle; but since the aforesaid principle had nothing for its intention except to seek nature’s necessary and greatest-possible unity, we will have to thank the idea of a supreme being (so far as we reach it) but cannot pass by the universal laws of nature in regard to which alone the idea was taken as a basis without drifting into contradiction with ourselves in order to regard that purposiveness of nature as contingent and hyperphysical in respect to its origin because we were not justified in assuming a being beyond nature with the aforementioned properties but rather only in taking the idea of that being as a basis in order to regard the appearances as systematically connected to one another by analogy with a causal determination.

Precisely because of that, we are also justified not only in thinking of the cosmic cause according to a subtler anthropomorphism (without which absolutely nothing would be thinkable of it): viz. as a being that has understanding, pleasure, displeasure, and also a desire and will accordant with them etc., but also in attributing infinite perfection to it that therefore far surpasses the perfection in respect of which we can be justified through empirical knowledge of the cosmic order. For the regulative law of systematic unity decrees that we shall study nature *as though* systematic and purposive unity were encountered everywhere *in infinitum* with the greatest possible multiplicity. For although we espy or reach only little of that cosmic perfection, it nevertheless belongs to our reason’s legislation to seek and surmise it everywhere; and it must always be advantageous to us but can never be detrimental to us to conduct natural contemplation according to that principle. Yet under that representation of the underlaid idea of a supreme author, it is also clear that I do not take the existence and knowledge of such a being as a basis but rather merely its idea; and therefore, nothing truly derives from that being but rather merely from its idea, i.e. from the nature of the things of the world according to such an idea. Moreover, a certain (albeit undeveloped) consciousness of the genuine use of that rational concept seems to have engendered the modest and fair language of philosophers of all times: since they speak of nature’s wisdom and providence and divine wisdom as synonymous terms and indeed prefer the first term, so long as merely speculative reason is at issue, because it restrains the pretension to an assertion greater than that for which we are authorised and simultaneously directs reason back to its peculiar field, viz. nature.

Thus, pure reason – which initially seemed to promise us nothing less than expansion of our knowledge beyond all limits of experience – contains, if we understand it correctly, nothing but regulative principles that admittedly demand greater unity than empirical use of the understanding can attain: but precisely through shifting the goal of its approximation so far, they bring the understanding’s harmony with itself to the highest degree through systematic unity; but if one misunderstands them and takes them for constitutive principles of transcendent cognitions, then – through an admittedly lustrous yet fallacious semblance – they bring forth persuasion and imagined knowledge but therewith eternal contradictions and disputations.

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So then, all human cognition begins with intuitions, goes thence to concepts, and ends with ideas. Although it admittedly has *apriori* cognitive-sources in respect of all three elements that, on first impression, seem to spurn the limits of all experience, a completed critique nevertheless convinces us that all reason in its speculative use can never go beyond the field of possible experience with those elements and that the true determination of that highest cognitive-capacity is only to avail itself of all methods and the principles thereof in order to pursue nature into its innermost according to all possible principles of unity, amongst which those of purposes are the most preeminent, but never to fly over its limit: beyond which, there is nothing but empty space *for us*. Admittedly, the critical investigation of all propositions that can expand our cognition beyond actual experience in the Transcendental Analytic has sufficiently convinced us that it can never lead to anything more than a possible experience; and if one were not oneself mistrustful against the clearest or abstract and universal theorems and if enticing and specious prospects had not allured us to throw off the compulsion of possible experience, then we could admittedly be excused from the toilsome hearing of all dialectical witnesses who let a transcendent reason appear for the behoof of their pretensions; for we already knew in advance with full certainty that all of their pretence was perhaps, admittedly, honourably intentioned but must be absolutely null because it concerned a doctrine that no human can ever receive. Only since there is no end of the discussion if one does not come to the true cause of the semblance, whereby even the most rational can be fooled, and the resolution of all our transcendent cognition into its elements (as a study of our internal nature) has no small value *per se* and is even a philosopher’s duty, it was not only necessary to thoroughly explore this entire, albeit idle, elaboration of speculative reason unto its first sources; but since the dialectical semblance here is not only deceptive in respect to judgement but also alluring in respect to the interest that one takes in judging here and is always natural and will always remain thus, it was advisable to thoroughly formulate the acts of this process (as it were) and record them within the archive of human reason in order to prevent future errors of a similar kind.

**Transcendental Methodology**

If I regard the complex of all cognition of pure and speculative reason as an edifice for which we at least have the idea within us: then I can say that in the Transcendental Elementology, we have estimated the construction materials and have determined for what edifice they suffice and what height and stability it could achieve. Admittedly, it was found that although we indeed had in mind a tower that would reach the sky, the inventory of materials nevertheless suffices only for a dwelling-house that was exactly spacious and high enough for us to survey our tasks on the level of experience but that that audacious undertaking had to fail from lack of material without even reckoning upon the linguistic confusion that inevitably disunites the labourers in respect of the plan and which had to disperse them throughout the world in order for each to begin discretely according to his design.

We are now concerned not so much with the materials as rather with the plan and with making the proposal for an edifice in relationship to the inventory that is given to us that is simultaneously congruous with our need: since although we are warned not to venture on the basis of an arbitrary blind delineation that could perhaps surpass our entire capacity, we still cannot well abstain from erecting a fixed dwelling-place.

By a ‘transcendental methodology’, I therefore understand a determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. In this intention, we will deal with a *discipline*, a *canon*, an *architectonic*, and finally a *history* of pure reason and will accomplish in a transcendental regard what was sought in the schools in regard to the use of the understanding *simpliciter* under the name of a *practical logic* but which was poorly accomplished because since universal logic is confined neither to a particular kind of intellectual cognition (e.g. pure intellectual-cognition) nor to certain objects, it can (without borrowing knowledge from other sciences) do nothing more than present titles for *possible methods* and technical terms whereof one avails oneself in regard to systematicity in all manner of sciences that first make the student familiar with names at the outset with whose signification and use he shall only subsequently become acquainted.

### 2.1. First Main Component of the Transcendental Methodology: The Discipline of Pure Reason

Negative judgements that are negative not merely in respect of their logical form but also in respect of their content stand in no particular esteem with human curiosity; one even indeed sees them as envious foes of our cognitive drive, which strives unremittingly for expansion; and an apology is almost needed in order to provide them merely with tolerance and still more in order to provide them with favour and high estimation.

*Logically*, one can admittedly express all propositions negatively that one wishes to express negatively; but in respect to the content of our cognition *simpliciter* (i.e. whether it is expanded or restricted through a judgement), negative propositions have the peculiar task of merely *averting error*. Hence, even negative propositions that shall avert a false cognition where an error is never possible are admittedly very true yet nevertheless empty, i.e. incongruous with their purpose, and precisely therefore often risible – such as the schoolteacher’s proposition that Alexander could not have conquered any lands without an army.

But where the constraints upon our possible cognition are very narrow, the stimulus to judge is great, the semblance that offers itself is highly fallacious, and the detriment from error is important, the *negativity* of the instruction that serves merely to preserve us from errors could obtain still more importance than some positive instruction whereby our cognition obtains growth. One calls *compulsion* whereby a constant tendency to deviate from certain rules is constrained and ultimately eradicated *discpline*. Discipline is distinct from *culture*, which shall merely provide a *skill* without eliminating another skill that already existed. Therefore, whereas culture and doctrine make a positive contribution to the formation of a talent that already has an impulse towards expression by itself, discipline will make a negative contribution.[[46]](#footnote-46)

Everyone will readily concede that temperament and also talents that gladly allow themselves a free and unrestricted motion (such as imaginal power and wit) need discipline in some regard. But that reason, which it in fact behoves to prescribe the discipline of all other endeavours, still itself has need of discipline may admittedly seem strange; and in fact, reason has also hitherto avoided such a humiliation precisely because with the solemnity and profound propriety with which it appears, no one could easily come to suspect a frivolous game with imaginings instead of concepts and words instead of items.

No critique of reason was needed in its empirical use because its principles become subjected to a continuous examination in light of the touchstone of experience; nor was such a critique needed in mathematics, where its concepts must be presented immediately *in concreto* and everything ungrounded and arbitrary will soon thereby become manifest. Yet where neither empirical- nor pure intuition hold reason in a visible orbit (viz. in its transcendental use with pure mere concepts), reason so greatly needs a discipline that restrains its tendency towards expansion beyond the narrow limits of possible experience and keeps it from excess and error that even the whole philosophy of pure reason deals merely with that negative utility. Individual errors can be remedied through *censure*,and their causes can be remedied through critique. Yet where, as in pure reason, a whole system of deceptions and illusions is encountered that are well conjoined amongst themselves and unified under common principles, an entirely discrete and indeed negative legislation seems to be requisite: which, under the name of a *discipline* from the nature of reason and of the objects of its pure use, erects a system of foresight and self-examination (as it were) before which no false sophistical semblance can subsist but rather must immediately betray itself despite all grounds of its embellishment.

It is to be well remarked, however, that in this second main part of the Transcendental Critique, I direct the discipline of pure reason not to the content but merely to the method of cognition from pure reason. The first has already occurred in the elementology. But there is much that is similar in reason’s use, irrespective of which object it is applied to; and yet so far as that use shall be transcendental, it is simultaneously so essentially different from everything else that without the cautionary negative-doctrine of a discipline applied particularly to it, the errors are not to be prevented that must arise necessarily from unfittingly following such methods that admittedly otherwise fit reason but do not do so here.

### 2.1.1. First Section: The Discipline of Pure Reason in Its Dogmatic Use

Mathematics gives the most brilliant example of a pure reason felicitously expanding itself by itself without the aid of experience. Examples are infectious, especially for that very capacity that naturally flatters itself to have exactly the same fortune in other cases as was imparted to it in one case. Hence, in its trascendental use, pure reason hopes to expand itself just as felicitously and profoundly as has been successful for it in its mathematical use if it primarily applies the same method in the former case that has been of such manifest utility in the latter case. It is therefore important for us to know whether the method for attaining apodictic certainty that one calls *mathematical* in the latter science is the same as that wherewith one seeks exactly the same certainty in philosophy and which would have to be called *dogmatic* there.

Whereas *philosophical* cognition is *rational-cognition from concepts*, mathematical cognition is *rational-cognition* from the *construction of concepts*. *Constructing* a concept, however, means presenting the *apriori* intuition corresponding to it. For construction of a concept, therefore, a *non-empirical* intuition is required that consequently, *qua* intuition, is an *individual* object but must nevertheless, as the contruction of a concept (of a general representation), express universal validity for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept within the representation. So I construct a triangle by presenting the object corresponding to that concept either through mere imagination (in pure intuition) or, according to it, also on paper in empirical intuition: both times fully *apriori*, however, without the pattern for doing so having been borrowed from any experience. The individual drawn figure is empirical and nevertheless serves to express the concept (despite its universality) because in that empirical intuition, one always looks solely to the action of constructing the concept, to which many determinations (e.g. the sizes of the sides and the angles) are entirely a matter of indifference; and those diversities, which do not alter the concept of the triangle, therefore become abstracted from.

Whereas philosophical cognition therefore contemplates the particular only *in universo*, mathematical cognition considers the universal *in particulari* and indeed even *in individuo* yet nevertheless *apriori* and by means of reason in such a way that as that individual is determined under certain universal conditions of construction, the object of the concept to which that individual corresponds only as its schema must be thought of as determined universally.

The essential difference between those two kinds of rational-cognition therefore consists in that essential difference and does not rest upon the difference in their matter or objects. Those who thought to distinguish philosophy from mathematics through saying that whereas the former has merely *quality* for its object, the latter has only *quantity* for its object have taken the effect for the cause. Mathematical cognition’s form is the cause of the fact that it can concern merely quanta. For only the concept of quanta can be constructed, i.e. presented *apriori* in intuition; but qualities can be presented in none other than empirical intuition. Hence, a rational-cognition of qualities can be possible only through concepts. So no one can take an intuition corresponding to the concept of reality anywhence other than from experience but never *apriori* from himself nor partake of it prior to empirical consciousness thereof. One will be able to render a conical shape intuitive without any empirical aid, merely according to concepts; but the colour of the cone will have to be previously given in one experience or another. I can present the concept of a cause *simpliciter* in intuition in no way other than in an example that experience delivers to me, etc. Moreover, philosophy treats of quanta just as well as mathematics: e.g. of totality, infinitude, etc.. Mathematics is also occupied with differences between lines and surfaces as spaces of diverse quality, with the continuity of extension as a quality thereof. But even though they have a common object in such cases, the way of treating it through reason is nevertheless entirely different in philosophical contemplation than in mathematical contemplation. Whereas the former adheres merely to general concepts, the latter can accomplish nothing with mere concepts but rather hurries immediately to intuition, in which it contemplates the concept *in concreto* but still not empirically but rather merely in such an intuition that it has presented *apriori* (i.e. constructed) and in which what follows from the universal conditions of the construction must also hold universally for the object of the constructed concept.

One may give the concept of a triangle to a philosopher and let him find, in his way, how the sum of its angles may relate to a right angle. He now has nothing but the concept of a figure that is enclosed within three straight lines and, in it, the concept of equally many angles. He may reflect upon that concept as long as he likes; he will extract nothing new from it. He can dissect and render perspicuous the concept of a straight line or the concept of an angle or the concept of the number three but cannot arrive at other properties that do not lie within those concepts at all. Only the geometer may take up this question. He immediately begins by constructing a triangle. Since he knows that two right angles together amount to just as much as all contiguous angles that can be drawn from a point on a straight line, he lengthens one side of his triangle and receives two contiguous angles that together are equal to two right-angles. Now he divides the outermost of those angles by drawing a line parallel with the opposite side of the triangle and sees that an external contiguous angle arises here that is always equal to an internal angle, etc. In such a way, he arrives at the fully lucid and simultaneously universal resolution of the question via a chain of inferences, guided always by intuition.

Mathematics, however, constructs not merely quanta (*quanta*) like in geometry but also mere quantity (*quantitatem*) like in algebra: wherein it totally abstracts from the constitution of the object that shall be thought of according to such a quantitative concept. It then chooses a certain notation for all constructions of quanta *simpliciter* (i.e. numbers), addition, subtraction, etc., root extraction; and after it has characterised the general concept of quantity according to its diverse relationships, it presents all treatment that becomes generated and altered through quantity according to certain universal rules in intuition – where one quantum shall be divided through another, it composes both of their characters according to the characteristic form of division and thus arrives somewhere by means of a symbolic construction just as well as geometry arrived there by means of an ostensive or geometrical construction of the objects themselves, but where discursive cognition could never arrive by means of mere concepts.

What may be the cause of such a diverse situation wherein two artists of reason find themselves, one of whom takes his path with concepts and the other of whom takes his path with intuitions that he presents *apriori* accordantly with concepts? According to the above-presented transcendental fundamental-doctrines, the cause is clear. Here, it is an issue not of analytic propositions that can be generated through mere dissection of the concepts (the philosopher would doubtless have the advantage over his rival therein) but rather of synthetic propositions and indeed such that shall be cognised *apriori*. For I shall not look to what I actually think of within my concept of a triangle (that is nothing beyond the mere definition), but rather I shall go beyond it to properties that do not lie within that concept yet nevertheless pertain to it. Now, that is impossible except through my determining my object according to the conditions of either empirical- or pure intuition. The first would yield only an empirical proposition (through measurement of its angles), which would contain no universality and still less necessity – the like of which is not under discussion here. The second procedure is the mathematical procedure, however, and indeed geometrical construction: by means of which, in a pure intuition just as in an empirical intuition, I add the manifold that belongs to the schema of a triangle *simpliciter* and therefore to its concept – whereby universal synthetic propositions must indeed be constructed.

I would therefore philosophise about (i.e. discursively reflect upon) a triangle in vain without thereby advancing any further in the slightest, except to the mere definition from which I rightly had to begin. There is admittedly a transcendental synthesis from mere concepts at which in turn the philosopher alone succeeds but which never concerns more than a thing *simpliciter*, under which conditions its perception can belong to possible experience. Yet in mathematical problems, the talk is not of existence at all – neither here nor in general – but rather of the properties of the objects *per se* merely so far as those objects are conjoined with their concepts.

In the adduced examples, we have sought merely to render perspicuous what great difference is to be encountered between reason’s discursive use according to concepts and its intuitive use through construction of concepts. Now, it is naturally asked what the cause is that renders such a twofold use of reason necessary and in light of which conditions one can cognise whether only the first or also the second occurs.

All our cognition still ultimately relates to possible intuitions, for an object is given through them alone. Now, an *apriori* concept (i.e. a non-empirical concept) either already contains a pure intuition within it: and then it can be constructed; or it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions that are not given *apriori*: and then one can indeed judge through it synthetically and *apriori* but only discursively according to concepts and never intuitively through construction of concepts.

Of all intuition, none is given *apriori* except the mere form of appearances: namely, space and time; and a concept of them as quanta can be presented either simultaneously with its quality (i.e. its shape) or even merely its quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifold) through number *apriori* within intuition, i.e. constructed. But the matter of appearances whereby *things* are given to us in space and time can be represented only in perception and therefore *aposteriori*. The sole concept that represents that empirical content of appearances *apriori* is the concept of a *thing simpliciter*; and synthetic *apriori* cognition thereof can deliver *apriori* nothing further than the mwre rule of the synthesis of what perception may give *aposteriori* but never the intuition of the real object because that intuition must necessarily be given empirically.

Synthetic propositions that concern *things simpliciter*,whose intuition cannot be given at all *apriori*, are transcendental. Thus, transcendental propositions can never be given through construction of concepts but rather only according to *apriori* concepts. They contain merely the rule according to which a certain synthetic unity of that which cannot be represented intuitively *apriori* (i.e. of perceptions) shall be sought empirically. Yet they can none of their concepts *apriori* in any case but rather do that only *aposteriori* by means of experience, which first becomes possible only according to those synthetic principles. If one is to judge of a concept synthetically, then one must go beyond that concept and indeed to the intuition in which it is given. For if one stayed with what is contained within the concept, then the judgement would be merely analytic and an explanation of the thought in respect of what is actually contained within it. Yet I can go from the concept to the pure or empirical intuition corresponding to it in order to consider the concept in the intuition *in concreto* and to cognise *apriori* or *aposteriori* what accrues to the concept’s object. The first is rational and mathematical cognition through construction of the concept; the second is mere empirical (i.e. mechanical) cognition that can never give necessary and apodictic propositions. So I could dissect my empirical concept of gold without thereby gaining anything beyond being able to enumerate everything that I actually think of with that word: whereby a logical improvement admittedly occurs in my cognition, but no augmentation nor addition is acquired. I may take the matter that is presented under that name, however, and conduct perceptions with it that will deliver diverse synthetic yet empirical propositions to me. I would construct the mathematical concept of a triangle (i.e. give it *apriori* in intuition) and, in that way, receive a synthetic yet rational cognition. But if the transcendental concept of a reality, substance, force, etc. is given to me, then it designates neither an empirical- nor pure intuition but rather merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions (which therefore cannot be given *apriori*); and since synthesis cannot pass over *a priori* to the intuition that corresponds to it, also no determinative synthetic proposition arises from it but rather merely a principle of the synthesis[[47]](#footnote-47) of possible empirical intuitions. Therefore, a transcendental proposition is a synthetic rational-cognition according to mere concepts and therefore discursive because all synthetic unity of empirical cognition thereby first becomes possible, though no intuition is thereby given *apriori*.

So then, there is a double use-of-reason that, despite the university of cognition and its *apriori* generation that they have in common, is nevertheless highly diverse in its progression and indeed because in appearance, whereby all objects are given to us, there are two components: viz. the form of intuition (space and time) – which can be cognised and determined fully *apriori* – and matter (what is physical) or content, which signifies a something that is encountered within space and time and therefore contains an existence and corresponds to the sensation. In respect of the latter, which can never be given otherwise than in a determinate way *qua* empirical, we can have nothing except indeterminate concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations so far as they belong to the unity of apperception (within a possible experience). In respect of the former, we can determine our concepts within intuition *apriori* by creating the objects themselves for ourselves in space and time through uniform synthesis because we consider them merely as quanta. The former is called reason’s use ‘according to concepts’ because we can do nothing more than bring appearances in respect to real content under concepts, which cannot be thereby determined otherwise than empirically (i.e. *aposteriori*): although according to those concepts as rules of an empirical synthesis; the latter is reason’s use through construction of concepts because those concepts – since they already concern an *apriori* intuition – can also precisely therefore be given determinately *apriori* and without any empirical data within pure intuition. To consider everything that exists (a thing in space or time) in respect of: whether and to what extent it is a quantum or not; that an existence or absence within it must be represented; to what extent that something (that fills space or time) is a first substratum or a mere determination or has a relation of its existence to something else as a cause or effect and finally stands isolated or in mutual dependence with others in respect to existence; to consider the possibility of that existence or the actuality and necessity or the contraries of both – all that belongs to *rational cognition* from concepts, which is called *philosophical*. But to determine an *apriori* intuition in space (shape), to divide time (duration), or merely to cognise what is universal in synthesis of one and the same in time and space and the magnitude of an intuition *simpliciter* (i.e. number) arising therefrom – they are *tasks for reason* through construction of concepts and are called *mathematical*.

The great felicity that reason attains by means of mathematics entirely naturally brings about the surmise that where not mathematics itself, then still at least its method will also succeed outside the field of quanta because it brings all its concepts to intuitions that it can give *apriori* and whereby it becomes master over nature, so to speak – whereas pure philosophy, by contrast, blunders around in nature with discursive *apriori* concepts without being able to render their reality intuitive *apriori* and precisely thereby believed. There even seem to be masters in this art who by no means lack that confidence in themselves; and the commoners by no means seem to lack great expectations of their skill, should they someday occupy themselves therewith. For since they have hardly ever philosophised about their mathematics (a difficult task!), the specific difference of one of the uses of reason from the other does not come into their sense and thought at all. Passable and empirically used rules that they borrow from common reason then hold for them instead of axioms. Whence the concepts of space and time wherewith they occupy themselves derive (as the only original quanta) is not at issue for them at all; and it likewise seems useless to them to explore the origin of pure intellectual-concepts and therewith also the extent of their validity, but instead they merely avail themselves of them. They act entirely rightly in all of this if they only do not transgress their assigned limit, viz. that of *nature*. Thus, however, they drift unremarkedly from the field of sensibility onto the insecure ground of pure and even transcendental concepts where the ground (*instabilis tellus*, *innabilis unda*) allows them neither to stand nor to swim and lets only fleeting steps be performed of which time conserves not the slightest trace: whereas, in contrast, their course in mathematics makes a military road that their most recent successors can still treat with confidence.

Since we have now made it our duty to determine pure reason’s limits exactly and with certainty in its transcendental use although this kind of endeavour has in it the particularity of still always letting oneself be tantalised through hope – despite the most empthatic and clearest warnings – before one totally abandons the attempt to pass over limits of experiences into the charming region of *intellectualia*, it is necessary to (as it were) remove the last anchor of a hope rich in phantasy and to show that following the mathematical method in this kind of cognition cannot create the slightest advantage – unless it be that of uncovering one’s own nakedness all the more perspicuously in respect of the fact that metrology and philosophy are two entirely diverse things, although they admittedly lend one another a hand in natural science, and the procedure of one can therefore never be imitated by the other. Mathematics’s profundity rests upon definitions, axioms, demonstrations. I will satisfy myself with showing that none of those components in the senses wherein the mathematician takes them can be implemented nor imitated by philosophy. That the metrologist, following his method, can bring about nothing but houses of cards in philosophy whereas the philosopher, following his own method in participating in mathematics, can arouse only verbiage: although his philosophy consists precisely in knowing his limits; and even the mathematician, if his talent is not perhaps already limited by nature and confined to his specialism, can neither reject philosophy’s warnings nor evade them.

1. On **Definitions**. As the term itself indicates, *to define* shall signify merely so much as to present the thorough concept of a thing inside its limits originally.[[48]](#footnote-48) According to such a demand, an *empirical* concept cannot be defined at all but rather merely *explicated*. For since we have only some characteristics of a certain kind of object in it, it is never sure whether under the word that designates the same object one does not think of more characteristics on one occasion and fewer characteristics on another occasion. So in the concept of *gold*, whereas someone might think of the property that it does not rust in addition to its weight, colour, and toughness: someone else might perhaps know nothing thereof. One avails oneself of certain characteristics only so long as they are sufficient for distinguishing; new observations, by contrast, remove some characteristics and add some others – the concept therefore never stands between secure limits. And what purpose should it even serve to define such a concept since when (e.g.) the talk is of water and its properties, one does not dwell upon what one thinks via the word ‘water’ but rather proceeds to experiments; and the word with the few characteristics that attach to it shall constitute merely a *characterisation* and not a concept of the item: and therefore, the purported definition is nothing but a verbal determination. Secondly, moreover: to speak precisely, no concept given *apriori* can be defined – e.g. substance, cause, right, equity, etc. For I can never be sure that the perspicuous representation of a (still confused) given concept has been thoroughly developed except if I know that that representation is adequate to the object. But since the concept of that object as it is given can contain many obscure representations that we pass over in dissection although we always use them in application, the thoroughness of the dissection of my concept is always doubtful and can be rendered *presumptive* but never *apodictically* certain through manifold adequate examples. Instead of the term ‘definition’, I would prefer to use that of *exposition*: which always still remains cautious and with which the critic accepts it to a certain degree and yet can harbour doubts concerning its thoroughness. Since therefore neither empirically- nor *apriori* given concepts can be defined, no others remain except concepts thought-of arbitrarily in which one can attempt this artifice. I can always define my concept in such a case; for I must nevertheless know what I have wanted to think, since I have made the concept intentionally and it is has neither been given to me through the nature of the understanding nor through experience: although I cannot say that I have thereby defined a true object. For if the concept rests upon empirical conditions (e.g. a ship’s clock), then the object and its possibility are still not given through that arbitrary concept; I do not even know therefrom whether it has an object at all: and my explanation can better be caled a ‘declaration’ (of my project) than a ‘definition’ of an object. Therefore, no other concepts remain left over that are fit for defining except such that contain an arbitrary synthesis and which can be constructed *apriori*; and therefore, only mathematics has definitions. For the object whereof mathematics thinks, it also represents *apriori* within intuition; and that object can surely contain neither more nor less than the concept because through the explanation, the concept of the object was given originally: i.e. without deriving the explanation from anywhere. The German language has for the terms ‘exposition’, ‘explication’, ‘declaration’, and ‘definition’ nothing more than the one word ‘*Erklärung’* [sc. ‘explanation’]; and we must therefore already somewhat relent from the strictness of the demand because we denied the honorific ‘definition’ to philosophical explanations and sought to confine this entire remark to the fact that whereas philosophical definitions are brought forth only as expositions of given concepts, mathematical definitions are brought forth as constructions of originally made concepts: and whereas the former are brought forth only analytically through dissection (whose completeness is not apodictically certain), the latter are brought forth synthetically and therefore *make* the concept itself whereas the former merely *explain* it. It follows therefrom:

a) that one must not imitate mathematics in philosophy so as to prefix a definition, except only perhaps for a mere experiment. For since they are dissections of given concepts, those concepts go ahead (albeit merely still confusedly); and the incomplete exposition precedes the complete exposition in such a way that from some characteristics that we have drawn from a still uncompleted dissection, we can draw much in advance before we have arrived at the complete exposition (i.e. at the definition) – in a word: that in philosophy, the definition (as measured perspicuity) must conclude the work rather than begin it.[[49]](#footnote-49) In mathematics, by contrast, we have no concept whatsoever prior to the definition through which the concept must first be given; mathematics therefore must and also can always begin therefrom.

b) Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, the concept contains precisely only what the definition wants to have thought about through that concept. Yet even though nothing incorrect can occur therein in respect of content, something can still sometimes (though admittedly only seldom) be lacking in the form (i.e. the apparel): i.e. in regard to precision. So the common explanation of a circle – viz. that it is a *curved* line, all points of which stand equidistant from a single point (viz. the centre point) – has the fault that the determination ‘curved’ has needlessly slipped-in. For it must be a particular theorem that is inferred from the definition and which can be easily proved that every line, all points of which stand equidistant from a single point, is curved (i.e. no part of it is straight). Analytic definitions, by contrast, can err in manifold ways: either because they import characteristics that do not actually lie within the concept or because they lack thoroughness, which constitutes the essential feature of a definition because one cannot be so fully certain of the completeness of one’s dissection. Because of that, mathematics’s method in defining cannot be imitated in philosophy.

2. On **axioms**. These are synthetic *apriori* principles so far as they are immediately certain. Now, one concept cannot be conjoined with another synthetically and yet immediately because in order for us to be able to go beyond a concept, a third *mediating* concept is needed. Since philosophy is merely rational-cognition according to concepts, no principle will be encountered in it that deserves the name of an ‘axiom’. Mathematics admits of axioms, by contrast, because by means of construction of concepts in intuition of an object, it can connect the object’s predicates *apriori* and immediately: e.g. that three points always lie in a plane. In contrast, a synthetic principle can never be immediately certain merely from concepts: e.g. the principle ‘everything that occurs has its cause’ – since I must look for a *tertium quid* (viz. the condition of the temporal determination in an experience) and could not cognise such a principle directly, immediately from the concepts alone. Discursive principles are therefore something entirely different than intuitive principles, i.e. axioms. The former always still require a deduction, with which the latter can totally and utterly dispense; and since the latter are evident precisely due to the same ground, which philosophical principles can never profess: despite all their certainty, it is still infinitely far from being the case that some synthetic proposition of pure and transcendental reason is as manifest (however defiantly one tends to express oneself) as the proposition *that two times two yield four*. In the Analytic, I have also admittedly thought of certain axioms of intuition in connection with the table of the principlees of the pure understanding; only the principle adduced there was not itself an axiom but rather served only to specify the principle of the possibility of axioms *simpliciter* and was itself only a principle from concepts. For even the possibility of mathematics must be shown in transcendental philosophy. Philosophy therefore has no axioms and may never mandate its *apriori* principles so absolutely but must rather content itself with justifying its authority in respect of them through profound deduction.

3. On **demonstrations**. Only an apodictic proof so far as it is intuitive can be called a ‘demonstration’. Experience indeed teaches us what exists, but not that it absolutely cannot be otherwise. Therefore, empirical probative-grounds provide no apodictic proof. Intuitive certainty (i.e. evidence) can never arise from *apriori* concepts (in discursive cognition), however apodictically certain the judgement may otherwise be. Therefore, only mathematics contains demonstrations because it derives its cognition not from concepts but rather from construction of concepts: i.e. of the intuition that can be given *apriori* correspondently to the concepts. Even the procedure of the algebraists with their equations from which they bring forth the truth together with the proof through reduction is admittedly not a geometrical construction yet nevertheless a characteristic construction in which one propounds the concepts (especially of the relationship of quanta) in light of signs in intuition and, without even looking to a heuristic, secures all inferences from faults through displaying them. In contrast, philosophical cognition must do without that advantage because it must always contemplate the universal *in abstracto* (through concepts): whereas mathematics contemplates the universal *in concreto* (in individual intuition) and yet can consider it through pure *apriori* representation, wherein every misstep becomes visible. I would like to call the former *acroamatic* (i.e. discursive) *proofs* because they can be conducted only through mere words (the object in thought) as *demonstrations*: which, as the term already indicates, progress in intuition of the object.

From all that, it now follows that it is altogether unfitting for philosophy’s nature – especially in the field of pure reason – for it to strut with a dogmatic gait and adorn itself with the titles and bands of mathematics: within whose order it does not indeed belong, though it admittedly has all cause to hope for fraternal union therewith. Those are idle pretensions that can never succeed but must rather reverse their intention in order to discover the illusions of a reason that misapprehends its limits and, by means of sufficient elucidation of our concepts, in order to diminish the self-conceit of speculation to modest yet profound self-cognition. Reason will therefore not be able to look ahead so confidently in its transcendental enquiries as if the path that it has travelled led so entirely directly to the goal and will not be able to reckon so boldly upon its underlaid premises that it would not need to often look back and pay heed to whether faults do not perhaps uncover themselves in the progression of the inferences that have been overlooked in the principles and which render it necessary to either determine them further or modify them entirely.

I divide all apodictic propositions (be they demonstrable or even immediately certain) into *dogmata* and *mathemata*. Whereas a directly synthetic proposition from concepts is a *dogma*, such a proposition through construction of concepts is a *mathema*. Analytic judgements in fact teach us nothing more about an object than what the concept we have of it already contains within itself because they do not expand the cognition beyond the concept of the subject but rather merely elucidate it. They therefore cannot aptly be called ‘dogma’ (a word that one could perhaps translate as *Lehrspruch* [sc. aphorism]). But amongst the two aforementioned kinds of synthetic *apriori* propositions, only those pertaining to philosophical cognition can carry that name according to customary language-use; and one would hardly call the propositions of arithmetic or geometry ‘dogmata’. Therefore, this use confirms the explanation that we gave: viz. that only judgements from concepts and not those from construction of concepts can be called ‘dogmatic’.

In its merely speculative use, the whole of pure reason does not contain a single directly synthetic judgement from concepts. For as we have shown: through pure ideas, pure reason is capable of absolutely no synthetic judgements that would have objective validity. Through intellectual concepts, however, pure reason admittedly erects secure principles but not directly from concepts but rather always only indirectly through relation of those concepts to something wholly contingent, viz. *possible experience* – whereas if possible experience (i.e. something *qua* object of possible experiences) is presupposed, the aforesaid principles are admittedly apodictically certain but cannot even be cognised at all *per se* (directly) *apriori*. So no one can profoundly discern the proposition ‘everything that occurs has its cause’ from those given concepts alone. Therefore, it is not a dogma: even though from another viewpoint (viz. the sole field of its possible use, viz. experience), it can be proved very well and apodictically. It is called a *principle* and not a *theorem* even though it must be proved, however, because it has the particular property that it first renders its probative ground (viz. experience) itself possible and must always be presupposed with it.

In pure reason’s speculative use, moreover, there are also no dogmata whatsoever in respect to content. So all *dogmatic* method – whether it is borrowed from the mathematicians or shall be a peculiar manner – is unfitting by itself. For it merely conceals the faults and errors and deceives philosophy, whose true intention is to let all of reason’s steps be seen in their clearest light. Nevertheless, method can always be *systematic*. For our reason (subjectively) is itself a system; but in its pure use, by means of mere concepts, it is merely a system of investigation according to principles of unity for which *experience* alone can supply the material. Nothing can be said here of the peculiar method of a transcendental philosophy, since we are dealing only with a critique of our wherewithal: namely, whether we can construct at all and how high we can well erect our edifice from the material we have (viz. the pure *apriori* concepts).

**2.1.2. Second Section: The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to Its Polemical Use**

In all of its undertakings, reason must subject itself to critique and cannot detract from that critique’s freedom through any forbiddance without damaging itself and drawing a suspicion onto itself that is destrimental to it. Now, nothing is so important in respect of utility and nothing is so holy that it may withdraw itself from this examining and scrutinising inspection that knows no respect of persons. Upon this freedom rests even the existence of reason, which has no dictatorial authority but rather whose pronouncement always seeks nothing but the consent of free citizens: each of whom must be able to express his doubts and indeed even his veto without restraint.

Even if reason can never *refuse* critique, it still does not always have cause to *shun* it. But pure reason in its dogmatic (non-mathematical) use is not so greatly conscious of the exactest observation of its highest laws that it would not have to appear with timidity and indeed having totally laid aside all presumed dogmatic authority before the critical eye of a superior and more judicial reason.

It is entirely different when reason deals not with a judge’s censure but rather with the claims of its fellow citizens and shall merely defend them against it. For since those claims wish to be equally dogmatic (albeit in denial, whereas the former was affirmative) a justification occurs καί ἄλήθειαν that secures against all infringement and provides a titled possession that may dread no foreign pretensions even if it cannot itself καί ἀλήθειαν be sufficiently proved.

By the ‘polemical use of pure reason’, I understand the defence of its propositions against dogmatical denials thereof. There it is not an issue of whether pure reason’s assertions might not perhaps even be false but rather merely that no one can ever assert the contrary with apodictic certainty (or indeed even merely with greater semblance). For we are then still not precarious in our possession if we have an albeit insufficient title to it before us and it is fully certain that no one can ever prove the illegitimacy of that possession.

It is somewhat concerning and depressing that there is an antithetic of pure reason at all and that pure reason, which indeed represents the highest tribunal over all disputations, should drift into dispute with itself. Admittedly, we above had such a spurious antithetic of pure reason before us; but it became manifest that it rested upon a misunderstanding because, accordantly with common prejudice, one took appearances for items *per se* and then demanded an absolute completeness of their synthesis in one way or another (which was equally impossible in both ways, however): which cannot, however, be expected from appearances at all. There was therefore no actual *contradiction of reason* with itself with the propositions ‘the series of *per se given* appearances has an absolutely first beginning’ and ‘this series is without any beginning absolutely and *per se*’; for both propositions subsist very well together because *appearances* are *absolutely* nothing *per se* in respect of their existence (as appearances), i.e. are something contradictory; and their presupposition must therefore naturally draw contradictory inferences with it.

Such a misunderstanding cannot be pretended and thereby attributed to the dispute of reason, however, when it is perhaps asserted theistically ‘there is a supreme being’ and contrarily atheistically ‘there is no supreme being’; or in psychology, ‘everything that thinks is of absolute persistent unity’ and therefore differentiated from all transient material unity, to which someone else might oppose ‘the soul is not an immaterial unity and cannot be excepted from transience’. For the question’s object here is free of everything inhomogeneous that contradicts its nature, and the understanding deals only with *items per se* and not with appearances. A true conflict would therefore admittedly be encounterable here if only pure reason had something to say on the negative side that approximated the ground of an assertion; for in respect of the critique of the probative-grounds of the dogmatic affirmant, one can very well grant him that without consequently abandoning those propositions: which still at least have the interest of reason in their favour, which the opponent cannot invoke at all.

I am admittedly not of the opinion that excellent and reflective men (e.g. Sulzer) have so often expresses because they felt the weakness of the previous proofs, viz. that one can hope one will still someday devise evident demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of our pure reason: namely, there is a God and there is a future life. Rather, I am certain that that will never occur. For whence shall reason derive the ground for such synthetic assertions that do not relate to objects of experience and its internal possibility? Yet it is also apodictically certain that no human will ever emerge who can assert the *contrary* with the slightest semblance, not to mention dogmatically. For since he could indeed demonstrate that merely through pure reason, he would have to undertake to prove that a supreme being or that the thinking subject within us *qua* pure intelligence is *impossible*. Whence shall he derive the knowledge that would justify him in judging so synthetically about things beyond all possible experience. We can therefore be entirely unconcerned that someone will someday prove the contrary; so we therefore have no need to reflect upon scholastically-correct proofs but rather can always assume those propositions that cohere very well with the speculative interest of our reason in its empirical use and which are, moreover, the sole means of reconciling that interest with the practical interest. For the opponent (who must not be considered merely as a critic here), we have our *non liquet* at the ready that must unfailingly confuse him: even though we do not fear its retorsion upon us because we have reason’s subjective maxim constantly in reserve, which the opponent necessarily lacks and under whose protection we can regard all of his wayward blows with tranquillity and indifference.

In such a way, there is in fact no antithetic of pure reason whatsoever. For the sole battleground for it would have to be sought on the field of pure theology and psychology, but that ground sustains no combatant in his full armour and with weapons that were to be feared. He can appear only with mockery or self-aggrandisement, which can be derided as a juvenile game. That is a consoling remark that gives reason courage again; for upon what would it otherwise rely if it – which alone is called to dispatch all errors – were corrupt *per se*, without peace, and unable to hope for tranquil possession?

Everything that nature itself ordains is good for some purpose. Even poisons serve to overwhelm other poisons that are generated in our own juices and hence may not be absent from a complete collection of medicines (i.e. a pharmacy). The objections against the persuasions and self-conceit of our merely speculative reason are themselves imposed through the nature of that reason and must therefore have their good determination and purpose that one must not cast to the wind. To what end has providence placed some objects – even though they are conjoined with our supreme interest – so high that it is almost merely granted to us to encounter them in an unperspicuous perception that we ourselves doubt whereby searching glances are more stimulated than satisfied – whether it is useful to venture brazen determinations in regard to such prospects is at least doubtful and perhaps even damaging. Always and without all doubt, however, it is useful to set enquiring as well as examining reason at full liberty in order that it can provide for its own interest unhindered, which is just as well furthered through its setting constraints upon its insights as it is through its expanding them and which always suffers when foreign hands interfere to steer reason against its natural course according to imposed intentions.

So let your opponent speak only reason, and combat him merely with weapons of reason. Moreover, do not concern yourself with the good cause (i.e. the practical interest); for it never comes into play in a merely speculative dispute. The dispute, then, uncovers nothing but a certain antinomy of reason that, since it rests upon reason’s nature, must necessarily be heared and examined. The dispute cultivates reason through contemplating reason’s object on two sides and corrects reason’s judgement through constraining it. What is disputed herein is not the *cause* but rather the *tone*. For enough still remains to you in order for you to speak the language of a firm *belief* justified before the acutest reason, even if you must forsake the language of *knowledge*.

If one should ask the coldblooded *David Hume*, who was truly created for equilibrium of judgement: ‘what moved you, through arduously excogitated doubts, to undermine the persuasion so consolatory and so useful for humans that their rational insight does not suffice for the assertion and determinate concept of a supreme being?’ He would answer: ‘nothing but the intention to bring reason further in its self-knowledge and simultaneously a certain indignation about the compulsion that one wishes to exert upon reason in aggrandising oneself with it and simultaneously preventing it from delivering a candid admission of its weaknesses that become manifest to it in its examination of itself’. In contrast: if you ask *Priestley*, who was given over to the principles of reason’s *empirical* use alone and disinclined to all transcendent speculation, what motivational grounds he had for tearing down freedom and immortality (the hope of a future life is for him merely the expectation of a miracle of resurrection) – two such fundamental-pillars of all religion – he, who is himself a pious and eager teacher of religion, could give no other answer than ‘the interest of reason’, which loses through one’s seeking to withdraw certain objects from the laws of material nature, which are the only laws we know exactly. It would seem unfair to malign Priestley, who knows to reconcile his paradoxical assertion with religion’s intention, and to vex a wellthinking man because he could not orient himself as soon as he had strayed outside the field of natural doctrine. But that goodwill must just as well benefit the no less wellmeaning *Hume*, who was also irreproachable in respect of his moral character and who did not permit abstract speculation because he rightly held that its object lies entirely beyond the limits of natural science in the field of pure ideas.

Now, what is to be done there: especially in regard to the danger that seems to threaten the common good therefrom? Nothing is more natural nor fairer than the decision that you therefore have to take. Let those people merely act – if they display talent; if they display deep and novel investigation; in a word: if they merely display reason, then reason always gains. If you seize means other than those of uncompelled reason; if you cry about high-treason; and if you convoke the commoners, who do not at all understand such subtle endeavours, as though it were to extinguish a fire: then you render yourself risible. For the talk is not at all of what is advantageous or disadvantageous to the common good therein, but rather only how far reason can progress in its speculation abstracting from all interest and whether one can reckon upon speculation at all or must forsake it altogether in favour of the practical. So rather than wielding a sword therein, instead watch that dispute tranquilly from the safe seat of critique – a dispute that whilst toilsome for the combatants is entertaining for you and must turn out fruitfully for your insights with a certainly bloodless outcome. For it is highly absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and yet prescribe to it in advance on which side it must necessarily turn out. Moreover, reason is already by itself so well bound and held in constraints through reason that you have no need to deploy sentinels to oppose civil resistance to that party whose worrying superiority seems dangerous to you. In this dialectic, there is no victory over which you would have cause to be concerned.

Reason even greatly needs such a dispute, and it would be to be wished that it would have been conducted sooner and with unconstrained public consent. For a mature critique would have come about that much earlier with whose appearance all those disputative actions would have had to fall away by themselves because the disputants would have learnt to discern their delusion and prejudice that had disunited them.

There is a certain impurity in human nature that, in the end, like everything that comes from nature, must contain a disposition for good purposes: namely, an inclination to dissimulate one’s true sentiments and display certain assumed sentiments that one deems good and glorious. It is entirely certain that through this tendency both to dissimulate themselves as well as to assume a semblance advantageous to them, humans have not merely *civilised* themselves but also little-by-little, in a certain measure, *moralised* themselves because no one could penetrate through the façade of uprightness, honour, and morality and therefore found a school for his own betterment in purportedly genuine examples of the good that he saw around him. Only that disposition to pretend to be better than one is and express sentiments that one does not have serves only *provisorily*, as it were, in order to bring man out of his roughness and let him first at least assume the *manner* of the good that he knows; for thereafter, once the genuine principles are developed and have been assimilated into the way of thinking, that falsity must be combatted little-by-little because it otherwise ruins the heart and does not allow good sentiments to sprout beneath the weeds of the beauteous semblance.

It pains me to perceive the very same impurity, dissemblance, and hypocrisy even in the expressions of the speculative way-of-thinking wherein humans yet have far fewer hindrances and no disadvantage whatsoever in uncovering an admission of their thoughts equitably, openly, and without dissimulation. For what can be more detrimental to insights than even to impart mere thoughts to one another falsifiedly, to dissimulate doubt that we feel about our own assertions, or to bestow a veneer of evidence upon probative grounds that do not satisfy even us ourselves. Yet so long as merely personal vanity instigates these secret intrigues (which is commonly the case in speculative judgements, which have no particular interest and do not easily admit of an apodictic certainty), then the vanity of others nevertheless resists *with public approbation* and the issues ultimately arrive where the purest sentiment and uprightness would have brought them (albeit much earlier). But where the commoners hold that captious sophists are engaged with nothing less than shaking the fundament of public welfare, then it seems not only accordant with prudence but also allowable and indeed glorious to come to the aid of the good cause with semblant grounds instead of leaving its purported opponents even merely the advantage of diminishing our tone to the moderation of a merely practical conviction and compelling us to admit the lack of speculative and apodictic certainty. Nevertheless, I should think that indeed nothing in the world is more poorly reconcileable with the intention of asserting a good cause than skulduggery, dissemblance, and deceit. That everything must proceed honourably in weighing the rational-grounds of a mere speculation is indeed the least that one can demand. Yet if one could also merely reckon upon that trifle surely, then speculative reason’s dispute over the important questions of God, immortality (of the soul), and freedom would either have long been decided or would very soon be brought to an end. So often purity of sentiment stands in a converse relationship to the benignity of the issue itself, and the cause has perhaps more upright and honest opponents than defenders.

I therefore presuppose readers who want to see no good cause defended wrongly. In regard to them, it is now decided that according to our principles of critique: if one looks not to what occurs but rather to what should occur equitably, then there is in fact no polemic of pure reason whatsoever. For how can two people conduct a dispute about a cause whose reality neither of them can present in an actual or even merely possible experience, over whose idea someone broods only in order to bring forth something *more* than idea from it: viz. the actuality of the object itself? Through which means shall they emerge from the dispute? For neither of them renders his cause directly comprehensible and certain but can rather only attack and refute that of his opponent. For this is the fate of all assertions of pure reason: that since they go beyond the conditions of all possible experience (outside which, no document of truth is encountered anywhere), yet must nevertheless avail themselves of the understanding’s laws (which are determined merely for empirical use: without which, no step can be made in synthetic thought), they always display flaws to the opponent and can conversely use their opponent’s flaw to their advantage.

One can regard the critique of pure reason as the true tribunal for all disputations of pure reason; for that critique is not concomitantly embroiled in those disputations, which concern objects immediately, but is rather set to the purpose of determining and judging the rights of reason *simpliciter* according to the principles of its initial institution.

Without that critique, reason is in the state of nature (as it were) and can neither validate nor secure its assertions and claims otherwise than through *war*. In contrast, the critique – which derives all decisions from the fundamental rules of its own institution and whose authority no one can doubt – provides us with the repose of a legitimate state in which we shall not conduct our disputation otherwise than through *process*. What ends the actions in the first state is a victory whereof both parties boast and upon which, for the most part, a merely insecure peace follows that the power that places itself at the centre institutes; but in the second, it is the *sentence* that, since it here impinges upon the source of the disputations, must afford an eternal peace. Moreover, the endless disputations of a merely dogmatic reason ultimately need to seek repose in some critique of that reason itself and a legislation that is grounded upon it; just as Hobbes asserted: the state of nature is a state of wrong and violence; and one must necessarily leave it in order to subject oneself to lawful compulsion, which alone constrains our freedom in such a way that it can subsist together with every other freedom and precisely thereby with the common good.

To that freedom, then, belongs also the freedom to publicly set out one’s thoughts and doubts that one cannot resolve oneself for judgement without being maligned as a turbulent and dangerous citizen for doing so. That lies already in the original right of human reason, which recognises no judge other than itself and in turn universal human-reason: wherein everyone has his voice; and since all betterment whereof our state is capable must derive from the latter, such a right is holy and must not be diminished. Moreover, it is highly unwise to proclaim certain ventured assertions or presumptuous attacks upon those who already have the assent of the greatest and best part of the commoners on their side to be dangerous; for that means giving them an importance that they should not have at all. When I hear that an uncommon mind shall have demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of God: then I am desirous to read the book, for I expect of his talent that it will carry my insights further. I already know fully certainly in advance that he will have accomplished none of that: not because I perhaps believe myself to already be in possession of invincible proofs of those important propositions, but rather because the transcendental critique that uncovered the whole inventory of our pure reason has fully convinced me that just as our pure reason is entirely insufficient for affirmative assertions in that field, it will know equally little and still less in order to be able to assert something about those questions negatively. For whence shall the purported free-spirit derive his knowledge that (e.g.) there is no supreme being? That proposition lies outside the field of possible experience and therefore also beyond the limits of all human insight. I would not read the dogmatic defender of the good cause against that foe at all because I know in advance that he will only attack the semblant grounds of the other in order to provide an ingress to his own; moreover, an everyday semblance does not yield as much material for new remarks as one that is stranger and ingeniously excogitated. In contrast: the opponent of religion, who is also dogmatic in his own way, would give my critique the desired occupation and occasion for further correction of its principles without anything needing to be feared, for its part, in the slightest.

Yet shall a youth who is entrusted for academic instruction still at least be warned of such writings and be prevented from attaining early knowledge of such dangerous propositions before his judging power is mature or rather before the doctrine that one wishes to ground in them is firmly rooted in order to powerfully resist all persuasion to the contrary, whencesoever it may come?

If one had to adhere to the dogmatic procedure in issues of pure reason and the dispatching of the opponent had to be truly polemical, i.e. so constituted that one would enter the fray and arm oneself with probative-grounds for opposed assertions: then admittedly nothing would be more advisable *for the nonce*, but simultaneously nothing would be idler and more fruitless *in the long term* than to place the youth’s reason under guardianship for a period of time and at least protect it from seduction during that time. But if either curiosity or the fashion of the age subsequently delivers such writings into his hands, then will that youthful persuasion still hold out? He who brings with him nothing but dogmatic weapons in order to resist the attacks of his opponent and who is unable to develop the concealed dialectic that lies no less in his own bosom than in that of his opponent sees semblant grounds arise that have the merit of novelty against semblant grounds that no longer have such novelty but instead arouse the suspicion of a misused gullibility of the youth. He believes himself no better able to display that he has outgrown his rearing than if he flouts those wellmeant warnings; and, accustomed dogmatically, he drinks into himself in long draughts the poison that ruins his principles dogmatically.

Precisely the contrary of what one advises here must occur in academic instruction, though admittedly only under the presupposition of a profound instruction in the critique of pure reason. For in order to bring the principles of that critique into exercise as early as possible and display their sufficiency in respect of the greatest dialectical semblance, it is thoroughly necessary to direct the attacks that are so fearsome for the dogmatists against his reason – which is admittedly still weak, but enlightened through critique – and to let him attempt to examine his opponent’s groundless assertions piece-by-piece in light of the aforesaid principles. It cannot at all be difficult for him to dissolve them into mere vapour; and thus early on, he feels his own power to fully secure himself against such deleterious illusions that must ultimately lose all semblance for him. Now, whether the very same strikes that subdued his foe’s edifice must admittedly be equally ruinous for his own speculative structure (if he thought to erect one) does not worry him at all because he needs no such structure to dwell in but rather still has a prospect into the practical field before him, where he can groundedly hope for a firmer ground in order to erect his rational and healthy system upon it.

So there is no genuine polemic in the field of pure reason. Both parties fight the air and brawl with their own shadows, for they go beyond nature: where nothing is available for their dogmatic clutches that could be grasped and held. They have fought well; the shadows that they dismember in turn coalesce in an instant, like the heroes in Valhalla, in order to be able to amuse themselves anew in bloodless struggles.

Yet there is also a permissible sceptical use of pure reason that one could call the ‘principle of *neutrality*’ in all its disputations. To inflame reason against itself, hand it weapons on both sides, and then observe its most heated combat tranquilly and mockingly does not look good from a dogmatic viewpoint but rather has in it the regard of a sadistic and malicious kind of mind. If one nevertheless regards the indomitable blinding and self-aggrandisement of the sophist who will not let himself be moderated through any critique, then there is actually no other counsel than to oppose to the self-aggrandisement on one side another side founded upon exactly the same rights in order that through the resistance of a foe, reason can at least be rendered merely defiant in order to place some doubt in its pretensions and give ear to critique. Only to totally acquiesce in that doubt and to set oneself upon recommending the conviction and admission of one’s ignorance not merely as a medicament against dogmatic self-conceit but also simultaneously as way to end reason’s dispute with itself is an entirely vain proposal and can in no way be conducive to providing reason with a state of repose but is rather at most merely a means of awakening reason from its sweet dogmatic dream in order to draw its state into more careful examination. Since that sceptical manner of drawing oneself from a tedious action of reason seems to be the short path, as it were, to arrive at a persistent philosophical repose or at least the military road gladly pursued by those who mean to give themselves a philosophical authority in a mocking contempt for all investigations of that kind, I find it necessary to present that way of thinking in its peculiar light.

**2.1.2.1. On the Impossibility of a Sceptical Satisfaction of a Pure Reason Disunited from Itself**

My consciousness of my ignorance (if that ignorance is not simultaneously cognised as necessary), rather than ending my investigations, is instead the true cause to awaken them. All ignorance is either that of the items or of the determination and limits of my cognition. If ignorance is merely contingent, then in the first case it must impel me to investigate the items (i.e. objects) *dogmatically*; but in the second case, it must impel me to investigate the limits of my possible cognition *critically*. Yet that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and consequently absolves me from all further investigation cannot at all be discerned empirically from *observation* but rather only critically through *fathoming* the first sources of our cognition. Therefore, a determination of our reason’s limit can occur only according to *apriori* grounds; but the constrainment thereof, which is a an admittedly merely indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that is never to be fully remedied, can also be cognised *aposteriori* through what always still remains to be known despite all knowledge. That cognition that is possible only through critique of reason itself is therefore *science*, which is nothing but *perception* of which one cannot say how far the inference from it may extend. If I represent the Earth’s surface to myself as a plate (according to sensory semblance), then I cannot know how far it extends. Yet experiences teaches me that wherever I go, I always see a space around me into which I could further proceed; and therefore, I cognise constraints of my respectively actual geography but not the limits of all possible descriptions of the Earth. But if I have come so far as to know that the Earth is a sphere and that its surfaces are surfaces of a sphere, then I can also cognise from a small part thereof (e,g,) the magnitude of a degree, a diameter, and through them cognise the Earth’s full determination (i.e. its outer surface) determinately and according to *apriori* principles; and even though I am ignorant in regard to the objects that that surface may contain, I am nevertheless not ignorant in regard to the extent that it contains and the magnitude and constraints thereof.

The complex of all possible objects for our cognition seems to us to be a flat plane that has its specious horizon: i.e. that which encompasses the total extent of those objects and has been called the ‘rational concept of the unconditioned totality’ by us. To reach that horizon empirically is impossible; and all attempts to that end, to determine it *apriori* according to a certain principle, have been in vain. Nevertheless, all questions of our pure reason target that which may lie beyond that horizon or perhaps even at its boundary.

The famous David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason who thought himself to have sufficiently dispatched those questions *in toto* through expelling them beyond human reason’s horizon, yet which he could not determine. He dwellt especially upon the principle of causality and remarked of it entirely correctly that one founds its truth (and indeed not even the objective validity of the concept of an efficient cause *simpliciter*) upon no insight (i.e. *apriori* cognition) whatsoever to the extent that also consequently not even the necessity of that law in the slightest but its mere universal usability in the course of experience and a thence arising subjective necessitt (which he calls ‘custom’) constitutes its entire authority. From our reason’s incapacity to make a use of that principle that goes beyond all experience, Hume inferred the nullity of all pretensions of reason *simpliciter* concerning the empirical.HuH

One can call a procedure of that kind, to subject the facts of reason to examination and (at discretion) to blame, the *censure* of reason. It is beyound doubt that this censure inevitably leads to *doubt* against all transcendent use of the principles. Only that is merely the second step that is still far from completing the work. The first step in matters of pure reason, which distinguishes its infancy, is *dogmatic*. The second step, which has just been mentioned, is *sceptical* and attests to the foresightedness of a judging power witted through experience. But now a third step is still needed that accrues only to the mature and virile judging-power and has firm maxims proven in respect of their universality as its basis: namely, to subject to estimation not the facts of reason but rather reason itself according to its whole capacity and fitness for pure *apriori* cognitions – which is not censure but rather *critique* of reason, whereby not merely *constraints* but rather the determinate *limits* of reason and not merely ignorance in one or another part but rather in regard to all possible questions of a certain kind and indeed not, say, merely surmised but rather proved from principles. Scepticism is thus a resting place for human reason where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wandering and make the delineation of the region wherein it finds itself in order to be able to choose its path thenceforth with more security but not a dwelling place for permanent residence; for that can be encountered only in a full certainty, be if of cognition of objects themselves or of the limits inside which all our cognition of objects is enclosed.

Our reason is not, say, a plan outstretched indeterminably far whose constraints one cognises only thus *simpliciter* but must rather be compared with a sphere whose radius is found from the curvature of the curve on its outer surface (the nature of synthetic *apriori* propositions), but the content and delimitation thereof cannot even be specified with sureness therefrom. Outside that sphere (i.e. the field of experience), there is nothing of its object; and indeed even question about such purported objects concern only subjective principles of a thoroughgoing determination of the relationships that can occur between intellectual concepts inside that sphere.

We are actually in possession of synthetic *apriori* cognition, as the intellectual principles that anticipate experience demonstrate. If someone cannot now render the possibility of experience at all comprehensible, then he may indeed initially doubt whether it also actually dwells within us *apriori*; but he still cannot profess that to be an impossibility of experience through mere powers of the understanding and present all steps that reason makes along the guiding cord of experience as null. He can say only that if we comprehended its origin and genuineness, then we would be able to determine the extent and limits of our reason; but before that has occurred, all assertions of the latter are ventured blindly. And in such a way, a thoroughgoing doubt upon all dogmatic philosophie that takes its course without critique of reason would be entirely well grounded; only such a progression could still not be totally denied to reason if that progression were prepared and secured through better groundlaying. For even all concepts and indeed all questions that pure reason propounds to us lie not, say, in experience but rather in turn only in reason and must therefore be capable of being resolved and conceived in respect of their validity or nullity. We are also unjustified in dismissing these problems as if their resolution actually lay in the nature of the things yet under the pretext of our incapacity and of refusing further investigation of them because reason has generate those ideas themselves in its bosom alone, of whose validlity or dialectical semblance reason is therefore held to give account.

All sceptical polemicisation is in fact directed only against the dogmatist: who, without placing any mistrust in his original objective principles (i.e. without critique) continues on his course gravitationally – merely in order to perplex him and bring him to self-cognition. *Per se*, it makes no difference whatsoever in respect of what we know and, by contrast, what we cannot know. All failed dogmatic enquiries of reason are facts that it is always useful to subject to censure. That can decide nothing about reason’s expectations, however, to hope for a better result for its future endeavours and to make claims thereupon; mere censure can therefore never bring the disputation concerning the rights of human reason to an end.

Since Hume is perhaps the most ingenious of all sceptics and, without question, the most preeminent in respect of the influence that the sceptical procedure can have upon the awakening of a profound rational-examination, it is well worth the effort to present the course of his inferences and the errors of such an insightful and estimable man that nevertheless began on the track of truth, so far as it fits with my intention.

Hume perhaps had in thought, although he never fully developed it, that in judgements of a certain kind, we go outside our concept of the object. I have called this kind of judgement *synthetic*. How I can go outside my concept that I hitherto have by means of experience is subject to no doubt. Experience is itself such a synthesis of perceptions, which augments my concept that I have by means of a perception through others that accrue. Only we believe ourselves to also be capable of going outside our concept and expanding our cognition *apriori*. We attempt that either through the pure understanding in regard to what at least can be an *object of experience* or even through pure reason in regard to such properties of things or even indeed the existence of such objects that can never occur in our experience. Our sceptic did not distinguish these two kinds of judgement as he indeed should have done and directly held such augmentation of concepts from themselves and, so to speak, the self-birthing of our understanding (together with reason) without being impregnated through experience to be impossible and consequently held all purported *apriori* principles of experience to be imagined and found that they are nothing but a custom arising from experience and its laws and therefore merely empirical, i.e. *per se* contingent rules, to which we attribute a purported necessity and universality. To assert that strange proposition, however, he invoked the universally recognised principle of the relationship of cause to effect. For since no intellectual capacity can lead us from the concept of a thing to the existence of something else that is thereby given universally and necessarily, he believed himself capable of inferring therefrom that without experience, we have nothing that could augment our concept and justify us for such an *apriori* self-expanding judgement. No understanding can divine, much less legitimately infer, from concepts that we previously had of these things that the sunlight that illuminates the wax simultaneously melts it even though it hardens clay; and only experience can teach us such a law. In contrast, we have seen in the Transcendental Logic that although we admittedly can never go *immediately* beyond the content of the concept that is given to us, we can nevertheless cognise the law of connection to other things fully *apriori* but in relation to a *tertium quid* (viz. *possible experience*) and therefore still *apriori*. Therefore: when wax that was previously firm melts, I can cognise *apriori* that something must have preceded (e.g. sunlight) upon which that has followed according to a constant law: although, without experience, I could admittedly cognise neither the cause from the effect nor the effect from the cause determinately *apriori* and without experience’s instruction. He therefore inferred falsely from the contingency of our determination *according to the law* to the contingency of the *law* itself; and he confused the transition from the concept of a thing to possible experience, which occurs *apriori* and constitutes the thing’s objective reality, with the synthesis of the objects of actual experience, which is admittedly always empirical; but thereby, from a principle of affinity that always has its seat within the understanding and expresses necessary connection, he made a rule of association that can be encountered merely in the ectypal imaginal-power and can present only contingent but by no means objective conjunctions.

The sceptical errors of this otherwise extremely sharpsensed man arose primarily from a deficiency that he nevertheless had in common with all dogmatists, viz. that he did not systematically survey all kinds of the synthesis of the understanding *apriori*. For, without mentioning the others here, he would have found (e.g.) the *principle of persistence* as a principle that anticipates experience just as well as that of causality. He would also have thereby been able to prescribe determinate limits for the understanding that expands itself *a priori* and for pure reason. Yet since he only *constrained* our understanding without *delimiting* it and indeed brought about a general mistrust but not a determinate knowledge of the ignorance that is unavoidable for us, since he brings some principles of the understanding under censure without placing that understanding onto the testing scale of critique in regard to its whole capacity; and because he denies the understanding what it actually cannot accomplish, he goes further and denies it all capacity to expand itself *apriori* even though he had not drawn that whole capacity into estimation; he was thus opposed by what always subdues scepticism, viz. that he himself became doubted because his objections rest only upon facts, which are contingent, but not upon principles: which could effect a necessary renunciation of the right to dogmatic assertions.

Since he also knows no difference between the grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which his attacks are indeed mainly directed: reason does not feel its entire peculiar impulse disturbed here in the slightest but rather merely hindered; the space for reason’s expansion is not closed off, and reason can never be totally deterred from its enquiries: although it is impeded here or there. For against attacks, one equips oneself for resistance and sets oneself that much more forcefully upon carrying through one’s demands. A full estimation of one’s whole capacity and the thence arising conviction of the certainty of a small possession eliminates all dispute in light of the idleness of higher claims and moves one to satisfy oneself peacefully with a constrained yet undisputed property.

Against the uncritical dogmatist, who has not measured the sphere of his understanding and consequently has not determined the limits of his possible cognition according to principles and therefore does not already know what he can achieve in advance but rather thinks to discover it through mere experiments, these sceptical attacks are not only dangerous but even ruinous. For if he is challenged on a single assertion that he cannot justify but whose semblance he also cannot develop from principles, then suspicion falls on all: however persuasive they may otherwise be.

And so, the sceptic is the disciplinarian of the dogmatic sophist and leads him to a healthy critique of the understanding and of reason itself. If he has reached that far, then he has no further challenge to fear; for he then distinguishes his possession from what lies totally outside it, to which he makes no claims and in respect to which he also cannot become embroiled in disputations. So the sceptical procedure *per se* is admittedly *unsatisfying* for the rational questions, but nevertheless *preparatorily* in order to awaken reason’s foresightedness and advert to profound means that can secure them in their legitimate possessions.

**2.1.3. The Discipline of Pure Reason In Regard to Hypotheses**

Because we then ultimately know so much through critique of our reason that we can in fact know absolutely nothing in its pure and speculative use, should it not open a yet further field for *hypotheses* where it is at least permitted to fabricate and to opine, even if not to assert.

Where the imaginal power shall not perhaps *effuse*, but shall rather *fabricate* under the strict oversight of reason, then there must always previously be something fully certain and not be invented or mere opinion; and that is the *possibility* of the object itself. Then, it is indeed allowable – in respect of the object’s actuality – to take one’s flight to opinion: which, however, in order not to be groundless, must be brought into connection as an explanatory ground with what is actually given and consequently certain; and it is then called a *hypothesis*.

Since we now cannot make for ourselves the slightest concept of the possibility of the dynamic connection *apriori*, and a category of the pure understanding does not serve to excogitate such connection but rather only to understand, whereas it is encountered in experience: we cannot originally excogitate a single object with a new and empirically unspecifiable constitution according to those categories and lay it at the basis of an allowable hypothesis; for that would mean basing reason upon empty figments of the brain instead of upon concepts of items. So it is not allowable to excogitate any new original powers, e.g. an understanding capable of intuiting its object without senses or an attractional power without any contact or a new kind of substances (e.g. substances that would be present in space without impenetrability) or consequently even a community of substances that differs from all of those that experience delivers – no presence otherwise than in space; no duration otherwise than in merely in time. In a word: it is possible only for our reason to use the conditions of possible experience as conditions of the possibility of the items but in no way to create something for itself entirely independently of those because such concepts, though admittedly without contradiction, would also nevertheless be without object.

As was said, the rational-concepts are mere ideas and admittedly have no object in any experience but still do not consequently designate fabricated objects that are therein simultaneously assumed to be possible. They are thought of merely problematically in order to ground regulative principles of the understanding’s systematic use in relation to them (as heuristic fictions) in the field of experience. If one departs therefrom, then they are mere cogitational-things whose possibility is indemonstrable and which also therefore cannot be taken as a basis of explanation of actual appearances through a hypothesis. To *think* of the soul as simple is very well allowable in order to lay a complete and necessary unity of all mental powers as the principle of our judgement of its internal appearances according to an idea, even if one cannot discern that unity *in concreto*. But to *assume* the soul as a simple substance (a transcendent concept) would be a proposition that would be not only indemonstrable (as multiple physical hypotheses are) but also entirely ventured entirely arbitrarily and blindly because the simple can occur in absolutely no experience whatsoever; and if by ‘substance’ here one understands the persistent object of sensory intuition, then the possibility of a *simple appearance* is not to be discerned at all. Merely intelligible beings or merely intelligible properties of the things of the sensible cosmos cannot be assumed as opinion with any grounded authority of reason, although (since one has no concept of their possibility nor of their impossibility) they also admittedly cannot be denied dogmatically through a purported better insight.

To explain given appearances, no things and explanatory grounds can be adduced other than those that have been posited in connection with those that are given according to already familiar laws of appearances. A *transcendental hypothesis*, with which a mere idea of reason would be used to explain natural things, would therefore not be an explanation at all because what one does not sufficiently understand from familiar empirical principles would be explained through something whereof one understands absolutely nothing. Moreover, the principle of such a hypothesis would truly serve only to satisfy reason and not to further the understanding’s use in regard to the objects. Order and purposefulness in nature must in turn be explained from natural grounds and according to natural laws; and there, even the wildest hypotheses – if they are merely physical – are more tenable than a hyperphysical hypothesis: i.e. the invocation of a divine author that one presupposes for that behoof. For at once to pass by all causes whose objective reality or at least possibility one can still be acquainted with through continued experience in order to rest in a mere idea that is highly comfortable for reason would be a principle of foul reason (*ignava ratio*). But in respect to the absolute totality of the explanatory ground in the series of the aforesaid causes: that can make no hindrance in regard to cosmic objects because since such objects are nothing but appearances, something completed in the synthesis of the series of conditions can never be hoped for in respect to them.

To perhaps avail oneself of transcendental hypotheses of reason’s speculative use and a freedom to supplement the lack of physical explanatory-grounds cannot at all be permitted: partly because reason is thereby brought no further but rather the whole progress of its use is terminated and partly because that licence would ultimately have to deprive reason of all fruits of elaborating its peculiar ground, viz. experience. For if natural explanation becomes difficult here or there, we constantly have a transcendental explanatory-ground to hand that excuses us from that investigation and concludes our investigation not through insight, but rather through total incomprehensibility of a principle that was also excogitated in advance in such a way that it had to contain the concept of something absolutely first.

The second requisite component for a hypothesis’s worthiness to be assumed is its sufficiency to therefrom determine *apriori* the consequences that are given. If one is compelled to invoke auxiliary hypotheses for that purpose, then they give the suspicion of a mere invention because each of them *per se* needs the same justification that the underlaied thought had needed and therefore cannot yield a fit witness.

If, under presupposition of an unconstrainedly perfect cause, there is admittedly no deficiency in explanatory grounds of all the purposefulness, order, and magnitude that are found within the world, that presupposition nevertheless needs still new hypotheses in light of the deviations and evils that manifest themselves (at least according to our concepts) in order to be saved from them *qua* objections. If the simple selfstandingness of the human soul that has been laid at the basis of its appearances is challenged through the difficulties of its phenomena that are similar to a matter’s modifications (i.e. growth and decrease), then new hypotheses must be called for aid that are admittedly not without semblance yet are nevertheless without any credential except that which the opinion assumed as their main ground gives, which the new hypotheses shall nevertheless advocate.

If the rational assertions adduced as an example here (e.g. non-bodily unity of the soul and the existence of a supreme being) shall be regarded not as hypotheses but rather as dogmata proved *apriori*, then the talk is not of them at all. In such a case, however, one sees that the proof has the apodictic certainty of a demonstration. For to wish to render the actuality of such ideas merely *probable* is an absurd proposal, as if one thought to prove a proposition of geometry merely probabilistically. Reason abstracted from all experience can cognise everything only *apriori* and as necessary ot not at all; therefore, its judgement is never opinion but rather either abstention from all judgement or apodictic certainty. Opinions and probable judgements about what accrues to things can occur only as explanatory grounds of what is actually given or as consequences according to empirical laws of what is actually underlying and therefore only within the series of the objects of experience. Outside that field, *opining* is so much as playing with thoughts: unless one merely had the opinion of perhaps finding the truth on an insecure path of judgement.

Even though no hypotheses occur with merely speculative questions of pure reason in order for propositions to be grounded thereupon, they are nevertheless entirely permissible in order to perhaps merely defend: i.e. admittedly not in a dogmatic-, but nevertheless in a polemical use. I understand by ‘defence’ not augmentation of probative-grounds of one’s assertion but rather mere vitiation of the opponent’s semblant insights, which shall do harm to our asserted propositions. All synthetic propositions from pure reason have in them the peculiarity, however, that if someone who asserts the reality of certain ideas never knows enough in order to render his proposition certain, then his opponent on the other side can know equally little in order to assert the contrary. This equality in human reason’s lot admittedly favours neither of the two in speculative cognition and there is also the right battleground of discords that are never to be laid aside. It will subsequently become manifest, however, that although in regard to its *practical use* reason has a right to assume something that it would in no way be authorised to presuppose in field of mere speculation without sufficient probative-grounds because all such presuppositions do harm to speculation’s perfection, with which the practical interest does not concern itself at all. There, it therefore has a possession whose legitimacy it need not prove and whereof it could not in fact even conduct a proof. The opponent shall therefore prove. But since the opponent just as little knows something about the doubted object in order to demonstrate its non-being as the first, who asserts its actuality, an advantage manifests itself here on the side of him who asserts something as a practically necessary presupposition (*melior est conditio possidentis*). For it stands open to him to avail himself of exactly the same means for his good cause in self-defence (as it were) whereof the opponent avails himself against that cause, i.e. hypotheses: which admittedly shall not serve in order to strengthen the proof thereof but rather merely to show that the opponent understands far too little of the object of the dispute than for him to be able to flatter himself of an advantage in speculative insight in respect to us.

Hypotheses are therefore allowed in the field of pure reason only as weapons-of-war not in order to ground a right upon them but rather merely to defend it. But here we must always seek the opponent within ourselves. For speculative reason in its transcendental use is *per se* dialectical. The objections that might be to be feared lie within ourselves. We must seek them out like old but never expiring claims in order to ground an eternal peace upon their annihilation. External peace is merely specious. The germ of the challenges that lie within the nature of human reason must be extirpated; but we cannot extirpate it if we do not give it freedom and even nourishment to produce leaves in order for it to thereby uncover itself so that we can thereafter eradicate it with the root? So devise objections yourself that no opponent has yet lighted upon, and even lend him weapons or grant him the most favourable place for which he himself could only wish. There is absolutely nothing to be feared therein, but it is indeed to be hoped that you will never again acquire a challengeable possession in the future.

To your complete armament belong also the hypotheses of pure reason that, although they are admittedly only lead weapons (because they have not been steeled through experiential law) are always nevertheless as capable as those of which any opponent may avail himself against you. If therefore against the immaterial nature of the soul that is subject to no bodily transmutation and which you have assumed (in some other, non-speculative regard), you encounter the difficulty that experience seems to demonstrate both the elevation as well as the perturbation of our mental powers merely as diverse modifications of our organs: you could weaken the power of that proof through assuming that our body is nothing but the fundamental appearance to which, *qua* condition, the whole capacity of sensibility and therewith all thought relate in the current state (viz. in life). Separation from the body is the end of this sensory use of your cognitive power and the beginning of the intellectual use. The body would therefore be not the cause of thought but rather a merely restrictive condition of it and would therefore admittedly have to be regarded as furthering the sensory and animal life but so much the more also as a hindrance of the pure and spiritual life; and the former’s dependence upon the bodily constitution would prove nothing about the dependence of the whole life upon the state of our organs. Yet you could go still further and indeed find entirely doubts that have either not been raised or not been carried far enough.

The contingency of the generations that with humans as well as with non-rational creatures also, moreover, often depend upon sustenance, governance, their whims and fancies, and often even upon vice make a great difficult for the opinion of an endurance continuing for eternities of a creature whose life has first begun under such unimportant circumstances that are left so entirely and absolutely to our freedom. In respect to the endurance of the whole genus (here on Earth): the difficulty carries little weight in regard to it because the contingency in individuals is nevertheless subject to a rule in the whole; but in regard to every individual: to expect such a powerful effect from such trifling causes admittedly seems dubious. Against that, however, you could offer up a transcendental hypothesis: viz. that all life is in fact only intelligible, that it is not subject to temporal alterations at all, and that it has neither begun through birth nor will be ended through death. That this life is nothing but a mere appearance, i.e. a sensory representation of the pure mental life, and that the whole sensible cosmos is a mere image that floats before our current mode of cognition and, like a dream, has no objective reality *per se*: that if we should intuit the items and ourselves *as they are*, then we would see ourselves within a world or mental natures with which our sole true community would have neither begun through birth nor will cease through bodily death (asmere appearances), etc.

Yet even though we know absolutely nothing about nor earnestly assert what we pretended hypothetically here against the attack, which is *excogitated* concept merely for resistance, we nevertheless proceed rationally herein because we merely show the opponent, who was meant to have exhausted all possibility in falsely presenting the lack of its empirical conditions as a proof of the total impossibility of what we believed, that he no more encompasses the whole field of possible things *per se* than we can acquire something for our reason in a grounded way outside experience. He who turns such hypothetical countermeasures against the pretensions of his brazenly negative opponent must not be taken as though he wished to appropriate them as his true opinions. He abandons them as soon as he has dispatched the dogmatic self-conceit of his opponent. For even as modest and moderate as it is if someone behaves merely recusatively and negatively in regard to foreign assertions: as soon as he wishes to validate his objections as proofs of the contrary, the assertion is no less proud and imagined than if he had adopted the affirmative party and its assertion.

One therefore sees therefrom that in reason’s speculative use, hypotheses have no validity as opinions *per se* but rather merely relatively to opposed transcendent pretensions. For extending the principles of possible experience to the possibility of things *simpliciter* is equally transcendent as an assertion of the objective reality of such concepts, which can find their objects nowhere other than outside the limit of all possible experience. What pure reason judges assertorically must (like everything that reason cognises) be necessary, or it is absolutely nothing. Thus, pure reason in fact contains no opinions whatsoever. The aforementioned hypothesis are only problematic judgements, however, which at least cannot be refuted even though they admittedly cannot be proved through anything and are therefore not personal opinions but cannot indeed be aptly disposed of (even for inner tranquillity) against stirring scruples.

One must always maintain them in that quality, however, and indeed carefully prevent them from being certified *per se* or appearing with some absolute validity and drowning reason under inventions and illusions.

**2.1.4. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to Its Proofs**

Amongst all proofs of synthetic *apriori* cognition, the proofs of transcendental and synthetic propositions have in them the peculiarity that with them, reason must not turn itself directly to the object by means of its concepts but must first demonstrate the objective validity of the concepts and the possibility of their *apriori* synthesis. That is not, say, merely a necessary rule of cautiousness but rather concerns the essence and possibility of the proofs themselves. If I am to go beyond the concept of an object *apriori*, then that is impossible without a particular guiding-thread situated outside those concepts. In mathematics, it is *apriori* intuition that guides my synthesis; and there, all inferences can be conducted immediately from pure intuition. In transcendental cognition, so long as it deals merely with concepts of the understanding, that guiding cord is possible experience. For the proof shows not that the given concept (e.g. of what occurs) leads directly to another concept (e.g. that of a cause); for such transition would be a leap that could not be justified at all; but rather the proof shows that experience itself and consequently the object of experience would be impossible without such a connection. Therefore, the proof would simultaneously have to indicate the possibility of arriving synthetically and *apriori* at a certain cognition of things that was not contained within the concept of those things. Without that attentiveness, the proofs run like waters that burst their banks – wildly and across country – whither the tendency of concealed association happens to lead them. The semblance of conviction that rests upon subjective causes of association and becomes taken for insight into a natural affinity cannot at all be in equilibrium with the doubt that must equitably arise concerning such ventured steps. Therefore, all attempts to prove the principle of sufficient ground according to the universal admission of experts have also been in vain; and before transcendental critique arose, one has preferred – since one still could not abandon that principle – to defiantly invoke the healthy human-understanding (a refuge that always demonstrates that the issue of reason is dubious), rather than seek to attempt new dogmatic proofs.

Yet if the proposition about which a proof shall be conducted is an assertion of pure reason, and if I wish to even go beyond my experiential concepts by means of mere ideas: then that proposition would still have to contain within it the justification of such a step of synthesis (if it were otherwise possible) as a necessary condition of its probative force. So even as spurious as the purported proof of the simple nature of our thinking substance from the unity of apperception may be, the doubt nevertheless inexorably opposes it that since absolute simplicity is not indeed a concept that can become immediately related to a perception but must rather be merely inferred as an idea, it is not at all to be discerned how the mere consciousness that is or at least can be contained *in all thought* – although it is admittedly, to that extent, a simple representation – shall lead to the consciousness and knowledge of thing *in which* alone thought can be contained. For if I represent the power of my body in motion, then it is to that extent an absolute unity for me and my representation of it is simple; therefore, I can even express that representation through the motion of a point because its volume is irrelevant here and can be thought of as small as one wishes without diminution of the power and therefore even as situated at a point. I will still not infer therefrom, however, that if nothing but the motive force of a body is given to me, then the body can be thought of as a simple substance because its representation is abstracted from all magnitude of the spatial content and is therefore simple. Now, through the fact that the simple in abstraction is entirely different from the simple in the object and that the ego that encompasses absolutely no multiplicity *within itself* in the first sense can in the second sense (since it signifies the soul itself) be a highly complex concept (i.e. contain and characterise very much *under itself*), I uncover a paralogism. Only in order to presage that previously (for without such a surmise, one would conceive no suspicion whatsoever against the proof), it is thoroughly necessary to have to hand an everlasting criterion of the possibility of such synthetic propositions that shall prove more than experience can give, which consists in the fact that the proof is led not directly to the demanded predicate but rather only by means of a principle of the possibility of expanding our given *apriori* concept up to ideas in order to realise them. If that cautiousness is always used; if, still before attempting the proof, one firstly wisely deliberates how and with what ground of hope one can well expect such an expansion through pure reason and whence, in such a case, one shall then derive those insights that are not developed from concepts and also cannot be anticipated in relation to possible experience: then one can spare oneself many difficult and nevertheless fruitless endeavours because one imputes nothing to reason that manifestly exceeds its capacity or rather subjects reason, which does not willingly let itself be constrained during fits of its speculative craving for expansion, to the discipline of austerity.

The first rule is therefore as follows: attempt no transcendental proofs without previously having reflected and having justified oneself in respect to whence one shall take the principles upon which one thinks to erect them and with what right one can expect a good result from them in their conclusion. If they are principles of the understanding (e.g. that of causality), then it is fruitless to attempt to arrive at ideas of pure reason by means of them; for such principles hold only for objects of possible experience. Shall they be principles from pure reason, then all effort is again fruitless. For although reason admittedly has such principles, they (*qua* objective principles) are *in toto* dialectical and can perhaps be valid only like regulative principles of a systematically coherent experiential-use. But if such purported proofs are already available, then oppose the *non liquet* of your mature judging-power to the fallacious conviction; and even if you have still not penetrated its illusion, then you nevertheless have full right to demand a deduction of the principles used therein: which, if they are to have arisen from mere reason, can never be produced for you. And so you do not even need to occupy yourself with developing and refuting every groundless semblance but can rather at once refer all dialectic, which is inexhaustible in artifices, in whole mounds to the tribunal of a critical reason that demands laws.

The second peculiarity of transcendental proofs is that for every transcendental proposition, only a single proof can be found. If I am to infer not from concepts but rather from the intuition that corresponds to a concept – be it a pure intuition (as in mathematics) or an empirical intuition (as in natural science) – then intuition taken as a basis gives me manifold material for synthetic propositions, which I can connect in more than one way and can arrive at the same proposition via diverse paths because I may set out from more than one point.

Nevertheless, every transcendental proposition begins merely from *one* concept and says the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object according to that concept. The probative ground can therefore be only single because outside that concept, there is nothing further whereby the object could be determined; the proof therefore contains nothing further than the determination of an object *simpliciter* according to that concept, which is also only single. In the Transcendental Analytic (e.g.), we had drawn from the principle ‘everything that occurs has a cause’, from the sole condition of the objective possibility of a concept of what occurs *simpliciter*, that the determination of an occurrence in time and therefore that (occurrence) as belonging to experience would be impossible without standing under such a dynamic rule. Now, that is also the sole possible probative-ground; for it is only through the fact that an object becomes determined for the concept by means of the law of causality that the represented occurrence has objective validity, i.e. truth. One has admittedly attempted still other proofs of that principle: e.g. from contingency; only when the latter proof is considered in the light, one can find no distinguishing mark of contingency except the *occurring* (i.e. the existence that a non-being of the object precedes) and therefore always returns to the aforesaid probative-ground. If the principle ‘everything that thinks is simple’ shall be proved, then one dwells not upon the manifold of thought but rather abides merely wit the concept of the ego, which is simple and to which all thought becomes related. It is exactly the same with the transcendental proof of the existence of God, which rests merely upon the reciprocability of the concepts of the most real- and necessary being and can be sought nowhere else.

The critique of rational assertions is greatly condensed through that cautionary remark. Where reason pursues its task through mere concepts, only a single proof is possible if any proof is even possible at all. So if one indeed sees a dogmatist appear with ten proofs, then one can assuredly believe that he has none whatsoever. For if he had one that proved apodictically (as must be the case in issues of pure reason), then for what purpose would he need the others? His intention is merely like that of the parliamentary advocate: one argument is for this; the other for that; i.e. in order to turn the weakness of his judges to his advantage: who, without entering into the task deeply and in order to soon be rid of it, seize the first good proof that happens to strike them and decide accordingly.

The third peculiar rule of pure reason when it is subject to a discipline in regard to a transcendental proof is that its proofs must never be *apagogical* but rather always *ostensive*. In all kinds of cognition, the direct or ostensive proof is that which simultaneously conjoins insight into a truth’s sources with conviction of that truth. An apagogical proof, by contrast, can admittedly bring forth certainty but not comprehensibility of the truth in regard to coherence with the grounds of its possibility. Therefore, the latter are more of an emergency aid than a procedure that satisfies all intentions of reason. Yet they have a evidentiary merit over the direct proofs in the fact that contradiction always carries with it more clarity in the representation than the best connection and thereby more closely approximates to a demonstration’s intuitiveness.

The true cause of the use of apagogical proofs in diverse sciences is indeed as follows. If the grounds from which a certain cognition shall be derived are too manifold or lie too deeply concealed, then investigates whether it is not to be reached via the consequences. Now, the *modus ponens* to infer to a cognition’s truth from the truth of its consequences is allowed only when all possible consequences therefrom are true; for then only a single ground is possible for that, which is therefore also the true ground. Yet that procedure is unfeasible because it exceeds our powers to discern all possible consequences from an assumed proposition. Nevertheless, one avails oneself of that way of inferring, though admittedly with a certain indulgence when it is a matter of proving something merely as a hypothesis because one concedes the conclusion according to the analogy: viz. that if as many consequences as one has ever tested harmonise well with an assumed ground, then all other possible consequences will also be consonant therewith. Because of that, a hypothesis can never be transformed into a demonstrated truth via that route. The *modus tollens* of rational inferences that infer from the consequences to the grounds proves not only entirely strictly, but also exceedingly easily. For even if only a single false consequence can be drawn from a proposition, then that proposition is false. Now, instead of running through the entire series of grounds in an ostensive proof that can lead to a cognition’s truth by means of complete insight into its possibility: if one may find only one single false consequence amongst the consequences flowing from the cognition’s contrary, then that contrary is also false and therefore the cognition that one had to prove is true.

The apagogical kind of proof can be allowed only in those sciences wherein it is impossible to *pass-off* what is subjective in our representations as what is objective therein, viz. the cognition of what is in the object. Where the latter prevails, however, it must often occur that the contrary of a certain proposition either contradicts merely the subjective conditions of thought but not the object or that both propositions are true under only one subjective condition: which, falsely taken for objective, contradict one another; and since the condition is false, both propositions can be false without it being possible to infer from the falsity of one to the truth of the other.

In mathematics, that subreption is impossible; they therefore have their true place there. In natural science, because there everything is grounded upon empirical intuitions: that inveiglement through many compared observations can admittedly for the most part be prevented, but that kind of proof is there for the most part unimportant. Yet the transcendental enquiries of pure reason will, *in toto*, be conducted inside the genuine medium of dialectical semblance (i.e. the subjective), which offers itself as objective or even imposes itself upon reason in its premises. Here, in respect of what concerns synthetic propositions, it cannot at all be allowable to justify one’s assertions through refuting the contrary. For either that refutation is nothing other than the mere representation of the conflict of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions of comprehensibility through our reason, which does absolutely nothing to that end in order to discard the item itself because of that (such as, e.g., the unconditional necessity in the existence of a being absolutely cannot be conceived by us and therefore rightly resists every speculative proof of a necessary highest being *subjectively*, but wrongly *per se*): or both the affirmative and the negative party, betrayed through the transcendental semblance, take an impossible concept of the object as a basis; and there the rule ‘*non entis nulla sunt praedicata*’ holds, i.e. both what one asserts affirmatively as well as what one asserts negatively of the object are incorrect; and one cannot arrive at cognition of the truth apagogically through refuting the contrary. So, for example: if it is presupposed that the sensible cosmos *per se* is given in its totality, then it is false that it must be *either* infinite in respect to space *or* finite and limited because both are false. For as mere representations, appearances that were nevertheless given *per se* (as objects) are something impossible; and the infinitude of this imagined whole would admittedly be unconditioned but would contradict the unconditioned quantitative-determination (because everything in appearances is conditioned), which was nevertheless presupposed in the concept.

The apagogical kind of proof is also the genuine illusion wherewith the admirers of the profundity of our dogmatic sophists have always been tantalised: it is, as it were, the champion that shall prove the honour and undisputed right of his adopted party through committing himself to tussle with everyone who wished to doubt it – even though through such self-aggrandisement, nothing in the issue but rather merely the respective strength of the opponents is discerned: and also indeed only on the side of the opponent who attacks. Since the onlookers see that everyone in is turn is sometimes a victor and sometimes defeated, they often take occasion therefrom to sceptically doubt the object of the dispute itself. Yet they do not have cause to do so, and it is enough to call out to them: ‘*non defensoribus istis tempus eget*’. Each must pursue his cause by means of a legitimate proof conducted through transcendental deduction of the probative-grounds in order that one may see what his rational claims have to say for themselves. For if one’s opponent bases himself upon subjective grounds, then he is admittedly easy to refute but without advantage for the dogmatist: who commonly attaches likewise to the subjective causes of the judgement and can be driven into a corner by his opponent in such a manner. Yet if both parties proceed merely directly, then they will either by themselves remark the difficulty and indeed impossibility of finding a title to their assertions and can ultimately invoke only expiration: or critique will easily uncover the dogmatic semblance and compel pure reason to abandon its pretensions in its speculative use that it has pursued too highly and withdraw inside the limits of its peculiar basis, viz. practical principles.

**2.2. Second Main-Component of the Transcendental Methodology: The Canon of Pure Reason**

It is demoralising for human reason that it can accomplish nothing in its pure use and even still needs a discipline in order to curb its excesses and prevent the illusions that thence arise for it. Only, on the other hand, it lifts human reason and gives it a confidence in itself that it can and must exercise that discipline itself without permitting another censure above it and also that the limits that it is compelled to set upon its speculative use simultaneously constrain the sophistical pretensions of every opponent and can consequently safeguard all that might remain to it from its previously excessive demands against all attacks. The greatest and perhaps sole utility of all philosophy of pure reason is therefore merely negative: since it serves not as an organon for expansion but rather as a discipline for determining limits; and instead of uncovering truth, it has only the silent merit of preventing errors.

Nevertheless, there must still somewhere be a source of positive cognitions that belong within the domain of pure reason and which perhaps give cause for errors only through misunderstanding but in fact constitute the aim of reason’s eagerness. For indeed to what cause should the undampenable desire to secure firm footing somewhere beyond the limit of experience otherwise be ascribed? Reason presages objects that carry with them a great interest for it. It treads the path of mere speculation in order to approach them, but they flee before it. Presumably, better fortune is to be hoped for on the sole path that remains to it: viz. that of the *practical* use.

By a ‘canon’, I understand the complex of the *apriori* principles of the correct use of certain cognitive-capacities *simpliciter*. So universal logic in its analytical part is a canon for understanding and reason *simpliciter*, though only in respect form: for it abstracts from all content. So the Transcendental Analytic was the canon of the pure *understanding*; for the pure understanding alone is capable of true synthetic *apriori* cognitions. But where no correct use of a cognitive power is possible, there is no canon. Now, all synthetic cognition of pure *reason* in its speculative use is totally impossible: according to all proofs hitherto conducted. Therefore, there is no canon of pure reason’s speculative use whatsoever (for that use is dialectical through-and-through); but rather all transcendental logic in that intention is nothing but discipline. Consequently, if there is a correct use of pure reason at all – in which case, there must also be a *canon* of pure reason – then that canon will concern not reason’s speculative use but rather its *practical* use, which we shall now therefore investigate.

**2.2.1. First Section of the Canon of Pure Reason: On the Last Purpose of Our Reason’s Pure Use**

Reason is driven, through a tendency of its nature, to go beyond the experiential use in a pure use and to venture, by means of ideas, to the extreme limits of all cognition and to find repose only in completing its circle in a systematic whole that subsists by itself. Now, is that endeavour grounded merely upon its speculative interest or instead only and solely upon its practical interest?

I shall now set aside the fortune that pure reason has in a speculative intention and enquire only after the problems whose resolution constitutes its last purpose (irrespective of whether it achieves it) and in respect of which, all others have merely the value of means. These supreme purposes will, according to the nature of reason, in turn have to have unity in order to unifiedly further the interest of humanity that is subordinate to no higher interest.

The final intention to which reason’s speculation ultimately leads in its transcendental use pertains to three objects: viz. the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. In regard to all three, reason’s merely speculative interest is only very small; and in respect to that interest, an exhausting labour of transcendental investigation that struggles with interminable hindrances would indeed hardly be undertaken because one can indeed make no use of all discoveries that might be made concerning it that would demonstrate their utility *in concreto*, i.e. in investigation. Even if the will is free, that can still concern only the intelligible cause of our willing. For in respect to the phenomena of the manifestations of that willing (i.e. actions), we must – according to an inviolable fundamental-maxim without which we can exercise no reason in empirical use – never explain them otherwise than all other appearances of nature, viz. according to immutable laws of nature. Secondly, even if the soul’s mental nature (and, with it, its immortality) can be discerned, no account can be given of it in regard to the appearances of this life (as an explanatory ground) nor in regard to the particular qualities of the future state because our concept of a non-bodily nature is merely negative and our cognition is not expanded in the slightest, nor does it offer any fit material for inferences except perhaps for such that can hold only for inventions but which cannot be permitted by philosophy. Even if thirdly the existence of a supreme intelligence were proved, then we would admittedly render the purposiveness in the cosmic arrangement and the order in general comprehensible to us therefrom; but we would in no way be authorised to derive any particular institution and order therefrom or, where they are not perceived, to infer keenly thereto because it is a necessary rule of reason’s speculative use to not pass by natural-causes and abandon that whereof we can be taught through experience in order to derive something that we know from something that totally surpasses all our knowledge. In a word: those three propositions always remain transcendent for speculative reason and have no immanent use whatsoever, i.e. a use permissible for objects of experience and therefore a use that is beneficial for us in some way; but considered *per se*, they are entirely otiose and, despite that, still extremely difficult endeavours of our reason.

So if those three cardinal-principles are not needed at all for *knowledge* and are nevertheless compellingly recommended to us through our reason, then their importance must indeed truly concern only the *practical*.

Everything is practical that is possible through freedom. If the conditions of exercising our free volition are empirical, however, then reason can have no use therein other than a regulative use and serve only to effect the unity of empirical laws – like, e.g., in the doctrine of prudence, the unification of all purposes that are imposed upon us by our inclinations into the single purpose *beatitude* and the harmony of the means in order to attain it constitutes the whole task of reason: which, because of that, can deliver none other than *pragmatic* laws of free behaviour to achieve purposes recommended to us by the senses and therefore no pure laws determined fully *apriori*. In contrast: pure practical laws, whose purpose is given fully *apriori* through reason and which are not empirically conditioned but rather decreed absolutely, would be products of pure reason. The *moral* laws are such laws and therefore belong to pure reason’s practical use alone and allow a canon.

Reason’s whole equipment in the labour that one can call ‘pure philosophy’ is in fact directed only to the three aforementioned problems. But they themselves in turn have their remoter intention, viz. *what is to be done* if the will is free and if there is a God and a future world. Now, since that concerns our behaviour in relation to the supreme purpose, the last intention of wisely providential nature in the arrangement of our reason is in fact directed only towards *moralia*.

Caution is needed, however, in order – since we turn our focus towards an object that is foreign[[50]](#footnote-50) to transcendental philosophy – not to deviate into episodes and compromise the system’s unity and, on the other hand, also in order for one to lose neither perspicuity nor conviction by saying too little about one’s new material. I hope to accomplish both through adhering to the transcendental as closely as possible and totally setting aside that which might perhaps be psychological (i.e. empirical) therein.

And it is then first to be remarked that, for now, I will here avail myself of the concept of freedom only in the practical sense and (as was done above) set aside the concept of freedom in the transcendental sense, which cannot be presupposed empirically as an explanatory ground of the appearances but is rather itself a problem for reason. For a volition is merely *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*) that cannot be determined otherwise than through sensory impulses, i.e. *pathologically*. But a volition that can be determined independently of sensory impulses and therefore through motive causes, which can be represented only by reason, is called ‘free volition’ (*arbitrium liberum*); and everything that coheres with it (be it as ground or consequence) is called *practical*. Practical freedom can be proved through experience. For not merely what stimulates (i.e. affects the senses immediately) determines human volition, but rather we have a capacity to overcome the impressions upon our sensory desiderative-capacity through representations of what is itself useful or deleterious in a remoter way. These reflections upon what is desirable in regard to our whole state, i.e. gut and useful, rest upon reason. Reason also therefore gives laws that are imperative, i.e. objective *laws of freedom*, and which say *what should occur*, even though it perhaps never has occurred; and they therein distinguish themselves from *natural laws*, which treat only of *what occurs*: because of which, they are also called ‘practical laws’.

Yet whether reason itself in these actions whereby it prescribes laws is not in turn determined through other influences and whether what is called ‘freedom’ in regard to sensory impulses may not in turn be nature in respect of higher and remoter efficient causes does not concern us at all in the practical because we primarily question reason only about the *prescription* of behaviour, but rather it is a merely speculative question that we can set aside so long as our intention is directed towards action or omission. We therefore cognise practical freedom through experience as one of the natural-causes, viz. a causality of reason in determination of the will: whereas transcendental freedom demands an independence of that reason itself (in respect of its causality to begin a series of appearances) from all determinative causes of the sensible cosmos and, to that extent, seems to be contrary to the natural law and consequently to all possible experience and therefore remains a problem. Only that problem does not belong before reason in its practical use; we are therefore dealing with only two questions in a canon of pure reason, which concern pure reason’s practical interest and in respect of which, a canon of its use must be possible: viz. is there a God? Is there a future life? The question concerning the transcendental freedom concerns merely speculative knowledge, which we can entirely set aside as a matter of indifference when only the practical is at issue; and sufficient discussion concerning it is already to be found in the Antinomy of Pure Reason.

**2.2.2. Second Section on the Canon of Pure Reason: On the Ideal of the Supreme Good as a Determinative Ground of the Last Purpose of Pure Reason**

In its speculative use, reason led us through the field of experiences and, because full satisfaction is never to be encountered for it there, thence to speculative ideas: which, in the end, led us in turn back to experience; and therefore its intention was fulfilled in a way that is admittedly useful but not absolutely accordant with our expectation. One enquiry still remains to us: viz. whether pure reason is also to be encountered in a practical use; whether it leads to the ideas in that use, which achieve the supreme purposes of pure reason that we have just adduced; and whether pure reason from the viewpoint of its practical interest cannot therefore accomplish what it denied us entirely and absolutely in respect to the speculative.

All interest of my reason (both the speculative as well as the practical) unite in the following three questions:

1. What can I know?

2. Whar should I do?

3. What may I hope?

The first question is merely speculative. We have (as I flatter myself) exhausted all possible answers and have ultimately found the answer with which reason must admittedly satisfy itself and, if it does not look to the practical, also has cause to be satisfied; but we have also remained just as far distant from the two great purposes to which this entire endeavour of pure reason was truly directed as though we had refused this labour out of convenience at the outset. If it is therefore knowledge that is at issue, then it is at least so greatly sure and established that knowledge can never be imparted to us in respect of those two problems.

The second question is merely practical. As such, it can admittedly pertain to pure reason; but it is then still not transcendental but rather moral: viz. can it not occupy our critique *per se*.

The third question (viz. if I due what I should, what may I then hope?’ is practical and theoretical simultaneously, in such a way that the practical leads only as a guiding thread to the answer to the theoretical- and, if that is elevated, speculative question. Form all *hope* aims at beatitude and is exactly the same in regard to the practical and the moral law as knowledge and natural-law are in respect to theoretical cognition of things. The former ultimately leads to the inference that something *is* (which determines the last possible purpose) *because something should occur*; this, that something is (which works as a highest cause) *because something occurs*.

Beatitude is the satisfaction of all our inclinations (both *extensive*, in respect of the multiplicity of it and *intensive*, in respect to degree, and also *protensive*: in respect to duration. I call the practical law from the motivational ground of *beatitude* ‘pragmatic’ (‘prudential rule’), but I call a practical law so far as it is such a law that it has nothing other than the *worthiness to be happy* ‘moral’ (‘moral law’). The first advises what is to be done if we wish to partake of beatitude; the second commands how we should behave in order to merely become worthy of beatitude. The first is grounded upon empirical principles; for otherwise than by means of experience, I can neither know what inclinations exist that shall be satisfied nor what the natural causes are that can effect their satisfaction. The second abstracts from inclinations and natural means of satisfying them and considers only the freedom of a rational being *simpliciter* and the necessary conditions under which alone it harmonises with the distribution of beatitude according to principles and *can therefore* at least rest upon pure reason and be cognised *apriori*.

I assume that there are actually pure moral laws that determined action and omission (i.e. use of the freedom of a rational being *simpliciter*) fully *apriori* and that those laws are commanded *absolutely* (not merely hypothetically under presupposition of other empirical purposes) and are therefore necessary in every regard. I can rightly presuppose that proposition not only by invoking the proofs of the most enlightened moralists but also the moral judgement of every human if he shall think of such a law perspicuously.

Pure reason therefore contains – admittedly not in its speculative- but nevertheless in a certain practical-, viz. moral-, use – principles of the *possibility of experience*, viz. of such actions that could be encountered in the *history* of man according to moral prescriptions. For since pure reason commands that such shall occur, they must also be able to occur; and therefore a particular kind of unity (viz. moral unity) must be possible even though the systematic natural-unity *according to speculative principles of reason* could not be proved because reason admittedly has causality in regard to freedom *simpliciter* but not in regard to nature in its totality; and moral rational-principles can admittedly bring forth free actions but not natural laws. Thus, pure reason’s principles in their practical-, viz. their moral-, use have objective reality.

I call the world so far as it is accordant with all moral laws (as it *can* be according to the *freedom* of rational beings and *should* be according to the necessary laws of *sensibility*) a **moral world**. So far as it is thought of as a merely intelligible world, the moral world becomes abstracted from all conditions (i.e. purposes) and even from all hindrances of morality within it (weakness or impurity of human nature). To that extent, it is therefore a mere yet nevertheless practical idea that actually can and should have its influence upon the sensible cosmos in order to render it as accordant with that idea as possible. The idea of a moral world therefore has objective reality as if it concerned not an object of an intelligible intuition (the like of which we cannot think of at all) but rather the sensible cosmos: but as an object of pure reason in its practical use and a *corpus mysticum* of the rational being within it so far as its free volition under moral laws has thoroughgoing systematic unity both with itself as well as with every other freedom.

That was the answer to the first of the three questions of pure reason that concerned the practical interest: viz. *do that whereby you become worthy to be happy*. The second now asks: how, if I behave in such a way that I am not unworthy of beatitude, may I also hope to be able to thereby become participant in it? In the answer to that, it is a matter of whether the principles of pure reason, which prescribe the law *apriori*, also necessarily conjoin a hope therewith.

I thus say that just as the moral principles according to reason in its *practical* use are necessary, it is also equally necessary to assume according to reason in its *theoretical* use that everyone has cause to hope for beatitude in the same measure as he has rendered himself worthy of it in his behaviour and that therefore the system of morality is inseverable with that of beatitude, but conjoined only in the idea of pure reason.

In an intelligible- (i.e. the moral-) world in whose concept we abstract from all hindrances of sensibility (e.g. inclinations), such a system of the beatitude proportioned to mortality can also be thought of as necessary because the freedom that is partly moved and partly restricted through moral laws would even be the cause of the universal beatitude: and the rational beings themselves, under the guidance of such principles, would therefore be authors of their own welfare and simultaneously of the enduring welfare of others. Yet that system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea whose implementation rests upon the condition that *everyone* does what he should: i.e. that all actions of rational beings occur as though they derived from a highest will that encompassed all personal volition within itself or under itself. But since the obligation from the moral law for every particular use of freedom remains valid even if others do not behave accordantly with that law, it is determined neither from the nature of the things of the world nor from the causality of the actions themselves and their relationships to morality how the actions’ consequences will relate to beatitude; and the adduced necessary connection of the hope of being happy with the unremitting striving to render oneself worthy of beatitude cannot be cognised through reason even if one takes merely nature as a basis but must rather merely be hoped for if a *supreme reason* that commands according to moral laws is simultaneously taken as a basis as a cause of nature.

I call the idea of such an intelligence in which the morally perfect will conjoined with supreme felicity is the cause of all beatitude within the world so far as it stands in exact relationship to morality (as the worthiness to be happy) *the ideal of the supreme good*. Therefore, pure reason can encounter the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the supreme derived good (viz. of an intelligible-, i.e. *moral* world) only in the ideal of the supreme *original* good. Since we must necessarily represent ourselves through reason as belonging to such a world even though the senses present us with nothing other than a world of appearances, we will have to assume the former world as a consequence of our behaviour in the sensible cosmos (whereas the sensible cosmos does not represent such a connection to us), and assume it as a world that is future for us. God therefore and a future life are two of the obligations that pure reason imposes upon us according to principles of exactly the same reason’s inseparable presuppositions.

Morality *per se* constitutes a system but not beatitude, except so far as it is apportioned in exact accordance with morality. That is only possible in the intelligible world, however, under a weise author and governor. Reason sees itself compelled to assume such an author and governor together with life in such a world that we must regard as a future world or regard the moral laws as mere figments of the brain because their necessary result that the same reason connects to them would have to fall away without that presupposition. Hence, moreover, everyone regards the moral laws as *commands*, which they could not be if they did not carry with them *apriori* congruous consequences with their rule and therefore as *promises* and *threats*. That also cannot be, however, where they do not lie in a necessary being as the supreme good that alone can render such a regular unity possible.

**Leibniz** called the world so far asone therein attends only to the rational beings and their coherence according to moral laws under the governence of the supreme good the *realm of graces* and distinguished it from the *realm of nature*: since they admittedly stand under moral laws but expect no other result from their behaviour than according to the course of the nature of our sensible cosmos. Looking into the realm of graces, where all beatitude awaits us except so far as we do not constrain our share in it ourselves through unworthiness to be happy is a practically necessary idea of reason.

Practical laws, so far as they are simultaneously subjective groundsof actions (i.e. subjective principles), are called *maxims*. *Judging* morality in regard to its purity, and its conseqiences occurs according to *ideas*; *following their laws according to maxims*.

It is necessary that our whole way of life becoms subordinate to moral maxims; but it is simultaneously impossible that that occurs if reason does not connect to the moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause that determines for behaviour accordant with that law an outcome that corresponds exactly to our supreme purposes, be it in this or another life. Without a God and a world that is now invisible for us yet hoped for, the majestic ideas of morality are admittedly objects of approval and admiration but not impetuses of proposals and their exercise because they do not fulfill the whole purpose that is determined naturally and through exactly the same pure *apriori* reason for every rational being.

Beatitude alone is far from the complete good for our reason. Reason does not approve beatitude (so much as inclination would wish it) so far as it is not unified with the worthiness to be happy, i.e. moral good-behaviour. Yet morality alone and, with it, mere *worthiness* to be happy are also still far from the complet good. In order to complete that good, he who had behaved so as not to be unworthy of beatitude can hope to partake of it. Even a pure reason free from all personal intention, if it puts itself in the position of a being that had to apportion all beatitude to others without taking its own interest into consideration, cannot judge otherwise than by saying that in the practical idea, both components are essentially conjoined: though admittedly in such a way that moral sentiment (*qua* condition) first renders sharing in beatitude possible and not conversely in such a way that the prospect to beatitude first renders moral sentiment possible. For in the latter case, it would not be moral and would therefore also not be worthy of total beatitude, which recognises not other constrainment before reason except that which stems from our own immoral behaviour.

Beatitude in the exact equal-measure with the morality of the rational beings whereby they are worthy of it alone constitutes the supreme good of a world wherein we must first thoroughly place ourselves according to the prescriptions of pure but practical reason and which is admittedly only an intelligible world, since the sensible cosmos does not promise us such systematic unity of purposes from the nature of the things; and that intelligible world’s reality also cannot be grounded otherwise than upon the presupposition of a supreme original good where selfstanding reason – equipped with all sufficiency of a highest cause – grounds, maintains, and consummates the universal order of the things, even though that order is deeply concealed from us in the sensible cosmos.

Moral theology has the peculiar merit over speculative theology that it inevitably leads to the concept of a *single*, *all-perfect*, and *rational* originary-being to which speculative theology does not even *advert* from objective grounds, not to mention being capable of *convincing* us thereof. For however far reason may lead us in transcendental- or natural theology, in neither of them do we find some significant ground even to merely asume a unitary being that we could prefix to all natural causes and upon which we would simultaneously have sufficient cause to render those causes dependent in all components. In contrast: if, from the viewpoint of moral unity as a necessary cosmic-law, we consider the cause that alone can give that cause its congruous effect and can therefore give a force obliging for us, then it must be a unitary highest will that encompasses all those laws within it? For how should we find perfect unity of purposes amongst diverse wills? That will must be omnipotent in order that the whole of nature be subject to it; it must be omniscient in order that it cognises the innermost of the sentiments and of their moral value; it must be omnipresent in order that it is immediately proximate to all needs that the supreme cosmic-optimality requires; it must be eternal in order that that agreement of nature and freedom is not lacking in any time; etc.

Yet that systematic unity of the purposes in this world of intelligences – which, although as mere nature it can be called only a ‘sensible cosmos’, as a system of freedom it can be called a ‘moral world’ (*regnum gratiae*) – leads also inevitably to the purposive unity of all the things that constitute that great whole according to universal natural-laws, just like the first world according to universal and necessary moral-laws and unifies practical reason with speculative reason. The world *must* be represented as having arisen from an idea if it is to harmonise with that use of reason without which we would deem ourselves unworthy of reason, viz. the moral use: which rests thoroughly upon the idea of the supreme good. All natural investigation thereby receives a direction according to the form of a system od purposes and in its supreme expansion becomes called ‘physicotheology’.

Since physicotheology starts from moral order as a unity grounded in the essence of freedom and not as a unity intstituted contingently through external commands, it brings nature’s purposiveness to grounds that must be inseverably connected *apriori* to the things’ internal possibility and thereby to a *transcendental theology* that takes the ideal of supreme ontological perfection for a principle of the systematic unity that connects all things according to universal and necessary natural-laws because they all have their origin in the absolute necessity of a unitary originary-being. What *use* can we make of our understanding – even in regard to experience – if we do not prefix purposes for ourselves? The supreme purposes, however, are those of morality; and only pure reason can allow us to cognise them. Provided only with that and along its guiding thread, we can make no purposeful use of knowledge of nature in regard to cognition where nature itself has not laid purposive unity; for without that unity, we would ourselves have no reason because we would have no school for it and no culture through objects that offer the material for such concepts. That purposive unity is necessary, however, and grounded in the essence of volition itself; but it must therefore also be volition that contains the condition of applying that unity *in concreto*: and so the transcendental escalation of our rational cognition would be not the cause but rather the effect of the practical purposefulness that pure reason imposes upon us.

Moreover, we therefore find in the history of human reason that before the moral concepts were sufficiently purified, determined, and discerned and before the systematic unity of the purposes according to those concepts was discerned and indeed from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature and even a considerable degree of the culture of reason in many other sciences could partly bring forth only rough and inconstant concepts of divinity and partly left a wondrous indifference generally in respect of that question. A greater elaboration of moral ideas that was rendered necessary through the extremely pure moral-law of our religion, sharpened reason in respect to the object through the interest that reason needed to take in it; and without expanded natural-cognitions nor correct and reliable transcendental insights (the like of which have been lacking in all times) contributing, reason brought about a concept of the divine being that we now deem the correct concept: not because speculative reason has convinced us of its correctness but rather because it harmonises perfectly with the moral rational-principles. And so, in the end, always only pure reason (albeit in its practical use) has the merit of linking a cognition that mere speculation could only mention, but not validate, to our supreme interest and thereby turning it admittedly not into a demonstrated dogma yet nevertheless into an absolutely necessary presupposition in respect to reason’s most essential purposes.

Yet if practical reason has reached that high point, viz. the concept of a unitary being as the supreme good, then it must not pretend that it has elevated itself above all empirical conditions of its applcation and soared to immediate knowledge of new objects in order to set out from that concept and derive the moral laws themselves from it. For it was precisely those moral laws whose *internal* practical necessity leads us to the presupposition of a selfstanding cause or of a wise cosmic-governor in order to give effect to those laws; and therefore we cannot in turn regard those laws as contingent and as derived from a mere will – particularly from such a will of which we would have no concept whatsoever if we had not formed it according to those laws. So far as practical reason has the right to lead us, we will not hold actions to be obligatory because they are commands of God, but would rather regard them as divine commands because we are internally obliged to do so. We will study freedom under the purposive unity according to principles of reason and believe to be accordant with the divine will only so far as we hold the moral law to be holy that reason teaches us from the nature of the actions, and we believe ourselves to serve the divine will only through furthering cosmic optimality in us and in others. Moral theology is therefore only of immanent use: viz. to fulfil our determination here in the world by fitting into the system of all purposes and not to effusively or indeed even licentiously abandon the guiding thread of a morally-legislative reason in a good way of life in order to link it immediately to the idea of the supreme being, which would yield a transcendent use but which, just like the use of mere speculation, must pervert and vitiate reason’s last purposes.

**2.2.3. The Canon of Pure Reason**

Holding something to be true is an occurrence within our understanding, which may rest upon objective grounds but also requires subjective causes in the mind of him who judges. If it is valid for someone so far as he merely has reason, then its ground is objectively sufficient; and the holding-for-true is then called *conviction*. If it has its ground only in the particular constitution of the subject, then it is called *persuasion*.

Persuasion is a mere semblance because the ground of the judgement, which lies merely within the subject, is taken for objective. Therefore, such a judgement also has only personal validity and the holding-for-true cannot be imparted. Truth, however, rests upon agreement with the object: in regard to which, consequently, the judgement of every understanding must agree (*consentientia uni tertio*, *consentiunt inter se*). The touchstone of holding-for-true in respect of whether it is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of imparting it and finding that the holding-for-true is valid for every human’s reason; for then, there is at least a suspicion that the ground of the consonance of all judgements despite the diversity of their subjects will rest upon the common ground, viz. the object: with which they therefore all harmonise, and thereby the truth of the judgement becomes proved.

Thus, persuasion admittedly cannot be distinguished from conviction subjectively if the subject has the holding-for-true in view merely as an appearance of his own mind; but the test that one makes with grounds that are valid for us in light of another understanding: whether they have exactly the same effect on another person’s understanding as they had upon ours is indeed an admittedly only subjective means, not indeed of effecting conviction, but nevertheless of uncovering the mere personal validity of the judgement: i.e. something within it that is mere persuasion.

Moreover, if one can develop the subjective *causes* of the judgement, which we take for objective *grounds* thereof, and consequently declare the fallacious holding-for-true to be an occurrence within our mind without having need of the constitution of the object to do so, then we expose the semblance and will thereby no longer be fooled, even though we are always still tempted to a certain extent if the subjective cause of the semblance attaches to our nature.

I can *assert* nothing, i.e. express a judgement necessarily valid for everyone, except what effects conviction. I can retain persuasion for myself if I am pleased by it but cannot and should not seek to have it accepted outside me.

Holding-for-true or the subjective validity of a judgement has the following three levels in relation to conviction (which simultaneously holds objectively): *opining*, *believing*, and *knowing*. *Opining* is a holding-for-true with consciousness that is both subjectively and objectively insufficient. If the latter is only subjectively sufficient and is simultaneously taken for objective, then it is called *belief*. Finally, a holding-for-true that is both subjectively and objectively sufficient is called *knowledge*. Subjective sufficiency is called *conviction* (for me); objective sufficiency is called *certainty* (for everyone). I will not dwell upon a discussion of such comprehensible concepts.

I may never undertake to *opine* without at least *knowing* something by means of which the *per se* problematic judgement receives a connection to truth that, even though it is not complete, is still more than arbitrary invention. The law of such a connection must, moreover, be certain. For if I also have nothing but opinion in respect to something, then everything is only play of imagination without the slightest relation to truth. In judgement from pure reason, *opining* is not allowable at all. For because they shall not be supported upon experiential grounds but rather everything shall be cognised *apriori* where everything is necessary, the principle of the connection requires universality and necessity and therefore full certainty; otherwise, no guidance to truth is encountered at all. Therefore, it is absurd to opine in pure mathematics; one must know or abstain from all judgement. It is the same with the principles of morality: since one may not venture an action on mere opinion that something is *allowed*, but rather one must know that.

In reason’s transcendental use, by contrast, opining is admittedly too little; but knowledge is also too much. In a merely speculative regard, therefore, we cannot judge at all there because subjective grounds of holding-for-true like those that belief can effect deserve no approval with speculative questions because they do not keep themselves free from all empirical aid, nor can they be imparted to others in the same measure.

Merely *in a practical respect*, however, theoretically insufficient holding-for-true can always be called ‘belief’. That practical regard is either that of *skill* or of *morality*: the first for arbitrary and contingent purposes and the second for absolutely necessary purposes.

Once a purpose is set, the conditions for its achievement are hypothetically necessary. That necessity is subjective yet only comparatively sufficient if I know absolutely no other conditions under which the purpose could be achieved; but it is absolutely sufficient and sufficient for everyone if I know certainly that no one can know other conditions that lead to the set purpose. In the first case, my presupposition and the holding-for-true of certain conditions is a merely contingent belief; but in the second case, it is a necessary belief. A doctor must do something with a patient who is in danger but does not know the illness. He looks at the symptoms and judges, because he knows no better, that it is consumption. His belief is itself, in his own judgement, merely contingent; someone else might perhaps have done better. I call such contingent beliefs that, however, underlie the actual use of the means for certain actions *pragmatic beliefs*.

The usual touchstone of whether something that someone asserrts is mere persuasion or at least subjective conviction (i.e. firm belief) is a *wager*. Often, someone expresses his propositions with such confident and unswerving defiance that he seems to have totally set aside all worry about error. A wager perplexes him. Sometimes, it becomes manifest that he admittedly possesses enough persuasion that can be estimated at one ducat in value, but not at ten. For he indeed still wagers the first; but at ten, he first becomes aware of what he did not previously remark: namely, that it is indeed still possible that he has erred. If one represents to oneself in thought that one shall wager the happiness of one’s whole life on something, then our triumphant judgement quickly vanishes; we become exceedingly shy and thus discover for the first time that our belief did not extend so far. So a pragmatic belief has only a degree that can be great or even small according to the diversity of the interest that is at stake therein.

Yet because – even if absolutely nothing is undertaken in relation to an object and the holding-for-true is therefore merely theoretical – we yet in many cases conceive an undertaking in thought and can imagine it, for which we think we have sufficient grounds if there were a means of discerning the certainty of the issue, then there would be an *analogue* of *practical* in merely theoretical judgements to whose holding-for-true the word ‘belief’ applies and which we can call *doctrinal belief*. If it were possible to discern through some experience, then I might well wager everything I have that there is inhabitants in at least one of the planets that we see. Therefore, I say that it is not merely opinion but rather a strong belief (upon whose correctness I would indeed venture many advanntages of my life) that there are also occupants of other worlds.

Now, we must concede that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. For even if I have nothing *at my disposal* in regard to theoretical cosmic-knowledge that necessarily presupposes those thoughts as a condition of my explanations of the world’s appearances but am rather obliged to avail myself of my reason as though every were merely nature: purposive unity is nevertheless such a great condition of reason’s application to nature that I can by no means pass it by, since experience also richly offers examples thereof. I know no other condition for that unity that renders it a guiding thread of natural research for me, however, other than if I presuppose that a supreme intelligence has ordered overything thus according to the wisest purposes. Consequently, the following is a condition of an admittedly contingent though not unimportant intention: viz. in order to have a guidance in investigation of nature, presuppose a wise cosmic-author. The outcome of my enquiries also so often confirms the usability of that presupposition, and nothing can be adduced against it in a decisive manner; that I would perhaps say too much if I sought to call my holding-for-true merely an ‘opining’, but rather it can be said even in this theoretical circumstance that I firmly believe in a God; but then that belief in a strict signification is not practical but must rather be called a ‘doctrinal belief’ that *theology* of nature (i.e. physicotheology) must necessary effect everywhere. In respect to the very same wisdom and in regard to the excellent apparatus of human nature and the brevity of life that is so poorly congruous therewith can sufficient ground for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul equally be encountered.

An expression of belief is in such cases an expression of modesty in an *objective* regard but yet simultaneously of firmness of confidence in a *subjective* regard. Even if I wished to call the merely theoretical holding-for-true here only a ‘hypothesis’ that I would be justified in assuming, I would already thereby commit myself to having more of a concept of the constitution of a cosmic-cause and of another cosmos than I can actually indicatel for even what I merely assume as a hypothesis, I must at least know so much in respect of its properties that I *need not* invent *its concept* but rather *only its existence*. The word ‘belief’, however, concerns only the guidance that an idea gives to me and the subjective influence upon the furtherance of my reason’s actions that adhere me to it, even if I am not in a position to give account of it in a speculative regard.

Yet merely doctrinal belief has something wavering in it; one is often dislodged from it through difficulties that are found in speculation, even if one inevitably always returns to it again.

It is entirely different with *moral belief*. For there, it is absolutely necessary that something must occur: namely, that I satisfy the moral law in all components. The purpose is unavoidably fixed here; and, according to all my insight, only a single condition is possible under which that purpose with all purposes in their totality and thereby has practical validity, viz. that a God and a future world are: I know also entirely certainly that no one knows other conditions that would lead to the same unity of the purposes under the moral law. But since the moral prescription is simultaneously my maxim (as reason commands that it should be), I will invevitably believe in an existence of God and a future life and I am sure that nothing could shake that belief because my moral principles would themselves thereby be overturned, which I cannot renounce without becoming abhorrent in my own eyes.

In such a way, after vitiating all ambitious intentions of a reason wandering beyond the limits of all experience, still enough remains left over for us to have cause to be satisfied therewith in a practical intention. Admittedly, no one will be able to boast of *knowing* that a God and a future life are; for if he knows that, then he is just the man I have long sought. One can impart all knowledge (if it concerns an object of mere reason), and I would therefore be able to hope to see my knowledge extended to such a wondrous extent through his instruction. Nay: the conviction is neither *logical* nor *moral* certainty; and since it rests upon subjective grounds (viz. moral sentiment), I must not even say ‘*it is* morally certain that a God is’, etc., but rather ‘*I am* morally certain’, etc. That is: the belief in a God and another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that I no more run the risk of losing the former than I worry that the latter could ever be torn from me.

The second doubt that is found herein is that that belief of reason is grounded upon the presupposition of moral sentiments. If we abandon them and take someone who were totally indifferent in regard to moral laws, then the question that reason raises becomes merely a problem for speculation and can then admittedly still be underpinned with strong grounds from analogy but not with such grounds to which even the stubbornest incredulity would have to yield.[[51]](#footnote-51) There is, however, no human who is free of all interest in respect of those questions. For even if he might be separated from the moral interest through a lack of good sentiments, enough still remains even in that case in order to effect that he *fears* a divine existence and a future. For nothing more is requisite for that than that he at can at least pretend no *certainty* that *no* such being and *no* future life is to be encountered: for which, because it would have to be proved through mere reason and therefore apodictically, he would have to demonstrate the impossibility of both, which certainly no rational human can undertake. That would be a *negative* belief that admittedly could not effect morality and good sentiments but could nevertheless powerfully restrain their analogue: namely, an outbreak of bad sentiments.

Yet is that all one will say pure reason accomplishes in disclosing prospects beyond the limits of experience? No more than two articles of belief? Even the common understanding could well have accomplished that, without seeking advice from the philosophers about it!

I shall not boast here of the service that philosophy has rendered to human reason through the arduous endeavour of its critique, even supposing that the outcome should be found to be merely negative; for something concerning that will still be said in the following section. But do you demand, then, that a cognition that impinges upon all humans surpasses the common understanding and shall be uncovered for you only by philosophers? Precisely what you reproach is the best confirmation of the correctness of the previous assertions because it uncovers what one could not initially foresee – viz. that nature, in what is important to humans without distinction, is to be accused of no partial apportionment of its gifts; and supreme philosophy in regard to the essential purposes of human nature could advance no further than the guidance that it has also imparted to the commonest understanding.

**2.2.3. Third Main-Component of the Transcendental Methodology: The Architectonic of Pure Reason**

By an *architectonic*, I understand the art of systems. Because systematic unity is that which first turns common cognition into science, i.e. makes a system from a mere aggregate thereof, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientificity in our cognition *simpliciter*; and it therefore belongs necessarily to methodology.

Under reason’s governance, our cognitions *simpliciter* must not constitute a rhapsody but must rather constitute a system in which alone they can underpin and further reason’s essential purposes. I understand by a ‘system’, however, the unity of the manifold cognitions under an idea. That is the rational-concept of the form of a whole so far as through that concept, both the manifold’s extent as well as the position of its parts amongst one another become determined *apriori*. The scientific rational-concept therefore contains the purpose and the form of the whole that is congruent with it. The unity of the purpose to which all parts relate and, in the idea of that purpose, also relate to one another effects that every part can be measured in light of knowledge of the others and that no contingent addition nor an indeterminate quantity of perfection occurs that does not have its *apriori* determinate limits. The whole is therefore articulated (*articulatio*) and not accumulated (*coacervatio*); it can admittedly grow internally (*per intus susceptionem*) but not externally (*per appositionem*): like an animal body, whose growth adds no element but rather render each element stronger and fitter for its purposes without alteration of the proportion.

The idea needs a *schema* for implementation, i.e. an essential multiplicity and order of the parts determinate *apriori* from the principle of the purpose. The schema that becomes delineated not according to an idea (i.e. from reason’s main purpose) but rather empirically according to intentions that offer themselves contingently (whose multitude one cannot know in advance) gives *technical* unity, but what arises only according to an idea (where reason imposes the purposes *apriori* and does not expect them empirically) grounds *architectonic* unity. What we call ‘science’, whose schema contains the outline (*monogramma*) and the division of the whole into elements according to the idea (i.e. *apriori*) and must distinguish that whole from all others securely and according to principles can arise not technically – due to the manifold’s similarity or the contingent use of the cognition *in concreto* for all manner of arbitrary external purposes – but rather architectonically because of kinship and derivation from a single highest and internal purpose that first renders the whole possible.

No one attempts to bring about a science without being underlain by an idea. Only in the elaboration of that idea, the schema and indeed even the definition that he gives of his science right at the beginning very seldom correspond to his idea; for the idea lies, like a germ, within reason: in which, all parts still lie deeply enveloped and hardly knowable for microscopic observation. Because of that – since all sciences become excogitated from the viewpoint of a certain universal interest – one must explain and determine sciences not according to the description that their authors give of them but rather according to the ideas that one finds grounded within reason itself from the natural unity of the parts that he has brought together. For it is then found that the authors and often still their most recent successors strayed around ideas that they have not themselves rendered perspicuous and hence could not determine the peculiar content, articulation (i.e. systematic unity), and limits of the sciences.

It is perverse that only after we have, for long a time, following the direction of an idea lying hidden within us, rhapsodistically collected many cognitions relating to that idea, as construction materials, and have indeed even technically composed them for long periods of time, it is only then possible for us to view the idea in a brighter light and delineate a whole architectonically according to reason’s purposes. The systems seem, like worms, to have been formed initially mutilatedly and, with time, completely through a *generatio aequivoca* from the mere confluence of collected concepts: even though they all *in toto* had their schemata, as their original germs, in reason: which merely unfolded itself; and therefore not only is each by itself articulated according to an idea, but also all are purposively united with one another within a system of human cognition in turn as elements of a system and allow an architectonic of all human knowledge, which at the present time – since so much material is already collected or can be collected from ruins of collapsed older edifices – is not only possible, but would also not even be difficult. We satisfy ourselves here with the completion of our task, viz. merely to delineate the *architectonic* of all cognition from *pure reason*, and begin only from the point at which the universal root of our cognitive power divides and throws out two stems, one of which is *reason*. I understand by ‘reason’ here, however, the whole higher cognitive-capacity and therefore oppose the rational to the empirical.

If I abstract from all content of cognition, objectively considered: then all cognition is either subjective, historical, or rational. Historical cognition is *cognitio ex datis*, but rational cognition is *cognitio ex principiis*. Whencesoever a cognition may originally be given, it is nevertheless historical in respect of him who possesses it if he cognises only to the degree that and as much as has been given to him elsewhence – whether it be given to him through immediate experience or recounting or even instruction (of universal cognitions). Therefore, someone who has truly *learnt* a system of philosophy (e.g. the *Wolffian* system) – even *if he* had all principles, explanations, and proofs together with the division of the whole doctrinal-edifice in his head and could recall it all easily – still has none other than complete *historical* cognition of the *Wolffian* philosophy; he knows and judges only as much as has been given to him. Deny him a definition, and he does not know whence he shall derive another. He formed himself according to someone else’s reason, but the reproductive capacity is not the generative capacity: i.e. the cognition arose with him not *from* reason; and even though objectively it was admittedly a rational cognition: it is subjectively nevertheless merely historical. He has comprehended and retained well (i.e. learnt) and is a gypsum cast of a living human. Cognitions that are rational-cognitions objectively were (i.e. at the beginning) capable of arising only from a human’s own reason and may then also carry that name subjectively only if they have been extracted from universal sources of reason wherefrom even critique and indeed even rejection of what has been learnt can arise, i.e. from principles.

All rational cognition is either that from concepts or from construction of concepts; the first is called ‘philosophical’, the second ‘mathematical’. I have already treated of the internal difference between those in the first main-component. A cognition can thus be objectively philosophical and yet subjectively historical: like with most students and with all who never see beyond school and remain students their whole lives. It is nevertheless curious, however, that mathematical cognition just as one has learnt it can yet also be regarded subjectively as rational cognition; and such a difference does not occur with it as occurs with philosophical cognition. The cause is because the cognitive-sources from which the teacher alone can extract lie nowhere other than in the essential and genuine principles of reason and can therefore be derived from nowhere else by the student nor, say, disputed by him: and that is because the use of reason here is only *in concreto* though it admittedly nevertheless occurs *apriori*, viz. in light of pure and precisely therefore faultless intuition and excludes all deception and error. Amongst all rational-sciences (*a priori*), one can therefore learn only mathematics alone but never philosophy (except historically); but one can rather at most learn to *philosophise*.

The system of all philosophical cognition is *philosophy*. One must take it objectively if one thereby understands the prototype of the judgement of all attempts to philosophise, which shall serve to judge every subjective philosophy: whose edifice is often so manifold and so alterable. In that way, philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science that is given nowhere *in concreto* but which one seeks to approach on many paths until the sole trail, which is highly overgrown through sensibility, is discovered and the hitherto faulty ectype is successfully rendered identical to the prototype so far as humans are permitted to achieve that. Until then, one cannot learn philosophy; for where is it? Who has it in his possession? And whereby is it cognisable? One can learn only to philosophise, i.e. to exercise the talent of reason in following its universal principles in certain available enquiries yet whilst always retaining reason’s right to investigate those principles themselves in their sources and confirm or reject them.

Until then, however, the concept of philosophy is merely a *scholastic concept*: i.e. a concept of a system of cognition that is sought only as a science without having something more than that knowledge’s systematic unity and therefore the cognition’s *logical* perfection for its purpose. There is also a *cosmic concept* (*conceptus cosmicus*), however, that has always underlain that denomination: especially when one personified that concept, as it were, and represented oneself as a prototype in the ideal of the *philosopher*. In that intention, however, philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to human reason’s essential purposes (*teleologia rationis humanae*): and the philosopher is not an artist of reason, but rather human reason’s legislator. In such a signification, it would be highly vainglorious to call oneself a ‘philosopher’ and to pretend to match the prototype that lies only within the idea.

The mathematician, the natural theorist, and the logician – even as excellently as the first two may have progress in rational cognition *simpliciter* and the third in philosophical cognition in particular – are nevertheless only artists of reason. There is also a teacher in the ideal who employs all these: uses them as tools in order to further human reason’s essential purposes. Him alone must we call ‘the philosopher’; but since he himself is nowhere encountered, although the idea of his legislation is encountered everywhere in each human reason: we will cleave solely to the latter and determine more closely what philosophy, according to this cosmic-concept,[[52]](#footnote-52) prescribes as systematic unity from the standpoint of the purposes.

Essential purposes are therefore still not the supreme purposes, of which (with more perfect systematic unity of reason) there can be only one. Therefore, they are either the final purpose or subaltern purposes that pertain to the first as means. The first purpose is none other than the whole determination of man, and philosophy concerning that determination is called ‘morality’. Because of this priority that moral philosophy has before all other rational acquisition, one understood by the name ‘philosopher’, even with the ancients, always simultaneously and preeminently the moralist; and even the outward semblance of self-control through reason effects that one even now calls someone a ‘philosopher’, according to a certain analogy.

Human reason’s legislation (viz. philosophy) has two objects, viz. nature and freedom, and therefore contains both the natural-law and the moral-law: initially in two discrete systems but ultimately in a single philosophical system. Whereas philosophy of nature addresses everything that *exists*, philosophy of morals addresses only what *should exist*.

All philosophy, however, is either cognition from pure reason or rational-cognition from empirical principles. The first is called ‘pure’ philosophy, the second ‘empirical’ philosophy.

Philosophy of pure reason is either *propædeutic* (preparation), which investigates the capacity of reason in regard to all pure *apriori* cognition and is called *critique*: or secondly the system of pure reason (science), the whole of (both true as well as spurious) philosophical cognition from pure reason in systematic coherence and is called *metaphysics* – although that name can also be given to the whole of pure philosophy with the inclusion of critique in order to summate investigation of everything that can ever be cognised *apriori* with presentation of what constitutes a system of pure philosophical cognitions of that kind: which is distinct from all empirical- but also all mathematical use-of-reason.

Metaphysics divides into that of the *speculative* use of pure reason and that of the *practical* use of pure reason and is therefore either *metaphysics of nature* or *metaphysics of morals*. The former contains all pure rational-principles from mere concepts (therefore with the exclusion of mathematics) of *theoretical* cognition of all things; the latter contains the principles that determine and necessitate *action* and *omission apriori*. Now, morality is the sole legitimacy of actions that can be derived fully *apriori* from principles. Therefore, metaphysics of morals is in fact pure morality, in which no anthropology (i.e. no empirical condition) is underlying. Metaphysics of speculative reason is that which one calls metaphysics in the *narrower sense*; but so far as pure moral-doctrine still nevertheless belongs to the particular stem of human and indeed philosophical cognition from pure reason, we shall preserve that denomination for it, even though we set it aside here as not pertaining to our purpose *now*.

It is of the utmost importance to *isolate* cognitions that differ from others in respect to their genus and origin and to carefully prevent them from commingling into a mixture with others with which they are usually conjoined in use. What chemists do in separating matters and what mathematicians do in their pure doctrine-of-quantity, it far more behoves the philosopher to do in order that he can surely determine the proper value and influence of the share that one particular kind of cognition has in vagrant use of the understanding. Hence, since it began to think or rather reflect, human reason have never done without a metaphysics; but nevertheless, it has never been able to present it sufficiently purified from everything inhomogeneous. The idea of such a science is just as ancient as speculative human-reason; and what reason does not speculate: though it may occur in a scholastic- or popular way? One must nevertheless concede that the distinction between the two elements of our cognition – the first of which are under our control fully *apriori* and the second of which can be taken from experience only *aposteriori* – remains only highly unperspicuous, even with thinkers of renown; and hence, neither the boundary-determination of a particular kind of cognition and nor therefore the genuine idea of a science that has occupied human reason for so long and so much has ever been able to be brought about. If one said ‘metaphysics is the science of the first principles of human cognition’, one did not thereby remark an entirely particular kind but rather merely a rank in regard to universality: whereby metaphysics therefore could not be recognisably distinguished from the empirical; for even amongst empirical principles, some are more universe and therefore higher than others: and in the series of such a subordination (wherein one does not distinguish what is cognised fully *apriori* from what is cognised only *aposteriori*), where shall one make the division that can distinguish the *first* part and the highest elements from the *last* part and the subordinate elements? What would one say if chronology could designate the world’s epochs only in such a way that it divided them into the first centuries and those that follow them? ‘Does the fifth-, the tenth-, etc., century also belong to the first centuries?’, one would ask. Likewise, I ask: does the concept of an *extensum* belong to metaphysics? You answer ‘yes!’. Fine, but also the concept of a body? ‘Yes!’ And that of a liquid body? You become perplexed; for if it progresses thus onwards, then everything will belong to metaphysics. One sees therefrom that the mere degree of subordination (the particular under the universal) cannot determine a limit of a science: but rather in our case, it is the total inhomogeneity and diversity of the origin. But what also obscured the fundamental-idea of metaphysics on another side was that as *apriori* cognition, it exhibited a certain homogeneity with mathematics that admittedly rendered them akin to one another in respect of their *apriori* origin; but in respect of the mode-of-cognition from concepts in metaphysics in comparison with the way of judging merely through construction of *apriori* concepts in mathematics and therefore the difference of a philosophical cognition from mathematical cognition, such a decisive inhomogeneity manifested itself that one admittedly always felt (as it were) but could never bring to perspicuous criteria. It has now thereby occurred that since philosophers themselves failed in the development of the idea of their sciences, that idea’s elaboration could have no determinate purpose and no secure guiding-cord; and they, being ignorant in respect of the path that they would have to take with a delineation made so arbitrarily and always in dispute amongst themselves regarding the discoveries that each wanted to have made on his respective path, brought their science into contempt: initially amongst others and ultimately even amongst themselves.

By virtue of the particular cognitive-capacity wherein it alone can have its seat, all pure *apriori* cognition constitutes a particular unity; and metaphysics is that philosophy which shall present that cognition in that systematic unity. The speculative part of metaphysics, which has appropriated that name predominantly for itself: viz. the metaphysics that we call *metaphysics of nature* and which considers everything so far as it is (not what should be) from *apriori* concepts becomes divided in the following way.

Metaphysics so-called in the narrower sense consists of *transcendental philosophy* and the *physiology* of pure reason. The first contemplates only the *understanding* and reason itself in a system of all concepts and principles that relate to objects *simpliciter* without assuming objects that *would be given* (*ontologia*); the second contemplates *nature*, i.e. the complex of *given* objects (irrespective of whether they are given to the senses or, if one will, to another mode of intuition), and is therefore *physiology* (albeit only *rationalis*). Now, the use of reason in this rational contemplation-of-nature is either physical or hyperphysical or better: either *immanent* or *transcendent*. The first addresses nature so far as its cognition can be applied within experience (*in concreto*); the second addresses the connection of the objects of experience that surpasses all experience. That *transcendent physiology* therefore has either an *internal* connection or an *external* connection: which both go beyond possible experience, however, to its object. The former is physiology of total nature, i.e. *transcendental cognition-of-the-cosmos*. The latter is physiology of the coherence of total nature with a being beyond nature, i.e. transcendental *cognition-of-God*.

Immanent physiology, in contrast, contemplates nature as the complex of all objects of the senses and therefore as it is given to *us*, but only according to *apriori* conditions under which it can be given to us *simpliciter*. There are only two kinds of objects thereof. 1. Those of the external senses and therefore their complex, viz. *bodily nature*. 2. The object of the internal sense, viz. the soul: and, according to the fundamental concepts thereof *simpliciter*, the *thinking nature*. Metaphysics of bodily nature is called *physics*; but because it shall contain only the principles of its *apriori* cognition: *rational physics*. Metaphysics of thinking nature is called *psychology* and from the cause just adduced, here only *rational cognition* thereof is to be understood.

The whole system of metaphysics thus consists of four main-parts. 1. *Ontology*. 2. *rational physiology*. 3. *rational cosmology*. 4. *rational theology*. The second part, viz. the natural doctrine of pure reason, contains two divisions: *physica rationalis[[53]](#footnote-53)* and *psychologia rationalis*.

The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason prescribes that division; it is therefore *architectonic* (according to its essential purposes) and not merely *technical* (according to contingently perceived kinships and conducted at a venture, as it were, but precisely therefore also immutable and legislatory. Yet some points are found therein that arouse doubt and which could weaken conviction of its legitimacy.

Firstly, how can I expect an *apriori* cognition and therefore metaphysics from objects so far as they are given to our senses and therefore *aposteriori*? And how is it possible to cognise the nature of the things, according to *apriori* principles, and to arrive at a *rational* physiology? The answer is: we take from experience nothing more than what is needed for us to *give* an object: partly of the external- and partly of the internal sense. Whereas the former occurs through the mere concept *matter* (i.e. impenetrable lifeless extension), the latter occurs through the concept of a thinking being (in the empirical internal representation ‘I think’). Moreover, in the whole metaphysics of those objects, we would have to totally eschew all empirical principles that might add still some experience to the concept in order to judge something about those objects therefrom. Secondly, where then does *empirical psychology* remain: which has claimed its place in metaphysics since time immemorial and from which one has expected such great things for enlightenment in our times after one abandoned the hope of accomplishing something apt *apriori*? I answer: empirical psychology comes where the genuine (empirical) natural-doctrine must be positioned: viz. on the side of *applied* philosophy, for which pure philosophy contains the *apriori* principles that must therefore admittedly be conjoined but not mixed with the former. Therefore, empirical psychology must be banished from metaphysics entirely and is already totally excluded therefrom through its idea. Nevertheless, according to scholastic usage, one will indeed still always permit it a place therein (albeit merely as an episode) and indeed from economical motive-causes because it is still not so rich that it alone should constitute a study and yet is too important for one to expel it entirely or attach it elsewhere where it might encounter still less kinship than in metaphysics. It is therefore merely a stranger that has so long been adopted and which one has granted a dwelling until it will be able to find its own housing in a thorough anthropology (the pendant to empirical natural-doctrine).

That is therefore the general idea of metaphysics: which, since one initially imputed more to it than can equitably be demanded and delighted oneself for a time with pleasant expectations, it has ultimately fallen into universal contempt because one found oneself betrayed in one’s hope. From the entire course of our critique, one will have been sufficiently convinced that even if metaphysics cannot be the fundament of religion, it must still always remain as its guardian and that human reason – which is already dialectical through its nature’s direction – could never do without such a science that reins it in and, through a scientific and fully lucid self-cognition, averts devastation that a lawless speculative reason would otherwise wreak in morality as well as religion. One can therefore be sure that, even as aloofly or disdainfully as those who know to judge a science not according to its nature but rather solely from its contingent effects may act, one will always return to metaphysics as to a beloved who has been estranged from us because reason – since it here concerns essential purposes – must labour restlessly upon either profound insight or destruction of already available good insights.

Metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals – primarily the critique of a reason that ventures upon its own wings, which *preparatorily* (propaedeutically) precedes – in fact therefore alone constitutes what we can call ‘philosophy’ in the genuine sense. Philosophy relates everything to wisdom, but via the path of science: the sole path that, once it is laid, never decays and permits no errors. Mathematics, natural science, and even empirical knowledge of man have a high value as means: in the greatest part for contingent-, though ultimately indeed to necessary and essential purposes of humanity but then only through mediation of a rational-cognition from mere concepts that – however one may wish to name it – is in fact nothing other than metaphysics.

Precisely because of that, metaphysics is also the consummation of all *culture* of human reason, which is indispensable even if one sets aside its influence (*qua* science) upon certain determinate purposes. For it contemplates reason in respect of its elements and highest maxims, which must underlie even the *possibility* of some sciences and the *use* of all. That metaphysics, as mere speculation, serves more to prevent errors than to expand cognition does not detract from its value but rather gives it dignity and authority through the censorial office that secures the universal order and concord and indeed the prosperity of the scientific commoners and prevents their valiant and fruitful labours from not distancing themselves from the main purpose: namely, universal beatitude.

**2.2.4. Fourth Main-Component of the Transcendental Methodology: The History of Pure Reason**

This title stands here only in order to designate a position that remains left over within the system and must be filled subsequently. I satisfy myself, from a merely transcendental viewpoint (viz. the nature of pure reason), with casting a fleeting glance upon the whole of the previous labours that admittedly represented edifices to my eye, though only in ruins.

It is remarkable enough – even if it naturally could not have occurred otherwise – that in philosophy’s infancy, humans began where we would now prefer to end: viz. by first studying cognition of God and hope or indeed even the constitution of another world. Even though what still remained of the ancient customs from the rough state of the peoples might have been introduced as gross religious-concepts, that still did not prevent the more enlightened part from dedicating free investigations to that object; and one easily discerned that there could be no more profound and more reliable way of appealing to the invisible power that rules the world than the good way of life, in order to at least be happy in another world. Hence, theology and morality were the two impetuses or, better, points-of-relation for all abstract rational-researches to which one has always thereafter dedicated oneself. The first was nevertheless truly that which drew merely speculative reason little-by-little into the task that has subsequently become so famous under the name of ‘metaphysics’.

I shall not now distinguish the times at which this or that alteration of metaphysics occurred, but shall rather merely present the diversity of the idea that incited the principal revolutions in a cursory summary. And there I find a threefold intention in which the most notable alterations on this stage of dispute were instituted.

1. *In regard to the object* of all our rational-cognitions, some were merely *sensual*- and others merely *intellectual philosophers*. *Epicurus* can be called the most preeminent philosopher of sensibility and *Plato* the most preeminent philosopher of the intellectual. This difference of the schools, even as subtle as it is, had already begun in the earliest times and has long maintained itself uninterruptedly. Those of the first school asserted that there is actuality only in the objects of the senses and that everything else is imagination; those of the other school said, by contrast, that there is nothing but semblance in the senses and that only the understanding cognises what is true. Yet the first did not therefore exactly deny reality to the intellectual concepts; but whereas with them their reality was merely *logical*, with the others it was *mystical*. The former admitted *intellectual concepts* but assumed merely sensible *objects*. The latter demanded that the true objects were merely *intelligible* and posited an *intuition* through the pure understanding: which was accompanied by no senses and, in their opinion, merely confused.

2. *In regard to the origin* of pure reason, whether they have derived from experience or, independently of it, have their source in reason. *Aristotle* can be regarded as the head of the *empiricists* and *Plato* as the head of the *noologists*. *Locke*, who in recent times follow the latter, and *Leibniz*, who followed the latter (albeit at a sufficient distance from his mystical system), have still nevertheless be unable to bring that dispute to a decision. At least *Epicurus*, for his part, proceeded more consistently according to his sensory system (for he never went beyond the limit of experience with his inferences) than Aristotle and Locke (though especially more consistently than the latter): who, after he had derived all concepts and principles from experience, went so far in their use that he asserted that one could demonstrate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul (although both objects lie entirely beyond the limits of possible experience) just as evidently as any mathematical theorem.

3. *In regard to method*. If one shall mention method, then it must be a procedure according to *principles*. Now, one can divide the method now prevailing in this discipline of natural-research into *naturalistic*-and *scientistic* method. The *naturalist* of pure reason takes for himself as a principle that through common reason (which he calls ‘healthy reason’), more can be accomplished in regard to the sublimest questions that constitute the problem of metaphysics than through speculation. He therefore asserts that one can determine the size and distance of the Moon more surely by eye than through mathematical detours. It is mere misology brought to principles and, what is most absurd, the neglect of all artificial means lauded as a *distinct method* of expanding one’s cognition. For in respect to what concerns the naturalists from *lack* of greater insight, one cannot groundedly accuse them of anything. They follow common reason without boasting of their ignorance as a method that shall contain the secret to retrieving the truth from Democritus’s deep well. *Quod sapio, satis est mihi*; *non ego curo*, *esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones* (Perseus) is their motto, with which they can live contentedly and admirably without concerning themselves with science or confusing its task.

In respect to what concerns the observers of a *scientific* method, they here have the choice of either proceeding *dogmatically* or *sceptically* but in all cases nevertheless have the obligation to proceed *systematically*. If I here mention the famous *Wolff* in regard to the first and *David Hume* in respect to the second, then I can leave the others unnamed: in accordance with my current intention. The *critical* path alone is still open. If the reader has had the grace and patience to divagate in my company, then he may now judge whether – if it appeals to him to make his own contribution in order to turn this trail into a military road – what many centuries could not accomplish may still be achieved before the end of the present century: viz. to bring human reason to full satisfaction in what has always occupied its curiosity, albeit only vainly hitherto.

1. Now and again, one hears complaints about the shallowness of our time’s way-of-thinking and the decay of profound science. Only I do not see that those sciences whose ground is well-laid – such as mathematics, doctrine-of-nature, etc. – deserve that reproach in the slightest, but rather claim the old glory of profundity: and the latter science even exceeds it. Exactly the same spirit would also prove itself efficacious in other kinds of cognition if only the correction of their principles were first provided for. In the absence of such correction, indifference and doubt and ultimately rigorous critique are instead *proofs* of a profound way-of-thinking. Our age is the true age of critique, to which everything must subject itself. *Religion* (through its *holiness*) and *legislation* (through its *majesty*) commonly wish to withdraw themselves from critique. But then they arouse just [*gerechten*] suspicion against themselves and cannot lay claim to unfeigned respect, which reason accords only to that which has been able to abide its free and public examination. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. If it had occurred to one of the ancients even to merely raise this question, then the question alone would have powerfully resisted all systems of pure reason up to our time and would have spared so many idle enquiries that were undertaken without one knowing what one was truly dealing with. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Only the Germans now avail themselves of the word ‘aesthetic’ in order to thereby designate that which others call ‘critique of taste’. A failed hope underlies this (which the excellent analyst *Baumgarten* formulated) of bringing critical judgement of the beautiful under principles of reason and of elevating its rules into a science. Only that endeavour is futile. For the aforesaid rules or criteria are merely empirical in respect of their sources and therefore can never serve as *apriori* laws with which our judgements of taste would have to comply. Instead, the latter constitute the true touchstone of the former’s correctness. For that reason, it is advisable to allow that denomination to fade away again and to reserve it for the doctrine that is true science: whereby one would also tread closer to the language and sense of the ancients, for whom the division of cognition into αισθητά καί νοητά [sc. aesthetic and noetic] was very famous. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. I can admittedly say ‘my representations follow one another’; but that means only that we are conscious of them as within a time-sequence, i.e. conscious of them according to the form of the internal sense. Time is therefore not something *per se*, nor is it a determination attaching to things objectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Just as if thought were a function of the *understanding* in the first case, of the *judging power* in the second case, and of *reason* in the third case – a remark that expects its enlightenment only in what follows. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. One should well heed this proposition, which is of great importance. All representations have a necessary relation to a *possible* empirical consciousness: for if they did not have such a relation and were it wholly impossible to become conscious of them, then that would be tantamount to saying that they do not exist at all. All empirical consciousness, however, has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness (i.e. a consciousness preceding all particular experience), viz. my consciousness of myself: which is the original apperception. It is therefore absolutely necessary that in my cognition, all consciousness belongs to one consciousness (of myself). Here there is a synthetic unity of the manifold (i.e. of consciousness) that is cognised *apriori* and which precisely thus yields the ground for synthetic *apriori* propositions pertaining to pure thought, just as space and time yield the ground for synthetic *apriori* propositions that concern the form of mere intuition. The synthetic principle that every diverse *empirical consciousness* must be conjoined within a single self-consciousness is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought *simpliciter*. It is not to be left unheeded, however, that the mere representation ‘I’ in relation to all others (whose collective unity it renders possible) is the transcendental consciousness. Whether that representation is clear (e.g. empirical consciousness) or not is not important here, nor is indeed even its actuality; but rather the possibility of the logical form of all cognition necessarily rests upon the relationship to that apperception *as a capacity*. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. No psychologist has yet considered that the imaginal power is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. That is the case partly because one restricted that capacity only to reproductions and partly because one believed that the senses not only deliver impressions to us but also compose them and bring forth images of objects: for which, without doubt, something more besides a receptivity to impressions is also required, viz. a function of their synthesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. A lack of judging power is in fact what one calls ‘stupidity’, and such an infirmity cannot be remedied at all. A dull or restricted mind that lacks nothing but an appropriate degree of understanding and his own intellectual concepts can very well be equipped through learning, even to the point of scholarliness. But since he then commonly tends to also lack judging power (cf. the *secunda Petri*), it is not uncommon to encounter highly-scholarly men who often allow that lack (which can never be ameliorated) to be viewed in their use of their science. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. One might well remark that I speak not of the alteration of certain relations *simpliciter*, but rather of alteration of the state. Therefore: if a body moves uniformly, then it does not alter its state (i.e. the movement) at all; but it indeed does so if its movement increases or decreases. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The unity of the cosmic whole in which all appearances shall be connected is manifestly a mere consequence of the secretly assumed principle of the community of all substances that are simultaneous. For if they were isolated, then they would not constitute a whole as parts; and if their connection (i.e. interaction of the manifold) were not already necessary due to their simultaneity, then one could not infer from the latter (which is a merely ideal relationship) to the former (which is a real relationship). Nevertheless, we have shown at its location that community is in fact the ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of coexistence and that one may therefore in fact only infer back from the latter to the former as its condition. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Through the actuality* of a thing, I admittedly posit more than possibility but not *in the thing*; for the thing can never contain more in actuality than what was contained within its complete possibility. But rather, since possibility was merely a position of a thing in relation to the understanding (i.e. its empirical use), actuality is simultaneously a connection of the thing to perception. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. I understand here the real definition: which does not merely substitute different and more intelligible words for the names of an item, but which rather contains within it a clear *mark* whereby the *object* (i.e. *definitum*) can always be surely cognised and which renders the explained concept usable for application. A real explanation would therefore be one that does not merely render a concept perspicuous but also simultaneously renders the *objective reality* of that concept perspicuous. Mathematical explanations that present the object in intuition according to the concept are of the latter kind. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. If one here wished to avail oneself of the usual excuse that at least *realitates noumena* cannot act contrarily to one another, then one would still have to adduce an example of such pure and non-sensory reality in order that one understood whether such a reality represents something at all or absolutely nothing. But no example can be taken from anywhere other than experience, which never offers more than phenomena; and so, that principle signifies nothing more than that a concept that contains merely affirmations contains nothing negative – a principle that we have never doubted. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Sensibility taken as a basis for the understanding, as the object to which the latter applies its function, is the source of real cognitions. Yet the very same sensibility is the ground of error so far as it influences the understanding’s action itself and determines the understanding for judgement. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. He also admittedly extended his concept to speculative cognitions, if they were only pure and fully *apriori*, and even to mathematics: even though mathematics has its object nowhere other than in possible experience. I cannot follow him therein, no more than in the mystical deduction of those ideas or the exaggerations whereby he hypostasises them (as it were): although the lofty language of which he avails himself in that field very well admits of a milder interpretation that is more congruous with the nature of things. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The reader, who will not so easily divine the psychological sense of these expressions in their transcendental abstractness and why the last attribute of the soul pertains to the category of *existence*, will find them sufficiently explained and justified in what follows. Moreover: in respect to the Latin expressions that have slipped-in in place of the synonymous German expressions contrarily to the taste of good writing-style, I have to say for exculpation – in respect to this section as well as the whole work – that I have preferred to detract somewhat from the delicacy of the language rather than encumber the work’s scholastic use through even the slightest unintelligibility. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. It is very easy to clothe this proof in the customary scholastically-correct precision. Only it is already sufficient for my purpose to display the mere probative-ground in a perhaps popular way. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. An elastic sphere that strikes an equal elastic-sphere in a straight direction imparts its entire motion and therefore its entire state (if one looks merely to the positions in space) to the latter sphere. Now, if you assume substances by analogy with such bodies, each of which instills representations in another together with their consciousness: then a whole series of them can be thought of, the first of which imparts its state together with its consciousness to the second; and the second imparts its own state together with that of the previous substance to the third; and the third likewise imparts the states of all previous substances together with its own and their consciousness. The last substance would therefore be conscious of all states of the substances altered before it as its own because they together with the consciousness in them have been transferred into it; and despite that, it would not have been the very same person in all those states. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. One must well remark this paradoxical yet correct principle: viz. that in space, there is nothing other than what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing other than representation; consequently, what is in it must be contained within representation: and absolutely nothing is in space, except so far as it is actually represented in it. A principle that must admittedly sound strange (viz. that an item can exist only within the representation of it) but which loses its offensiveness because the items with which we are dealing here are not things *per se* but rather merely appearances (i.e. representations). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. I cannot yet show how the simple in turn corresponds to the category of reality here but will rather show it in the following main component on occasion of another rational use of the very same concept. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The absolute whole of the series of the conditions for a given *conditionatum* is always unconditioned because there are no more conditions outside that series in respect of which it could be conditioned. Only that absolute whole of such a series is merely an idea or rather a problematic concept whose possibility must be investigated and indeed in relation to the way wherein the *inconditionatum* – as the genuine transcendental idea that is at issue – may be contained therein. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Taken adjectivally (i.e. formally), ‘nature’ signifies the coherence of a thing’s determinations according to an internal principle of causality. In contrast: by ‘nature’ taken substantively (i.e. materially), one understands the complex of the appearances so far as they thoroughgoingly cohere by means of an internal principle of causality. In the first sense, one speaks of the nature of liquid matter, of fire, etc. and avails oneself of that word only adjectivally. In contrast: when one speaks of the things of nature, one has a subsistent whole in mind. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The antinomies follow one another according to the order of the transcendental ideas adduced above. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. We can intuit an indeterminate quantum as a whole if it is enclosed within limits without needing to construct its totality through measurement, i.e. successive synthesis of its parts. For the limits already determine the quantum’s completeness by excluding everything else. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. In this case, the concept of totality is nothing other than the representation of completed synthesis of its parts because, since we cannot extract the concept from intuition of the whole (which in this case is impossible), we can conceive it only through synthesis of the parts until the *infinitum*’s completion: at least in the idea. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Space is merely the form of external intuition (i.e. formal intuition) but not an actual object that can be intuited externally. Prior to all things that determine it (i.e. fill or delimit it) or which rather give an empirical intuition accordant with its form, space (under the name of ‘absolute space’) is nothing other than the mere possibility of external appearances so far as they either exist *per se* or can still accrue to given appearances. Empirical intuition is not therefore composed of appearances and space (i.e. perception and empty intuition). One is not the correlate of the other’s synthesis, but rather they are only conjoined within one and the same empirical intuition as its matter and form. If one wishes to posit one of those two components externally to the other (e.g. space outside all appearances), then all manner of empty determinations of external intuition arise therefrom that are nevertheless not possible perceptions: e.g. the world’s movement or rest in infinite empty space – a determination of their relationship to one another that can never be perceived and which is also therefore the predicate of a mere cogitational-thing. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The quantum thereby contains a multitude (of a given unity) that is greater than all number, which is the mathematical concept of the infinite. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. One easily remarks that it shall thereby be said that empty space so far as it is delimited through appearances and therefore empty space inside the world at least does not contradict the transcendental principles and can therefore be admitted in respect to them (even though its possibility is not immediately asserted). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. As a formal condition of the possibility of all alterations, time admittedly precedes that possibility; only subjectively and in the actuality of consciousness, that representation is nevertheless – just like every other representation – given only through incitement of perceptions. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The word ‘begin’ is taken in a twofold signification. The first is active: where a cause begins (*infit*) a series of states, which is its effect. The second is passive: where the causality in the cause itself starts (*fit*). I here infer from the former signification to the latter. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. There is still, nevertheless, the question of whether Epicurus ever presented those principles as objective assertions. If they were perhaps nothing more than maxims of reason’s speculative use, then he therein showed a more genuine philosophical spirit than any of the sages of antiquity. The following principles: that one must go to work in explaining appearances only as though the field of investigation were not cut off through a limit or beginning of the world; to assume the material of the world as it must be if we wish to be instructed about it through experience; that no generation of occurrences is to be used except how they become determined through unalterable natural-laws; and finally that no cause distinct from the world must be used are even now very correct but little observed principles to expand speculative philosophy as well as also to find the principles of morality independently of foreign sources-of-aid without someone who demands that we ignore those dogmatic principles so long as we are occupied with mere speculation consequently needing to be accused of wishing to deny them. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. One can admittedly give no answer to the question of what manner of constitution a transcendental object has (i.e. what it is) except indeed that the question itself is nothing because no object thereof has been given. Therefore, all questions of transcendental doctrine-of-the-soul are also answerable and actually answered; for they concern the transcendental subject of all internal appearances, which is not itself an appearance and which therefore is not given as an object and to which none of the categories (which the question indeed truly concerns) encounter conditions of their application. Therefore, here is the case wherein the common expression holds that no answer is also an answer – i.e. that a question concerning the constitution of that something that cannot be thought about through a determinate predicate – is totally null and empty because it is posited totally outside the sphere of objects that can be given to us. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. That cosmic series can therefore also be neither greater nor smaller than the possible empirical *regressus* upon which alone its concept rests. And since that concept can give nothing determinately infinite nor equally, however, something determinately-finite (i.e. something limited absolutely): it is clear therefrom that we can neither assume the cosmos’s magnitude to be finite nor assume it to be infinite because the *regressus* (whereby it becomes represented) permits neither of those. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. One will remark that the proof here has been conducted in an entirely different way than the dogmatic proof above in the first antinomy’s antithesis. There, in accordance with the common and dogmatic way of representing it, we had to accept the sensible cosmos as being a thing that was given *per se* in its totality prior to all *regressus* and had denied it a determinate position within time and space altogether if it did not occupy all time and all spaces. Hence, the inference was also different than here: namely, the sensible cosmos’s actual infinitude was inferred. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. For the understanding allows no condition *amongst appearances* that would itself be empirically unconditioned. Yet if an *intelligible* condition that therefore does not concomitantly belong to the series of the appearances as an element could be thought of as a *conditionatum* (within appearance) yet without thereby abrupting the series of empirical conditions in the slightest, then such a condition could be permitted as *empirically unconditioned* in such a way that no abruption thereby occurred within the continuous empirical *regressus*. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The genuine morality of actions (i.e. desert and blame) – even that of our own behaviour – therefore remains totally concealed from us. Our imputations can be related only to the empirical character. But how much thereof is the pure effect of freedom and how much is to be ascribed to mere nature and the blameless fault of temperament or of its fortuitous constitution (*merito fortunae*), no one can fathom; and nor therefore can anyone comply with full justice. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Through that principle, every thing therefore becomes related to a common correlate (viz. total possibility): which, if it (i.e. the material for all possible predicates) were encountered within the idea of a single thing, would demonstrate an affinity of everything possible through the identity of the ground of its thoroughgoing determination. Whereas *determinability* of every *concept* is subordinate to the **universality** (*universalitas*) of the principle of the exclusion of a mediator between two opposed predicates, the *determination* of a *thing* is subordinate to **allness**(*universitas*) or the complex of all possible predicates. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The observations and calculations of the astronomers have taught us much that is worthy of wonder; but most importantly, they have uncovered for us the abyss of *ignorance* that human reason would never have been capable of conceiving to be so great without that knowledge and in light of which, reflection must bring forth a great alteration in determination of our reason’s final intentions. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Therefore, that ideal of the most real being – although it is admittedly a mere representation – is firstly *realised* (i.e. turned into an object), thereupon *hypostasised*, and finally – through a natural progression of reason to the unity’s completion – even *personified* (as we will soon say) because the regulative unity of experience rests not upon the appearances themselves (of sensibility alone) but rather upon the connection of sensibility’s manifold through the *understanding* (within an apperception) and consequently because the unity of the supreme reality and the thoroughgoing determinability (i.e. possibility) of all things seem to lie within a supreme understanding and consequently within an *intelligence*. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. A concept is always possible if it does not contradict itself. That is the logical mark of possibility, and the concept’s object is thereby distinguished from *nihil negativum*. Only it can nevertheless be an empty concept if the objective reality of the synthesis whereby the concept becomes generated is not demonstrated particularly: which, however, (as was shown above) always rests upon principles of possible experience and not upon the principle of analysis (i.e. the principle of contradiction). That is a warning to not immediately infer from the possibility of concepts (i.e. logical possibility) to the possibility of things (i.e. real possibility). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. This inference too familiar for it to be necessary to present it extensively here. It rests upon the purportedly transcendental natural-law of causality, viz. that everything *contingent* has its cause: which, if it is in turn contingent, must likewise have a cause until the series must end with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it would have no completeness. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Not theological morality; for that contains moral laws that *presuppose* the existence of a supreme cosmic-governor: whereas, by contrast, moral theology is a conviction of the existence of a supreme being that is grounded upon moral laws. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. The advantage that a spherical shape of the Earth creates is familiar enough; but few know that its flattening alone, as a spheroid, prevents the projection of the fixed land or even of smaller mountains that are perhaps thrown up through earthquakes from continuously and, in a not exactly long time, considerably displacing the Earth’s axis were the protuberance of the Earth below the equator not such a enormous mountain that the impulse of every other mountain can never noticeably shift from its position in respect to the axis. And yet, without thinking, one explains this wise ordinance from the equilibrium of the Earth’s once liquid mass. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. The ancient dialecticians thus named a fallacious inference that read as follows: if your fate brings with it that you should recover from this illness, then it will occur whether you may use a doctor or not. Cicero says that this way of inferring has its name from the fact that if one follows it, no use of reason whatsoever remains in life. That is the cause why I have bestowed the same name upon the sophistical argument of pure reason. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. What I have already said previously concerning the psychological idea and its genuine determination as a principle for the merely regulative use of reason relieves me of the farreachingness of also particularly expounding the transcendental illusion according to which that systematic unity of all multiplicity of the internal sense becomes represented. The procedure here is similar to that which the critique observed in regard to the theological ideal. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. I well know that in scholastic language, one tends to use the name of ‘discipline’ interchangeably with that of ‘instruction’. Only there are, by contrast, so many other cases wherein the first term, as *Zucht* [sc. rearing], is carefully distinguished from the second, as *Belehrung* [sc. instruction]; and the nature of the things also itself demands to conserve the only fitting terms for this difference in such a way that I wish that one would never allow that word to be used in any signification other than a negative one. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. By means of the concept of a cause, I actually pass out of the empirical concept of an occurrence (where something occurs) but not to the intuition that presents the concept of a cause *in concreto* but rather to the temporal-conditions *simpliciter* that might be found to be accordant with the concept of a cause within experience. I therefore proceed merely according to concepts and cannot proceed through construction of concepts because a concept is a rule of synthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intuitions and which therefore cannot be *given apriori*. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. *Thoroughness* signifies the clarity and sufficiency of the characteristics; *limits* signifies the precision that there can be no more of them than belong to the thorough concept; *original*, however, signifies that that determination of limits is not derived from somewhence and therefore still needs a proof, which would render the purported explanation incapable of standing at the pinnacle of all judgements about an object. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Philosophy teems with faulty definitions, predominantly such that indeed actually contain elements for definition but still not completely. If one would rather not begin to deal with a concept at all until one had defined it, then all philosophising would stand in a rather dire situation. Yet since, as far as the elements (of dissection) reach, a good and secure use is to be made thereof, even deficient definitions (i.e. propositions that are in fact not yet definitions but nevertheless true and therefore approximations to them) can be used highly beneficially. Whereas definitions belong in mathematics *ad esse*, they belong in philosophy *ad melius* *esse*. It is fine but often very difficult to arrive at them. Jurists still seek a definition for their concept of *right*. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. All practical concepts pertain to objects of pleasure or displeasure (i.e. desire or aversion) and therefore, at least indirectly, to objects of our feeling. Since feeling is not a power to represent things but rather lies outside the entire cognitive power, the elements of our judgements – so far as they relate to desire or aversion and therefore to the practical – do not belong within the complex of transcendental philosophy, which deals merely with pure *apriori* cognitions. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Human reason (and I believe it necessarily occurs with every rational being) takes a natural interest in morality even *if* that interest is not undivided and practically preponderant. Cement and augment that interest, and you will find reason highly docile and even more enlightened in order to also reconcile the speculative- with the practical interest. If you do not ensure that you first make at least halfway good humans, then nor will you ever make even uprightly faithful humans from them! [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *Cosmic concept* here means a concept that concerns what necessarily interests everyone; I therefore determine a science’s intention according to *scholastic concepts*, when it is regarded merely as one of the skills for certain arbitrary purposes. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. One should not indeed think that I thereby understand what one commonly calls *physica generalis* and which is more mathematics than philosophy of nature. For metaphysics of nature abstracts itself totally from mathematics and also has by no means as many expansive insights to offer as mathematics but is nevertheless highly important in regard to critique of pure intellectual-cognition *simpliciter* applied to nature; in its absence, even mathematicians – because they adhere to certain common concepts that are in fact indeed metaphysical concepts – have burdened natural doctrine with hypotheses unnoticedly that vanish with a critique of those principles without thereby disrupting the use of mathematics in that field in the slightest (which is entirely indispensable). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)